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Fortnightly Review Are DPP and KMT Views of China Converging?

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Fortnightly Review Are DPP and KMT Views of China Converging? Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 20 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 20 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Are DPP and KMT Views of China Converging? David G. Brown Taiwan and France Expand Relations in the Covid-19 Era I-wei Jennifer Chang How China Could Decide Not to Invade Taiwan Michael Mazza Repelling a Chinese Invasion: The Critical Role of Taiwan’s Ground Forces Charlemagne McHaffie Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the vides insight into the latest news Global Taiwan Brief. on Taiwan. President Tsai Calls for Dialogue with Beijing in 109th National Day Speech Editor-in-Chief Russell Hsiao Even as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) provocativelyramps up activities in and around Staff Editor the Taiwan Strait and concerns over a possible limited conflict mount, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英 Katherine Schultz 文), president of the Republic of China (Taiwan), used the firstNational Day speech of her Copy Editor second term to call on Beijing to engage in dialogue with Taipei on the basis of “mutual Marshall Reid respect, goodwill, and understanding.” Like previous National Day speeches, which past The views and opinions expressed presidents of the ROC would use to contextualize and present their cross-Strait policy, this in these articles are those of the year’s speech delivered an overview of the administration’s approach to China. However, authors and do not necessarily re- it undeniably stood out—not because it signaled a major policy change—but because it flect the official policy or position was seemingly calibrated to carefully signal President Tsai’s even-keeled policy, especially of the Global Taiwan Institute. against the backdrop of Beijing’s intensifying pressure campaign against the island-democ- racy. To the casual observer, Tsai’s speech may seem to simply rehash recurring themes To view web sources cited in the from her previous speeches. However, when the current policy context is taken into con- published papers (underlined in printed text), visit http://global- sideration, the subtle yet meaningful signals from President Tsai’s address snap into view. taiwan.org/2020/10/vol-5-is- National Day (國慶日) in Taiwan—also known as Double Ten Day (雙十節)—commemo- sue-20/. rates the start of the Wuchang Uprising (武昌起義) in 1911, which led to the Xinhai Rev- Global Taiwan Institute olution 辛亥革命( ) that deposed the Qing Dynasty and resulted in the establishment of 1836 Jefferson Place NW, the Republic of China (ROC). Reflecting on this momentous occasion in the 109th National Washington DC 20036 Speech, President Tsai stated: [email protected] “In addressing cross-Strait relations, we will not act rashly, and will uphold our prin- To subscribe, visit ciples. Maintaining stability in cross-Strait relations is in the best interests of both http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- sides. We are committed to upholding cross-Strait stability, but this is not something scribe/. Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 20 2 Taiwan can shoulder alone; it is the joint respon- fare of people on both sides.” While Beijing continued sibility of both sides.” to doggedly refuse Tsai’s overtures and insisted that dialogue be based solely on the basis of the so-called “At this stage, the most pressing cross-Strait is- “1992 Consensus,” Tsai used her 2017 speech to im- sue is to discuss how we can live in peace and plore Beijing authorities to consider “new modes” of coexist based on mutual respect, goodwill, and cross-Strait relations. understanding. As long as the Beijing authorities are willing to resolve antagonisms and improve However, the tone of Tsai’s speeches began to shift as cross-Strait relations, while parity and dignity China ratcheted up its multifaceted diplomatic, eco- are maintained, we are willing to work together nomic, and military pressure campaign to coerce Taipei to facilitate meaningful dialogue. This is what the into accepting its negotiating terms, which included people of Taiwan advocate, and it is a cross-par- poaching several of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners and ty consensus.” significantly increasing its military encirclement activi- ties around Taiwan. In her2018 speech, Tsai called out While the remarks themselves do not represent any- Beijing’s “unilateral diplomatic offensive and military thing breathtakingly new, the occasion is notable, coercion [that] have not only harmed cross-Strait re- since National Day is an important symbol in cross- lations. They have also seriously challenged the status Strait relations. Indeed, it commemorates the histori- quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Yet, cal events that connect the formation of the ROC gov- she continued to maintain a steady hand in managing ernment in Taiwan with China. Moreover, its continued cross-Strait conflict escalation, even as pressure con- official