Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 17 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Guatemala’s Role in Taiwan’s Diplomatc Strategy in Central American I-wei Jennifer Chang Propaganda Drives “Massive” PLA Exercises in the Taiwan Strait J. Michael Cole Knock-on Efects of Acceleratng Demographic Changes in Taiwan Michael Mazza Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a bi-weekly publicaton released ev- By: Russell Hsiao ery other Wednesday and provides insight into the latest news on Russell Hsiao is the executve director of the Global Taiwan Insttute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the Taiwan. Global Taiwan Brief. Editor-in-Chief Democratc Party’s Platorm Omits “One-China Policy” in Reference to Taiwan Russell Hsiao Staf Editor In a sign of the changing politcal winds in Washington, DC, the Democratc Party’s 2020 Katherine Schultz platorm made a not so subtle and signifcant adjustment in the party’s policy towards Copy Editor Marshall Reid Taiwan—bringing it more into alignment with the Republican Party’s positon on the is- land-democracy. A party platorm encapsulates the view of mainstream members of the The views and opinions expressed party’s principles, goals, and positons on domestc and foreign afairs. In the paragraph in these artcles are those of the authors and do not necessarily underscoring the “China challenge” facing the United States, the Democratc Party’s 2020 refect the ofcial policy or positon platorm, adopted on August 18, states: of the Global Taiwan Insttute. “Democrats believe the China challenge is not primarily a military one, but we will To view web sources cited in the deter and respond to aggression. We will underscore our global commitment to free- published papers (underlined in printed text), visit dom of navigaton and resist the Chinese military’s intmidaton in the South China htp://globaltaiwan.org/2020/08/ Sea. Democrats are commited to the Taiwan Relatons Act and will contnue to sup- vol-5-issue-17/ port a peaceful resoluton of cross-Strait issues consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.” Global Taiwan Insttute 1836 Jeferson Place NW, For the frst tme since 1996—at the height of cross-Strait tension during the 1995-96 Third Washington DC 20036 [email protected] Taiwan Strait Crisis—the Democratc Party conspicuously omited reference to a “One-Chi- na Policy” in reference to Taiwan in its party platorm. Indeed, in all the platorms adopted To subscribe, visit between 1996 and 2016 (2012, 2008, 2004, 2000), the party’s platorm included reference htp://globaltaiwan.org/sub- scribe/. to a “One-China Policy” in sectons referring to its approach to China and Taiwan. For ex- ample, the 2016 platorm stated: © 2020 · Global Taiwan Insttute “We are commited to a “One China” policy and the Taiwan Relatons Act and will contnue to support a peaceful resoluton of Cross-Strait issues that is consistent with Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 2 the wishes and best interests of the people of Tai- from the party’s platorm could also result in some wan.” politcal costs for the elected president. This is espe- cially true in the case of Taiwan policy, as the prevail- As noted earlier, this shif in the Democratc Party’s ing views of both major politcal partes seem to align platorm brings it more in line with mainstream Re- on the issue. As noted earlier, the platorms do refect publican views on Taiwan policy. As the Republican broader sentments within the party towards these is- Party’s 2020 platorm—which is identcal to the 2016 sues. It is worth notng how, afer being elected into of- platorm—states: fce in 2000, then-President George W. Bush said that “We salute the people of Taiwan, with whom we the United States would do “whatever it took to help share the values of democracy, human rights, a Taiwan defend herself” in the event of atack by China. free market economy, and the rule of law. Our This was very much in line with the strong language relatons will contnue to be based upon the pro- used in the 2000 Republican Party platorm. visions of the Taiwan Relatons Act, and we af- These changes to the party’s platorm do not occur in frm the Six Assurances given to Taiwan in 1982 isolaton; indeed, they also seem refectve of deeper by President Reagan.” changes in American society, which have been accel- Like the Democratc Party’s 2020 platorm, there was no erated by the COVID-19 crisis. While the change in the menton of a “One-China Policy.” The closest a Repub- party’s platorm may only refect a certain segment lican Party platorm has come to implying a “One-Chi- of the broader populaton, the shif is also consistent na Policy” was in its 2004 platorm, which stated: “The with a deeper souring