POPULATION GROWTH AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TAIWAN
Kao-Chiao Hsieh
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
June 1976 ii
ABSTRACT
Some of the developing countries have experienced a
modernization of their demographic structure as their economies
have undergone a partial transformation from an agrarian to an
urban state. Will this demographic transition follow the his
torical transition experienced by the developed countries?
This study seeks to provide a partial answer to this question
through a case study of the demographic transition in Taiwan.
The aggregate data for Taiwan used in the study were
collected for the years 1949-1972. The statistical analysis
was carried out both for the total time span covered by the
study, and separately for the initial period of development
(1949-60) and the transitional period of the society (1961-72). Principle component factor analysis was used to produce a
composite index for societal development, and the relationships
between socioeconomic development and mortality and fertility
trends were analyzed through correlation techniques and mul
tiple regression.
It was found that the demographic transition in Taiwan
was closely related to. the level of socioeconomic development.
In agrarian Taiwan, mortality and fertility were at relatively
high levels. As agricultural-industrial development occurred, mortality started to decline; but fertility rose slightly and remained at a fairly high level. During the period of socio economic development, mortality continued to decline, but slowed down in the late period of transition when fertility began to iii
decline at an accelerated pace.
Rising agricultural production and incomes were the
most salient factors in the reduction of mortality, although
other factors such as increasing physical mobility and education have created a favourable condition for mortality decline. The increase in income and the decline in overall mortality and infant mortality, as well as the shift from an agricultural to a non-agricultural labor force were the most significant factors in the reduction of fertility. Again, however, other factors such as increased education and mobility, and expanding employ- z ment opportunities for women created a favourable setting for a decline in fertility. At the same time, socioeconomic develop ment created conditions favourable for changes in attitudes toward age at marriage, abortion and contraception, all of them rein forced the fertility decline.
In contrast.to the European pattern of demographic transition, Taiwan experienced a higher level of fertility and mortality at the outset, a more rapid pace of demographic and socioeconomic development, and the active intervention of the government. However, the general relation between the level of mortality and fertility and socioeconomic development was the same. This suggests that the general propositions of trans ition theory appear sound, but that the timing and pace of fertility decline will vary with the level of development, socio-cultural background, and the extent of government interest. IV
Acknowledgments
As is true with all studies of its kind, the present
undertaking could not have been carried out without the help
and cooperation of a great many people. First of all, I am
indebted to United States Educational Foundation in the Republic
of China for awarding me a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship during the
academic years, 1973-1976. The availability of these funds
made it possible for me to come to the United States, and it
enabled me to devote full attention to my studies and research.
My appreciation extends to the several members of the
Department of Sociology for the help and encouragement offered
me during the entire course of my study at Bowling Green State University. I am especially indebted to Professor Edward G.
Stockwell, who was my constant advisor throughout the period of
study and research, and who guided the final preparation of the
manuscript from beginning to end. Without his helpful comments
and constructive criticism my task would have been much more
difficult. I am also grateful to Professors H. Theodore Groat,
Joseph B. Perry, Meredith D. Pugh and Bruce W. Smith, the latter
of the Department of Geography, for reading the completed manuscript and offering many valuable suggestions for its
improvement. Needless to say, final responsibility for any errors or inadequacies in the text rests solely with the author.
A special acknowledgment is due my wife, Su-Hua Huang, V who, in addition to collecting data from Taiwan for me, took the family responsibilities which relieved me of the financial burden of supporting a family. J 7/ 77/
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page INTRODUCTION ...... 1
The problem of population growth...... 2
Taiwan as a unit of study...... 5
Methods and data...... 6
Purpose of the study...... 12
Plan of presentation...... 13
THE THEORY OF POPULATION GROWTH...... 15
Theories of population growth...... 16
Population and resource...... 16
Population and social structure...... 21
Population and economic progress...... 26
Population and the transformation of society: the demographic transition...... 29
A re-examination of demographic transition theory . . .33
Rural-agrarian society—high growth potential populations...... 35
Urban-industrial society--incipient decline populations...... 37 The developing society—populations of transition growth...... 40
TAIWAN'S SOCIETY: ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE...... 53 Geography, history and people...... 54
Characteristics of the traditionals ociety...... 58
Taiwan's development under Japanese rule, 1895-1945 ...... 59
Economic development ......
Bowling 6rw Vll
Promotion of a public educational system .... 61
The improvement of sanitary facility ...... 62
Transportation and communication facilities. . . 63
Chinese social organization...... 64
Taiwan's development after 1945 ...... 65
Educational development and reform ...... 65
Land reform...... 66
Development plans...... 68
Assistance program and foreign investment. ... 69
Social effects of economic development ...... 70
Taiwan in transition...... 72
Summary and conclusion...... 84
THE PATTERN AND PROGRESS OF POPULATION GROWTH...... 87
Population growth in Taiwan ...... 87 The trends of population growth...... 88
Source of population growth...... 90
Changes in fertility and mortality ...... 92
Balance between fertility and mortality...... 100
Population growth and societal transformation . . . .103
The agrarian period...... 104
The period of socioeconomic development...... 110
Summary and conclusions '...... 115
THE DYNAMIC PROCESS OF FERTILITY AND MORTALITY DECLINE...... 117
Data and methods...... 118 VITI
Levels of societal development and the demographic transition ...... 126
Economic and social causes of fertility and mortality decline...... 133
Mortality...... 135
Infant mortality...... 139
Fertility...... 144
Lagged effect of selected socioeconomic indicators on the crude birth rate ...... 158
Intermediate variables in fertility decline...... 161
Summary...... 174
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 178
Summary of major findings and policy implication ...... 179
Relevance of transition theory to demographic change in Taiwan ...... 183
Policy implications for the devel'oping countries...... 188
Evaluation and suggestions for further research...... 191
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193 IX
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
3-1 Changing pattern of net domestic production, Taiwan, 1951-1973 ...... 74
3-2A Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development, Taiwan, 1946-1973...... 76
3-2B Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development, Taiwan, 1946-1973...... 78
3- 3 Trends in selected indexes of family life, Taiwan, 1946-1973 ...... 82
4- 1 Population size and annual growth rates: Taiwan, 1905-1972 ...... 89
4-2 Components of population growth: Taiwan, 1906-1972 ...... 91
4-3 Vital rate trends in Taiwan, 1906-1972...... 94
4-4 Age-specific death rate trends in Taiwan, 1906-1972 ...... 96
4- 5 Trends in age-specific birth rates: Taiwan, 1940-1972 ...... 99
5- 1 Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development: Taiwan, 1949-1972...... 124
5-2 . Intercorrelations of 14 socioeconomic develop ment indicators: Taiwan, 1949-1972...... 127
5-3 Results of a simple regression analysis with four demographic indicators as dependent variables and the social development index as the independent variable: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 129
5-4 Zero order correlations of the crude death rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 136
5-5 Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude death rate as the dependent variable: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 137
5-6 Zero order correlations of the infant mortality rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972...... 141 X
5-7 Results of a multiple regression analysis with the infant mortality rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972...... 142
5-8 Zero order correlations of the crude birth rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic develop ment, by development periods: Taiwan, 1949-1972 . . . 145
5-9A Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949*1972 ...... 146
5-9B Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 147
5-9C Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 148
5-10 Results of a multiple regression analysis of the Immediate Effect and the Lagged Effect of selected indexes of socioeconomic development on fertility: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 159
5-11 Zero order correlations of the proportion of women at age 15 and over unmarried with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 163
5-12 Percentage of the women in the childbearing age group who are married: Taiwan, 1958-1972...... 165
5-13 Zero order and partial correlations of the crude birth rate and selected indexes of socioeconomic development, with the proportion of women unmarried held constant and by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972 ...... 167
5-14 Zero order correlations of birth control with selected indexes of socioeconomic development and fertility: Taiwan, 1964-1971...... 170
5-15 General fertility rates and age-specific fertility rates of currently married women: Taiwan, 1959-1972 . 171
5-16 Zero order and partial correlations of the crude birth rate and selected indexes of socioeconomic development with birth control held constant: Taiwan, 1964-1972 ...... 173 XI
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
2-1 Illustrative of the demographic, social and economic transformation of society ...... 43
2-2 An analytic framework of the demographic, social and economic transformation of a society ...... 45
4-1 Crude birth and death rates: Taiwan, 1906-1972 . . .101 I
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the relationship between population
growth and economic and social development has, in recent
decades, become a topic of world wide discussion. Historically
the theory of demographic transition provided a convenient
approach to explaining this relationship. Recently, the
attention of the international community and of individual
countries has focused increasingly on efforts to accelerate
development (United Nations, 1975:45; Teitelbaum, 1975), hoping
thereby to influence a decline in the rate of population growth
So far, however, demographic trends in the developing countries have revealed an un-precedented acceleration in the rate of population growth. An important question thus arises: will they be able to achieve a modern demographic structure such as that which has been achieved in the urban-industrial countries of the world? Since the Second World War, some of the originally underdeveloped countries have experienced a "transition" of their demographic structure as their economies have undergone a partial transformation from a rural-agrarian to an urban-indsutrail state. A study of the process of population dynamics in those countries will produce more knowledge about the basic question and permit stronger speculations about the future progress of other developing countries. This is the main task of the present study. 1 2
The Problem of Population Growth
Although concern over the problem of population growth
is not new, the accelerating growth rate during the years
since the end of World War II, and a steady shortening of the
time interval required to double human numbers has led to
a resurgence of interest in this topic. This new concern
has not really focused on the rapid rates of population growth
in the world as a whole, but rather has emphasized the dis
proportionate share of population growth taking place within
two different worlds—the urban-industrial nations of the
developed world, and the still largely rural-agrarian nations
of the lesser developed world. As of 1960-1970, the annual
rate of population growth in the lesser developed countries was 2.5 per cent, which is more than twice that (1.1 per cent)
of the developed countries (World Population Conference of the United Nations, 1974:24-28). Population growth during the remainder of this century will vary greatly between these two worlds. Even though a gradual decrease in the rate of population growth is expected (e.g., the United Nations has projected a decline to 2.0 per cent in the lesser developed nations and to 0.8 per cent in the developed nations by around
2000), the total number of people in the lesser developed nations could still double, rising from 2.5 billion to
5 billion. In contrast, the developed nations are likely to increase at about half the rate of the lesser developed nations, rising from 1 billion to 1.5 billion (United Nations, 3 1973:546).
During these postwar years, rapid population growth
has imposed a heavy pressure on the resources of the world.
Particularly in the lesser developed countries, it has
barely been possible to increase production fast enough to
stay ahead of population growth. This has led to speculation
about the possibility of maintaining even a subsistence level
of living for those societies, and sounds of Malthusian
pessimism have begun to be sounded again. More and more it
seems that the population problem is really one of man against
nature, with nature always in control. In human history, however, the Industrial Revolution
has enabled man to utilize his resources more effectively
and has thus improved the relation between nature and man,
at least in the more developed countries. This is a con
sequence of man’s improved mastery over nature, both in terms
of technology and organization, rather than of nature’s
imperious control over man (Chamberlain, 1970:3-14). In contrast, the rapid population increase of the lesser developed nations, which has been caused by the dramatic reduction of the death rate made possible by public health measures rather than by any social-economic development, has created a serious imbalance between numbers of people and resources. Thus, the population problem today lies primarily in the relation ship between numbers of people, technology and social insti tutions; and its most serious manifestation is found in the
-¿if 4
lesser developed world.
Population change in both the developed and lesser developed countries has traditionally been explained by the
"theory of demographic transition" (Robinson, 1964). This
theory, which has dominated contemporary thought concerned
with the dynamics of population growth, is based on actual
historical experiences which occurred in the demographic evolu
tion of the countries in the Western world from the start of
the Industrial Revolution until the depression years of the
1930's. The theory has been viewed as a group of related
empirical generalizations which summarized the results of
several empirical findings in general form (Moore, 1959), and its explanatory and predictive validity is limited. In
light of this problem, several students of demography have
recently attempted to refine transition theory through more
intensive study of particular societies (Peterson, 1960),
or the integration of segmental findings (Tranter, 1973),
or by concentrating on the study of the historical decline
of European fertility (Bacci, 1971; and Knodel, 1974).
However, the range of confidence in empirical generalizations
can increase through repeated observation of concrete situ ations (Reynolds, 1975:80). Thus, if the theory of demo graphic transition can be re-examined in the context of the developing countries, its statements can be improved and become more discriminating.
Although the lesser developed countries of the world 5
are characterized by population growth rates much higher than
those prevailing in the advanced nations, some of the former
have in recent years experienced a "modernization" of their
demographic structure as their societies have undergone some
socioeconomic development. A major question confronting us now is: Will the changes that have been observed lead to a
completion of the demographic transition and, in particular
will the pattern of transition resemble or differ from the
historical transition experienced by the more developed countries
l£ the pattern is different, what are the key features of the difference? The answers to these questions can have serious implication for demographic policy in developing countries.
The present research is an attempt to provide a partial answer to these questions by reference to a demographic case study of Taiwan.
Taiwan as a Unit of Study
There are several unique aspects to Taiwan which make it a valuable site for demographic investigation. First, Taiwan is the only place where it is now possible to study the processes of change in a Chinese society. Second, given its compact size and homogeneity with respect to culture and population, it can serve as a valuable case study. Third, it is an area where a falling birth rate has made a substantial start on narrowing the demographic gap created by the earlier decline of mortality, and is thus in what has been described as the late period of demographic transition (Stockwell, 1963). 6
Taiwan also has broken away from being purely an agrarian society
and is undergoing a persistent, inclusive process of change
that is transforming and reshaping the traditional social
structure. Finally, under Japanese rule, modernization programs were implemented in a number of areas, such as agricultural
production, economic development and public health. Of par
ticular relevance is the fact that the Japanese administration established and maintained an unusually accurate demographic and economic statistical record system, so that Taiwan is one of the few cases of a lesser developed country in which ■ Í sufficient data are available to trace the trends in fertility and mortality with reasonable precision from the initial stages of modernization. Furthermore, since the end of World
War II the island was under the influence of a developmental program initiated by the Chinese government and the American assistance program, and this has facilitated a move toward an urban-industrial society. Thus, Taiwan represents an ex cellent laboratory for analyzing the causal relationship between population growth and economic and social development.
Methods and Data The aim of this study is to assess the relationship between demographic and socioeconomic transformation. A non- experimental design is used for this task because it enables us to probe the causal direction on longitudinal data (Caporaso and Roos, 1973; Blalock, Jr., 1964). This design involves 7 (1) periodic measurements or observations on a variable at
equally spaced points in time, (2) the occurrence of an event
somewhere in the series, and (3) the assumption the event
occurs midway between two selected measurement points. This
design may be diagramed as follows:
Event. Event-
0 , 0 °1' °2' m m+1' ^m+2' 0 n f On.+1v 0 n+2
Agrarian period Initial period Transitional period of development
where 0's represent periodic observations on a variable over
time, and where events represent occurrences which have an
effect on the transformation of society. In this design, the
observed unit is the temporal unit of aggregation, and the
time lapse is a necessary condition to permit an assessment of the causal relationship. The long-term behavior of the
variable is used as the background against which to examine
the change in the variable or a shift in the variable's
trend after development has taken place.
The events which initiate development or societal
transformation are considered as antecedent variables or experimental stimuli. Examples of such events would be the introduction into society of land reform, implementation of an economic development plan, educational development, etc.
These events are described and understood in terms of their 8
being potentially operative factors which could lead to demo
graphic and societal change.
The independent variable in this study is socioeconomic
development. Although it can be a dependent variable in the
process of societal transformation, it is here necessary to
treat it as an independent variable in order to examine trans
ition theory in which the demographic variable is assumed to
adjust to development. Since development consists of a fairly
large number of interrelated dimensions, a wide choice of social
and economic indicators has been included in the analysis.
In selecting the indicators for this study it was decided that
they should possess certain general characteristics: (1) they
should emphasize measurement of the distribution of modern
characteristics in the population; (2) they should have been
previously shown in the literature to be associated with
fertility decline and with development; (3) they should reflect
changes in the capacity to transform society; (4) they should
be interdependent processes—that is, they should reflect, in
varying degrees, many more things than they directly measure
(McGranahan, 1972:92); and (5) the data should be available on a temporal basis. With these criteria in mind, the follow ing indicators were chosen as measures of social and economic development. 1. The proportion of the total population living in the five largest cities. This indicator is a measure of population concentration. As Davis (1955, 1965) suggests, 9 an increase in the proportion of the population in metro
politan areas is one of the most distinctive characteristics
of the development of a society. It is in the urban centers
that we find special motivational constraints on marriage and
procreation for example (Thompson, 1946; Notestein, 1953),
and these in turn bring about changes from traditional to
modern ways of life (Wirth, 1938).
2. Proportion of the population aged 15 and over who
graduated from junior middle school. The preference of secondary
education over primary education is because primary education
is not sufficient to train a person to the level where he would be able to perform the tasks characteristic of an in
dustrializing middle class (McClelland, 1966:262). Further,
in Taiwan there has been a high percentage of school-age children
attending primary school since the Japanese occupation; there
fore, it is not significant to use primary education to in
dicate educational attainment in Taiwan. 3. Per capita agricultural production (including for
estry and fishing). This is used to measure agricultural
development, which is considered a primary factor in the de
velopment of urban society. 4. Hospital beds per 1000 population. This indicator
is used to measure the availability of health care service, and it can be regarded as an index of various aspects of the health care system. 5. Per capita annual income. This is the most commonly 10 used measure of the level of living; and although it has its
limitations, per capita income is closely related to those
factors which depict the social and cultural changes accompany ing industrialization (Adelmen and Morris, 1966:133).
6. Proportion of the labor force in non-agricultural activities (including manufacturing, commerce, transportation
and communication, and service). This indicator is used to
measure the occupational differentiation and specialization which are a major component of industrial society.
7. Per capita circulation of domestic mail, newspapers and printed materials; per capita use of railway and highway
(internal travel of population). These two indicators measure the extent of internal communication (Freidlander and Silver,
1967) by which the dissemination of information is achieved beyond the locality. They particularly indicate the extent to which rural people will be brought into contact with urban life styles.
8. The proportion of the economically active female population who are unmarried; the proportion of the child bearing population engaged in housekeeping work; and the crude marriage rate. All of these measures reflect the nature of the female role in the marital and family structure. In
Taiwanese society, the family is the basic unit of social organization, and changes in the family have repercussions throughout the society. Changes in the family also relate to the process of modernization, in turn causing fertility to 11
decline. In addition, the proportion of married women who
accepted contraceptive devices for the first time is used as
a measure of family planning and birth control in this sphere of family modernization.
The dependent variable which we are mainly interested in explaining is population growth or change, which will be
determined by measures of fertility and mortality, and the
balance between them. The basic demographic measures to be
used are crude birth and death rates. The former is the annual
number of births per 1000 population and the latter is the
number of deaths per 1000 population. In addition, the infant
mortality rate is viewed as an indicator of demographic status.
The level of infant mortality is a function of socioeconomic
development, and in turn, it has an affect on fertility decline
(Heer, 1966).
In order to measure the transition in economic and
social organization and demographic modernization, time series
data derived from vital records and statistics on socioeconomic
development will be used. The sources of data are primarily the Taiwan Demographic Fact Book, the Statistical Summaries
of Taiwan Province, Household Registration Statistics of Taiwan,
and the Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China. The demographic data are collected through a household registration system which was established by the Japanese administration in Taiwan. The statistical data derived from this system and other survey systems are compiled and published by the 12 Chinese Government every year. These data are used as an
important reference for government administration and private
research, and they are generally considered to possess a high
degree of completeness and accuracy (see Barclay, 1954; Shryock and Siegel, 1973:34; Speare, Jr., 1974:303).
The statistical techniques used to analyze the data
are mainly factor analysis, product-moment correlations, and
multiple regression. The use of each technique will depend
on the nature of the data and the theoretical framework.
Further discussion of these techniques will be presented in
Chapter V.
Purpose of the Study
Our purpose here is (1) to describe and explain the
pattern and process of population change under the impact of
changes in economic and social conditions in Taiwan, (2) to
find the similarity and dissimilarity between Taiwan and the
European pattern of demographic transition, and (3) to make
some suggestions for the consideration of future demographic development in the developing countries.
Although it is recognized that a single case study places serious limitations on the extent to which research findings can be generalized, it may nevertheless be the best way to examine the relationship between demographic patterns and economic and social structure in the process of societal transformation (Goldscheider, 1971:91), because it allows 13 us to analyze differences over time. Furthermore, it is our
conviction that the proposed description and analysis of the
pattern of demographic modernization in a non-Western society
will enhance our knowledge and understanding of the relation
ship between the dynamics of population growth and socioeconomic development, and will contribute significantly to current
efforts to revise classical transition theory.
Plan of Presentation
In the following chapter we shall consider the histor ical background and recent conceptualizations of population growth theory. In light of this review, certain propositions about the demographic transition will be formulated. Chap ter III begins with a background description of the pattern of social and economic organization in Taiwan before 1945, when it was returned to the Republic of China; and then examines societal changes from 1949 to 1973 under the influence of developmental programs of the Nationalist government. In the ensuing chapters the trend and pattern of population modern ization is presented. Chapter IV deals with the pattern and process of population growth in the process of societal evolu tion; and Chapter V presents an empirical investigation of the dynamic processes of fertility and mortality decline under the influence of socioeconomic development. A final chapter summarizes the results of our analysis and relates it to the
European pattern of demographic transition, and then presents 14
some conclusions with regard to the nature of the relation
ship between demographic modernization and societal develop ment in a non-Western setting. CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF POPULATION GROWTH
Much has been written from historical times to the
present concerning ways in which populations grow, but it is
only recently that scholars have attempted to investigate
systematically the causal factors of population growth or
decline. Modern population theory is generally considered
to have its beginnings in the late eighteenth century writings
of Thomas Malthus (Thompson, 1953:20-31). His work stimulated
interest in population and in the economic and social issues
associated with it, and he can be credited with bringing the discussion of population growth into prominence for the first time. The works on population theory published since that time are far more numerous and weightier than the earlier writings in the field, and they reflect the controversy that has continually surrounded the whole question of population growth.
Population growth is a complex phenomenon, and this has resulted in multiple approaches to the formulation of population theory. As an animal in the biological community, human beings are closely related to nature, and their number is inevitably subjected to the regulation of nature. This is the basic principle of Malthus and later biological approaches 15 16
to population theory. On the other hand, human beings are also
social and cultural animals capable of adapting to a wide range
of physical environments. That is, man alone has been able
to develop the technology and social organization to permit
an ever increasing degree of control over his natural environ
ment, thus greatly enhancing his capacity for survival. This
fact has led social scientists away from purely biological
theses in a search for social and cultural bases on which to
construct theories of population growth. In the post-indus
trial period this has most recently led to the development
of a formal theoretical framework for assessing the inter
relations between population growth and social and economic
development (i.e., the "theory" of demographic transition).
In the present chapter we shall examine further the develop
ment of population growth theory in order to provide a theor
etical framework for the present study.
THEORIES OF POPULATION GROWTH
Population and Resources
For more than a century and a half the thinking about
the relationship between population, resources, and well being has recurrently attracted the interests of scholars and
statesmen. Most recently the rapid population growth in the
lesser developed countries has led to a resurgence of interest in this relationship. As indicated above, Thomas Malthus was one of the earlier scholars to focus on this relationship 17
and to formulate a model based on it.
Malthus' basic theory is rooted in scientific biology,
which sees man as an animal, living in a finite world (Peterson,
1957:26). Reasoning from the two basic postulates that food
is necessary for survival and that the human sex drive is
very strong, Malthus (1798) based his "principle of population"
on the assumption that man could increase his means of sub
sistence only in arithmetical progression, whereas his numbers
had the potential to increase in geometrical progression. That is, man's capacity to increase his means of subsistence was seen as much less than his capacity to multiple. Popu lation, according to Malthus, always tended to increase up to the limits set by the available means of subsistence, and it was contained within these limits by the operation of certain checks. With the exception of abstainence and the deferment of marriage (the preventive checks), these checks would take the form of either misery or vice (positive checks). Among these latter positive checks, Malthus seemed to think of food shortage as the ultimate check on population growth at any given time and place, with other aspects of "vice and misery"
(i.e., war, disease) being primarily functions or effects of deficiencies in the food supply (Hertzler, 1956:99).
In the second and later editions of his essay, while still maintaining that population is necessarily ultimately limited by the means of subsistence, Malthus examined at greater length what he regarded as the principle cause of mass poverty; 18
namely, population pressure and the diversion of too large
an amount of productive resources to population growth. Malthus
asserted that the principal and most permanent cause of poverty
had little or no direct relation to forms of government, or
to the unequal division of property; hence he saw no reason
for any significant change in the social structure and the class composition of society. Poverty had its origin in the
pressure of population on subsistence, and in Malthus’ view
poverty would be an inevitable feature of human society. For Malthus, economic and other social institutions
embodied fixed laws of nature. Hence, he did not anticipate
the emergence of a rationality in social life that the changes
in these institutions were creating at that time. He also
did not foresee•that existing science would develop so much further creating a whole new technology, or that the new
technology would in turn produce an agricultural revolution
and an immense increase in man’s productive potential. In
short, Malthus failed to anticipate both the development of
a new rational mode of thinking (i.e., a freedom from tradi
tional social control), and the social progress which was
envisioned by Godwin, Condorcet and others of his contemporaries.
Finally, in the Malthusian view, fertility was regarded as the independent variable, and he did not give any consideration to the possible role of contraception in controlling population growth.
The man-resource relationship has played a central 19
role in the theories of other students of biology or animal
ecology. Raymond Pearl (1925) formulated the well-known
proposition that population growth curves follow a logistic
function, gradually but asymtotically approaching an upper
limit. The logistics formula relates the level of population
density and the availability of resources to population growth,
with the level of population density and the availability of
resources being limited by pressures created by increasing
density and a limited supply of food (Endres, 1975:36).
Pearl’s theory rests mainly on the assumption that the physical
environment on which the population depends for its support
is constant; hence population growth will be checked by the
amount of resources available in a given place. Pearl (1924:
585) also asserted that the theoretical explanation of popu
lation growth must not be couched in terms of social or economic
institutions but in terms of more fundamental natural causes.