celebration in Taiwan thus marks the continu- tinued to build, both externally and internally. “I will ous existence of that regime for nearly 110 years. At not be provoked into confrontation or conflicts that points in Taiwan’s past—especially in the early years endanger cross-Strait relations, nor will I deviate from of the island’s democratization—it has been a symbol the will of the people, and sacrifice Taiwan’s sovereign- of controversy within Taiwan, acting as a flashpoint in ty,” Tsai insisted. the long-running clash between those who favored outright independence and those who supported uni- Those internal pressures found a release valve as po- fication with China. Nevertheless, previous Double litical unrest in Hong Kong came to a head when the Ten speeches have included consistent themes, such Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aggressively clamped as calls for unity and the overall welfare of the nation, down on protests against a controversial extradition even as the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) and Democrat- law. In her 2019 speech, the Taiwanese president un- ic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) held starkly differ- derscored the unviability of Beijing’s “one country, ent approaches to cross-Strait policy. This was not an two systems” (一國兩制) formula for Taiwan. “The exception under the previous Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九( ) overwhelming consensus among Taiwan’s 23 million and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administrations. Howev- people is our rejection of ‘one country, two systems,’ er, as David Brown notes in his article in this issue of regardless of party affiliation or political position,” the Global Taiwan Brief, the two political parties’ re- she said. According to GTI’s non-resident senior fel- spective positions on cross-Strait relations appear to low, J. Michael Cole, “Tsai’s speech [in 2019], perhaps, be converging. This trend is reflected in President Tsai’s was intended to appeal to the greatest common de- National Day speeches. nominators within Taiwanese society—freedom and democracy, and opposition to ‘one country, two sys- In her first National Day speech in 2016—after Beijing tems’—while wisely using a combination of “Taiwan,” froze high-level dialogue with Taipei—President Tsai “Republic of China” and “Republic of China (Taiwan)” called on Beijing’s leaders “to face up to the reality that to refer to the nation.” the Republic of China exists” and that “[t]he two sides of the strait should sit down and talk as soon as pos- What emerges from a wholistic reading of President sible.” Furthermore, she stated that “[a]nything can Tsai’s National Day speeches over the past several years be included for discussion, as long as it is conducive is the clear evolution in her approach to cross-Strait to the development of cross-Strait peace and the wel- relations. Carefully calibrated signals found through- Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 20 3 out the speeches reflect a convergence of the posi- The main point: President Tsai’s call for dialogue with tions of the major political parties. Making clear this Beijing in her 2020 National Day speech, even as China latter point, in a press release further elaborating on ratchets up tension, is a carefully calibrated signal— the 2020 speech, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, not only to Beijing, but also to the United States that 大陸委員會)—the cabinet-level agency in charge of Taiwan can and should be trusted. cross-Strait policy—stated: “The MAC noted that the *** statement conveyed not only the unanimous position and consensus of the people of Taiwan and all politi- Survey: Taiwanese People’s “Will to Fight” Spikes as cal parties, but a responsible approach to maintaining China Ties Deteriorate and US-Taiwan Relations Im- peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” Moreover, in prove expressing its grievances against Beijing’s recalcitrant position, the MAC did not mince words on the key In recent remarks made at a think tank event, White sticking point: House National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien stat- ed openly that Taiwan should prepare to deter a Chi- “The MAC expressed strong dissatisfaction and nese invasion. Speaking at the Aspen Institute, O’Brien regret over the Taiwan Affairs Office’s consistent stated: “I think Taiwan needs to start looking at some responsibility-shirking and criticism, refusal to asymmetric and anti-access area denial strategies and join Taiwan in promoting cross-Strait peace, and so on and really fortify itself in a manner that would de- coercion of Taiwan into accepting the premise of ter the Chinese from any sort of amphibious invasion the “One China Principle” that leaves no space or even a gray zone operation against them.” While for the survival of the Republic of China.” not directly addressed, a subtext for the broader issue raised by the US national security adviser is Taiwan’s As noted earlier, concerns over a possible conflict in degree of readiness for a Chinese invasion, as well as the Taiwan Strait are mounting.
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