of American attudes toward United States government’s policy is that there is one China. In an April 2020 survey of public attudes in the China, as refected in the Three Communiqués and the United States toward China conducted by the Pew Re- Taiwan Relatons Act.” On the contrary, in perhaps the search Center, the number of people with unfavorable strongest language adopted by the Republican Party, views toward China reached a new high of 66 percent, the 2000 platorm stated: “If China violates these prin- increasing six points from 60 percent just the year ciples and atacks Taiwan, then the United States will before. This marks the second consecutve year of in- respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan creases in the percentage of people who see China as Relatons Act. America will help Taiwan defend itself.” unfavorable, rising from 47 percent in 2018. Simulta- neously, the proporton of those with favorable views While party platorms are largely symbolic and of China dropped from 38 percent in 2018 to 26 per- non-binding for whoever is elected to hold the top ex- cent in 2020. ecutve ofce in the world’s most powerful democracy, they nevertheless infuence the framing of the issues To be fair, the US “One-China Policy” is not codifed in that are addressed during presidental debates. Al- law, nor has it ever been clearly defned. Furthermore, though foreign policy is generally not a priority issue in it wouldn’t be precisely clear what it would mean in most presidental electons, the focus on Russian inter- terms of both the substance and conduct of US infor- ference over the past four years, the ongoing US-China mal relatons with Taiwan if an administraton were to trade war, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic dispense with a “One-China Policy” while stll main- could all help to positon China policy as an issue in taining the Taiwan Relatons Act (TRA)—which legally the natonal dialogue. In turn, this could—and perhaps governs relatons with Taiwan in the absence of diplo- should—make Taiwan policy a mater of presidental matc recogniton. debate. As the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal It is perhaps worth remembering how then-Presi- argued: “The candidates should be pressed to explain dent-elect Donald Trump strred a hornet’s nest in De- their views on Taiwan beyond plattudes about warm cember 2016 when he stated: “I don’t know why we feelings. The island is at the center of a great-power [the United States] have to be bound by a ‘One-China rivalry, and voters deserve to hear how the next presi- Policy’ unless we make a deal with China having to do dent would handle it.” with other things, including trade.” Similar to reactons Despite its non-binding functon, a radical departure to the president-elect’s brief phone conversaton with Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 17 3 the democratcally elected president of Taiwan, most Former Senior US Natonal Security Ofcials Imagine responses to this statement ranged from fear, to dis- a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan in 2021 belief, to contempt. Some observers were shocked As the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chi- that President Trump had the audacity to queston the nese Communist Party (CCP) approaches in July 2021, seemingly sacrosanct “One-China Policy.” a cautonary tale penned by two former top American This is to say that, in spite of the Democratc Party’s intelligence and defense ofcials has re-ignited an on- subtle but signifcant adjustment of its policy towards going debate among Taiwan watchers about the possi- Taiwan, this does not mean that the Democratc pres- ble tmeline for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In a think idental nominee, Joseph Biden, would discard the piece for the US Naval Insttute imagining a hypothet- “One-China Policy” if he were to win the presidency. cal confict scenario ttled “The War that Never Was?”, Indeed, such an event is very unlikely. And, to be clear, former Actng Director of the Central Intelligence Agen- President Donald Trump, a Republican, did not discard cy (CIA) Michael Morell and former Vice-Chairman of the “One-China Policy,” even afer winning the presi- the Joint Chiefs of Staf Admiral (ret.) James Winnefeld dency running on a pro-Taiwan Republican platorm. imagined how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that could take place as early as in January 2021 could unfold. While hyper-partsanship contnues to consume the broader policy ecosystem in the United States, Tai- Morrell and Winnefeld envision a Chinese invasion of wan policy remains a bright spot, allowing for a strong Taiwan that exploits the distracton caused by the tur- demonstraton of bipartsanship.