In a more recent expression of this biological approach,
Calhoun (1962) has generalized from experiments with mice
to postulate a "natural" end to the human population explosion:
as crowding increases It will lead to an increase in abnormal patterns of behavior and a consequent slowing down and end to the growth of population. Paul Ehrlich (1968, 1970) has described the explosive growth of world population, and pre dicted that present high levels of world fertility will lead to mass famine and disease. "Spaceship Earth," according to Ehrlich, is now filled to capacity or beyond and is running 20
Out of food, and population control is urgently needed. This
projection rests on the natural limits of land and a static
level of technology. Ehrlich's work reflects a certain naturalistic bent and in some cases bears at least a latent
resemblance to the Malthusian approach. Pearl, Calhoun and
Ehrlich, like Malthus, are indifferent to the significance of
such institutional changes as urbanization and industrializa
tion, and have not given adequate consideration to human culture
as an intervening variable between man and environment.
In sum, the scholars in the population-resources model
have commonly assumed that population increase was determined
by the limits of the environment and that population pressure
on the enviornment was a constant threat. Thus, a population
should maintain an optimum relationship with its environment
and the supply of critical resources. But how population growth
was controlled in the past seems to be beyond their prediction.
Historically, population growth, particularly in the developed
countries, has not been limited by the calamities of misery
and vice. The development of technology (e.g., the agricul
tural and industrial revolutions) has so far continuously raised the limits of the environment and accommodated an increasing population; at the same time, emigration mitigated population pressure where it occurred. Although resources may be provided by nature, their exploitation is a socio cultural phenomenon. Culture provides both the technology and the social and ideological means for appropriating nature's resources and putting them to man's use (Sahlins and Service, 21
1960:24). Malthus, Pearl, Calhoun and Ehrlich gave little
credit to technology and social change as causes of the rise
in the optimum, level of population, and they did not give sufficient recognition to man's ability to develop socio
cultural means of coping with his environment and population
size; however, their emphasis on the relationship between
rapid population growth and the scarcity of resource, particu
larly in underdeveloped countries, cannot be ignored.
Population and Social Structure
Over the years, numerous scholars have reacted to the
limitation of such biological or natural theories and have
sought to develop alternative explanations of population change
that incorporated various aspects of social structure or
culture as the underlying independent variables (Robinson,
1964:385). Among the more outspoken of these critics was
Karl Marx. Although Marx did not formulate a systematic theory
of population of his own, he did put forth a set of basic principles which he regarded as governing population and its
economic and social correlates (United Nations, 1973:46). Marx (1867:693) said that every special historic epoch with
its characteristic modes of production has its own special
laws of population, historically valid within its limits alone.
He consistently held that the capitalistic mode of production was characterized by its own unique population phenomenon— overpopulation—because capitalism deliberately creates surplus 22
labor, or relative overpopulation by accumulating capital which
can be invested to displace workers. Marx thus explained
poverty in terms of the social and economic relations to the
means of production rather than to increasing population.
However, since the basic problem being considered is the same
(i.e., an imbalance between numbers and resources), Marxian
theory can be viewed as complementary to that of Malthus in
the study of poverty (Daly, 1971:26).
Under his theory of "modes of production," Marx re
jected Malthus and his works; he related the population problem
to economic means rather than natural resources. One impli
cation of this is that there could be no natural and universal law of population. Rather, population processes were determined
by the social and economic conditions prevailing in different
societies. Marx's theory thus establishes the connection —A between economic processes as causes and demographic processes | as effects (see below); but Marx did not pursue this point further. For instance, he had nothing to say of what governed the population growth of primitive, feudal, or socialist societies, and his law of population only concentrated on capitalist society (Peterson, 1957:27-28). Meanwhile, his theory of the industrial reserve army pertains not to popu lation as such but to the labor force; population and labor force are related, but they are not identical. Marx never did respond to the basic problems recognized by Malthus; namely, that population increases as the means of subsistence increases. 23
In addition, his neglect of the more social and cultural
processes in formulating his general economic theory further
limited his vision of the demographic future.
After the beginning of the industrial revolution,
the relationship between population and social structure
became more pronounced in urban societies as fertility declined
As early as 1890, Dumont (1890:106-110) saw the cause of
France’s declining birth rate to be in the consuming involve ment of the populace in status seeking; and this led to the
formulation of his theory of "social capillarity." According to this theory, as societies' stratification systems became more permeable, social capillarity increased (i.e., as the class system becomes more open, social mobility increases).
Industrialization, urbanization, democratization, and other aspects of modern society increased the number and variety of economic opportunities and encouraged the emergence of a systematic achievement orientation and individualism, which in turn had an effect on a lowering of the birth rates.
Modern family limitation is seen as originating among persons rising in the social scale: as the proportion of middle class persons in society increased, fertility decreased, thus establishing an inverse relationship between socioeconomic class and fertility. Although Dumont's theory implies the / demographic transition, his approach over-simplified a very complicated phenomenon, and it was to be several decades before a more complete model was forthcoming. \ 24
In the 1930s, the pronounced decline in the western
birth rate became a prominent factor in the study of population
growth, and more and more attention was given to the search
for factors underlying the decline. Carr-Saunders (1936),
Fairchild (1939), and others believed that modern contra
ceptive methods were responsible for a large part of the
decline in the birth rate, and they argued that only after the invention and mass availability of effective means of
contraception did widespread interest in family limitation
arise and did effective human control over the birth rate
become possible. They would thus attribute the decline in
fertility to an advancing technology that provided the improved
means of birth control.
In contrast, Notestein and Stix (1940) pointed out
that the fertility decline in most Western nations began well before modern contraceptive techniques were widely known or used. They asserted, rather, that new patterns of living and new values brought a growing interest in family limitation, and these social and cultural changes enhanced the diffusion and use of known methods of contraception and stimulated the development of new and more effective ones. This argument stresses the importance of social and cultural change as antecedent stimuli to technological change.
In analyzing the relationship between social structure and fertility more fully, Davis and Blake (1957) presented a classification of "intermediate variables" through which 25
any social factor influencing the level of fertility must
operate. Later, Davis used the intermediate variable approach
in formulating his theory of multiphasic response. In both,
social structure as a cause of fertility change is seen to be
a complex one involving many different aspects of society
(e.g., family, religion, class system) as potential influences
on a number of different fertility variables (e.g., age at
marriage, contraception usage). The prevailing fertility
situation is thus seen to be a function of responses to
particular social and economic conditions in a particular
country at a particular time in the process of modernization
(Davis, 1963:346).
The availability of effective contraceptive techniques
is obviously an important factor in fertility decline, but
whether or not and how people decide to use them is the
crucial question. Fertility control is based on rational
behavior, but the degree of freedom in the decision-making
is fixed in the structure of society (Hawley, 1973:1199).
As long as the structural factors which motivate families to produce a large number of off-spring exist in society, dis
semination of contraceptive information and materials will be of little aid in bringing.about fertility decline (see
Mamdani, 1972). For in order to achieve fertility decline, a certain level of socioeconomic development (for example, a major shift away from a kinship-based organization) has to be achieved (Freedman, 1965:418; United Nations, 1965:143), 26
and then the emerging urban-industrial condition leads to the
emergence of the small family ideal thus influencing a lower
fertility (Freedman, 1961/62:53-56).
Population and Economic Progress
Contributions to the economic analysis of fertility
have found the notions of "utility" and "cost" as being basic
factors in decisions effecting the birth of any added child. The two conflicting schools of thought that dominated these
economic analyses are essentially elaborations of the earlier
theories of Dumont and Malthus—that economic progress is a
cause of declining fertility, on the one hand, and that economic
progress is an antecedent to an increase in fertility and the
rate of growth, on the other. Harvey Leibenstein (1957)
has provided a theory which illustrates the first position, whereas an expression of the second position is found in the writings of Gary Becker (1960).
Leibenstein has provided the first consistent theore tical framework explaining completed family size. His assump tion is that if parents are able and willing to make a rough calculation of the cost and benefits of procreation, parents will presumably stop having children when the utility or satis faction of the added child just matches the disutility or negative satisfaction. Economic progress and modernization normally generate rising per capita income, a higher rate of survival and a new occupational environment characterized by 27
greater specialization and increased mobility. All these
factors affect the costs and benefits of the added child in
a different way (Leibenstein, 1963:161-165). Leibenstein
then hypothesizes that with rising real incomes per head,
the utility of the added child as a consumption good remains
more or less unchanged* but his value as a productive agent
and source of old age support declines. The direct and in
direct costs of child rearing, however, go up (e.g., more has
to be invested in the training and formal education of children)
Economic development is thus seen to inhibit fertility.
Becker (1960) developed a different view concerning
the effect that rising per capita income has on fertility.
Becker treats the demand for children somewhat analogously
to the demand for consumer durables. Taking modern society
as his starting point, he argues that couples with sufficient
access to contraception will acquire children much in the same way they acquire consumer durables such as cars. In a modern
society, children contribute little to the income of the parents; economically they are a burden. However, they possess utility in the sense that they provide the parents with various kinds of satisfaction. When the family's purchasing power increases, the demand for the satisfaction that children bring builds up. Becker thus suggests there is a positive correlation between income and family size. In regard to
Becker's theory, Blake (1967, 1968) points out that such a positive relationship does not exist. The income-fertility 28
hypothesis, she concludes, must therefore be abandoned. She
adduces additional circumstantial evidence to suggest that
the crucial determinants are rather much more straightforwardly
sociological, in that they have to do with non-economic norms.
This argument about the relationship between income
and fertility has been reconciled in Heer's and Easterlin's
work. Heer (1966:430) has suggested that the effect of an increase in the level of well-being in a society is an increase
in fertility, but various indirect effects of an increase in economic well-being (increased education and net economic cost
of children, decreased infant mortality, etc.) have such
adverse consequences for fertility that, taking into account
both direct and indirect effects, an increase in economic
level decreases fertility. Easterlin (1969) insists that the
effect of income must be seen as the effect also of tastes,
preferences or norms for the disposal of that income. Per
capita income growth, he suggests, operates through two
channels. On the one hand, it has the usually emphasized
effect of tending to increase fertility by giving the second
generation more resources. On the other hand, it tends to
lower fertility by increasing the relative desire for material goods. Since these two influences may be more or less off setting, it no longer follows that per capita income growth tends to increase fertility.
Both Heer and Easterlin relate income to social change; that is, the indirect effect of income or desire for material 29
goods (or changing taste) increases as social development
increases, and thus a negative rather than a positive relation
ship between income and fertility is strengthened. Hawthorn
(1970:78-82) points out that income is the factor most obviously
related to economic development, and thus to the main theses
about the causes of various demographic transitions in various
societies, so that it cannot be ignored altogether.
Population and the Transformation of Society: > The Demographic Transition
Demographically speaking, population growth on a world
level is determined by only two factors—fertility and mortal ity. Since the industrial revolution, a fertility decline has taken place, but it has not been a global phenomenon.
The developed countries of the Western world have attained a low level of fertility, but in the underdeveloped countries fertility has remained at a preindustrial high level. By contrast, mortality decline has been more or less a global phenomenon. Even though it began later in the lesser developed countries, it has occurred much faster; and in some of them mortality levels have fallen as low as in the developed countries
The growth of the Western population that had accelerated due to an initial mortality decline eventually achieved a relative stability based on a new balance between low birth and death rates in the years prior to World War II; but since then the growth of the rest of the world population has accelerated as a rapidly declining death rate has widened the 30
gap between levels of fertility and mortality. As far as the
situation in the Western world is concerned, the theory of
demographic transition provides a socio-cultural explanation
of the dynamics of this historical population charge.
As we noted above, demographic change is influenced
by economic status and social structure which vary country
to country at a particular time in the process of modern
ization. In 1909, Landry (1934 ed.) was probably the first
to attempt a description of the historical demographic change
as occurring in stages. He pointed out that three economic
regimes--^the primitive,. the intermediate and the modern— were characterized by different rates of population growth.
However, transition theory was first stated in its modern
form in the work of Warren S. Thompson. Thompson (1929), in an attempt to generalize the demographic experience of
Europe into a theoretical framework which could apply to other areas as well, grouped the nations of the world into three groups according to the level of their birth and death rates: (1) countries with very rapidly declining birth and death rates, with the former declining more rapidly, so that the growth rate was also declining; (2) countries with declin ing birth rates and death rates for certain classes, but with death rates declining as rapidly or more rapidly than the birth rate, producing a stable or even increasing growth rate; and (3) countries where both birth and death rates are less controlled, but where there is evidence that the 31
death rates are coining under control faster than birth rates, producing the likelihood of a very rapid increase in numbers
in the future. He concluded that these demographic changes
are correlated with industrialization, and as the under
developed countries became industrialized, they would adopt
the characteristics of the Western nations.
Since then, the stages of demographic transition have attracted the interest of more and more scholars, and it has today become a widely accepted typology. Notestein (1945) formalized the model still further by specifying three types of populations, or stages of the tra/SjnJition: (1) populations of high growth potential where growth was very slow and erratic because fertility and mortality were both high, but where there was a potential for rapid growth once mortality decline got underway; (2) populations of transitional growth, where an initial mortality decline had opened a gap between birth and death rates and where population was growing fairly rapidly; and (3) populations of incipient decline where a very low birth and death rate contributed to a very slow growth rate, and where the possibility of a still lower birth rate emerging created the potential for population decline.
Blacker (1947) elaborated on this initial model and identified five stages of the transition: (1) the high sta tionary, characterized by high birth and death rates; (2) the early expanding, in which declining mortality is causing a rise in growth rates; (3) late expanding, in which population 32
growth rates are slowing down as declining fertility narrows
the gap between birth and death rates; (4) the low stationary,
characterized by low birth and death rates; and (5) the
declining where fertility has fallen below the level of
mortality.
More recently, Coal and Hoover (1958) empirically
investigated the process of demographic transition in the
course of economic development as based on the experience of the presently industrialized countries. They stated that
an agrarian low income economy is characterized by high birth
and death rates. Then, as the economy progresses to become more interdependent, specialized and market-dominated, the
average death rate begins a decline that continues under the
impact of better organization and improved medical knowledge and care. Somewhat later the birth rate begins to fall.
Finally, as further reductions in the death rate become harder to obtain, the birth rate again approaches equality with the death rate and a more gradual rate of growth is re established with a low level of mortality and the small family as a typical pattern.
In the last two decades, although the model has been widely accepted, transition theory has come under a great deal of criticism. With respect to the developing countries, some writers (Taeuber, 1952; Hauser and Duncan, 1959; Cowgill,
1970) have pointed out that at least the tempo of demographic change in them differs considerably from that observed in the 33
Western countries on which transition theory is based, par
ticularly in regards to the speed of mortality decline and
the consequent rate of natural increase. Another criticism
has focused on the characteristics of the theory itself. A
number of writers (Hauser and Duncan, 1959; Gutman, 1960;
Wrong, 1967) have argued that the so-called theory is merely
an interpretation of turning points in demographic evolution
rather than a system of logically consistent and explicit
relationships that provide a basis for predictions of future
developments.
These criticisms essentially concern the precise links between "modernization" or "development" and "demographic
transition." Why does modernization act to change birth and
death rates in the way it does? In regard to this question,
Goldscheider (1971:79) has said:
One way to uncover these major interconnections and link ages is to investigate how fertility, mortality, and migration have varied between societies over time, weav ing together variation and change in population and social variables. To achieve this objective systematically and rigorously, we need to locate a persistent, inclusive process of change, a dynamic social force that has trans formed and reshaped human societies.
The present study represents an attempt to identify a mechanism that can account for the change in economic and social organ ization and in demographic structure.
A RE-EXAMINATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY
As we have discussed above, the stages of demographic transition are generally described in terms of three com 34
binations of fertility and mortality: (1) high birth rate and
high death rate, (2) high birth rate and low death rate, and (3) low birth rate and low death rate. These three combinations
have been identified with three types of populations or
stages of population growth: Stage I, high growth potential,
Stage II, transitional growth and Stage III, incipient
decline (Notestein, 1945). The first and third stages are
stages of relative stability with population growth being slow
due to the near balance between levels of fertility and mor
tality, whereas the second stage is one of fairly rapid
growth and change. According to "transition theory," the
shift from the first or "primitive" stable stage to the third
or "modern" stable stage is one that parallels the socio
economic transformation of society from a rural-agrarian state
to an urban-industrial one, and population change, e.g., the
decline of fertility and mortality, is viewed as a natural . • response to changing economic and social conditions in the
process of modernization or development. A significant part
of population theory should pertain to the description and
explanation of the conditions of both stability and change
(Cowgill, 1963:271). Our theoretical framework of the demo graphic transition will contain two conditions of stability and one of change. In the following paragraphs, we first describe the relatively stable conditions of population and economic and social structure in the two polar ideal societal types--agrarian and urban, and then use the comparative 35
approach to construct a dynamic process based on the changes
that occur as the latter type evolves from the former. These
two ideal-typical societies will be abstracted from reality
and presented in an extreme form for analytic purposes, but
they are not far removed from the real world. We here consider
the transformation from a rural to urban society as an evolu tionary continuum, because it is possible for us to observe how societal growth progresses (Hawley, 1970:193).
Rural-Agrarian Society—High Growth Potential Populations
The economies of these societies are agrarian, in some instances with an absolute majority of the population engaged in agriculture and related activities; and their levels of living are very low and often approaching a bare subsistence standard. What manufacturing that does exist largely takes the form of village handicrafts. The factory system and its correlates vary in degrees of development, although most of them are still in the incipient stages of industrial development with factories confined mainly to a few large cities. Capital equipment is limited, and for most of the productive operations consists largely of fairly simple tools and implements. The main instrument of production, apart from land, is human labor. The ability of men to protect themselves against disease or calamity by technology is very limited, and life is rather precarious. The great bulk of the population is illiterate. Communication is largely of 36
the intimate face-to-face variety. Life is lived mainly within
the self-sufficient community, and communities are relatively
isolated. The population of the local communities is homo
geneous, with a strong sense of solidarity prevailing among
the members. The extended family is the basic unit of pro
duction and, with the village, is the basic unit of social
organization as well. There is very little mobility, either physical or social. These are essentially "sacred" societies
in the sense that behavior is dominated by sanctified values, traditions, and customs; social control is largely through superstition, folkways,.and mores.
In such societies, the simple and backward level of technology does not permit the attainment of much control over nature or the physical environment, and the utilization of the earth’s resources is less efficient. As a consequence, the resources available to human beings are limited. In a classical Malthusian sense, then, population increase imposes an increasing pressure on the available resources. Under this circumstance, food shortages,various epidemic diseases and unsanitary living conditions are prevalent, and they combine to produce a high level of mortality. The agrarian societies therefore have to have a high fertility; otherwise the continuing existence of the society would be threatened
(Davis, 1955b:33; Peterson, 1969:12). The institutions of human society have been developed to cope specifically and directly with mortality. An important function of the social 37
organization in agrarian societies is to induce their people
to reproduce a large number of children (Davis, 1955b:33;
Freedman, 1961-2:48; Goldsheider, 1971:102). For example,
the emphasis on kinship and the large family, the use of children’s labor in agriculture and handicraft, the reliance
on off-spring for old age security, and the segregation of male
and female roles are all conducive to high fertility. Thus
high fertility fits into the economic and social structure
which was shaped by high mortality, and this equilibrium
ensures the continuance of the agrarian society.
Mortality levels are not constant but fluctuate over
time. They represent an adjustment to unstable environments
as well as to changes in socioeconomic conditions. Fertility
in turn adjust to parallel mortality variations, but its fluctuation is not generally large. Under favorable cultural
patterns the fertility level is relatively high and constant
but well below the maximum because of a variety of balancing mechanisms (e.g., prejudice against widow re-marriage, the taboo on intercourse after childbirth, restraint on medical knowledge and practice', and malnutrition) which depress fertility. Any decline of mortality in such societies will trigger a spurt of population growth; hence their designation as having high growth potential.
Urban-Industrial Society—Incipient Decline Populations
Power and machines are widely used as the basis of 38
production in this type of society. The production processes
require special buildings and other expensive and complicated
capital equipment, an extensive division of labor based on technical specialization of function, and the diversification
of output of the factory system. The majority of the popu lation is engaged in non-agricultural occupations. Wealth
and personal income have reached a relatively high point, and
the level of living emphasizes material comforts, leisure and recreation, and better health and diet. A high proportion of the population is concentrated in metropolitan .areas, and urban ways of life and interests permeate the whole society.
There are more and better educational opportunities, and a high proportion of the population is literate. Mass communi cation and transportation networks are highly developed, thus enhancing physical and social mobility. Human relationships are largely impersonal, anonymous, transitory, and formal.
People participate less and less in local, intimate, neighbor hood groups; in fact they are often alienated from them, being attracted instead to segmental, special-interest groups or to large, diffuse secondary groups. The individual is free from many of the pressures of the extended family, the local community, and other traditional authority structures, and he tends to develop unique capacities and potentialities. There is an individual-centered culture with a new kind of motivation
(Hertzler, 1954:41). Personal achievement and aspiration are important factors in individual life, while the family, 39
although it retains its lessened reproductive functions, ceases
to be the basic productive unit and operates mainly as a
consumption unit.
The main features of this society are the advances i
in science and technology and functional specialization in
social organization which have reduced and facilitated the
problem of adjusting to an environment; and utilization of
the earth's resources is much more efficient. Technology is
not only a factor enabling the population to control its environment and bring about a transformation of the environ ment (Duncan, 1959:682).; it also has organizational and demo
graphic consequences. The population is free from the en vironmental restraints of the preindustrial era and is now subject to human control. Mortality was the first demographic process to change under the impact of this new condition, and death rates fell to low levels. Fertility also eventually adjusted to the consequence of these new social and cultural conditions (Thompson, 1953:33-37); Bogue, 1969:657). The improved standards of health and the development of formal institutions to support the elderly brought about substantial changes in the value of an additional child; the new occupa tional environment limited opportunities for child labor and required more costly training for children; and the prevalence of achieved status changed the preference system of individuals.
All these structural conditions are favorable to a small family. With the weakening of the extended family, the couple 40
would develop mobility aspirations and would elect a rise in
living standards in preference to increasing the number of
children (Thomlinson, 1965:20; Goldscheider, 1971:151). At
the same time, the attainment of family limitation is made
possible by the availability of effective methods of contra
ception.
With low levels of fertility and mortality, population
growth will be slow, if not zero. Since social systems are
seldom completely integrated (Hawley, 1970:196), change may
occur in one or another sector of society and may influence variations in fertility or mortality, but such variation will be small and will center around a low level.
The Developing Society--Populations of Transitional Growth
This is an agrarian society which is undergoing socio economic development, and its social structure and culture are in the process of becoming modernized. In other words, the agrarian components of society are gradually losing their significance in social life, whereas the urban components are becoming more and more prevalent. In this developmental process, population change occurs in response to change in social and economic conditions. It is in a society such as this that we want to study the demographic transition, because its dynamic nature makes it possible to understand the relationship between demographic transition and socio economic development and to observe its future development. 41
"Development" is inevitably a normative concept,
partially synonymous with growth or improvement. It includes
an enormous range of societal changes—social, economic,
political, cultural and personal. In this study, however,
our concern is mainly with the social and economic dimensions because they are the most important factors in shaping demo
graphic behavior. When we use the term "development" in relation to social and economic structure we are referring to a complex process which involves changing structures, establishing new ways of doing things, and developing new patterns of social organization. In this sense, development reflects change in the capacity of a society to utilize its resources to attain social objectives.
The basic question of development is how change is introduced into a social system. Generally, there are two kinds of sources: internal and external. The former is a result of accumulated culture or inventions of a society; r the latter results from cultural diffusion from other societies.
Whether by invention or through diffusion, the change tends to modify some economic structure, or some existing physical arrangement, or some transitional social pattern. Any change introduced in a society will have consequences for the entire system (Western, 1975:55), because development is not merely a matter of aggregates such as financial flows, capital output ratios and growth rates but involves the painful transformation of social institutions and human attitudes (Streeten, 1972:192), 42
An induced event may produce economic growth without develop
ment (Clower et. al., 1966), because it has not generated the
structural transformation necessary for development. In this sense, during the developmental process economic develop
ment may occur first, and be followed by social development.
Only in the later period of development are agrarian character
istics abandoned and those of urban society adopted (Frank,
1972a:325). It is this stage in which a significant demo
graphic transition occurs.
The level of development is a continuum along which
societies may be ranked high or low in their components as
they approach one end or the other of the developmental range.
When we compare the two polar extremes, agrarian society
and urban-industrial society, we find many' common elements
in each, but the magnitude or degree of importance of particu
lar elements varies substantially. These common elements
include demographic characteristics such as birth and death
rates, and more general social and economic characteristics such as level of educational attainment, availability of health
services, occupational distribution, family structure, and
so forth. When a society undergoes the transformation from
an agrarian to an urban-industrial state these characteristics
move from one end of the development continuum to the other.
The nature of these shifts is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In Figure 2.1 it can be seen that high levels of fer tility and mortality are associated with agrarian features; low 43
FIGURE 2-1
Illustrative summary of the demographic, social and economic transformation of society
Characteristics Agrarian Industrial
Demography
Size Small - to - Large Fertility High - to - Low Mortality High - to - Low Infant mortality High - to - Low
Social organization and economy
Agricultural occupation Major - to - Minor Non-agricultural occupation Minor - to - Major Educational attainment Low - to - High Social mobility Low - to - High Communication Direct - to - Indirect Standard of living Low - to - High Life expectancy Short — to — Long Fertility control of family planning Poor to — Effective Health care service Bad - to - Good Single status of women Restricted - to - Flexible Housekeeping role of women Emphasized - to - Unemphasized Family size Large - to - Small Population concentration Low - to - High 44
levels are associated with urban ones; and changes in demo
graphic characteristics run parallel to changes in the more direct indicators of social and economic development, but in
an inverse direction. In other words, as societies move
from an agrarian to an urban state, agrarian features are
weakened whereas urban ones become prevalent, and high
fertility and mortality shift to lower levels. Therefore, in the course of societal transformation, altering the social
structure brings about a demographic transition. This con- sideration of the relationship between the demographic transi
tion and socioecoixomic development is sketched in Figure 2.2 This figure_prov.ides_a_theqretical framework from which we
can develop the propositions guiding this study.
As we discussed above, the theory of the demographic
transition relates to a particular social change from a
traditional, agrarian society to a modern, urban society.
The fundamental assumption of the theory is that agrarian
societies that have undergone development will undergo a change
in demographic structure. In other words, during the process
of societal transformation, changes in social and economic
conditions will require an adjustment from the population.
The level of population change thus relates to the level of
socioeconomic development (Oechsli and Kirk, 1975; Stockwell,
1963). The main components of population growth—mortality and fertility—react differently to developmental conditions.
Mortality directly relates to the physical environment and/or FIGURE 2-2
An analytic framework of the demographic, social and economic transformation of a society
4S. U1 46
socioeconomic conditions, and a lowering of mortality is
universally valued. Fertility, on the other hand, is rooted
in cultural norms which were developed in response to a given
set of socioeconomic conditions; thus fertility decline will
not occur until social norms about the large family have
changed.
Theoreticians often posit that when change occurs
there is a tendency for basic values to persist longer than
other aspects of social structure and culture. According
to "cultural lag" theory, Ogburn (1922, 1955) asserts that
technology changes prior to and more readily than either social
structure or culture. This position corresponds with Parsons' (1966) view of the stability of the "pattern maintenance"
system. In this sense, mortality decline will come about as
soon as technological change permits an improvement in the
environment and living conditions. At the same time, with
technological change and industrial growth occurring in the
absence of social structure change, fertility may be freed
from the traditional restraints of the agrarian condition and
may rise further (Krause, 1954; Habakkuk, 1953; Peterson,
1960) . According to the "threshold" hypothesis (United
Nations, 1965), improving economic and social conditions are
likely to have little if any effect on fertility in a develop
ing country until a certain economic and social level is
reached. Once that level is achieved, fertility is likely to start declining and to continue downward until it is again M
stabilized at a much lower level. This hypothesis explains
the insensitivity of fertility levels to wide differences
in economic and social variables (Kuznets, 1970). Without social development or the capacity to change
their institutions and beliefs, societies will suffer from rapid population increase. This may produce a negative feed back between population change and socioeconomic development; that is, rapid population increase may retard socioeconomic development (see Figure 2.2 ). Most lesser developed countries have been in this dilemma. However, if social development can get started, then declining fertility will enhance socio economic development (see positive sign in Figure 2.2). With this background, we can now derive the following propositions:
Proposition 1: In the course of societal transformation, the
level of demographic development closely re lates to the level of socioeconomic development.
Proposition la: Mortality decline begins in the initial stage of development and it takes place consistently
as development progresses. Proposition lb:High fertility remains stable, or may even
increase during the initial stage of develop
ment, but it begins to decline significantly
in the later period of social development.
Mortality is extremely sensitive to variations in living conditions. Socioeconomic development, particularly 48
changes in the dimensions of agricultural production and
income, has improved human living conditions. Abundant
food, good clothing and warm dwellings can cause a vast
improvement in mortality (Wrigley, 1969:127-9). On the
other hand, medicine and public health measures protect the
people against disease, and generally improve mortality con
ditions. In the developed countries, mortality decline was
first achieved through socioeconomic development, but in
the developing countries medical and public health measures
more closely affect the pace and sharpness of mortality decline
In the lesser developed countries today, mortality decline
through the diffusion of technology has often been independent of developmental levels (Stockwell, 1963). ~~
Proposition 2: The direct effect of rising agricultural pro
duction, income, and health care service is to
reduce mortality.
The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between socioeconomic structure changes and
fertility. In regard to this point, we analyze those aspects of social organization that affect family size as well as the intermediate fertility variables of intercourse, conception and gestation (Davis and Blake, 1957). In recent years, many studies (Weintraub, 1962; Adelman, 1963; Russett, 1964; Heer,
1966; and Friedländer and Silver, 1967) have found a negative relationship between the birth rate and a society's levels 49
of education, urbanization, income, and degree of industrial
ization. During the process of socioeconomic development,
these variables move to a higher level and create a new milieu
wherein high fertility and large family size conflictswith
levels of livings, mobility aspirations and life style
(Goldscheider, 1971:150). At the same time, the dominance and centrality of family-kin groupings break down under the
influence of development (Goode, 1963: Chapter 4); and once
the bonds that tied individuals to broader kinship groups
are broken new behavioral and value patterns became possible.
A major contributing factor here is the constant mortality decline which is caused by the initial changes in economic and health conditions and which creates demographic pressure on agrarian structures. Since the normative number of children and the magnitude of the surplus of births is determined by mortality levels (Freedman, 1975), lowering the mortality level, particularly infant mortality which makes more surviv ing children visible, will reduce the desire for additional children. As we noted before, change in economic conditions " ) preceeds change in social conditions. This difference in timing is reflected in a different impact on fertility: the effect of economic change will be lagged while that of social change will be more immediate. 50
Proposition 3: The persistence of agricultural features in a
society (i.e., a large agricultural labor force
and the domestic position of women) hampers
fertility decline.
Proposition 4: The emerging features of urban society (i.e.,
increase in income, education, urbanization
and female employment) is favorable to fertility decline.
Proposition 5: The direct effect of mortality decline, es
pecially of infant mortality, is to reduce
fertility.
Proposition 6: The effect of social factors on fertility
decline tends to be immediate and that of
economic-industrial factors tends to be lagged.
Fertility change is directly related to the intermediate variables, and different societies will have different fertility values with respect to the several variables (Davis and
Blake, 1957). In traditional societies, birth control practice was limited and did not depend on the diffusion of contra ceptive knowledge. Rather, fertility was regulated mainly by abortion, infanticide, prolonged lactation and coitus interruptus. Fertility decline during the demographic trans ition has led to the question about the mechanism of the intermediate variables; that is, which of the variables are more conducive to the fertility transition. For example, <_ 51
the postponement of marriage was a major factor in Western
Europe J abortion played a key role in East Europe and Japan;
and in all the advanced countries modern contraception has
been used effectively to restrict fertility. In the develop
ing countries, if age at marriage can be increased it may
enhance fertility decline. However, while marriage is ex
tremely sensitive to economic conditions, this sensitivity
declines as the availability and efficiency of methods of
birth control increases (Hawthorn, 1970:88). Thus, age at marriage cannot be a determinant of fertility decline. Although abortion is the single most widely used method of birth control
in the world today (Freedman, 1966), its use decreases as the availability of easier methods increases. More recently, new contraceptive devices, which are more convenient and effective, have played an important role in the fertility transition. This suggests our final proposition:
Proposition 7: The use of birth control will be more effective
in reducing fertility than the postponement
of marriage.
The propositions presented here represent a theoretical description of the relationship between demographic change and socioeconomic development in the process of societal trans formation. They will be examined empirically as they apply to the case of Taiwan in Chapters IV and V. In the next 52
chapter (III) we first present a brief history of Taiwan and
its development in recent decades in order to provide a general background of societal transformation against which the pertinent demographic changes can be analyzed in the following chapters. CHAPTER III
TAIWAN’S SOCIETY: ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE
Taiwan did not begin its transformation to an indus-
tiral society until its restoration to the Nationalist Chinese
in 1945. Although the Japanese government developed the island
into a highly profitable colonial enterprise during the occu
pational period, fundamental changes in the Chinese culture
did not take place; and the extended family remained the basic
socio-economic unit. Recently, in a relatively brief span of
years, Taiwan has evolved under the leadership of the National
ist Chinese from a traditional, premodern society to an emerging
urban-industrial society. Individualism, as it is known in the Western world, has begun to emerge and to compete with
familism as a dominant value. The traditional family, unchanged
for centuries, is undergoing a dramatic change in response to cultural influences in the society and to internal' and commercial development in the large urban cetners. The transformation of the family has had important repercussions for the institutional structure of this society. This dynamic process and its social forces is presented and analyzed in this chapter.
53 54
GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY AND PEOPLE Geography
The island of Taiwan lies off the east coast of China, separated from Fukien province on the mainland by the
Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is about two hundred and fifty miles
from north to south, and together with its dependent islands
has an area of 13,885 spuare miles.
Taiwan is one of the most mountainous islands in the world. The main mountain range divides the island into two
unequal sections: the rugged, mountainous central and eastern
section which has little lowland available for productive
utilization; and the low, flat coastal plains and basins which
is the locus of most human activities. The latter area is
very limited, comprising only about one-third of the total area; and this shortage of land is one of the major handicaps
to the development of agriculture.
Taiwan is a tropical country. Nevertheless, there are marked regional differences of climate associated with the peculiar topography of the island. The average temperature of the low land areas remains above 15 degrees centigrade throughout the year, and the growing season is virtually con tinuous for most field crops. Rainfall is abundant, with annual average rainfall being about 2,580 mm. These climatic conditions are very favorable for plant growth. Moreover, the island's position in both temperate and tropic zones
(e.g., the tropic of Cancer runs through it not far from the 55
center), and wide altitudinal ranges permit a wide variety
of crop choices.
Although there is some potential for the development
of hydroelectric power, Taiwan has a very limited mineral
resources base. There is some coal, marble and natural gas,
but others are in short supply. The potentials of the country’s
land resources are principally conditioned by the dominant
properties and limitations of its major soils. The soils
are of variable fertility throughout the island, and in many
places they have been leached of their native fertility through
long years of use. In general, the soils of Taiwan are de
ficient in the important mineral plant foods, and all of the
soils demand intensive fertilization in order to counter this
infertility.
Historical Background Although it is known that the Chinese discovered
Taiwan, no historical record can be found to ascertain the date of their first settlement on the island (Chen, 1963:10).
For a long period, this neglected island was inhabited solely by aborigines who were scattered mostly along the coastal plains. Later, when the Chinese came, they were pushed into the mountains. The aborigines practiced hunting, fishing and shifting cultivation, and they were the ancestors of the present aborigines of the interior, the real Taiwanese. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, some 56
Chinese pioneers managed to migrate to Taiwan, despite an
imperial decree against it; and by the time the Dutch invaded
the island in 1624 the Chinese settlers numbered about 30,000.
When the Dutch arrived Taiwan was an exporter of deer skin, deer meat, sugar and rice. The Dutch established a few forti
fied outposts on the island, commenced trading across the
straits, and formed a limited government to minister to what
they took to be the civil and religious needs of the native
population. With a view to expanding their trade, the Dutch
also made an effort to cultivate the land to increase agri
cultural produce; and they also encouraged emmigration from
the Chinese mainland. Since earning a living was very hard
in over-populated Fukien province across the strait, people
flocked to Taiwan by the thousands, and by the middle of the
17th century the Chinese immigrants amounted to about 100,000.
Although the Dutch made a start on developing the island, their rule left nothing of lasting importance (Barclay, 1954:17).
The celebrated leader Cheng Ch’eng-Kung, known as Koxinga, drove the Dutch out of Taiwan in 1662, and established it as a Chinese territory. The first thing Koxinga did after his conquest of Taiwan was to transplant Chinese traditions to the island. This he did by opening schools for the edu cation of the young. He also ordered the construction of the first Confucian temple in Taiwan as a symbol of the contri bution of Chinese culture (Chu, 1961:28). Within a few years he had so developed agricultural production that Taiwan's 57 rice, sugar, and salt were on sale in the markets of mainland
Chuanchow and Changchow, and as far away as Japan and the
Philippines (Goddard, 1960:3). Under Koxinga's encouragement,
many scholars from the mainland of China migrated to Taiwan to build up the cultural life of the island (Goddard, 1960:3).
Both economically and culturally, Taiwan, at that time, was
more advanced than the Chinese mainland itself (Goddard, 1960:3) .
During this period there was continuous migration from
Fukien and Kwangtung provinces. These new migrants soon out
numbered the previous settlers, and they gradually spread
out over the flat area most suitable to intensive farming.
Little by little they displaced the aborigines from the low
lands, and pushed them back into the mountains. This steady movement from the mainland raised the population of Taiwan
to 250,000 by 1683 (Chen, 1963:48). Further, since both
Fukien and Kwangtun were largely civilized areas at that time,
the settlers in Taiwan possessed a high degree of civilization
(Chang, 1951:6). Koxinga’s reign was brief and stormy, however, and in 1683 his successor was dethroned by the Chinese emperor and Taiwan became a dependency of Fukien province. This dependency lasted until 1887, at which time Taiwan became a separate province of the Chinese empire. In 1894 war broke out between China and Japan, and at its close in 1895 the island was ceded to Japan. Taiwan, thus, was under the colonial 58 rule of Japan. After the end of World War II, Taiwan was
returned to Chinese sovereignty by the defeated Japanese.
Since then Taiwan has become an independent province of China.
The People
Although there are small numbers of people from Europe
and the Americas, the inhabitants of Taiwan fall into two
main ethnic groups: the aborigines, who are Malayan, and
the Chinese. The latter, comprised of immigrants and des
cendents of earlier immigrants from the mainland, is clearly
the dominant group. The majority of them trace their origins to Fukien province, and speak what is called the Amoy dialect.
These are called Hoklos. A smaller group is from Kwangtung
province. They are called Hakkas and have their own distinct forms of life and language. Together the Chinese comprise
about 97 percent of the population.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
The traditional society that emerged in Taiwan reflected
the social structure and cultural characteristics of the early
Chinese settlers. The main features of this society were
a landlord-tenant form of subsistence agriculture (Barclay, 1954; and Gallin, 1966); strong, male-dominated familism
characterized by filial piety, ancestor worship, and an
emphasis on maintaining the family lineage (Mackay, 1896;
Su, 1922 and Hsieh, 1967); a conservative educational system, 59
available almost exclusively to the children of the well-to-
do, that was oriented primarily to revering and preserving
the old traditions (Mackay, 1896; and Davidson, 1903); a
lack of medical and sanitation facilities (Davidson, 1903);
and a primitive demographic balance characterized by high birth and death rates.
This traditional society persisted more or less un
changed until the Japanese take-over in the late nineteenth
century. The changes that have taken place since then can be divided into two distinct periods: the period of Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945;. and the period since 1945. In the remainder of this chapter we shall examine briefly the major developments of these two periods.
TAIWAN’S DEVELOPMENT UNDER JAPANESE RULE, 1895-1945
The Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945 had a direct and vital impact on the modernization of Taiwan. The Japanese wanted both a source of food and a market for their home industries, and their program for the island was directed toward achieving these ends. In order to further these ends the Japanese government substantially improved Taiwan’s physi cal and socio-economic conditions, thereby contributing to the development of urban and' industrial life in that country
(Raper, 1954 : 8).
Economic Development Japan's objective was to see to it that Taiwan developed 60
as an agricultural exporter and as a market for industrial
products to be imported from Japan (Yin, 1953:23). Under
Japanese leadership, agricultural production was substantially
increased through the expansion of irrigation, the use of
commercial fertilizers, the adaption of improved crop seed,
and the introduction of foot-pedal rice threshers. Progress
was also made in industrial development, especially after
the establishment of a hydro-electric power system in 1919.
By the late 1930s and early 1940s, industrial development reached a peak; at this period, the large-scale industries
such as cement, aluminum, iron and steel, pulp and paper
were established. This development was emphasized in order
to support the Japanese invasions in Southeast Asia rather
than for the sake of over-all development of the Taiwanese
economy. Generally speaking, the industries developed by
the Japanese concentrated mainly on the production of semi
finished raw materials to be further processed in Japan rather
than upon the manufacture of finished goods for local con
sumption .
As this industrial development progressed in Taiwan, there was an increase in non-agricultural white collar occu pations. For the most part, however, the Japanese government and private industry recruited their personnel from Japan or from among the Japanese in Taiwan. They established a caste like status system for their own nationals, characterized by favoritism in employment, education and business opportunities 61
(Barclay, 1954:65-70). These new activities were spread thinly
among the Taiwanese, and most of them continued to be engaged
in the same agricultural pursuits their ancestors had followed for countless generations (Barclay, 1954:69).
Under Japanese rule, then, economic development in Taiwan was characterized by relationships of dependence upon
Japan; that is, it was a form of satellite development (Frank,
1972b:19-46), which was not autonomous to Taiwan, not self
generating, and not self-perpetuating. This status of sub ordination did not make Taiwan an "advanced" area, but instead restricted the evolution of the social structure, the ideologies, and the culture of Taiwanese society. At the same time, however,
Taiwan did experience substantial material progress, particu larly after the accelerated industrialization of the later period of Japanese rule. While the structure of society did not change much, the level of living of the masses did improve.
The period of Japanese rule thus played an important role in setting the stage for the present day.
Promotion of a Public Educational System The Japanese government established a program to make education available to the broad masses of people. However, this program was largely limited to the primary school level.
For example, in the 1943-44 academic year about 70 percent of the Taiwanese school-age children attended primary school; but the figures for secondary and higher education were far 62
less impressive: less than half the high school and less than
one fourth of the college students were Taiwanese (Cheng, 1953:13).
The modern education system established by the Japanese
government did not weaken the Chinese cultural influence. One
of the important factors in the preservation of Chinese culture
under the Japanese was the Taiwanese people’s retention of
the southern Fukien dialect. Another factor was the Japanese
belief in Confucianism as the highest standard of moral conduct.
It was precisely this belief which enabled the Taiwanese to
keep the Confucian temple intact as a symbol of ancient Chinese civilization (Huang, 1952:11). Thirdly, the traditional
conservatism of the Chinese was strong in Taiwan as well as on the mainland, and this was reflected in a preference for
their traditional values which would contradict the values
endorsed by the Japanese system (Davidson, 1903:602). Whatever influence the Japanese exerted on the Taiwanese people in the area of education was primarily in the fields of science and technology, whereas the cultural life remained predominantly Chinese.
The Improvement of Sanitary Facilities
One of the most urgent requirements facing the Japanese on their arrival in Taiwan was an improvement in sanitary conditions. The first steps taken by the Japanese were to clean the streets, and to improve, so far as they could, the 63
sanitary conditions of the cities. Hospitals were also
established by the central government, in addition to which
there were institutions maintained in the smaller places by
local funds (Davidson, 1903:612). By 1920, plague, cholera,
smallpox, and remittent fever which was native to Taiwan were
fairly well under control (Chen, 1955a:7-9). This situation
changed the Taiwanese attitudes toward medical science, and
had a significant impact on the nation’s demographic
structure.
Transportation and Communication Facilities
When the Japanese arrived the military were set to work at once building roads. The emphasis was at first laid on the military rather than on the economic aspect of such construction, but later, road building activities were somewhat coordinated to meet the needs of economic development. Along with road construction, harbor facilities were also developed and a railway system which was initiated by the Chinese was completed. By 1930, highway construction was well under way, and a close-connected highway network on the western plains of Taiwan was completed in subsequent years. These develop ments were followed by an increase in internal mobility.
Under the Chinese empire there was no postal service on the island, and a letter to an interior city always required a special messenger. During the Japanese occupation, however, every village had a post office, and mail was delivered regularly 64
to any city. There was also a telegraph under government
control, that was operated in connection with the post offices
(Davidson, 1903:622).
Chinese Social Organization
It was the general policy of the Japanese to leave
the basic social organization of the people intact, and to
utilize it to further their own economic and political control
of the population. As Barclay (1954:52) has pointed out, it
was advantageous to Japanese colonialism to maintain the
Chinese social and economic order which already existed in
Taiwan. It was by means of the traditional Chinese system,
which facilitated the maintenance of social control, that
Japan was best able to function as a colonial power and to
derive the greatest advantage from this area.
Of course, many new kinds of associations developed
after the Japanese took over, and in general the new forms
served to weaken the earlier folk organizations. For instance,
the Japanese early set up a hierarchical system of govern ment controls. Under this system the village became an ad
ministrative unit of the township rather than the seat of
authority, and this permitted a broadening of social conscious ness beyond the family to thé township and further. As a result, dependence on the clan and family as the sole means of security was lessened somewhat. For the most part, however, the fifty years of Japanese rule had little direct effect on 65
the traditional social life of Taiwan (Gallin, 1966:2). The
extended family continued to be of great importance, both
socially and economically; and the behavioral patterns of the
people were largely related to such matters as ancestor worship,
and the importance of the kinship group was stressed in all
relationships (Raper, 1953:200). One explanation for this,
as noted earlier, is the fact that the bulk of the Taiwanese
remained in agriculture. That is, the occupational shift
that is most important for the transformation of a rural-
agrarian society did not take place; thus, the economic and technological progress realized under Japanese rule did not
effect any real changes in Taiwanese cultural life.
TAIWAN'S DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1945
After the Japanese colonial power was destroyed at
the end of World War II, Taiwan was returned to Chinese sovereign
ty. This marked a turning point in the development of the
society. During these postwar years the Nationalist govern ment put forth a series of social and economic programs aimed to converting the island into a modern society. Among the particularly relevant programs were (1) an expansion of edu cational opportunities, (2) land reform, (3) the adoption and implementation of four-year development plans, and (4) the encouragement of foreign assistance and investment.
Educational Development and Reform
Under the Nationalists, free and unlimited education 66
was given top priority in the development plan for Taiwan;
and it was stipulated that every child must have an opportunity to progress from primary school through the university, with
the only condition being an individual's intellectual capacity.
The content of education was also changed, and in 1952 practical
subjects such as technology and field work were added to the
traditional curriculum in order to integrate education with
productive work. Further, in 1950 a broad program was launched
to eliminate illiteracy, and to give the general public some
supplementary education either to acquire knowledge or to learn
a trade. More recently, the importance the government attaches
to education can be seen by the fact that in 1968 there was
an extension of compulsory education from six to nine years.
Thus, in Taiwan today there is a well-established educational
system aimed both at assuring universal literacy, and at pro
viding extensive advanced education for those who qualify.
Land Reform
The Chinese Nationalist Government also instituted
a series of land reform programs. The first was the reduction of rent on private tenanted lands to a rate that was not to exceed 37.5 percent of the standard yield; the second per mitted the sale of public land to tenant farmers; and the third, known as the Land-to-the-Tiller Program, provided for the purchase of excess private tenanted land from landlords by the government and its resale to tenant farmers at a fair price. 67
In rural Taiwan the traditional way to amass wealth
was to become a landlord. Historically, this resulted in a
considerable concentration of landholdings, and tenancy became a significant feature of the social organization, with tenants
comprising the major element of the farm population. This
concentration of landholdings among a few large and powerful
families was a major obstacle to industrial investment. One consequence of land reform, then, was to encourage the transfer
of capital from investment in land to investment in industrial
and commercial enterprises. A corollary of this change was
to make farmland available for distribution to tenants. Also,
as the economic interests of former landlords have been focused
increasingly outside of rural areas, there has been a decline in the leadership formerly provided by the landlord or gentry class. Thus, land reform has led to a social as well as an economic transition.
The new owner-tenants cultivate their own land and make independent decisions as to production. They have made land improvements through the application of modern agri cultural technology, and they have been able to develop a self- confidence and sense of responsibility. Finally, since the traditional means for improving one's family status by acquiring more land and the advantages of being a landlord are no longer so readily attainable, the main outlet for those who have hopes of improving their econ omic conditions is to acquire some kind of business interest, 68
usually outside the rural areas. This situation has resulted
in an increase in mobility away from rural areas to the new
centers of employment.
Development Plans
The Taiwan that was returned to China in 1945 had
suffered great physical and economic damage during World War II. The economy was disrupted, agricultural and industrial
production was way down; and in addition to the needs of post
war rehabilitation, the island had to combat various other
problems, such as those imposed by the influx of 1.6 million
refugees from the mainland and a high birth rate, both of
which contributed to a substantial increase in local population
pressure at a time when Taiwan could not afford imports of
necessary foodstuffs and raw materials (Lew, 1965:24).
In order to further social and economic progress, the Government instituted a series of four year development
plans: the first one began in 1953; the present (sixth) plan will be completed in 1976. Since Taiwan’s economic activities were chiefly in agriculture, the development plans started with the promotion of agricultural production, plus the develop ment of certain light industries closely related to agricul tural development (e.g., communication and fertilizer pro duction). Meanwhile, the expansion of the hydro-electric power system was under way. By 1960, at the end of the second development plan, Taiwan had fully developed its agriculture and at the same time built up its light industries producing 69
finished consumer goods such as processed food, cosmetics,
textiles, machinery, etc. Since then the thrust of the develop
ment plans has shifted to the further development of industry
(Chang, 1975). As there has been considerable progress in
the development of light industries, the next emphasis will
be on heavy industries, such as machinery, steel, shipbuilding,
and automobile manufacture. In the coming development plan
the emphasis will be on the acceleration of growth of in
dustrial production and raising per capita income (Central
Daily News, 1975). The aim will be to accelerate the trans
formation of agrarian Taiwan to an industrial state.
Assistance Programs and Foreign Investment
After its return to China, various international
cooperation and assistance programs brought many foreign
technicians, civilians, and military men to Taiwan; and they have contributed much both to industrial development and to cultural change. To illustrate, the Agency for International
Development assisted Taiwan in its economic and industrial development; the Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction was implemented to improve the living con ditions of rural people as well as to increase the production of food and fiber; and the U; S. Information Service helped diffuse Western ideas to the local population.
The Nationalist Government also adopted a policy of encouraging private investment as a means of speeding up the industrialization of Taiwan. In this endeavor particular 70
emphasis was placed on securing the investment of foreign
and overseas Chinese capital. This measure was not only the
main source of capital formation, but it also brought a number
of advanced industries to Taiwan. These industries served
as an impetus to technological progress as well as the medium
through which the Western cultures were introduced into the
local communities.
Social Effects of Economic Development
The Nationalist Government has conducted a successful program of transforming a traditional agricultural society into an industrial one. These development programs exerted profound influences on the traditional social structure of
Taiwan, particularly as regards family life. These influences may be noted briefly as follows:
(1) The economy of Taiwan has come more and more to be dominated by a machine technology. One of the pre requisites of this development was the establishment of uni- versalistic criteria for evaluating performence, and another was a greater degree of specialized training (i.e., functional specificity in task performance) (Levy, 1949:218). Thus, in contrast to the particularism and diffuseness which char acterized traditional Taiwan society, individuals now obtain their jobs on the basis of individual competence and merit rather than on family position. Further, because of the increased diversity in Taiwanese industry, men and women are continuously performing tasks which are considerably different \ \ 71
and more specialized than those performed earlier in the society
These changes, by their nature, have disrupted the traditional
status and role relationships of family members.
(2) Modern consumer goods are available throughout Taiwan and even peasants in isolated villages have access to
such items. These goods have altered home living patterns, particularly among younger persons. More importantly, however,
these consumer goods have gradually changed the nature of work
functions, especially in lessening the work load of women.
Young women, particularly the unmarried, have been largely
freed from the drudgery of household chores and have increas ingly sought and been able to find employment outside the
family.
(3) Occupational opportunities created by industrial ization have attracted surplus manpower, notably youths, from rural areas. Thus, occupational diversification has enhanced personal mobility in Taiwan. The residential rule which encouraged the assembly of kinsmen in one locality is no longer as rigidly adhered to; and this change in residential patterns provides an important point of departure for other changes in family patterns (Murdock, 1964:202). (4) Reflecting the above noted improvements in the educational system, levels of both literacy and advanced edu cational attainment have risen, and are still rising. This has not only increased the technological capacity of the work force, but has also helped broaden people's outlook thus 72
facilitating the acceptance of social changes.
(5) The increased number of foreigners provided the
local population with firsthand contact with Western customs;
and familiarity with Western customs, such as those pertain ing to relations between sexes, the care of children, forms
of recreation, and types of housing provided the impetus for
corresponding local changes. For example, in sharp contrast
to their role in the traditional family, many Taiwanese women now enjoy an enhanced status and the role of companion to
their husbands, as is common in the Western family structure.
(6) Many Western ideas such as individualism, self- reliance, and values with regard to industry were introduced directly through the modern educational institutions and foreign agencies. Particularly, the spread of individualism affects solidarity between family members, and that of egal itarianism lessens subordinate relations between males and females, and between the young and old. Thus, the new ideas being created introduced a new basis for relationships between the sexes and between family members.
TAIWAN IN TRANSITION
Family life, religious practices, and social and cultural customs of the Taiwanese people have long been patterned after the Chinese system. The economic programs of the Japanese administration had little influence on the traditional values, but they did get Taiwan started on the road to economic modernization. When the island was returned 73
to Chinese sovereignty in 1945, the Taiwanese still had a
deep commitment to Chinese customs and family patterns; but
after having successfully implemented the various develop
mental programs, this commitment has lessened and today Taiwan
has replaced its traditional rural or peasant structure with
that of an emerging industrial society. Therefore, the year
of 1945 is taken as the departure point of socioeconomic trans
formation; the period before 1945 is the agrarian stage of Taiwan society, while from 1945 onward Taiwan is the stage
of socioeconomic development. Although the developmental
programs were implemented in the 1950's, the over-all trans
formation of society did not take place until 1960 when the
second development plan was completed. In order to under
stand how society changes we have divided the development period
into two stages: the initial stage of development 1949-1960,
and the transitional stage 1961-1972. In this final section
we shall document more explicitly tne nature of the changes
that have occurred in Taiwan during the post-war years. Table 3-1 shows the distribution of the Net Domestic
Product (NDP) by sector for the years since 1950, or when
such data first became available. Generally speaking, agri cultural production was the mainstay of the economy at that time, but industrial development has proceeded fairly rapidly since then and the proportion that agriculture contributes to the NDP has fallen gradually but consistently from roughly
35 percent in 1950 to 15 percent in the most recent year for TABLE 3-1 Changing pattern of net domestic product, Taiwan, 1951-1973 Total ..... -...... — amount Agri Con Transp. Com Others Year (NT$ culture Sub Manu Min Elec struc and merce million) total factur ing tricity tion comm. ing Initial period of development 1951 10,527 35.51 15.18 12.93 1.27 0.98 4.24 4.25 14.20 27.18 1952 14,653 35.70 13.50 10.78 2.09 0.63 4.40 3.82 18.71 24.42 1953 19,542 38.04 13.64 11.21 1.72 0.71 3.93 3.43 18.37 23.23 1954 20,761 31.46 16.73 14.36 1.85 0.52 5.28 3.69 17.55 25.95 1955 24,684 32.52 16.06 13.66 1.74 0.66 4.84 4.04 16.77 26.75 1956 28,079 31.19 17.33 14.36 2.21 0.76 4.82 3.90 16.94 26.96 1957 32,409 31.31 19.06 15.50 2.56 1.00 4.49 4.34 15.21 26.81 1958 35,921 30-95 19.55 15.43 2.93 1.19 4.30 4.11 15.35 27.26 19 59 41,592 30.26 21.20 17.59 2.94 1.12 4.35 3.90 14.62 26.93 1960 50,528 32.51 20.30 16.70 2.32 1.28 4.42 4.08 14.42 25.45 Transitional period 1961 57,012 31.31 20.56 16.93 2.09 1.54 4.38 4.75 13.95 1962 25.67 61,524 29.02 21.21 16.92 2.53 1.76 4.52 4.60 14.47 26.78 1963 70,763 26.64 23.34 19.60 2.09 1.65 4.63 4.35 14.75 1964 26.89 84,565 27.75 23.91 20.39 1.78 1.74 4.25 4.33 14.94 25.38 1965 91,559 26.99 23.64 19.88 1.91 1.85 4.58 4.75 14.90 25.92 196 6 101,967 25.73 23.86 20.21 2.00 1.74 4.74 5.38 14.36 26.73 1967 118,047 23.21 25.52 21.94 1.95 1.63 4.84 5.08 14.57 27.42 1968 136,074 21.51 27.01 23.68 1.64 1.69 4.94 5.57 14.35 27.46 1969 152,795 18.49 28.82 25.47 1.42 1.93 4.96 5.79 13.50 29.34 1970 178,195 17.65 29.58 25.94 1.45 2.19 4.52 5.79 13.19 30.19 1971 206,816 15.26 32.07 28.52 1.41 2.14 4.52 5.87 13.11 1972 29.99 241,320 14.87 34.54 31.10 1.33 2.11 4.42, 6.01 11.71 29.35 1973 303,573 15.06 35.08 32.36 1.03 1.69 4.99 6.09 10.97 29.03 Source: National Income of the Republic of China December 1974 75
which data are available (1973). Conversely, the percentage
contributed by industry has risen from 15 to 35 percent, with
manufacturing accounting for the greatest part of the increase.
These changes, which reflect the major economic trends
of the postwar period, were slow during the initial develop
ment years of the 1950's, but they have speeded up substantially
during the post-1960 transitional period. By 1973, industry
contributed by far the largest share of the NDP, and it was
in fact on a level comparable to that found in the more highly developed countries (e.g., in 1971 the portion of the NDP derived from industry was 34 percent in Canada, 32 percent in the United States, 36 percent in Japan, 40 percent in England and 42 percent in France) (Executive Yuan, the Republic of
China, 1974:168-75). However, in comparison with those countries, Taiwan still derived a fairly large share of its
NDP from agriculture--15 percent as opposed to about 5 percent in the preceding advanced nations. However, iq spite of this relatively large contribution from agriculture, Taiwan is no longer an agriculturally based economy. Rather, the data in Table 3-1 clearly indicate the dominant role that industry has come to play in the economy of this society.
Table 3-2 depicts some of the more significant social changes that have occurred since 1946. Inspection of this table reveals that at the end of the Second World War Taiwan was clearly a rural-agrarian society characterized by a low level of social and economic development. Since then, all TABLE 3-2A Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development, Taiwan, 1946-1973
Per capita Proportion of Per capita Per capita cir Hospital beds agricultural the total popu- annual number culation of per 1000 Year production lation living traveling by domestic mail, population in the five trailway and newspapers and largest cities highway printed materais Amount Percent Propor Percent Num Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent (NT$) change tion change ber change (Number) change (Number) chanqe Postwar andi agrarian period — 1946 NA 11.76 NA NA NA 1947 — NA 14.17 20.49 9.29 4.32 MB* MB* 0.34 1948 NA 15.18 7.13 10.41 12.06 3.93 -9.03 0.34 0.00 Initial period of development 1949 NA 17.35 14.30 11.44 9.89 4.13 5.09 0.30 -11.76 19 50 NA 17.69 1.96 11.26 -1.57 5.21 26.15 0.29 -3.33 1951 — 475 18.25 3.17 12.16 7.99 6.23 19.58 0.30 3.45 1952 644 35.58 18.46 1.15 12.58 3.45 7.66 22.95 0.29 -3.34 1953 881 36.80 18.91 2.44 13.5.1 7.39 9.55 24.67 0.29 0.00 1954 746 -15.32 19.11 1.06 14.81 9.62 11.52 20.63 0.29 1955 0.00 884 18.50 19.37 1.36 16.48 11.28 13.75 19.36 0.35 20.69 1956 933 5.54 19.75 1.96 18.16 10.19 17.01 23.71 1957 0.35 0.00 1047 12.22 19.93 0.91 19.69 8.43 23.43 37.74 0.36 2.86 1958 1107 5.73 20.15 1.10 21.10 7.16 31.18 33.08 0.35 -2.78 1959 1207 9.03 20.41 1.29 21.66 2.65 34.80 11.61 0.37 5.71 1960 1522 26.10 21.60 5.83 21.38 -1.30 33.22 -4.54 0.38 2.70 average 14.91 3.03 6.27 20.00 1.18
Note: NA = the data are not avilable
Proportion of Per capita Per capita cir- Hospital beds the total popu- annual number culation of per 1000 lation living traveling by domestic mail, population in the five trailway and newspapers and largest cities highway printed matem1s Amount Percent Propor- Percent Num- Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent (NT$) change tion change ber change (piece) change (piece) change Transitional period 1961 1601 5.19 20.90 -3.24 21.92 2.53 . 27.91 -16.00 0.37 -2.63 1962 1551 -3.12 21.07 0.81 19.93 -9.08 29.68 6.34 0.39 5.41 1963 1586 2.26 21.08 0.05 19.83 -0.50 31.25 5.29 0.38 -2.56 1964 1915 .20.74 22.20 5.31 22.66 14.27 32.43 3.78 0.37 -2.63 1965 1957 2.19 21.71 -2.21 24.01 5.69 30.05 -7.34 0.35 -5.41 1966 2019 3.17 21.83 0.55 25.03 4.25 28.18 -6.22 0.34 -2.86 1967 2061 2.08 22.43 2.75 25.82 3.16 29.40 4.33 0.38 11.76 1968 2144 4.03 25.11 11.95 26.88 4.11 32.24 9.66 0.42 10.53 1969 1971 -8.07 25.69 2.31 25.70 -4.39 34.42 6.76 0.36 -14.29 1970 2143 8.73 2.6.20 1.99 25.05 -2.53 37.67 9.44 0.40 11.11 1971 2105 -1.77 26.63 1.64 26.27 4.87 41.88 11.18 0.55 37.50 1972 2347 11.50 26.56 0.26 27.61 5.10 45.62 8.93 0.59 7.27 1973 2937 25.14 26.90 1.28 28.90 4.67 49.00 7.41 0.62 5.80 annual average 5.54 1.80 2.49 3.35 4.44
Source: (1) Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1973. (2) Household Registration Statistics of Taiwan 1962. 1959-1961. and 1946-1958 TABLE 3-2B Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development, Taiwan, 1946-1973
X J J. Ui. riupuiLiun Ui proportion or Per capita Infant Life the population the labor force the labor force annual income mortality expectancy aged 15 & over engaged in engaged in non- rate for males who graduated agricultural agricultural Year from junior activities activities middle school Propor- Percent Propor- Percent Propor- Percent Amount Percent Rate Percent Ages Percent tion change tion change tion change (NT$) change change change Postwar and agrarian period — 1946 NA 46.52 18.00 — — NA NA NA 1947 NA 46.54 0.04 19.33 7.39 NA NA NA 1948 NA 44.69 -3.98 19.86 2.74 NA NA NA Initial period of development 1949 3.67 — 42.69 -4.48 21.99 10.73 NA NA NA 1950 4.04 10.08 40.72 -4.61 20.96 -4.68 NA 35.32 — 52.90 _ 1951 4.37 8.17 39.74 -2.41 21.82 4.10 1275 — 34.47 -2.41 53.10 0.38 1952 4.42 1.14 38.77 -2.44 22.24 1.92 1716 34.59 35.27 2.32 56.50 6.40 1953 4.54 2.71 38.07 -1.81 21.70 -2.43 2215 29.08 33.67 -4.54 1954 58.30 3.19 4.51 -0.66 36.91 -3.05 22.29 2.72 2273 2.62 30.11 -10.57 59.86 2.68 1955 4.48 -0.65 35.81 -2.98 22.25 -0.18 2604 14.56 33.88 12.52 59.91 0.08 1956 4.37 -2.46 34.72 -3.04 21.62 -2.83 2858 9.75 33.11 -2.27 1957 59.79 -0.20 4.75 8.70 33.93 -2.28 22.68 4.90 3198 11.90 35.72 7.88 59.89 0.17 1958 4.77 0.42 32.55 -4.07 22.87 0.84 3434 7.38 34.93 -2.21 61.26 2.29 1959 4.93 3.35 31.76 -2.43 22.81 -0.26 3849 12.09 33.27 61.80 1960 -4.75 0.88 5.13 4.06 31.27 -1.54 22.95 0.61 4557 18.39 30.51 -8.30 61.80 0.00 Annual average 3.17 -2.93 1.29 15.60 -1.23 1.59
Note: NA = the data are not avilable.
03 TABLE 3-2B: (continued)
Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of Per capita Infant Life the population the labor force the labor force annual income mortality expectancy aged 15 & over engaged in engaged in non- rate for males who graduated agricultural agricultural Year from junior activities activities middle school Propor Percent Porpor- Percent Propor Percent Amount Percent Rate Percent Ages Percent tion change tion change tion change (NT$) change change change Transitional period 1961 .5.32 3.70 31.12 -0.48 23.18 1.00 4953 8.69 30.71 0.44 62.26 0.74 1962 5.42 1.88 30.61 -1.64 23.34 0.69 5189 4.76 29.11 -5.21 62.62 0.58 1963 5.61 3.51 30.19 -1.37 23.74 1.71 5782 11.43 26.35 -9.48 63.25 1.01 1964 5.80 3.39 29.68 -1.69 23.77 0.13 6728 16.43 23.87 -9.41 63.75 0.79 1965 5.82 0.34 28.68 -3.37 23.37 -1.68 7082 5.26 22.19 -7.04 64.52 1.21 1966 6.06 4.12 27.97 -2.48 23.50 0.56 7677 8.40 20.19 -9.01 64.14 -0.59 1967 6.36 4.95 26.77 -4.29 24.81 5.57 8669 12.92 20.56 1.83 64.22 0.12 1968 6.38 0.31 27.09 1.20 25.13 1.29 9758 12.56 19.05 -7,34 63.95 -0.42 1969 7.19 12.70 26.83 -0.96 30.19 20.14 10712 9.78 17.53 -7.98 65.12 1.83 1970 7.14 -0.70 25.81 -3.80 29.89 -0.09 12214 14.02 15.65 -10.72 66.08 1.47 1971 7.52 5.32 25.52 -1.12 32.29 8.03 13863 13.50 14.64 -6.45 66.43 0.53 1972 7.79 3.59 24.47 -4.11 34.28 6.16 15849 14.30 14.84 1.37 66.77 0.51 1973 NA 23.13 -5.48 35.44 3.38 19571 23.48 NA 65.72 -1.57 Annual average 3.96 -2.26 3.61 11.96 -5.75 0.48
Note: NA = the data are not available. Source: (1) Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1973 (2) Household Registration Statistics of Taiwan 1962, 1959-1961, and 1946-1958.
kO 80
of the indicators have moved in the direction of a more modern
society. However, not all of them changed at the same rate
at the same time. Some of them (e.g., per capita agricul
tural production, the transportation and communication indexes)
changed more rapidly during the initial development years
from 1949-1960, whereas others (e.g., proportion engaged in
manufacturing, infant mortality) changed most rapidly during
the later transition period.
Careful examination of these and other differences
revealed in Table 3-2 suggests a definite pattern to the modern
ization process. This is a process that begins with the
development of agriculture. In the initial period of develop
ment, an increase in agricultural productivity is achieved
through the application of modern techniques. As we have
discussed previously, this began in Taiwan with land reform
and continued through the first two economic development
plans during which farmers changed their traditional procedures
and increased output to a surplus level, thus providing capital
for industrial development (Hsieh and Lee, 1966:2). Meanwhile,
the expansion of communication and transportation systems enhanced the dissemination of information and facilitated personal mobility beyond the local area, particularly from rural to urban areas (In 1949 the high percentage of the pop ulation in urban areas is not the result of rural-urban migration on Taiwan, but is due to the large influx from the mainland). As agricultural development proceeded, per 81 capita incomes rose and the whole traditional way of life began
to change. New motives, new desires, and a new sense of values
with regard to industry emerged, thus giving an impetus to
the industrialization aspect of the modernization process
during the 1960's; and today (1973) Taiwan is on the threshhold
of becoming an urban-industrial, modern nation.
The process of over-all socio-economic development
has had a profound affect on the traditional family system
which is the backbone of Chinese society, and this has had a
depressing effect on fertility and family size (Yang, 1966:37).
Table 3-3 shows some of the changes in family life that have occurred since 1946. For example, the proportion of women
at the childbearing ages engaged in housekeeping work has
fallen from 65 percent in 1949 to 48 percent in 1972. That
is, more than half of the childbearing age women are engaged
in productive work outside the home. Today, the women of
Taiwan are no longer confined to the roles of wife and mother.
Rather, reflecting increases in educational attainment as
well as changes in occupational structure which have created
more suitable jobs for women, Taiwanese women have today gone on to enter every profession and occupation, and become active
participants in every aspect of social life.
To take another example, the percentage of the female
population aged 15 and over who are unmarried has risen from 23 percent in 1946 to 31 percent in 1973, and the crude marriage rate has fallen from about 12 to 8 per 1000 population. 82 TABLE 3-3 Trends in selected indexes of family life, Taiwan, 1946-1973
Average Proportion of Crude Proportion of Proportion of person per the economic marriage the childbear married women Year household ally active rate ing population accepting female popula engaged in contraceptive tion unmarried housekeeping devices work Percent Num Percent Propor■ Percent Rate Percent Propor Percent Propor change ber change tion change change tion change tion Postwar and agrarian period 1946 6.09 23.4 NA NA NA 1947 5.80 -4.76 25.0 6.84 11.83 NA NA 1948 5.71 -1.55 25.7 2.80 9.28 -21.56 NA NA Initial period of development — 1949 5.55 -2.80 26.3 2.33 9.49 2.26 64.92 NA 1950 5.52 -0,54 25.2 -4.18 9.58 0.95 64.60 -0.49 NA 1951 5.46 -1.10 24.8 -1.59 9.55 -0.31 63.17 -2.21 NA 1952 5.45 -0.20 24.7 -0.40 8.64 -9.53 64.82 2.61 NA 1953 5.50 0.91 24.8 0.40 8.80 1.85 65.51 1.06 NA 1954 5.58 1.45 24.7 -0.40 8.92 1.36 66.73 1.86 NA 1955 5.57 -0.20 24.9 0.81 8.57 -3.92 66.93 0.30 NA 1956 5.54 -9.54 25.0 0.40 8.26 -3.62 67.01 0.12 NA 1957 5.55 0.18 25.2 0.80 7.87 -4.72 67.90 1.33 NA 1958 5.56 0.18 24.7 -1.98 8.23 4.57 69.30 2.06 NA 1959 5.58 0.36 24.5 -0.81 8.44 2.55 69.18 -0.17 NA 1960 5.56 -0.40 24.1 -1.63 7.75 -8.18 69.13 -0.07 NA annual average -0.23 -0.52 -1.40 0.58 Transitional period NA 1961 5.57 0.18 23.9 -0.83 7.51 -3.10 70.13 1.45 1962 5.59 0.36 23.9 0.00 7.68 -2.26 70.06 -0.10 NA 1963 5.61 0.36 24.3 1.67 7.35 -4.30 69.51 -0.79 NA -0.42 2.4 1964 5.60 -0.18 24.8 2.06 7.62 3.67 69.22 4.5 87.50 1965 5.60 0.00 25.6 3.23 7.29 -4.33 67.51 -2.47 -1.35 5.3 17.78 1966 5.60 0.00 26.8 4.69 7.36 0.96 66.60 6.4 20.75 1967 5.57 -0.54 27.4 2.24 7.37 0.14 58.61 -12.00 28.3 3.28 7.50 1.76 58.55 -0.10 6.4 0.00 1968 5.54 -0.54 3.13 1969 5.64 1.81 29.1 2.83 7.40 -1.33 56.35 -3.7b 6.6- -0.43 b - b 3.03 1970 5.60 -0.71 29.9 2.75 7.50 1,35 56.11 -7.47 11.9 75.00 1971 5.55 -0.90 30.3 1.34 7.20 -4.00 51.91 1972 5.50 -0.90 31.2 2.95 7.42 3.06 48.07 -7.40 NA 1973 5.43 -1.28 30.8 -1.28 7.92 6.74- NA NA Annual 29.60 average -0.18 1.92 -0.13 -2.91 Note: NA = the data are not available. Source: (1) Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1?73_ (2) Taiwan Demographic Fact Book 83
The latter decline occurred largely during the initial years
of development, whereas the former has continued throughout
the 1960's. Both of these indicators measure the incidence
of family formation, thus suggesting a decline in the rate
of family formation in Taiwan since development began. Such
changes imply an increase in the period of non-familiar wage
earning between completion of school and marriage, and this
has demographic as well as economic consequences. That is,
this changing pattern of family formation is in conflict with
the traditional emphasis on early marriage and childbearing
to maintain the family line, and it is an indication of another
change in the basic structure of the Chinese family—the
weakening of parental authority.
The weakening of the traditional family structure is
further illustrated by a decline in the average size of house
holds, from just over 6 persons to 5.4 persons in 1973. The
size of households is not a true means of family size because many family members who work outside of the family form their
own household units. Therefore, decreasing the household
size might be caused by members living away rather than by
a decline in fertility. However, whatever the reason at this
point, the decline in average household size suggests further
changes in the traditional extended family structure.
Finally, although data are available only for the most recent period, it is apparent that contraceptive usage is gaining in Taiwan. In 1964, an island-wide family planning
Bowling Breen Univ, liiiraij 84
program was launched by the Organization of Family Planning
Committee under the Taiwan Provincial Health Administration.
This program introduced the Lippes Loop, an intra-uterine
device, as the major contraceptive method. In the first year
of the program nearly 2.5 percent (50,250 cases) of the married
women accepted contraception, and in 1971 nearly 12 percent
accepted. During this eight-year period, the number of married
women who used a contraceptive device increased by six times,
and by the end of 1971, a cumulative total of more than one
million married women on the island had tried the loop, pill
or condom (Chow, 1974:108). Thfs number represented approx
imately 50 percent of all married women in Taiwan. Today's
young people of marriageable age look forward to not more than
two or three children, and the goal of the family planning
program is to reduce this to two (New York Times, 1974).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Though Taiwan has made important progress, it is still
in a transitional period from the stage of labor-intensive
to the stage of capital-intensive industrial development;
and there are many problems confronting future progress. In
agriculture the further extension of cultivated land will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible; and the effective use
of working capital inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides,
improved seeds and labor have nearly reached a saturation point. There is thus an urgent need to accelerate the economic
transformation. Ten major government-sponsored programs are presently underway on Taiwan, the collective aim of which is 85
to further strengthen the island's infrastructure and promote
further development in the years to come.
Economic development is far more than a mere tech
nological or physical transformation. It is more fundamentally
an organizational transformation of old ways of life and work into new rules of inter-personal behavior; and this in turn
is possible only to the extent that people are able to make
revisions in their traditional basic values and convictions.
For centuries Chinese traditions have inculcated the strong feeling that family heads owe it to their ancestors to work
as diligently as they can so as to achieve the means necessary
for rearing their children well, and in this way pass on the
family line from generation to generation. This orientation
ensures the posterity of Taiwan's society, but the cost of
rearing many children is quite expensive in a modern society.
The expense of having many children to perpetuate the family line conflicts with raising the standard of family living, and
has had an effect in bringing about a transformation of the family.
There is in Taiwan a stable government committed
to progress. The government uses its power and leadership
capabilities in continually transforming old behavioral norms
into new ones that enable the Taiwanese people to be more
effective in creating and putting to greater use increasingly more productive technologies. Also, effective action has been taken to encourage parents to practice family limitation, 86
and there is some evidence that the old family-kinship domin
ance is being replaced by a new individualism. We believe
that the Taiwanese family has already lost many of its tradi
tional characteristics and has taken on many aspects of the
Western family (Hsieh, 1967:73-5). Since the traditional
rural or peasant structure of Taiwan society was based on
the family institution, it can be expected that the develop
ment of the urban structure of Taiwan society will be
accelerated in the future. Changes in family structure and/or
social structure will have a significant implication for
population change. In the next two chapters, the pattern
of demographic change and its relationship with socioeconomic development will be investigated in detail; the social organ ization and the changes described in this chapter provide the background for this analysis. CHAPTER IV
THE PATTERN AND PROCESS OF POPULATION GROWTH
Population change is an integral part of the social
and economic development process. In the preceding chapter we examined the trends of economic and social development in
Taiwan during recent decades. In the present chapter we
shall examine population trends in relation to these economic and social trends, and then illustrate the dynamic inter relations among these two processes.
POPULATION GROWTH IN TAIWAN
Demographic statistics are not available for Taiwan until the Japanese occupation. The Japanese established a system for collecting population data on an annual basis, and they also conducted a series of seven censuses, the first one in 1905, the second in 1915 with one every five years thereafter. These two systems of data collection continued to function after the restoration of Taiwan to the Republic of China. They have become the main sources of demographic statistics today, and they are the basis for the present population analysis. This analysis will look at population trends for two broad periods: (1) the period of Japanese occu pation from 1905-1942; and (2) the postwar period of develop ment from 1946-1972 (data are not available for the 1943-45
87 88
war years). This latter phase will be examined in terms of
(a) the initial period of societal development (1949-1960),
and (b) the most recent period of transition from 1961-1972.
The Trends of Population Growth
The population of Taiwan has increased rapidly, par
ticularly since the end of World War II. In 1905 the total
population numbered slightly more than 3 million. Some
30-odd years later, when Japanese rule came to an end, there
were more than 6 million persons (see Table 4-1). Since 1946
the population has risen to 15,289,048 and is now more than
five times as large as it was in 1905.
Further examination of Table 4-1 reveals that the rate of population growth was smallest at the beginning of
the period under investigation (0.7 percent per year), but
the secular trend until fairly recently was upward—as was
the case with European populations just before the Industrial
Revolution. The annual growth rate reached 2.5 percent in 1925 and remained around that level throughout the remainder of the period of Japanese rule. Immediately after World
War II the growth rate shot up, reaching a peak of 8.7 percent in 1949. This large but short-lived increase was due to heavy migration from the mainland following the exodus of the Nationalists. Throughout the 1950's growth rates remained high, generally well above 3 percent, but during the 1960’s a decline set in and by . 1972 the annual growth rate had fallen 89 TABLE 4-1 Population size and annual growth rates: Taiwan, 1905 1972
Year Number Growth rate Year Number Growth rate (percent) (percent). Acrarian Deriod Postwar period 1905 3,055,461 — 1946 6,090,860 — 1906 3,075,375 0.65 1947 6,495,099 6.64 1907 3,097,052 0.71 1948 6,806,136 4.79 1908 3,118,516 0.69 1909 3,146,505 0.90 Initial period 1910 3,186,605 1.27 1911 3,243,178 1.78 1949 7,396.931 8.68 1912 3,294,448 1.58 1950 7,554,399 2.13 1913 3,349,072 1.66 1951 7,869,247 4.17 1914 3,392,936 1.31 1952 8,128,374 3.29 1915 3,414,388 0.63 1953 8,438,016 3.81 1916 3,435,034 0.61 1954 8,749,151 3.69 1917 3,482,084 1.37 1955 9,077,643 3.75 1918 3,499,706 0.51 1956 9,390,381 3.45 1919 3,538,631 1.11 1957 9,690,250 3.19 1920 3,566,381 0.73 1958 10,039,435 3.60 1921 3,632,647 1.86 1959 10,431,341 3.90 1922 3,607,371 1.78 1960 10,792,202 3.46 1923 3,763,548 1.79 Average 1924 3,827,112 1.69 annual rate 3.92 1925 3,924,574 2.55 1926 4,010,485 2.19 % change 1927 4,096,057 2.13 1949-•1960 +46 1928 4,186,518 2.21 1929 4,284,902 2.35 Transitional period 1930 4,400,076 2.69 1931 4,514,820 2.60 1961 11,149,139 3.31 1932 4,639,226 2.76 1962 11,511,728 3.25 1933 4,759,197 2.59 1963 11,883,523 3.23 1934 4,882,288 2.59 1964 12,256,682 3.14 1935 4,990,131 2.21 1965 12,628,348 3.03 1936 5,108,914 2.38 1966 12,992,763 2.89 1937 5,261,404 2.99 1967 13,296,571 2.34 1938 5,329,860 2.50 1968 13,650,370 2.66 1939 5,524,990 2.45 1969 14,334,862 5.01 1940 5,682,233 2.85 1970 14,675,964 2.38 1941 5,823,682 2.65 1971 14,994,823 2.17 1942 5,989,888 2.70 1972 15,289,048 1.96 Average Average annual rate 1.85 annual rate 2.94
% change % change 1905-1942 +96 1961-1972 +37 Source: The data for 1905-1943 are taken from Statistical Abstract of Taiwan Province 1962. The. data for^ 1946-1972 are taken from Statistical Abstract of_ the Republic of China 1973. 90
below 2 percent.
The pattern of Taiwanese population growth described
above, and depicted in Table 4-1, differs notably from that
which characterized the modern European nations during their
demographic transition. To see this difference more clearly
it is necessary to examine the overall population growth
trend in terms of its basic components.
Sources of Population Growth
There are two sources of population growth: (1) natural
increase, or the balance between births and deaths, and (2) net
migration,, or the balance between the number moving in and
out of an area. As noted in Chapter III, migration played a major role in the early settlement of the island; and mi gration from the mainland contributed some to population growth throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. By 1895, when the Japanese occupied the island, the population had reached
2.5. million. During the period of Japanese rule, 1895-1945, migration from the mainland was ended, partly by Japanese policy and partly because the island itself was densely popu lated in relation to its agrarian economic base. In fact, this period was actually characterized by fairly consistent rates of net out-migration (see Table 4-2), and population growth was due entirely to natural increase. In-migration was again very heavy immediately following World War II, and some slight gains were recorded during the 1950's; but none of these was sufficient to offset the fact that natural 91
TABLE 4-2 Components of population growth: Taiwan, 1906-1972 (Rate per 1000 population)
Year Natural Net Year Natural Net increase migration increase migration rate rate______rate______rate______Agrarian period Postwar period — — 1906 5.30 -0.01 1946 1907 6.80 -0.15 1947 20.16 +4.43 1908 6.27 0 1948 25.33 +10.52 1909 9.26 -0.10 1910 14.09 +0.05 Initial period 1911 15.85 -0.06 1912 16.77 -0.09 1949 29.22 +47.56 1913 16.13 +0.06 1950 31.82 +21.06 1914 14.05 +0.01 1951 38.40 +4.79 1915 8.50 + 0.32 1952 36.74 +2.72 1916 8.53 +0.62 1953 35.79 +2.00 1917 13.90 -0/09 1954 36.46 + 1.25 1918 5.32 -0.20 1955 37.70 +2.83 1919 11.80 -0.16 1956 36.82 + 1.03 1920 7.32 -0.16 1957 32.93 +0.56 1921 18.78 -0.20 1958 34.07 + 1.14 1922 17.18 -0.46 1959 33.95 +0.55 1923 17.80 -0.20 1960 32.58 +0.27 1924 16.87 +0.11 1925 16.69 -0.45 Transitional period 1926 21.72 +0.28 1927 21.38 +0.11 1961 31.58 +0.30 1928 22.12 +0.06 1962 30.93 +0.14 1929 23.01 -0.08 1963 30.14 -0.02 1930 25.99 -0.08 1964 28.80 -0.09 1931 25.09 -0.09 1965 27.22 -0.02 1932 23.99 -0.04 1966 26.96 + 0.01 1933 25.01 -0.08 1967 23.01 + 0.81 1934 24.61 -0.12 1968 23.80 -0.09 1935 25.12 + 0.26 1969 22.88 -1.72 1936 24.26 +0.33 1970 22.26 + 0.02 1937 25.53 +1.73 1971 20.86 -0.18 1938 24.15 -1.96 1972 19.43 -0.79 1939 24.59 -1.49 1940 24.02 -1.67 1941 25.26 -1.51 1942 22.84 +0.19
Source: (1) The data for 1906—1942 are taken from Statistical Abstract of Taiwan Province 1962. (2) the data^for 1946-1972 are taken from Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China 1973■ 92
increase has been and continues to be the main source of
population growth in Taiwan (e.g., over 90 percent of the
total population gain since 1910 was contributed by natural
increase) (Chang, 1966:21).
During the early years of the 20th century, the rate
of natural increase was 6 per thousand population. This is
as large as the rates that prevailed in more developed countries
during the period from 1750 to 1850 (United Nations, 1973:
518). In 1910 the rate rose to 14 per thousand. Thereafter
it accelerated fairly rapidly, although there were occasional
setbacks, reaching a peak during the 1950s when rates in excess of 35 per thousand were experienced in several years. During
the most recent decade a pronounced reversal has taken place, and the annual rate of natural increase has fallen from 31 to less than 20 per thousand.
Changes in Fertility and Mortality
Since natural increase is a function of the balance between births and deaths, an adequate understanding of the changes in the pattern of population requires a knowledge of trends in mortality and fertility. Historically, the trend has been for both to decline, with changes in growth rates reflecting differences between these two components with respect to the timing of decline. Since the fall in mortal ity usually preceded the equally fundamental decline in fertility, and since fertility changes are best understood 93 against the background of declining death rates, it is both
logical and useful to begin with a discussion of population
changes brought about by mortality.
Mortality--Vitai statistic rate trends in Taiwan since
1906 are presented in Table 4-3. Inspection of these data
reveals, first of all, that the crude death rate has undergone
a pronounced decline during the 20th century. In 1906 the
crude death rate was 34.4 per thousand, well above that pre vailing in more developed countries (e.g., for the 1906-1909 period, average crude death rates were 14 for Sweden, 15 for
England and Wales and for the United States, and 20-21 in
France and Japan) (United Nations, 1973:112-113). Mortality declined fairly consistently during succeeding decades and by 1942 the crude death rate had reached a level of 18.4 per thousand. Thus, in thirty-six years (1906-1942) the death rate of Taiwan had fallen by 47 percent, which is a much faster decline than that experienced by any of the "modern" nations. After World War II, mortality declined even more rapidly
Between 1947 and 1960 the death rate fell from 18 to 7 per thousand, or by 78 percent in a scant 13 years. The downward trend has continued since 1961 but the rate of decline has slowed down considerably. By 1972 the death rate had reached its lowest level of 4.7 per thousand. Thus, although the mortality transition in Taiwan began much later than that in
Europe, it took much less time to fall to a level comparable 94
TABLE 4-3 Vital rate trends in Taiwan, 1906-1972 (Rates per 1000 population)
Year Crude Crude Infant Year Crude Crude Infant birth death mortality birth death mortality rate rate rate rate rate rate Agrarian period Postwar period — — 1906 39.71 34.41 154.09 1946 — 1907 40.32 33.52 146.05 1947 38.31 18.15 167.00 1908 39.45 33.18 155.83 1948 39.67 14.34 J 1909 41.53 32.27 155.45 1910 42.54 28.45 147.68 Initial period 1911 42.89 27.04 150.36 1912 42.52 25.75 140.45 1949 42.36 13.14 *36.19 1913 41.95 25.82 152.44 1950 43.29 11.47 35.32 1914 42.77 28.72 161.07 1951 49.97 11.57 34.47 1915 41.37 32.87 183.63 1952 46.62 9.88 35.27 1916 38.40 29.87 177.23 1953 45.22 9.43 33.67 1917 41.94 28.04 .160.87 1954 44.63 8.17 30.11 1918 40.86 35.54 187.17 1955 45.29 8.59 33.88 1919 39.58 27.78 173.43 1956 44.84 8.02 33.11 1920 40.56 33.24 176.27 1957 41.39 8.46 35.72 1921 43.73 24.95 158.52 1958 41.65 7.58 34.93 1922 42.76 25.58 170.07 1959 41.18 7.25 33.27 1923 39.95 22.15 148.84 1960 39.53 6.95 30.51 1924 42.41 25.54 174.63 Av- annual 1925 41.53 24.84 172.40 rate 43.83 9.21 33.87 1926 44.80 23.08 155.17 1927 44.25 22.87 160.40 % change -7 -47 -16 • 1928 44.80’ 22.68 166.93 1949- 1960 1929 45.26 22.25 156.49 1930 45.94 19. 95 151.11 Transitional period 1931 47.02 22.00 161.43 1932 45.05 21.03 153.71 1961 38.31 6.73 30.71 1933 45.35 20.34 149.37 1962 37.37 6.44 29.11 1934 45.75 21.14 155.36 1963 36.27 6.13 26.35 1935 46.12 21.00 146.55 1964 34.54 5.74 23.87 1936 44.61 20.35 145.78 1965 32.68 5.46 22.19 1937 45.89 20.36 144.78 1966 32.40 5.45 20.19 1938 44.52 20.37 145.71 1967 28.47 5.47 20.56 1939 45.08 20.49 139.57 1968 29.26 5.47 19.05 1940 44.16 20.14 135.50 1969 27.92 5.04 17.53 1941 42.17 16.81 122.94 1970 27.16 4.90 15.65 1942 41.21 18.37 126.10 1971 25.64 4.78 14.64 Av. annual 1972 24.15 4.72 14.84 rate 42.94 24.21 155.77 Av. annual rate 31.18 5.53 21.22 % chancre +4 -47 -18 -52 1906- 1942 % change -37 -30 1961- 1972 ote : * indicates an estimated figure. ource: (1) The data for 1906-1942 are taken from C. H. Chen and S. C. Tsai, "The trends of fertility and mortality in Taiwan," Journal of the Bank of Taiwan, Sept. 1955. (2) The data for 1947-1972 are taken from Taiwan Demo graphic Fact Book, 1972. (3) Infant mortalitydata^for 1947-T948 are taken from D. J. Bogue, The Principles of Demography (New York: John Wiley and Sons). 95
to that experienced by more developed countries.
Mortality levels are of course influenced by the age
composition of a population, and the recent very low death
rate of 4.7 is partly a reflection of the overall youthful
ness of Taiwan’s population (e.g., from 1906 to 1972 the aged-
child ratio has increased, but its value has never exceeded
8 percent). As might be expected, mortality declines have
not been uniform for all ages (see Table 4-4). From 1906 to 1940, the death rate fell more among school-age children
(5-9) and teenagers (10-19) than among adults (20-59), whereas
the rate for infancy (under 1), pre-school children (1-4) and the aged (60+) fell less. After World War II, from 1949 to 1960 death rates continued to decline at all ages, but now the biggest declines in the death rates occurred among the pre-school children; the infant death rate also showed a more rapid decline. The reduction of death rates for all ages continued during the most recent decade, but with the exception of the infant mortality rate, which is declining much faster than before, the rate of decline has slowed down.
The more rapid decline in infant mortality in recent years would have a "younging" affect on overall population age composition (e.g., the age structure of the population in 1972 was as follows: under 15 years-“38 percent, 15-64 years— 59 percent, and 65 years and over—'3 percent); and as suggested earlier, this would tend to reinforce the observed decline in the crude death rate. TABLE 4-4 Age-specific death rate trends in Taiwan, 1906-1972 (Rates per 1000 population)
Year __ Age-specific death rate ------—------■ - ° 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-59 70-74 75-79 80+ Agrarian period 1906 212.1 59.0 16.8 9.1 11.3 15.6 19.9 24.4 28.5 33.4 39.5 46.3 56.7 70.3 1915 276.8 49.7 11.9 91.8 141.3 — 5.9 8.6 13.3 17.3 21.2 26.2 28.9 33.7 42.2 54.3 67.1 86.6 151.9 — 1920 268.2 52.4 13.9 7.2 11.2 17.0 21.5 25.6 27.8 30.1 33.1 38.7 48.1 60.5 80.9 134.7 — 1925 270.3 41.5 6.7 3.6 5.6 8.2 10.6 13.7 17.2 19.7 23.4 28.2 37.2 51.3 __ 1930 165.2 27.8 4.0 68.3 116.5 — 2.5 4.5 6.3 7.8 9.0 10.9 14.1 17.5 21.4 28.8 39.1 -- 1935 161.3 30.2 5.4 55.8 103.3 — 3.3 . 5.0 7.0 8.1 9.5 11.8 15.3 18.4 23.9 32.1 41.3 58.5 117.6 — __ 1940 147.3 33.2 4.9 2.7 4.3 6.2 7.2 9.1 11.0 14.0 17.6 24.3 — 1945 — 31.7 43.5 57.9 117.6 — % change-31 -46 -71 -70 -62 -60 -64 -63 -61 -58 -55 -48 1906-1940 -44 -38 -37 -17 Initial period- 1949 55.7 29.1 3.9 2.6 2.7 4.2 5.2 6.4 7.9 11.5 14.7 20.5 __ 1950 28.7 39.0 49.3 108.3 — 39.8 25.3 3.4 2.2 2.2 3.5 4.3 5.3 6.3 9.7 12.6 18.2 27.1 36.5 48.7 108.0 — — 1951 40.4 24.9 3.5 2.0 2.1 3.4 4.4 5.4 6.5 9.2 11.9 16.0 22.4 34.4 46.9 112.0 — — 1952 37.2 18.2 3.2 1.7 1.8 2.9 3.6 4.4 5.5 7.4 1953 9.7 13.2 19.2 30.3 42.4 100.4 — — 35.8 16.9 2.5 1.4 1.6 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.9 6.8 — — 1954 9.7 13.1 19.8 30.4 44.1 104.9 32.2 11.1 1.9 1.1 1.4 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.7 5.9 9.0 — — 1955 12.7 19.0 28.2 41.3 99.0 36.9 13.4 1.8 1.1 1.3 2.0 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.6 8.6 — — 1956 12.3 18.8 29.4 43.6 103.7 35.9 9.9 1.6 1.0 1.3 2.2 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.8 7.9 12.4 18.1 — — 1957 28.6 43.9 107.4 37.3 12.6 1.7 0.9 1.4 2.2 2.5 3.1 4.2 5.6 7.8 — — 1958 12.5 18.6 28.7 46.0 107.0 37.9 9.7 1.4 0.9 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.9 3.8 5.4 7.0 11.5 — — 1959 17.4 26.5 41.2 95.4 35.9 8.7 1.3 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.2 2.8 3.7 5.0 6.5 10.8 1960 17.3 26.4 40.9 60.7 96.6 198 J 32.4 7.9 1.1 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.2 2.8 3.6 5.0 6.6 10.8 17.1 25.5 % change-42 41.1 63.9 99.6 1995 ! -78 -72 -69 -52 -52 -58 -56 -54 -57 -55 -47 -40 -35 1949- 1960 -17
k0 cn TABLE 4-4: (Continued)
Age-specific death rate 0 5-9 KRT“15-19 TO-24'"25-29 10^34 T5- 3 9 40-44 4 5"-4 9 "50-54 “55-50"60-64 ”55=09"70-7T"75-70'"BUT Transitional period 1961 32.7 7.5 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.9 2.1 2.6 3.4 4.8 6.6 10.6 16.6 26.1 38.9 61.3 95.8 194 1962 31.3 6.4 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.6 6.5 10.1 16.0 25.1 38.9 62.4 95.8 196 1963 28.4 5.9 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.5 6.8 9.3 15.2 24.6 37.7 61.5 92.3 195 1964 25.5 4.9 0.8 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.3 3.2 4.4 6.4 9.3 15.1 24.4 36.9 59.7 90.2 176 1965 23.7 4.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.9 4.1 6.2 9.0 14.6 23.8 35.2 57.6 86.2 168 1966 22.1 4.3 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.2 3.0 4.3 6.1 9.0 14.2 23.6 37.3 58.2 89.0 177 1967 21.1 4.3 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.0 4.2 6.2 9.4 13.8 23.6 37.3 60.7 93.3 185 1968 21.3 3.7 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.9 4.1 6.2 9.7 13.7 24.5 37.8 62.9 98.5 185 1969 19.5 3.4 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.8 3.9 5.9 9.2 12.8 22.5 35.6 55.3 90.0 164 1970 17.4 2.9 0.6 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.6 5.6 8.8 12.5 22.9 35.9 57.0 88.1 166 1971 16.0 2.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.6 3.6 5.3 8.5 13.0 21.8 34.5 55.7 84.0 165 1972 16.4 2.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.7 5.3 8.2 12.9 19.9 34.2 53.0 83.2 165 % change -50 -73 -45 -37 -31 -32 -24 -23 -24 -23 -20 -23 -22 -24 -12 -14 -13 1961-1972
Source: (1) The data for 1906-1940 are taken from Chen Shao-Shiang, "Population growth and social change in Taiwan^ The Journal of Archaeology and Anthropology (National Taiwan University),
(2) The data for 1949-1962 are taken from Taiwan Demographic Fact Book, 1972.
V) 98
Fertility—Fertility has been fairly well under control
in more developed countries since the early part of the
present century. However, the decline of the birth rate in
Taiwan did not really get underway until the late 1950s.
In 1906 the crude birth rate was 39.7 per 1,000 (see Table
4-3), which was substantially above that prevailing in more
developed countries (e.g., for the period of 1905-1906 the
average rate of birth in Sweden and England and Wales was
about 25 whereas that of France was around 20 per 1,000).
During the first half of the 20th century the Taiwanese birth
rate followed an upward trend, and persisted at a level of
44-46 until the Second World War. There was a slight decline
immediately after the war, but then there was a pronounced
"baby boom" during which the crude birth rate rose to nearly
50 per 1,000. This baby boom seems to have ended in the mid-
1950s. Since then the level of fertility has fallen off, and by 1972 it had reached 24 per thousand. In just two decades
the Taiwanese birth rate had fallen from 50 to 24 per thousand,
or by more than 50 percent. This fertility decline is the decisive phase of the demographic transition, and is one that took anywhere from 100 to 200 years in most Western countries.
Against this background then, one can say that Taiwan has experienced a truly remarkable fertility transition.
As with mortality, the decline in fertility was not uniform across all age groups (see Table 4-5). From 1949 to 1960 the biggest declines occurred among the older age 99
TABLE 4-5 Trends in age-specific birth rates: Taiwan, 1940-1972 (Rates per 1000 population) Year Age-specific birth rate 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-4~9
Agrarian period 1940 100 321 301 280 213 99 Initial period 1949 61 241 290 264 186 111 27 1950 61 246 297 269 191 112 30 1951 68 287 350 311 226 132 34 1952 53 272 342 294 220 113 29 1953 48 265 336 292 218 108 27 1954 48 263 334 292 218 104 27 1955 50 273 341 295 219 103 25 1956 51 264 340 296 222 105 23 1957 45 249 325 275 197 92 17 1958 43 248 336 281 199 90 14 1959 46 258 334 270 190 86 14 1960 48 253 333 255 169 79 13 % change 1949-1960 -21 +5 +15 -3 -9 -29 -52 Transitional period 1961 45 248 342 245 156 71 10 1962 45 255 338 235 145 65 10 1963 41 252 337 231 139 60 10 1964 37 254 335 214 120 52 8 1965 36 261 326 195 100 41 6 40 274 326 188 91 38 6 1966 4 1967 39 250 295 158 70 28 1968 41 256 309 161 68 26 4 1969 40 245 298 151 63 23 4 1970 40 238 293 147 59 20 3 1971 36 224 275 134 51 16 3 1972 35 208 257 117 41 13 2 % change 1961-1972 -22 -16 -25 -52 -74 -82 -80
Source: (1) The data for 1940 are taken from C. H. Chen and. S. C. Tsai, "The trends of fertility and mortality in Taiwan," Journal of the Bank of Taiwan, Sept. 1955. (2) The data for 1949-1972 are taken from Taiwan Demo graphic Fact Book, 1972. 100
woman. Rates for women in their thirties and the youngest
teenagers declined more slowly whereas those for women in their
twenties were still increasing. From 1961 to 1972, however,
the birth rates for women in their twenties also declined
while the declines among older women were accelerating. Thus,
the reduction of fertility has tended to become more pro
nounced.
Balance Between Fertility and Mortality
In the preceding section we described the separate
trends of fertility and mortality. Here we will look at them
together and see how they have produced population growth
in Taiwan. The long-time trends of fertility and mortality
exhibit the following outstanding characteristics (see
Figure 4-1).
1. Before 1909 both birth and death rates were at
a relatively high level, with the birth rate slightly higher than the death rate. The gap between them was narrow so that
the rate of population growth was slow. However, the existence
of a high birth rate indicated a potential for rapid growth.
2. In the period of 1910-1914 the birth rate increased
slightly while the death rate decreased. The slight widening
of the gap between them marks the beginning of the transitional
period of population growth.
3. During the 1915-1925 period both birth and death
rates fluctuated widely from year to year, thus causing population growth rates to fluctuate, but still at a fairly 101
FIGURE 4-1
Crude birth and death rates: Taiwan, 1906-1972 (Based on Table 4-3)
year
I = Agrarian period ' II = Agrarian period with economic-industrial development III = War and postwar period IV = Initial period of socioeconomic development V = Transitional period of society 102 low level.
4. From 1926 to the end of World War II, the birth
rate tended to fluctuate mildly at a fairly high level while
the death rate declined slowly but fairly consistently, thus
causing a slow rise in the growth rate to a level of
2 to 2-1/2 percent during the war and the immediate post war period.
5. Immediately after World War II, the death rates decreased steadily and rapidly, while the birth rate rose to a peak in the early 1950s, thus producing a very substantial increase in the rate of population growth. After this postwar
"baby boom," a sustained and fairly rapid decline in the birth rate set in whereas the pace of mortality decline slowed down.
The expanded gap between birth and death rates started to narrow, and the rate of population increase began to slow down as Taiwan neared the completion of its demographic transition.
A closer examination of the rate trends depicted in
Figure 4-1 reveals that birth rates tend to fluctuate or move inversely with death rates, with a lag period of a year or slightly more; and in the period of societal development, both birth and death rates move downward. This observation sug gests (1) that the conditions which affect mortality also influence fertility, but mortality is more sensitive to them, and (2) that there is a feedback between mortality and fertility with either mortality or fertility change requiring an adjustment from the other. 103 In agrarian societies, both fertility and mortality
are uncontrolled and changes in such conditions as production
technology and the environment will affect mortality as well
as fertility. However, the response of fertility will be
slower than that of mortality because of the lag time it takes for any change in reproductive behavior to show up in
birth rates. When the transition began, declining death rates
and increasing birth rates quickly brought about a population
growth rate that reached the upper-limits set by the resources
Thus, Malthusian and biological checks (e.g., malnutrition
or subfecundity) operated to curb fertility increase and
mortality decline.
To illustrate, mortality decline may increase the
proportion of women entering the childbearing age, and then
increase the birth rates. High birth rates in turn may cause
high infant mortality because of limited resources. On the
other hand, during the process of societal development, social
and cultural norms change to favor fertility decline, and
fertility as well as mortality come under control and the population growth created by mortality decline is slowed. In other words, the population growth curve does not follow a straight line but rather exhibits a cyclical pattern, thus adjusting to variations in social and economic conditions.
POPULATION GROWTH AND SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION
In this section we shall consider the conditions under which fertility and mortality are reduced. In this endeavor we shall investigate the variations and fluctuations in the 104
population variables before, during, and after the shift
from an agrarian to an urban-industrial type of society.
Our primary concern at this time will be to describe the
path of demographic transition from high to low fertility and
mortality in relation to the general conditions of the evolu
tionary process of social change. The more meaningful questions
of their cause, and whether certain conditions are favorable
or necessary will be taken up in the next chapter.
The Agrarian Period
The agrarian stage of Taiwan's growth and development
can be divided into two periods: the early, pre-industrial
period of relatively low rates of population growth, and the
later period characterized by the beginning of both economic
development and transitional population growth.
Early Agrarian Period—This period, which lasted until l about 1925, is characterized demographically by high birth and death rates and a relatively low rate of population growth
(Chen, 1957; Chuang, 1966). As noted in the preceding chapter,
Taiwan was a rural-agrarian society when the Japanese occupation began late in the nineteenth century. Agricultural technology was traditional and backward; social life centered on family and clan; superstition was widespread; infectious disease raged endemically with little effective control. Human life on the island was very much at the mercy of nature.
Since the backward technology limited the capacity 105
for controlling the physical environment, the growth and
stability of society had to be maintained by adjusting the
demographic side of the equation, and this was achieved by
social institutions which adjusted fertility behavior to the
prevailing levels of living and mortality conditions. In
other words, rates of birth and death are high and in an
unstable equilibrium in a pre-industrial setting (Hawley,
1973:1199). As society grows, particularly as technological
advances occur that lead to increases in productivity and
that facilitate movement and communication, this vital
equilibrium is upset. The growth potential of population
is released by a decline in the death rate while the birth rate remains stable at a high level, or sometimes even increases. Taiwan represents a good illustration of this pattern of societal growth. Following their occupation in 1895, the Japanese used their technology and capital to improve the island’s physical, social and economic conditions. The first programs introduced into the island related to agricultural development and the improvement of sanitary facilities. The development of agriculture included both increasing the amount of land under cultivation and increasing the productive capacity of the labor working on the land. The increase in production provided a better diet for the local people as well as raw materials for the motherland. Medicine and public health measures were also introduced to help control diseases, par- 106
ticularly epidemics of infectious disease.
These changes in the mode of food production and health
care services quickly released the Taiwanese population from
its heavy dependence on nature, and opened the way for in
creasing population growth. These changes influenced both
a rise in fertility and a drop in mortality, and produced
an initial widening of the birth-death gap. Because the
improvement of the physical environment did not proceed far enough, the initial opening of the demographic gap was small and fluctuated in an unstable manner with ups and downs in both birth and death rates.
The developmental programs carried out by the Japanese expanded beyond agriculture to other aspects of Taiwanese society, and included the establishments of industries, a public educational system, and a communications network.
At the same time, the provision of immunization services and training programs for medical personnel were also estab lished (Chen, 1957:9-10). All these programs were to have a significant effect on many aspects of life: (1) they in fluenced changes in attitudes toward the way of life, par ticularly with respect to medicine and technology (Chuang, 1966:286-7); (2) the people were well protected from disease and levels of health improved; (3) social and physical mobility increased and activities expanded beyond the local community; and (4) the proportion of school-age children attending primary school increased. In other words, these 107
programs inaugurated a new period of Taiwanese development.
Taiwan at this time was on the threshold of both socioeconomic
development and demographic modernization.
Late Agrarian Period—From 1926 until the Second
World War, Taiwan was characterized by a high fluctuating
birth rate and a steadily declining death rate, so that this
late agrarian stage was marked by an increasing rate of
population growth. These demographic trends reflected both technological change and food increases. Mortality is
directly influenced by improved health and nutrition. As
noted earlier, it was among teenagers and young adults that
the biggest mortality declines occurred, whereas progress in
the reduction of infant and childhood mortality was slow. The health of children, and especially of infants, depends to a great extend on nutrition, hygiene, pure food and water, and the care which the parents are able and willing to give
(World Population Conference, 1974:46; E/CONF.60/3); and
Taiwan at that time was not well organized in this respect.
The immediate effect of mortality decline then, was to raise the survival chances of married couples as child-producing units. The same improvements in health and nutrition that enhanced adult survival also served to increase the physio logical capacity to reproduce (e.g., by reducing subfecundity and sterility, and also by diminishing rates of spontaneous abortion and stillbirth) (United Nations, 1973:74). At the same time, the cultural norm stressing familism still provided 108
a strong incentive for a large family. These various con
ditions and factors all combined to influence a slight in
crease in fertility during the late 1920s.
Birth rates persisted at a fairly high level until
1939, at which point a downward trend begins. Can this initial decline be regarded as the start of the fertility
transition in Taiwan? The percentage decline of fertility
that we can measure during this short period, 1939-42 (data
are not available on the war years) did not reach the 10 per
cent criterion which Knodel (1974:57) suggested as the way
to measure the start of the transition. If it is not the
beginning of the transition, how does one account for the
decline in the birth rate? There are two possible explana
tions we may cite. First, during the period of World War II,
many young men were recruited to serve in the army, thus disrupting marriage and child bearing (Sen, 1952:11). Second,
changes in age structure may be operating as the young adult ages, which usually experience the highest fertility, were smaller at this time reflecting the influence of the severe epidemics experienced during 1915-1919 (Chen, 1955b:49-50).
These two factors may suggest that the birth rate decline during this period was not the beginning of the fertility transition but just a temporary setback reflecting a unique situation.
In this section we have noted a close relation between demographic change and the process of industrial and agricultural 109
development in Taiwan during the period 1905-1942. That
is, changes in the modes of production, in either agriculture
or industry or both, influenced a rise in the birth rate and
a fall in the death rate. As the agrarian features of
Taiwanese social organization did not change very much during
this period, development proceeded within an agrarian setting
The agrarian features of the social structure served to reinforce an increase in the birth rate by promoting early
marriage, not only because this was a traditional Chinese
norm, but also because economic prosperity facilitated
marriage by more readily providing dowries and bride prices.
The increase in Taiwan's population during the 1906-1942
agrarian period was similar to that which took place in a
number of old European agricultural societies before the
18th century (Ohlin, 1967), and that which occurred in Japan
during the period from 1868 to 1945 (Taeuber, 1960). This
was a classic Malthusian situation in which population in
creased as the food supply increased because the associated
rise in incomes and prosperity raised birth rates and lowered
death rates. But this does not suffice to explain the long term growth trends. As noted by Taeuber (1952:31-32), the population increase that accompanies industrialization is transitory. The economic-industrial development in Taiwan during the Japanese rule, like that which occurred in Japan itself, did not disturb the traditional culture. While it served to initiate mortality decline, it did not produce any 110
of the conditions necessary to reduce fertility. Population
thus increased because fertility behavior was enmeshed in
a web of institutionalized relationships (Hawley, 1973). Not until the social structure takes on an urban character does a new vital equilibrium emerge (Taeuber, 1952:32).
However, the population dislocations during this period did
exert a pressure for changes in the agrarian aspects of social
structure in Taiwan, thus paving the way for later demo
graphic changes.
The Period of Socioeconomic Development
From 1946 onward, Taiwan has undergone substantial
social and economic development, and it has experienced a
partial transformation from an agrarian to urban-industrial
state. However, the pattern of this transformation has
varied greatly over time, with different implications for
demographic change. To facilitate our description we have
divided this period of socioeconomic development into two
substages: the initial stage and the transitional stage.
The Initial Stage of Socioeconomic Development—
During the period from 1949 to 1960, certain developmental programs initiated economic and social change in Taiwan.
First, industrial development was speeded up and the economy started shifting from an agrarian to an industrial base.
Second, land reform changed the nature of social organization, reducing tenancy in rural Taiwan and encouraging a transfer Ill
of investment capital from land to industrial and commercial enterprises. Third, the expanding educational program
emphasized secondary and higher education, and more and more
people were able to participate in it.
As Taiwan has progressed toward a higher level of
urban-industrial development it has been reflected in asso ciated demographic changes. From 1946 on, mortality decline
has been steady and fairly rapid, but fertility has followed
two distinct trends. First, beginning in 1946, the birth
rate experienced a substantial increase, reaching a peak
of 49 per thousand during the period of 1951-1952. One
possible explanation for this increase may be an improvement
of vital registration under the leadership of the Chinese
government. However, a good part of the increase is due to
a real "baby boom" during this period. One important con
tributor to this increased fertility is the changing age
structure; the number of women at ages 20-24 years increased
rapidly during this period. This reflects both the high birth rates and declining death rates in the 1930-1935 period.
Thus the immediate postwar period saw a high proportion of young people enter the childbearing ages. On the other hand, the rapid postwar economic recovery in the absence of any marked change in the socio-cultural sphere created a very favorable condition for an increase in reproduction.
Under the influence of a high birth rate and a steadily declining death rate, Taiwan experienced a short population 112
"explosion." Even though agricultural development continued,
this rapid population increase threatened to nullify the effects of the increases in food production. To illustrate,
between 1947 and 1960, increases in rice production just
barely kept pace with the increase in population (Ke, 1963: 23-24); and after 1960, per capita food production actually
declined (e.g., from 193 kilograms in 1952 to 152 kilograms
in 1974) (Chang, 1976). If societal development is to continue
there has to be a feedback between population growth and
economic growth. Fortunately, for Taiwan, socioeconomic development had progressed far enough to enable an acceleration of industrial growth, which then became the major basis of production and reduced the significance of agriculture and the influence of traditional social structure. As a result, a positive feedback, fertility decline, was built into the development process. The most important contribution to this development during this period lies in a change in marriage patterns and in the role of women in the Chinese family; specifically, the postponment of marriage and an increase in the propensity of women to work outside the family.
Although these changes were slow and gradual, they do illus trate the breakup of the family-kinship dominance which created conditions favorable to a decline in reproduction; and after 1956 there begins what has been a sustained decline in the birth rate. It is at this point that the fertility transition in Taiwan began. The sustained decrease in the 113
birth rate following the "baby boom" has contributed to a
reduction in the rate of population growth. This positive
adjustment of demographic behavior would be very helpful
to continued economic development in Taiwan. Let us now
take a closer look at this most recent period of development.
The Transitional Stage of Socioeconomic Development—
The formidable difficulties posed by rapid population growth
in Taiwan during the postwar years were removed by large
capital inflows to industry (e.g., in the form of foreign
aid and investment), land reform and mass increases in edu
cational attainment. The demands for social and institutional
adjustment in the transition from a traditional agricultural
economy to an urbanized industrial society are high in the
best of circumstances. Taiwanese society during the 1949-
1960 period had passed a certain level of development, (e.g.,
at which the problem of sustenance is solved), and from 1961 onward the development of industrial and urban organization proceeded at an accelerated pace. The family during this transitional period experienced large increases in the costs of meeting parental responsibilities (i.e., the provision of adequate nutrition, health services, education, housing and other amenities for the children). Such changes encouraged parents to think in terms of a smaller family. As noted by Chen (1963:276-279), and Freedman and Takeshita (1969:
3-33) , a major proportion of the population prefers a small family to the large one. This means that the Taiwanese 114 people have been motivated by the new emerging objective
conditions to reduce fertility.
After 1960 the decline in fertility was very rapid,
with the crude birth rate falling from 40 to a level of 24
per thousand in 1972. In just 12 years, fertility was reduced
by 37 percent; and the annual rate of population growth fell
from 3.3 percent to 1.9 percent/ or by slightly more than
40 percent. Since mortality has continued to decline in
the most recent period this slowing down in the rate of population growth is due solely to the very pronounced fer tility declines that have taken place.
It does seem, then, that socioeconomic development
and major reductions in the birth fate were closely asso
ciated in Taiwan. The fact that this occurred "naturally"
in Taiwan (i.e., the beginning of fertility decline came
before the days of effective family planning programs)
suggests that "transition theory" can be applied to cultures other than those of Western Europe. However, the pace of the fertility transition has been faster in Taiwan than it was in Europe. The major reason is probably the pace of social change in general; that is, just as Taiwan was able to take a shorter route to urban industrial development so too was she able to speed up the process of demographic modern ization. This latter change has likely been facilitated by a strong family planning program. Since 1959, many social and political leaders in Taiwan have been attracted to the 115 population problem, and an experimental family planning pro
gram was started in 1964. Since then, the government estab
lished the Taiwan Family Planning Act in 1968 and Population
Policy Guidance in 1969 and the program has become an island
wide one. This indicates that the government in Taiwan is
very much interested in controlling population growth, and
this could have the effect of further enhancing fertility
declines as socioeconomic development progresses.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Following the transformation from an agrarian to an urban-industrial society, Taiwan has undergone a demographic transition. But the transition of both fertility and mor tality exhibited a different speed and pattern in the stages of socioeconomic development. In the initial stage, as agri cultural and economic development and improved health services proceeded in a traditional setting, a moderately high birth rate rose even higher while mortality decreased. If we look at the demographic transition in terms of declining mortality, it may be said that Taiwan’s population was in transition from about 1910 onward. But this mortality decline was more in keeping with the Malthusian model rather than transition theory; and it was not until.1956, when socioeconomic develop ment began to have an effect on social structure, that birth rate declines took place. As societal development went further, the birth rate decline accelerated while the death rate decline slowed down, and Taiwan seemed to be approaching 116
a new demographic balance between low’birth and death rates.
The lag between the transitions of mortality and fertility decline was only about 50 years in Taiwan, as compared to
100-200 years in most modern European nations.
The demographic transition in Taiwan is not yet com
pleted, and the question arises: Will it be completed in the
near future? If natural resources are available, if a mature
urban-industrial organization is developed, and if the
family planning program is effectively promoted, it is pro bable that the demographic transition will be completed
soon. However, the infants born during the postwar high
fertility years will soon comprise a large proportion of the childbearing age population. This change in the age structure of the population will pose a challenge to the continuation of a decline in fertility; and it will also entail a considerable increase in numerical growth. Thus, even if fertility continues to fall, and population growth ultimately comes to an end, it will not be until after several decades have elapsed. in
CHAPTER V
THE DYNAMIC PROCESS OF FERTILITY
AND MORTALITY DECLINE
In the previous chapter we noted that the progress
of the demographic transition in Taiwan is closely related
to the stage of socioeconomic development, particularly during
the most recent post-1960 period. Although Taiwan's socio economic development began in the early years of the 20th century, the demographic transition, especially fertility decline, did not begin until the mid-1950s. Since then both fertility and mortality decline have taken place at an accelerated pace. As is well known, progress in social and economic development is highly conducive to this trans ition. Indeed, the transition to low levels of both fertility and mortality may be regarded as an important part of the process of societal development (Oechsli and Kirk, 1975:392), and in fact, population change did not occur in Taiwan until the society had progressed to a certain level of social and economic development. In this chapter we present an empirical investigation of the relationship to date between societal development and the demographic transition, the specific causes of the movement to the control of fertility and mor tality at low levels, and the conditions which may be necessary
117 118
for the transition to be completed in Taiwan.
DATA AND METHODS
Before discussing the causes and conditions of mor
tality and fertility decline, we need to state briefly the
methods used to analyze the data in this chapter. Due to
the lack of earlier social and economic data, only the 1949-
1972 period is included in this analysis. Fortunately, however,
this period encompasses the major socioeconomic and demo
graphic changes with which we are here concerned. The data
for the study are time series data, and time periods are the
basic units of analysis for the study (rather than areas or
individuals). A total of 24 such units (years) is covered
by the present investigation. These 24 years are divided
into two broad time periods: (1) the period of initial
development, from 1949 to 1960; and (2) the transitional
period, from 1961 to 1972. Much of the analysis to follow
will compare rates of socioeconomic and demographic change
during these two periods. As a society moves from agrarian to urban, its com
ponents do not all change at the same pace in a given time.
Rates of development, as well as rates of decline in mortality
and fertility, have all tended to accelerate over time
(Beaver, 1975:105). The obvious implication here is that when one studies the relationship between socioeconomic develop ment and the demographic transition, one must examine changes in the two sets of variables at different times. However, 119
due to limitations with respect to the availability of data,
most studies so far have been limited to the cross-sectional
approach in which countries are the units of analysis, and
in which socioeconomic-demographic comparisons are made for
specific points in time. This approach does not provide a
chance for observing change over time (Heer, 1966; Beaver,
1975). In particular, it is difficult to observe fertility
levels in the early stage of development and their subsequent
decline during later stages. The time-series analysis pro
posed for the present study is an attempt to avoid this
difficulty. It must be pointed out, however, that time-series data
may impose certain limitations on this study. First, the
values of variables used in the study are standardized by
total population, and a change in total population may cause
a change in the value of a variable. For example, an increase
in per capita income between two points in time may reflect
a decline in the rate of population increase as well as a
rise in the rate of income. Thus, one has to raise questions
such as: Is it possible that the accelerating development
in recent years in Taiwan is caused by a lowering of the rate of population increase? In this case, a negative answer can be given. An examination of the percentage change of the absolute value of the socioeconomic valiables indicated that they were increasing three to six times faster than the rate at which population growth was being reduced. Similarly, it 120
can be shown that the recent acceleration of fertility decline
is due more to a reduction in the number of births than to
a slowing down of the annual increase in the size of the
base population.
A second problem concerns the interrelation between
socioeconomic development and population change. As was
noted in the last chapter, socioeconomic development preceded
the demographic transition. This prompts such questions as:
can the relatively high birth rate during the early period
be cited as an obstacle to earlier economic development in
Taiwan? and, can the rapid birth rate decline in the later
period contribute to an acceleration of socioeconomic develop
ment? As was shown earlier in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, changes
in social and economic characteristics during the postwar
years were steady and rapid, particularly those relating
to educational attainment, per capita income, and non- agricultural employment. Since the Second World War, the
progress of socioeconomic development and mortality decline
have coexisted with high fertility and rapid population growth
in Taiwan. Thus, in Taiwan the potential retarding effect
has not yet led to any serious problems. It can also be
argued that since the early days of the 20th century when
Taiwan first began her development, significant socioeconomic development and mortality decline have always preceded fer tility decline, but the reverse has never occurred. Mean while, the question as to whether rapid fertility decline 121
in recent years has had a stimulating effect on socioeconomic
development cannot be clearly answered from our data. It
is clear, however, that during the period under study,
causation has moved primarily from socioeconomic development
and mortality decline to fertility decline, rather than
vice versa.
In addition to the preceding questions, we must note
that any finding obtained by using aggregate units for analysis
cannot be routinely generalized to individuals (Robinson,
1950) . In order to avoid this ecological fallacy our research
is not concerned with individual behavior but rather focuses exclusively on the societal level; and the data used are summary statistics aggregated at the national level (e.g., percentage of population in particular categories, or some per capita quantity) and are thus viewed as a property of society (Beaver, 1975:61). It is our contention that social change might be translated into the behavior of family, couples, and individuals; but in the present context we merely attempt to show the impact of social change on societal level variables without drawing any conclusions about the other levels. Another problem facing studies such as the present one relates to the fact that the independent variables are highly intercorrelated. This problem of multicollinearity is a persistent one for quantitative socio-demographic research. Since the independent variables are themselves 122
highly correlated, the sampling error of the partial slopes
and partial correlations will be quite large (Blalock, Jr.,
1963:233); and it becomes very difficult to attribute causa
tion to one or the other with any confidence (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970:257-259). Generally the development process
contains a set of mutually related variables; and it is very
difficult to tell which one is cause or effect. Thus, we
will not attempt to test the structural patterns of independent
variables which can be hurt seriously by multicollinearity
(Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1969:263). Rather, we shall try
to examine the different impact of various socioeconomic
indicators on fertility. While it is true that the data
collected for socioeconomic indicators show different variance
at a given time, it is also a fact that both the postwar induced development program and the historical "natural" development of Taiwan have revealed certain causal relations of the socioeconomic indicators. Our findings will be inter preted with this point, as well as the existing theoretical knowledge of the field in mind. The specific statistical techniques used in this analysis are factor analysis, product-moment correlation and multiple regression. In orde^ to get a reasonably broad measure of socioeconomic development thirteen socioeconomic indicators were selected. These indicators, as well as an overall Societal Development Index derived from a factor analysis, are presented for the years covered by this study 123
in Table 5-1.
The main part of this study focuses on a correlation
analysis of the relationship between the socioeconomic in
dicators and levels of mortality and fertility. This includes
a multiple regression analysis to examine the contribution
of specific variables or sets of variables. Standardized
regression coefficients, or beta weights, are used to indicate
such contributions. Since our independent variables are measured on different units (e.g., income in dollars, edu
cation in years of school), these coefficients are necessary
to permit a comparison of the relative effect on the dependent variable (Nie, et al., 1975:325).
As noted above, the statistical analysis will be carried out both for the total time span covered by the study
(1949-1972), and separately for the initial period of develop ment (1949-1960) and for the transitional period of the society (1961-1972). This approach will permit direct com parisons of fertility and mortality behavior at different levels of societal development? and it also will reduce the problem of multicollinearity and the need for fitting curvi linear relationships, thus increasing the probability of obtaining statistically significant regression coefficients (Friedländer and Silver, 1967:34). On the other hand, the use of the two sub-periods has the disadvantage of reducing the number of observations and of decreasing the variances of the independent variables used. TABLE 5-1 Trends in selected indexes of socioeconomic development: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Year PCA PLC PCT PDM HB LEM EDJ ALF NLF PCI FUM CMR FHW SDI
Initial period of development
1949 258* 17.35 11.44 4.13 0.30 52.70* 3.67 42.69 21.99 703* 26.30 9.49 64.29 -1.4716 (0.53) 1950 350* 17.69 11.26 5.21 0.29 52.90 4.04 40.72 20.96 947* 25.20 9.58 64.60 -1.4492 (0.55) 1951 475 18.25 12.16 6.23 0.30 53.10 4.37 39.74 21.82 1275 24.80 9.55 63.17 -1.3007 (0.70) 1952 644 18.46 12.58 7.66 0.29 56.50 4.42 38.77 22.24 1716 24.70 8.64 64.82 -1.0783 (0.92) 1953 881 18.91 13.51 9.55 0.29 58.30 4.54 38.07 21.70 2215 24.80 8.80 65.51 -0.9645 (1.04) 1954 746 19.11 14.81 11.52 0.29 59.86 4.51 36.91 22.29 2273 24.70 8.92 66.73 -0.9048 (1.10) 1955 884 19.37 16.48 13.75 0.35 59.91 4.48 35.81 22.25 2604 24.90 8.57 66.93 -0.7013 (1.30) 1956 933 19.75 18.16 16.01 0.35 59.79 4.37 34.72 21.62 2858 25.00 8.26 67.01 -0.5989 (1.40) 1957 1047 19.93 19.69 23.43 0.36 59.89 4.75 33.93 22.68 3198 25.20 7.87 67.90 -0.3784 (1.62) 1958 1107 20.15 21.10 31.18 0.35 61.26 4.77 32.55 22.87 3434 24.70 8.23 69.30 -0.3021 (1.70) 1959 1207 20.41 21.66 34.80 0.37 61.80 4.93 31.76 22.81 3849 24.50 8.44 69.18 -0.2048 (1.80) 1960 1522 21.60 21.38 33.22 0.38 61.80 5.13 31.27 22.95 4557 24.10 7.75 69.13 -0.0243 (1.98) Transitional period
1961 1601 20.90 21.92 27.91 0.37 62.26 5.32 31.12 23.18 4953 23.90 7.51 70.13 -0.0264 (1.97) 1962 1551 21.07 19.93 29.68 0.39 62.62 5.42 30.61 23.34 5189 23.90 7.68 70.06 -0.0095 (1.99) 1963 1586 21.08 19.83 31.25 0.38 63.25 5.61 30.19 23.74 5782 24.30 7.35 69.51 +0.1055 (2.11) 1964 1915 22.20 22.66 32.43 0.37 63.75 5.80 29.68 23.77 6728 24.80 7.62 69.22 +0.2801 (2.28) 1965 1957 21.71 24.01 30.05 0.35 64.52 5.82 28.68 23.37 7082 25.60 7.29 67.51 +0.3663 (2.37) 1966 2019 21.83 25.03 28.18 0.34 64.14 6.06 27.97 23.50 7677 26.80 7.36 66.60 +0.4551 (2.46) 1967 2061 22.43 25.82 29.40 0.38 64.22 6.36 26.77 24.81 8669 27.40 7.37 58.61 +0.7488 (2.75) 1968 2144 25.11 26.88 32.24 0.42 63.95 6.38 27.09 25.13 9758 28.30 7.50 58.55 +0.9691 (2.97) 1969 1971 25.69 25.70 34.42 0.36 65.12 7.19 26.83 30.19 10712 29.10 7.40 56.35 +1.1888 (3.19) 1970 2143 26.20 25.05 37.67 0.40 66.08 7.14 25.81 29.89 12214 29.90 7.50 56.11 +1.3645 (3.36) 1971 2105 26.63 26.27 41.88 0.55 66.43 7.52 25.52 32.29 13863 30.30 7.20 51.91 +1.8135 (3.81) 1972 2347 26.56 27.61 45.62 0.59 24.47 34.28 15849 31.20 7.42 48.07 +2.1230 (4.12)
66.77 7.79 1 2 4 (Continued on page 125) Note to Table 5-1 Source: See tables in Chapter III above.
* — Estimated figure.
1 — The value enclosed in parenthesis is obtained as the original SDI value plus 2.
The rationality for doing this is to convert all SDI values to a positive score. PCA — Per capita agricultural production in Taiwan dollars.
PLC — Proportion of total population living in the five largest cities.
PCT — Per capita use of railway and highway.
PDM — Per capita circulation of domestic mail, newspaper andp rinted materials.
HB — Hospital beds per 1000 population.
LEM — Life expectancy for males.
EDJ — Proportion of the population aged 15 and over who graduated from junior middle school. ALF — Proportion of the labor force in agricultural activities.
NLF — Proportion of the labor force in non-agricultural activities.
PCI — Per capita annual income in Taiwan dollars. FUM — Proportion of the female population aged 15 and over who are unmarried. CMR — Crude marriage rate (number married per 1000 population).
FHW — Proportion of women at the childbearing ages engaged in housekeeping work. 1 2 5 SDI — Societal Development Index (a summary score derived from a factor analysis of the above 13 variables). 126
LEVELS OF SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
Variations in the demographic trends in Taiwan are
related to differences in timing with respect to the level
of societal development. In this section, this relationship
is empirically investigated by analyzing the data for the
postwar years when the demographic transition really began.
Since the 13 socioeconomic indicators chosen for this study
cover a wide range of conditions of society (see Table 5-1)
it is desirable to generate some kind of composite index which can describe the over-all trend of socioeconomic develop ment. In a recent study, Oechsli and Kirk (1975) have shown that such a development index can be established by a factor analytical technique, and can be a useful tool in measuring the levels of development. Following their procedure, we used a "principle component factor analysis" to construct a Societal Development Index that is a summary score of the
13 separate indicators for each of the 24-year units. This factor, which accounts for more than 82 percent of the variance, is presented in the final column of Table 5-1. These data show clearly that since the end of World War II, and par ticularly since the start of the transitional period in 1961, all aspects of Taiwanese society have been moving rapidly toward a higher level of development.
As shown in Table 5-2, the various socioeconomic indicators are highly inter-correlated, thus emphasizing that development is an interdependent process. These many facets TABLE 5-2
Intercorrelations of 14 socioeconomic development indicators: Taiwan, 1949-1972*
PCA PLC PCT PDM HM LEM EDJ ALF NLF PCI FUM CMR FHW SDI
0967 .9610 .9014 .7218 .9488 .9271 -.9814 .7151 .9064 .6086 -.9335 -.4671 .9463 PLC .8923 .8643 .8166 . 8708 .9743 -.9162 .9056 .9757 .8208 -.7925 -.7198 .9793 PCT .9361 .7367 .9414 .8857 -.9801 .6980 .8752 .6070 -.9130 -.4460 .9367 PDM . 8041 .9228 .8497 -.9449 .7221 .8411 .5196 -.8738 -.3759 .9107 HB .7133 . 8015 -.7551 .8460 .8553 .6962 -.6459 -.6629 .'8566 LEM . 8748 -.9694 .6942 .8536 .5290 -.9374 -.3755 .9197 EDJ -.9262 .9100 .9879 .8145 -.8105 -.7260 .9822 ALF -.7372 -.9058 -.6072 .9351 .4667 -.9585 NLF . .9327 .9013 -.5807 -.8631 .8909 PCI .8608 -.7772 -.7707 .9850 FUM -.4192 -.9473 .7857 CMR .2586 -.8554 FHW -.6751 SDI
Note: *— Where N=24 values of r in excess of .388 are significant at 5 percent, and those in excess of .453 are significant at 1 percent.
See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
-«J 128
of development appear to conform to a pattern in which in
dicators change together in characteristic ways, with some
changing more rapidly during the initial stages of develop
ment while others change more rapidly during the transitional
stage of development (refer back to Table 5-1). Although
one or more dimensions of this process can arise independently
and early, ultimately all must occur if a society is to change;
and this transformation is facilitated if all aspects are
moving more or less together (Beaver, 1975:4).
Although demographic change is a part of the develop
ment process, social and economic change has come far ahead
of the demographic transition in Taiwan. In fact, the
demographic transition seems to be a function of social and
economic change in Taiwan. A simple regression analysis has
been used to measure this relation (see Table 5-3).
The correlation between the Societal Development
Index (SDI) and the annual population growth rate is low in
each period of development, and the F ratio (except for the total 1949-1972 period) is so small that it is not statis
tically significant. This suggests that the relationship
between the rate of population growth and socioeconomic
development in Taiwan is very weak. In other words, not much change in population growth is accounted for by the
level of societal development. In part, this may reflect the pattern of population growth in Taiwan. Since 1949, natural increase has been the major source of Taiwanese TABLE 5-3 Results of a simple regression analysis with four demographic indicators as dependent variables and the societal develop ment index as the independent variable: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Annual population Crude birth Crude death Infant mortality growth rate -____ rate______------rate------rate------r R F~ f R F r Rz F
Societal development index
Total period, -.4789 .2294 6.56 -.9494 .9014 201.19 -.9021 .8137 96.08 -.9316 .8679 144.59 (1949-1972)—
Initial period -.3377 .1141 1.29 -.6141 .3771 6.05 -.9251 .8559 59.39 -.4384 .1922 2.38 (1949-1960)—
Transitional -.3959 . 1567 1.86 -.9570 .9158 108.76 -.9023 .8141 43.79 -.9193 .8452 54.59 period , (1961- 1972)— 2 R Change + 37% +143% -5% + 340% (1949-1960 to 1961-1972)
1— Where N=24, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels are attained by values of r in excess of .388 and .453, respectively.
2— Where N=12, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels are attained by values of r in h* excess of .532 and .661, respectively. 130
population growth; but various waves of Chinese refugees,
whether from mainland China or other areas, have migrated
at different times to Taiwan. Much of this migration is
"forced" and caused by political factors rather than socio
economic development. That is, this migration does not
correspond to socioeconomic conditions in Taiwan, ,and thus
confounds the pattern of overall population increase. Al
though population growth is generally related to socioeconomic
development, this relation should be investigated in terms
of natural increase separately from the effects of such
"forced" migration. Nevertheless, although the association
is weak, the negative sign of the coefficient may suggest
that population growth will slow down when socioeconomic
development proceeds further.
According to the data presented in Table 5-3, birth,
death, and infant mortality rates are closely related to levels
of societal development. The negative association for the
total period of development is high for all three measures,
thus indicating a good fit between the level of societal development and declines in these basic demographic rates
(i.e., the SDI explains over 80 percent of the variance in the two mortality measures and over 90 percent of the variance in birth rates). It is important to note that the association with fertility and mortality decline varies with the stage of societal development. In the initial period of development, 131
the negative correlation with the SDI is -.61 for the birth
rate and -.44 for the infant mortality rate, with only the
death rate being very closely associated with the SDI
(r = -.93). In the transitional period, the negative co efficients for both birth and infant mortality rates rise
to -.96 and -.92, while that for the death rate still remains
high at -.90. With the exception of infant mortality during
the initial period, all of these correlations indicate a
significant relation between the levels of societal develop
ment and declines in these vital processes.
The decline in the crude death rate during the initial
stage of development is most highly correlated with societal
development, and the coefficient decreases only slightly in 2 . . the transitional period. Also, as the R values indicate,
the percentage of variance in death rates explained by societal development is reduced only slightly from the earlier to
the latter period. The decline in mortality can be independently influenced by one or more dimensions of development (e.g., either by changes in the mode of production, or improved health care services, as well as by over-all socioeconomic development). Therefore, as development is initiated, mor tality decline will begin and it will be enhanced to the extent that all the developmental variables are improving.
However, as societal development progresses further, mortality 2 decline will tend to slow down. That is why R is smaller in the transitional period of development. It will become 132
even more difficult to realize further declines in mortality
as development proceeds, because the earlier rapid decline
has produced a crude death rate that is already very low.
The decline in infant mortality rate followed a dif
ferent pattern than the decline in the crude death rate.
In the initial period, the association with the Societal
Development Index is so low that it does not meet the
5 percent level of significance. During the transitional period the correlation rises to .92; and 85 percent of the variance in infant mortality is accounted for by the Societal
Development Index. This indicates that infant mortality decline is strongly related to overall socioeconomic develop ment. That is, the rapidity of declines in infant mortality is related to the rapidity of the progress of social and economic development. With respect to fertility and the level of societal development, the relation is quite different in the initial and transitional period. The correlation with the SDI is
-.61 in the initial period of development, but it rises to
-.96 in the transitional period. During the later period,
92 percent of the variance in birth rates is accounted for by societal development. This indicates that rapid fertility decline, like infant mortality, is strongly related to the rapid progress of societal development. Societal development during the initial period is slow and limited to a few aspects of society (see Table 5-1). It may be sufficient to initiate 133
fertility decline, but is not enough to bring about a con
sistent and steady decline. Moreover, as societal develop
ment progresses further and more rapidly (as in the trans
itional period) it will exert a greater impact on fertility.
This suggests that further societal development will be
associated with further reductions in the birth rate (see
below).
To summarize briefly, the demographic transition is
closely related to the level of societal development. Mor
tality during the initial and transitional period exhibits
a high negative correlation with societal development.
Mortality decline occurs as development is implemented, whether
in one or more dimensions of society, and its downward trend
to a minimum level will be facilitated as societal develop
ment progresses further. On the other hand, a significant
and steady decline of fertility occurs when all aspects of
the development process are underway; and the rapidity of
fertility decline will increase as the progress of societal development proceeds more rapidly. The different adjustments of fertility and mortality to the conditions of societal
development over time create a time lag between mortality
and fertility decline in the development process.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CAUSES OF FERTILITY AND MORTALITY DECLINE
The preceding analysis showed a general relationship between levels of societal development and the rate of 134
fertility and mortality decline, thus certain features or
conditions of social and economic organization must be con
ducive to lower birth and death rates in the development
process. We shall now take a closer look at some of these
conditions.
As noted earlier, the existence of multicollinearity represents a problem in the analysis of the independent variables. In order to reduce this problem and to maximize the number of observations for the separate development periods, the number of independent variables included in any regression is generally limited to four. Prior considerations, as well as a knowledge of the literature on this subject, led us to select a number of variables as being probable causes of fertility and mortality decline. The variables selected were primarily measures of income, education, urban ization, and agricultural production. These are important dimensions of socioeconomic development, and changes in them have influenced the development process in Taiwan and led to changes in other aspects of society. Other variables included in some of the regression equations related to health services, mobility, occupation, and the status of women. In this way we hoped to investigate all the relevant factors, albeit in different regressions and/or in different combinations of variables. Unfortunately, we cannot expand the regression to include all variables simultaneously. 135 Mortality
As far as mortality decline in Taiwan is concerned,
the history of its industrial-economic development has re
vealed that improvements in sanitation and public health
measures, increases in production, improved living conditions,
and increased capacity of communication and transportation
contributed to lower death rates during the Japanese rule.
After the Second World War, over-all socioeconomic develop ment reinforced changes in those conditions and contributed more significantly to the process of mortality reduction.
Zero-order correlations of the crude death rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development are presented in Table 5-4. The main observation to be drawn from this table is that the relationship between the death rate and each of the socioeconomic indicators is significant at the level of .01 percent; and the degree of association remains relatively stable over time.
Since the association between death rates and each of the socioeconomic indicators is persistent over time, we decided to limit the multiple regression analysis to the total period, 1949-1972. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5-5. In this table, the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) of per capita income and agricultural production are high and statistically sig nificant at the .05 percent level. Thus they are independently related to mortality, with the direction of the relationship 136
TABLE 5-4
Zero order correlations of the crude death rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent, , Total period Initial period Transitional period variables — (1949-1972)* (1949-1960)* (1961-1972)*
PCA -.9557 -.9241 -.9051 PLC -.8586 -.9252 -.8655 HB -.6724 -.7213 -.5403 EDJ -.8686 -.8888 -.9233 NLF -.6517 -.6552 -.8081 PCI -.8358 -.9328 -.9068 PCT -.9402 -.8779 -.8413
Note: *— All coefficients are statistical significance at the .01 level. 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 137
TABLE 5-5
Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude death rate as the dependent variable: Taiwan, 1949-1972 * 1
Independent. . Standardized "T" value variables — regression (one tail)* coefficient
Case I PLC -.8304 2.0714 HB -.0736 .4201 NLF . 9837 3.9499 PCI -.8803 1.8148
R = .9258 R2 = .8572 F (4,19) = 28.50
Case II PC A -.7135 2.7957 PLC .0337 .1838 PCT -.3246 1.3596 HB . 0542 .4803
R = .9600 R2 = .9217 F (4,19) =55.90
Case- IIIPLC -.3101 .6159 HB .0977 .5148 EDJ -.6448 1.3264
R = .8721 R2 = .7606 F (3,20) =21.18
Note: *— With 19 degrees of freedom a "t" value in excess of 1.729 is significant at the .05 percent level.
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definition of the indicators. 138
being inverse. Although the percentage of the population
living in the five largest cities is high and statistically
significant at .05 percent level in case I, it is not so in
cases II and III. In view of this inconsistency, it is impossible to assess the direct effect of urban concentration
on mortality decline.
The correlation with the proportion of the labor
force in non-agricultural activities is also high and statis
tically significant, but the positive sign of its coefficient represents a reversal from the original zero-order correlation
(see Table 5-4). Mortality is related to occupational level, with some categories of occupations being associated with
low and others with high death rates (Kitagawa and Hauser,
1973:34-46). The non-agricultural labor force indicator used in this study included workers in manufacturing, commerce, transportation and communication, and services. Those who are more exposed to hazardous working conditions may be over-represented in this grouping. However, working conditions can be improved as socioeconomic development progresses further
This is a three variable problem in which the direct path from certain occupations to mortality is positive and the indirect effects through correlations of occupation with other aspects of socioeconomic development are negative.
The association between hospital beds per 1000 population and mortality is not significant in any of the analyses. This result does not mean that health care services 139
are not related to mortality. On the contrary, the control
of epidemic disease is a most important contributor to mor
tality decline in the developing countries; however, it is
something that can be done by relatively simple public health measures (World Population Conference—E/CONF.60/4, 1974:15).
Thus, hospital beds simply may not be an adequate indicator
of public health measures in developing countries.
The beta weights of horizontal mobility (per capita
use of railway and highway) and educational attainment (junior middle school graduate) are -.32 and -.64, respectively, and neither of them meet the .05 percent level of statistical significance. The high standard error may be caused by the high intercorrelations between the independent variables, and it is generally difficult for us to assess their association with mortality. However, the negative sign of their beta weights may indicate that they are inversely related to mortality during the development process. Increasing horizontal mobility may bring people in contact with a better social and economic environment or with new ideas; and educational attainment qualifies the individual for a better occupational position. If this is the case, the association of mortality with mobility and educational attainment will become stronger if these factors develop further.
Infant Mortality
Table 5-6 presents the zero-order correlations of 140
infant mortality and selected indexes of socioeconomic develop
ment for each of the development periods; and Table 5-7
presents the results of the associated multiple regression.
With the exception of the crude death rate, all the zero-
order correlations between infant mortality and each of the
independent variables are in the negative direction, and all
but one are significant at .05 percent. The point to make, however, is that the correlations do not remain the same
over time. During the initial period they are rather low,
but they become stronger, higher, and more highly significant
(.001 level) during the transitional period of development.
The low correlations in the initial period did not produce
a significant result in the multiple regression analysis,
so this has been omitted from Table 5-7. The observed dif
ference between the correlation coefficients in the initial
and transitional periods indicates that the extent of the
association between socioeconomic indicators and infant
mortality may vary according to the level of development.
In other words, as these socioeconomic indicators move to a higher level of development, their impact on infant mortality increases.
One exception to this observation relates to the in dicator of health care service—the number of hospital beds per 1000 population. This variable has a weak association with infant mortality, which may indicate that variance in hospital beds is so small that the coefficient is reduced. 141
TABLE 5-6
Zero order correlations of the infant mortality rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent, , Total period Initial period Transitional period variables (1949-1972) (1949-1960) (1961-1972)
PLC -.9328 -.5657 -.8968 HB -.7051 -.2275* -.5569 EDJ -.9618 -.5295 -.9329 PCI -.9560 -.5206 -.9212 CDR . 8335 .6104 .9890
Note: *— Not significant at the level of .05.
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 142
TABLE 5-7
Results of a multiple regression analysis with the infant mortality rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent. , Total period Transitional period variables — (1949-1972) (1961-1972) Standardized H m it Standardized II m II ; 2/ ; 3/ regression value— regression value— coefficient coefficient
PIC .1935 .6358 -.2163 1.4109
EDJ -.7418 1.5950 .1792 .6021
PCI -.3818 .8293 -.0883 .3590
CDR .0362 .2700 .8872 7.4480
R = .9834 R = .9928 r2= .9281 r2= .9856 F (4,19) = 61 .31 F (4,7) = 119 .52
Note: 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
2— With 19 degrees of freedom a "t" value in excess of 1.729 is significant at the .05 percent level.
3- With 7 degrees of freedom a "t" value in excess of 1.895 is significant at the 05 percent level. 143
On the other hand, as noted earlier, it may be that this
"hospital bed" measure is an inadequate indicator of infant
care services. Rather, infant health is more directly
influenced by social and cultural environmental factors
such as the quality of housing, sanitary surroundings,
feeding, and parents' knowledge of hygiene (Chandrasekhar,
1972:157-182).
As the results of the multiple regression analysis
shown in Table 5-7 reveal, the beta weight for educational
attainment (junior middle school) is relatively high for the
total development period, per capita income is moderate, and
percentage urban population low. During the period of trans
ition, the first two coefficients become lower and the last
one increases very slightly. Because of the high standard
error, none of these correlations are significant at con
ventional levels. The different levels of the coefficients
for the total period of development and for the period of transition may suggest that the impact of educational attain ment and income on infant mortality tends to be closer in the long run rather than the short period.
In regard to the association of the crude death rate and infant mortality, the correlation for the total period of development is not significant; but for the most recent period of transition the association is very strong and is significant at the .001 level. Thus, infant mortality varies directly with the crude death rate at the higher level of 144
socioeconomic development. Infant mortality is strongly
related to morbidity and mortality at adult ages (Heer, 1966:
440); thus, the rapidity in the decline of adult morbidity
leads to infant mortality decline.
Fertility
Table 5-8 presents the zero-order correlations of
the association between the crude birth rate and selected
indexes of socioeconomic development for each of the develop ment periods, and Tables 5-9A, 5-9B, and 5-9C present the
results of the corresponding multiple regression analyses.
Again the correlations do not remain the same over time. In
the initial period, they are generally low and often do not meet the .05 level of statistical significance. They are much stronger during the period of transition, and all are significant at the .001 level. The low correlations in the initial period again do not yield significant results in the multiple regression analysis; thus, we have left this period out of Table 5-9. The difference between the coefficients in the initial and transitional period indicates that the extent of the interrelation between the socioeconomic indicators and the crude birth rate may vary according to the level of development. In other words,- the impact of socioeconomic indicators on birth rates increases as they move to a higher level of development.
Income—In the total period of development, the 145
TABLE 5-8
Zero order correlations of the crude birth rate with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent./Total period Initial period Transitional period variables -z (1949-1972) (1949-1960) (1961-1972)
PCA -.9223 -.5644 -.9182 PLC -.9275 -.5613 -.9096 PCT -.8927 -.6535 -.9035 EDJ -.9496 -.3849* -.9588 NLF -.8351 -.5242 -.8550 ALF .9056 .5556 .9937 PCI -.9535 -.6031 -.9522 FHW .6682 -.7801 .9664 CDR .8316 .4419* .9531 IMR .9481 .1417* .9683
Note: *— Not significant at the .05 level. 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 146
TABLE 5-9A
Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent., Total period Transitional period variables — _____ (1949-1972) (1961-1972) Standardized "T" 7 , Standardized "T" regression value- regression value- coefficient coefficient
Case I
PCA -.1534 .4850 -.2495 1.3820 PLC .0512 .1571 .0873 .4261 PCT -.1470 .5540 -.1722 .8878 EDJ -.7270 2.0144 -.6970 3.1595
R = .9569 R2 = .9157 R = .9866 R2 ~ .9734 F (4.19) ■■= 51.58 F (4,7) = 64.04
Case II
PLC .2590 .8162 -.1041 .8890 EDJ -.0787 .1644 -.2443 1.1477 ALF .2663 1.4950 .9452 7.6830 PCI -.8873 1.9268 .2902 1.3928
R = .9601 R2 = .9218 R = .9959 R2 = .9918 F (4,19) = 55. 95 F (4,7) = 211 .45
Note: 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
2— With 19 degrees of freedom a "t" value in excess of 1.729 is significant at the .05 percent level. 3
3— With 7 degrees of freedom a "t" value in excess of 1,895 is significant at the .05 percent level. 147
TABLE 5-9B
Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent Total period Transitional period variables — (1949-1972) (1961-1972) Standardized "T" 2/ Standardized "T" g, regression value—■ regression value- coefficient coefficient
Case III
PLC .0708 .2331 .1189 .4951 EDJ -.0465 .1000 -.2967 .6580 PCI -.5798 1.3038 -.2495 .6415 IMR .4153 1.7755 .5683 2.8507
R = .9618 R2 = .9250 R = .9819 R2 = .9642 F (4,19) = 58 .57 F (4,7) = 47.09 Labe ±V PLC .2082 .6305 . 0029 .0104 EDJ -.1985 .3934 -.2404 .4499 PCI -.8634 1.7191 -.3004 .6721 CDR .1162 .8002 .4612 2.1566
R = .9568 R2 ,= .9154 R = .9765 R2 = .9535 F (4,19) := 51 .39 F (4,7) = 35.87
Note: 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
2— See Table 5-9A.
3— See Table 5-9A. 148
TABLE 5-9C
Results of a multiple regression analysis with the crude birth rate as the dependent variable, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent, . Total period Transitional period variables (1949-1972) (1961-1972) Standardized "T" 7/ Standardized "T" regression value- regression value- coefficient coefficient
Case V
EDJ -.0485 .1012 -.2630 1.3571 ALF .0672 .2104 .8650 6.8104 PCI -.9387 1.7396 .3180 1.5926 FHW -.1218 .6105 .1898 1.1518
R2 = .9923 R = .9595 R2 = .9206 R = .9962 F (4,19) = 55 .04 F (4, 7) ;= 226.14
Note: 1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
2— See Table 5-9A. 3— See Table 5-9A. 149 regressions reveal that per capita income is closely related
to fertility in a negative direction. In spite of the high
intercorrelations between the independent variables included
in the regressions, the beta weights for income are rather
stable in each of the cases and most meet the .05 percent
level of statistical significance. Further, income consis tently exhibits the largest beta weight among the four variables
in each case, thus suggesting that income may be the most
significant factor relating to fertility change.
As rural Taiwan moves toward the urban-industrial
state, a high aspiration for achievement beyond the family
increasingly becomes a social norm, and rising income can
increase one's capacity to attain it. Meanwhile, the pro
ductivity of children, the significance of children as the
source of financial security for the aging parents, and the
contribution to family income traditionally derived from
the use of grandparents to care for young children, have lost
ground in the new environment. Conversely, children become
a greater burden for their parents (e.g., they require a
longer and more expensive period of education and training).
Thus, many children offset the increased income which the parents can use to achieve their aspirations for personal advancement. Nowadays, Taiwanese parents, like American parents, have ambitious educational plans for their children
(Mueller, 1972:388), because education has always been viewed as the way to honor the family name and raise ones social 150 status. The accumulation of money required by new consumption
habits is easier in those households with a favorable ratio
of earners to dependents, because the demographic composition
of the household has, in many cases, more influence on the
living standard of the household members than the wage level
of active earners (Szabady, 1972:14). The tendency is thus
for families to respond demographically in order to maximize
their socioeconomic opportunities as they view them.
The results of the regression analysis show that
the income beta weights for the transitional period are
different than those in the total period of development.
That is, the income beta weights are no longer the largest
among the four independent variables during the most recent
transition period, and none of the associations meets the
.05 percent level of statistical significance. The difference
of beta weights between the total and transitional period may suggest (1) that income as a factor in the process of
fertility reduction is more significant in the long term, and
(2) that at the higher level of socioeconomic development, social factors may become more important in the reduction of fertility. Although most of the relationships between per capita income and the crude birth rate are negative, a positive sign is found in one set of variables (Case V). In this case, the direct effect of an increase in income is an increase in fertility. Why is this not so in other cases. As noted 151
by Heer (1966), the logical positive association between
high income and high fertility may be mitigated by various
indirect effects of an increase in income (such as a reduction
in infant mortality) that may have a depressing effect on
fertility. Unfortunately we cannot include all of the factors in one regression analysis; and the best we can say is that
whether a partial association of income and fertility is
negative or positive appears to be in part a function of
the independent variables used in the regression.
Educational attainment—The percentage of persons
aged 15 and over who are junior school graduates was used to measure the educational attainment of the population.
In this case the regression results show a negative associ ation for both the total and the transitional development periods, but the beta weight is statistically significant in Case I only. Most of the standardized regression co efficients which are not significant may be influenced by the high intercorrelation between the independent variables, because they produce a large measurement error. However, the consistency of the negative sign in the regressions may suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the crude birth rate and educational attainment.
The rising ecucational attainment of the mass of the population in Taiwan has become increasingly noteworthy. This reinforces the dissemination of urbanism and rationalism 152
which reshape the people's modes of thought and behavior, and
it brings about a rational assessment of the value of having
a large family in the new environment. Two fertility surveys
in Taiwan have shown, first, that education is the only
important source of variation in desired family size (Speare,
et. al., 1973); and second, that many husbands are aware of
the disadvantages of a large family and the advantages of a
small family (Mueller, 1972). Thus, the rising level of edu
cational attainment in Taiwan has had a definite effect on
people's perception of family values and reproductive behavior
Urbanization—The zero-order correlation between the
percentage of the population living in the five largest cities
and the crude birth rate is negative and significant; but
the standardized regression coefficient is quite small and
is not significant. One of the signs observed in the re gression is negative and the other positive. Because of this
difference in the direction of the association, it is im
possible to assess the relationship between urbanization and
fertility on the basis of this indicator. However, the follow
ing examination of the size of the agricultural labor force may provide further information to help us understand this relationship.
Agricultural Labor Force—For the total period of development, the beta weights (Case II and V) for the pro portion of the labor force engaged in agriculture is positive, 153
but not statistically significant. For the period of trans
ition, the beta weights for this agricultural labor force
variable are positive and statistically significant. This
finding indicates that fertility varies directly with the
proportion of agricultural laborers, and that the relationship
is much more pronounced at the higher level of development.
Change in the relative size of the agricultural labor force
implies the progress of urbanization. Thus,, the finding of a positive relationship between this labor force variable and fertility also suggests that there is an inverse relation ship between urbanization and fertility.
As far as the transformation from rural to urban society is concerned, change in the size of the agricultural labor force indicates a rearrangement of the occupational structure which is accompanied by the general process of urbanization.
It is this structural mobility which is a result of shifts in the structure of the economy (e.g., transition from peasantry to industrial workers or from physical occupations to in tellectual ones). This large-scale occupational re-structuring is conducive to a reduction in the fertility of upwardly mobile persons (Tien, 1975:622) who adopt the demographic behavior of the higher social strata to which they are moving.
The fertility of non-agricultural workers is lower than that of peasants, and the fertility of intellectuals is lower than those of the two other strata (Szabady, 1972:10); thus, the transformation from rural to urban society with the reduction 154
of the agricultural labor force leads to the reduction of
fertility.
Horizontal Mobility—Per capita use of railways and
highways was used to measure the horizontal movement of
population. Here the results of the regression show that
the association between horizontal movement and the crude
birth rate is negative; but again it is not statistically
significant. The small beta weight, which may be caused by
the small variance in this measure, was somewhat larger during the period of transition. Thus, as societal develop
ment progresses further, the relationship between horizontal
mobility and fertility may become stronger.
Increasing horizontal mobility implies a wider freedom
of choice of partners and associations; that is, greater
autonomy in ones personal relations (Wilson, 1968:112).
That is, the individual is not bound to his position by
kinship as he is in a rural society. As a result, the resi
dential rule which is the mainstay of the extended family
has lost its significance. Indirectly, then, an increase
in horizontal mobility may have a strong impact on fertility decline.
Non-agricultural Labor Force—The beta weight for the non-agricultural labor force has a positive sign and is statistically significant. This result was not unexpected.
As we noted in the earlier discussion of mortality, this 155
indicator is a broad category which does not include all the
non-agricultural labor force, but is heavily represented by workers in manufacturing, commerce, transportation and communi
cation, and services. This grouping of the non-agricultural
labor force has a relatively low status in the new social
strata. For the most part these workers are former marginal
farmers who were displaced by agricultural mechanization.
Many of those who work in manyfacturing still live in rural
areas from which they commute. Thus, they would have tended
to maintain a strong traditional orientation, and to differ
little from workers still engaged in agricultural activities.
Thus, such non-agricultural work experience has very little
effect on fertility attitudes and behavior (Speare, et. al.,
1973:333).
Social Position of Women—The proportion of women at
the childbearing ages engaged in housekeeping activities
was used to measure the social position of women. The zero-
order correlation between this variable and fertility was
positive and statistically significant for the total period of development; however, different relationships characterized
the two sub-periods. The association was negative during
the initial period and positive during the transitional period: both were statistically significant. The negative relation
ship during the initial period of development reflects a
fairly marked increase in the proportion of women in house keeping work at this time when fertility was beginning to 156
decline a little. It is only after 1961 that we see a real
shift of women away from housekeeping chores to the labor
force. Such a change in the domestic role of women is closely
related to the level of societal development.
The results of the regression show a negative asso
ciation in the total period of development and a positive one in the transitional period, but neither beta weights
are significant. The negative association for the total
period, which is a reversal from the original direction, may
also reflect the increasing proportion of women in housekeeping
work during the initial period. Although there is a reduction
of such female activity during the period of transition,
the variance is not large enough to make the coefficient
significant. Nevertheless, the positive sign may indicate
that the increasing tendency for women to be employed outside
the family, or a devaluing of the traditional domestic role
of women, has created a condition favourable to fertility
decline. In contrast, women confined to household work may
prefer more children. In the Chinese family, a woman is not
involved in family economic matters, so she may not be as
sensitive to the expensive costs of a large family. In
addition, most wives begin their married life in the home of their husbands’ parents, which probably reinforces the traditional concept of the wife-mother role rather than that of working wife among women engaged in housekeeping. Thus, 157
housekeeping activity is directly related to a large family
size.
Mortality and Infant Mortality--The zero-order
correlations between fertility and both the crude death rate
and the infant mortality rate are positive for all the periods
of development, but are statistically significant only for
the total period and the most recent transitional period.
For the initial period of development, when fertility decline
was just getting started, the correlation is low and not
significant. The difference between the associations in the
two periods suggests that mortality and infant mortality are
related to fertility only if they have reached a certain low
level.
From the regression analysis we see that the beta
weights for infant mortality are positive and significance
at the .05 level, and that the beta weights for the crude
death rate are also positive but are significant only for
the period of transition. This suggests that the independent
impact of infant mortality on fertility is more important than that of the overall crude death rate. This is readily understandable. Maintaining the family line is the most important function of the Chinese family, and one of the reasons why the Chinese want many children is related to this function. The confidence of parents in insuring the continu ation of the family line would not be enhanced until the decline of mortality, especially of infant mortality, was 158
well established. When this occurs, more and more infants
and children survive and impose an increasing burden on the
parents. Parents then perceive the effect of changes in infant and child mortality and make the necessary adjust
ments in their fertility behavior.
Lagged Effect of Selected Socioeconomic Indicators on the Crude Birth Rate
When we use time-series data, one of the problems
which must be taken into consideration is the "lagged effect."
Some factors tend to have an immediate effect on the birth
rate, whereas the effect of other factors may require the
passage of a certain length of time before they are felt. In the present analysis we are going to examine this possi bility in terms of the relation between changes in selected
socioeconomic indicators during the initial period of develop
ment (1949-1960) and subsequent changes in fertility during
the transitional period (1961-1972). This lagged effect is
compared with an "immediate effect" which relates changes in socioeconomic measures to fertility changes during the same
period (1961-1972). The independent variables selected are
measures of education, income, mortality, and urbanization.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5-10
In both cases, the lagged effect is larger and accounts for
over 95 percent of the variance. This suggests that the
lagged effect of the socioeconomic indicators on fertility is more important in the development process than the immediate 159
TABLE 5-10
Results of a multiple regression analysis of the Immediate Effect and the Lagged Effect of selected indexes of socioeconomic development on fertility: Taiwan, 1949-1972
Independent. , Immediate Effect* Lagged Effect* Il mil »mil variables — Standardized 1 2/ Standardized 1 2 regression value— regression value— coefficient coefficient
Case I
EDJ -.2381 .5212 .1642 1.1397 PCI -.2997 . 7143 -.9866 5.4247 CDR .4615 2.3251 .1608 1.0427
R = .9765 R2 = .9535 R = .9881 R2 = .9762 F (3,8) = 55 .66 F (3,8) = 109'.58
Case II
PLC -.0263 .1002 -.8511 3.5967 EDJ -.5068 1.4830 .1411 .7202 CDR .4624 2.2415 .2729 1.3915
R = .9750 R2 = .9505 R = .9788 R2 = .9580 F (3,8) = 51.,24 F (3,8) = 60. 76
Note: *— The independent variables for the Immediate Effect refer to the 1961-1972; those for the Lagged Effect refer to the 1949-1960 period. The dependent variable refers to the 1961-1972 period.
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 2— With 8 degrees of freedom at "t" value in excess of 1.860 is significant at the .05 percent level. 160 effect. Further examination of Table 5-10 reveals that the
lagged effect produces a greater beta weight for the change
in income and urbanization than does the immediate effect;
on the other hand, the lagged beta weight for change in edu
cation and mortality is smaller.
These differences between the immediate and lagged
effects may imply that the influence of each of the four
independent variables on fertility operates in its own time
dimension. More specifically, in Taiwan economic-industrial
development (as indicated by changes in income and unban-
ization) precedes social development (as indicated by changes
in education and mortality); and this would account for the observed time difference of their effects on the birth rate.
The effects of economic-industrial development tend to be
lagged rather than immediate, while the opposite is the case for social development.
So far we have found that fertility decline in Taiwan is related to changes in a variety of socioeconomic indicators.
Among the factors examined, the relative size of the agri cultural labor force and the proportion of women engaged in household work were positively related to fertility whereas the rest were inversely related to fertility. The former factors are representative of the traditional agricultural features of society, and thus their prevalence is related to a high level of fertility. During the period of trans formation from rural to urban society, the standard of living, 161
levels of educational attainment, social mobility, degree
of urbanization, and the frequence of female employment outside
the family all increase, whereas the traditional agricultural
characteristics decrease. This is accompanied by a shift
in fertility from high to low levels. Since changes in socio
economic variables vary with respect to the timing of develop
ment, the impact of each of them on fertility will be dif
ferent.
As the preceding regression analyses have shown, the multiple R is high in every case; but the value of the multiple
R for the transitional period is higher than those of the total period. Over 96 percent of the variance is accounted for by all the independent variables together, and the explained portion of variance increases with the level of societal development. Thus, fertility decline during the development process simply reflects the co-variation of all socioeconomic variables.
Intermediate Variables in Fertility Decline
Although we have shown that socioeconomic factors are closely related to fertility, it should be apparent that the socioeconomic variables themselves do not directly operate to reduce or enhance fertility (e.g., to reduce conception or prevent the conception from becoming a live birth); but they do create conditions favourable for family limitation.
In Taiwan, a large minority of couples had done something on their own to limit family size before the organized family 162
planning program began in 1964 (Freedman and Takeshita, 1969:
53). Measures used were fairly traditional, however; and
although abortion, sterilization and contraception had been
introduced in Taiwan after the Japanese rule, very few of
the people had any experience with any of these more modern
techniques before the organized family planning program was
established (Chen, 1963a). Since 1964, contraception has been readily available and has been effectively practiced by Taiwanese women, and thus has clearly enhanced the fertility decline already under way at that time. In this section we will take a closer look at the relationship between inter mediate variables (e.g., age at marriage, abortion and birth control) and socioeconomic development and fertility. These relationships are statistically examined by means of simple and partial correlation.
Age at Marriage—The percentage of the female population aged 15 and over who are unmarried was used to measure the marital status of women. Table 5-11 shows that zero-order correlation of single women and fertility is negative and statistically significant for both the total period of develop ment and the period of transition. But for the initial period of development, the coefficient was positive but not significant. This indicates that the effect of change in the marital status of women on fertility has been effective at the higher level of socioeconomic development.
As we noted earlier, the increase in the number of 163
TABLE 5-11
Zero order correlations of the proportion of women at age 15 and over unmarried with selected indexes of socioeconomic development, by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
. , ______■____ Coefficient ______. ______Variables — Total period Initial period Transitional period (1949-1972) (1949-1960) (1961-1972) (N=24) (N=12) (N=12)
PLC .8208*** -.7179** .9537*** EDJ .8146*** -.8588*** .9791*** ALF -.6078*** .6896** -.9821*** NLF .9014*** -.4286 .9030*** PCI .8611*** -.6884** .9754*** CBR -.8040*** . 0370 -.9785***
Note: * Significant at .05 percent ** Significant at .01 percent *** Significant at .001 percent
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators 164
single women in Taiwan is a fairly recent phenomenon. The
increase in single women could be due both to the postpone
ment of marriage and increasing celibacy. The latter runs
against Chinese moral teaching (i.e., a girl is expected to
marry and rear children). Thus the declining propensity to
marry early rather than increasing celibacy has been the
important factor behind the increase in single women. The
conclusion can be seen in Table 5-12 which depicts changes
in the percentage of the women in the childbearing age group
married in Taiwan during the 1958-1972 period. The pro
portion ever married among females aged 15-19 fell from
12 percent in 1958 to 7 percent in 1972, the proportion
among those aged 20-24 fell from 69 percent in 1958 to
46 percent in 1972, and the porportion among those aged
25-29 slightly dropped from 89 percent in 1958 to 86 percent
in 1972. The proportion ever married among females in ages
30 and over has increased since 1958. This fact indicates that the Taiwanese women have postponed their age at marriage, but still retained the pattern of universal marriage. The delay of marriage has played an important part in the recent
fertility transition in Taiwan. Even though the pattern of universal marriage which was made possible by economic growth has brought more childbearing women into marital unions, and it may offset the effect of later marriage on fertility, the prevalence of birth control among even married women in ages
30 and over (see Table 5-15) may compensate for this counter- TABLE 5-12
Percentage of the women in the childbearing age group who are married: Taiwan, 1958-1972
Year 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50 +
1958 11.8 69.0 88.6 84.0 77.1 69.8 65.4 50.1 1959 11.6 59.7 84.6 82.7 76.8 70.0 63.7 50.8 1960 12.4 62.3 89.3 91.3 89.6 85.7 79.1 49.1 1961 12.5 60.9 89.3 91.6 89.8 85.6 80.2 49.7 1962 12.1 '60.0 89.1 91.8 90.0 85.9 81.4 50.4 1963 11.4 59.3 88.7 92.1 90.2 86.5 82.2 51.4 1964 10.3 58.7 88.7 92.5 90.6 87.0 82.9 52.3 1965 9.2 58.3 88.7 92.8 91.5 88.0 83.3 53.6 1966 8.7 57.7 88.7 93.0 92.1 88.8 83.7 54.8 1967 8.7 56.4 88.4 93.1 92.5 89.3 84.2 55.5 1968 8.5 54.2 88.3 93.5 93.0 90.0 85.1 63.7 1969 8.1 51.8 88.2 93.3 93.3 90.3 85.5 57.1 1970 8.0 50.3 88.1 93.0 93.2 90.6 85.7 57.5 1971 7.5 48.5 87.6 93.0 93.3 91.1 86.4 58.0 1972 6.6 46.4 86.4 93.1 93.5 91.6 87.5 58.9 Percentage change 1958-1972 -44 -33 -2 + 10 + 18 +24 +25 + 15
Source: Taiwan Demographic Fact Book, 1972. 1 6 5 166
balance.
The delay of marriage is a new phenomenon in Taiwan
and can be better understood in terms of socioeconomic
development. As shown in Table 5-11, the proportion of single women is highly related to the selected indexes of socio
economic development in both the total and transitional
periods. The direction of the association varies with the different indicators. The proportion of single women is positively related to income, education, urban concentration and the non-agricultural labor force, but bears a negative relationship with the proportion of workers in the agricul tural labor force. One exception to this pattern is that the association in the initial period of development is in a reverse direction. It is apparent that the emergence of urban features has brought about change in the marriage pattern of Taiwan.
In Taiwan, the delay of marriage is a function of socioeconomic development, and it in turn mediated the re lationship between socioeconomic development and fertility decline. This point can also be seen in Table 5-13. When we hold the proportion of single women constant, the partial correlations between the crude birth rate and urban concen tration, education, income and the non-agricultural labor force are substantially reduced, particularly in the period of transition, although the partial coefficient for the agricultural labor force still remains fairly high. This TABLE 5-13
Zero order and partial correlations of the crude birth rate and selected indexes of socioeconomic development, with the proportion of women unmarried held constant and by development period: Taiwan, 1949-1972
1/ T°tal period (1949-1972) Initial period (1949-1960) Transitional period (1961-1972) Variables— Zero-order Partial Zero-order Partial Zero-order Partial coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient (N=24) (N=24) (N=12) (N=12) (N=12) (N=12)
PLC -.9274*** -.7876*** -.5613* -.7683** *** -.9096*** .3814 EDJ -.9496*** -.8544*** -.3848 -.6897** -.9588*** -.0163 ALF .9056*** .8830*** .5556 .7325** .9937*** .8426*** NLF -.8351*** -.4287** -.5242* -.5631* -.8550*** .3227 PCI -.9535*** -.8640*** -.6031* -.7969** -.9522*** .0481
Note * Significant at .05 percent ** Significant at .01 percent *** Significant at .001 percent
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators.
H*
^4 168 would indicate that the traditional pattern of marriage may
not change much in the agricultural section of society.
Abortion—Abortion for any reason is still illegal
in Taiwan, but reform is under consideration. In practice,
however, abortion is widely available from private physicians.
Despite restrictive abortion laws, the incidence of abortion
rose during the 1960's. According to surveys conducted by
the Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family Planning, the percentage of women who had ever experienced an induced abortion
rose from 9 percent in 1965 to 20 percent in 1973 (Sun, 1975:
20). The increasing use of abortion led directly to fertility
decline in Taiwan. Change in attitude toward abortion, like
age at marriage and contraception, is related to socioeconomic
development in Taiwan. In the 1966-67 Vital Registration
Survey, the proportion of women who had experienced at least one abortion increased from 9 percent for those with no formal education, to 14 percent for those with a primary school education, and to 18 percent for women having completed junior high school. The number of abortions per 1000 live births was 134 in large cities, 94 in towns and 60 in rural areas
(Chow, 1970:251-259). Thus, the incidence of abortion is directly related to the levels of educational attainment and urbanization.
Birth Control^-The introduction of modern contraception
(e.g., pills and IUD's) in Taiwan has been acknowledged as an 169 important factor in the recent dramatic fertility decline.
Table 5-14 shows that there is a strong negative relation
ship between birth control and the birth rate, thus indicating
that the adoption of family planning has played a major role
in reducing the birth rate in Taiwan. The point can also be seen in Table 5-15 which depicts marital fertility in
Taiwan during the 1959-1972 period. Marital fertility is the measure which most directly reflects the extent of the
practice of contraception (Wrigley, 1969:192). The general
fertility rate of married women in Taiwan fell by 38 percent
in 13 years (see Table 5-15), with the decline being especially
pronounced after 1964. However, contraceptive usage is apparently not uniform for all ages. The birth rates for married women at ages 25 and over (particularly for the groups
30-49 years of age) have steadily decreased, whereas those for married women under age 24 increased. It thus appears that older women tend to practice birth control much more than younger women. The pattern of decline of marital fertility in Taiwan seems to indicate that Taiwanese women have not postponed their births by practising birth control, but rather have started practising birth control once their desired family size is attained. This usually happens around
30 years of age, at which time they may also have had an opportunity to experience first hand the heavy burden of■ childbearing and rearing. Birth control is a rather recent phenomenon in Taiwan 170
TABLE 5-14
Zero order correlations of birth control with selected indexes of socioeconomic development and fertility: Taiwan, 1964-1971
Variables —Coefficient*
PLC .7373 PCT .7316 PDM .7409 EDJ .8428 ALF -.8746 PCI .8938 HB .8583 FHW -.8742 IMR -.8748 CBR -.8796
Note : * — PCT, PLC and PDM are statistically significant at the .05 percent level, the rest of the variables are significant at .01 percent.
1 See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 171
TABLE 5-15
General Fertility rates and age-specific fertility rates of currently married women: Taiwan, 1959-1972
Year General Age-specific fertility rate fertility 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 rate
1959 273 374 406 374 296 212 100 18 1960 264 390 407 373 279 189 92 16 1961 258 362 403 382 268 174 83 13 1962 254 376 424 380 256 161 76 12 1963 248 357 425 380 251 154 70 12 1964 237 355 433 377 231 132 60 10 1965 225 390 447 368 210 109 47 8 1966 224 460 475 368 202 98 43 7 1967 197 447 444 333 169 76 31 5 1968 203 478 473 350 172 74 29 5 1969 196 497 473 338 162 68 26 5 1970 192 502 473 332 158 64 22 4 1971 181 486 462 316 144 55 18 4 1972 170 522 448 297 126 44 14 3
Average -1.8% -1.0% + 1.0% +0.4% -3.0% -5.4% -6.0% -6.6% annual change 1959-1963
Average -3.2% + 5.2% + 0.3% -2.3% -5.0% -7.4% -8.6% -7.8% annual change 1964-1972
Source: 1973 Taiwan Demographic Fact Book, Republic of China 172
and can be better understood in terms of socioeconomic
development. As shown in Table 5-14, birth control is
highly related to the various socioeconomic indicators, but
the direction of the association varies with the different
indicators. The birth rate is positively related to income,
education, urbanization, social mobility and hospital services, but bears a negative relationship with the size of the agri
cultural labor force, the proportion of women in housekeeping work, and the level of infant mortality. This finding may suggest that increases in what can be called the urban features of society (e.g., the growth of urbanization, the lengthening period of education, rising income, the increasing proportion of women working outside their homes, and improved health services) will enhance the practice of contraception. On the other hand, the prevalence of a traditional agrarian structure is unfavourable to the spread of birth control.
Thus, birth control as an intermediate variable between socio economic development and fertility is more effective in an urban setting. This point can also be seen in Table 5-16. When we hold birth control constant, the partial correlations between the birth rate and urbanization, income, education, hospital services and infant mortality are reduced very much, par ticularly those for hospital services and infant mortality. Thus, an increase in hospital services and a decrease in infant mortality may be the most important factor in encouraging 173
TABLE 5-16
Zero order and partial correlations of the crude birth rate and selected indexes of socioeconomic development with birth control held constant: Taiwan, 1964-1972
Variables — Zero-order Partial coefficient coefficient by controlling birth (N=8) control (N=8)
PLC -.8512** -.6308 HB -.6672* .3589 EDJ -.9268*** -.7244* ALF .9797*** .9120** PCI -.9299*** -.6737* FHW .9911*** . 9614*** IMR .9199*** .6527
Note : * Significant at .05 percent ** Significant at .01 percent *** Significant at .001 percent
1— See note to Table 5-1 for definitions of the indicators. 174 the adoption of birth control. On the other hand, the partial
coefficients for the agricultural labor force and for women
engaged in housekeeping work still remain fairly high. This
would indicate that the relationship between fertility and
agrarian structure is not disrupted by birth control. In
other words, birth control will not be effective in a tradi
tional agrarian stiuation, and fertility will remain high.
To enhance the adoption of birth control and the reduction
of fertility it is necessary to promote changes in the whole
constellation of socioeconomic variables associated with an
urban-industrial society.
In sum, later marriage, abortion and birth control
have worked together to bring about the fertility transi
tion in Taiwan. Among them, the practice of birth control
accounts for the largest portion of fertility decline. For
example, the proportion of births averted by the use of family
planning program methods increased from 3 percent in 1965
to 50 percent in 1974 (Sun, 1975: Table 8 and 9).
SUMMARY In Taiwan, the demographic transition is closely re lated to the level of societal development. Mortality during
the initial and transitional period exhibits a high negative and statistically significant correlation with societal development. A high negative and statistically significant correlation between the crude birth rate and societal develop ment is only established in the< period of transition. This 175
observation provides strong support for the proposition
stated in Chapter II; namely, that the decline of mortality
and fertility closely relate to societal development, but
whereas mortality decline starts in the initial period of
development fertility decline occurs in the later period.
Change in the features or conditions of social and
economic organization has been conducive to lower birth and
death rates during the development process. The regression
for the total period of socioeconomic development established
the negative and statistically significant relationships be
tween the death rate and income and agricultural production.
The relationship between urbanization and the death rate
cannot be determined in this study because of the unstable
beta weights and signs in the regressions. Horizontal mo
bility and educational attainment were found to be negatively
correlated with the death rate, but the beta weights fell
somewhat short of statistical significance. The signs of
the standardized regression coefficients for hospital beds are positive, but the small variation in this variable has not produced a large enough coefficient to be significant.
Fertility decline is related to changes in a variety of socioeconomic indicators. In the regressions for all development periods a negative and statistically significant relationship between the birth rate and income is established; and a positive and significant relationship is observed between the birth rate and infant mortality and the non- 176 agricultural labor force. The positive sign for the non-
agricultural labor force probably reflects the over
representation of workers in the low and of the occupational
system. The beta weights for educational attainment are not
consistently significant, but they have negative signs. The
indicators of agricultural production, women in housekeeping
work, and horizontal mobility yield negative signs. Others
like agricultural labor force, infant mortality, the death
rate and urbanization produce positive signs, but their
standardized regression coefficients are not statistically significant.
In the regressions for the period of transition, the birth rate has a statistically significant relationship with the death rate, infant mortality and the agricultural labor force. The beta weights for educational attainment are not statistically significant, but they are negative. The standardized regression coefficient for women in housekeeping work turned up a positive sign, but it too fell somewhat short of statistical significance. An inverse relationship between the birth rate and urbanization is established through the proposition of the labor force in agriculture.
In general, the highly interrelated independent variables and small sample size probably account for much of the fluctuation in the signs of the beta weights and the failure to attain statistical significance. However, the findings still reveal that income, mortality, infant 177
mortality and the agricultural labor force fraction are more
important factors in the dynamics of fertility decline, while the other aspects of socioeconomic development have
created the conditions for a change in fertility. The effect of each indicator on fertility operates in its own time dimension; economic-industrial indicators (income and urban ization) tend to be lagged rather than immediate in their effect, while the opposite is the case for social development
(education and mortality). Also, the nature of the indicators determines their direction of association; agricultural features of society are positively related to fertility whereas urban features are negatively related to fertility. In the course of socioeconomic development, the prevalence of urban features brought about changes in marriage patterns and in attitudes toward abortion and birth control, which worked together to reduce fertility. Among these mechanisms of fertility decline, birth control is most important. The causal factor and process of fertility and mortality decline in Taiwan provide strong support for the propositions in
Chapter II, which mainly concern the dynamic process and mechanisms of the demographic transition. CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have used the demographic transition
model as a theoretical framework for an empirical analysis
of the relationship between population growth and socio
economic development in Taiwan. The basic assumption of
transition theory is that demographic behavior adjusts to
changes in social and economic conditions as society under
goes a transformation from a rural-agrarian to an urban-
industrial state. Population thus is treated as a dependent
variable measured by crude birth'and death rates, while socio
economic development is treated as an independent variable
measured by a set of indicators including agricultural pro
duction, occupation, income, urban concentration, communi
cation and the social position of women. The statistical analysis is concerned mainly with (1) the association between
levels of fertility and mortality and the level of societal
development, and (2) the dynamic process of mortality and
fertility decline under the influence of socioeconomic development. From 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government sub stantially improved Taiwan's physical and socio-economic conditions through agricultural-industrial development and
178 179 the improvement of public health measures, thus promoting
the initial development of urban and industrial life in
Taiwan. After 1945, the Nationalist government converted
the island into a modern society through the implementation
of a series of social and economic programs such as the ex
pansion of educational opportunities, land reform, economic
development plans, and foreign assistance and investment
programs. This economic development has created the con
ditions essential for changes in societal structure; and it
is the nature of this social structure, the motivation it
induces and the expectation it creates, that constitutes the
dynamic factor in the process of modernizing demographic
behavior.
Summary of Major Findings and Policy Implications
The following is a summary of some of the more salient
findings pertaining to the relationship between demographic
change and socioeconomic development in Taiwan.
(1) A relatively high level of fertility and mortality
prevailed in agrarian Taiwan. Before 1905, Taiwan was a tra
ditional and agrarian society; the birth rate was around 40
per 1000 population, the death rate was 34 per 1000 population,
and the rate of population growth was relatively low. (2) With initial economic-industrial development during the agrarian period, mortality began to decline slowly while fertility first increased slightly and thereafter
fluctuated at a fairly high level. From 1906 to 1942, the 180
death rate declined from 34 to 18 per 1000 population whereas
the birth rate increased slightly from 40 to 41 per 1000
population. During this period, the rate of population
growth began to increase slowly.
(3) As socioeconomic development proceeded mortality
decline continued consistantly and rapidly, and fertility also began to decline at an accelerated pace over time.
During the period from 1947 to 1972, the death rate fell from
18 to 5 per 1000 population. The birth rate exhibited a some what erratic pattern during the same period, characterized
first by a "baby boom" in the immediate post-war period, then a steady and rapid decline. From 1955 to 1972, the birth rate
fell from 45 to 24 per 1000 population. The lag time between the transition of mortality and fertility is around 50 years.
Population growth during the initial stage of development was rapid but it slowed down steadily after the onset of fertility decline.
(4) Change in the features of social and economic organization has been conducive to lower fertility and mor tality during the development process. Rising agricultural production and incomes are the most salient factors in the reduction of mortality, although other factors such as in creasing physical mobility (or communication) and educational attainment have created a favorable condition for mortality decline. Fertility decline is also related to a variety of socioeconomic factors. It was found that the increase in 181
income and the decline in overall mortality and infant mor
tality, as well as the shift from an agricultural to a non-
agricultural labor force are the most significant factors in
the reduction of fertility. Again, however, other factors
such as increased educational attainment, physical mobility
or communication, and expanding employment opportunities
for women have created a favorable setting for a decline in
fertility.
(5) Changing marriage patterns (e.g., postponement
of marriage age), increasing abortion, and the adoption of new contraceptive devices are directly responsible for the
fertility transition in Taiwan. Socioeconomic development
in Taiwan not only encouraged an increase in the age at
marriage but also fostered more modern attitudes and values with respect to fertility behavior. The utilization of contra
ceptive devices and induced abortion has increased remarkably
in recent years, although the former is more prevalent than the latter. As noted in the findings, only mortality and not fertility has so far reached the low level of modern societies Will the fertility transition be completed soon? This question should be taken into consideration in the investi gation of the demographic transition in Taiwan. In recent decades, changes in social and economic organization have created the conditions essential for changes in social norms about family patterns and birth control. If the course of 182
development can go further and contraceptive devices can be
made more accessible to the mass of people, the fertility-
transition could be completed in the near future.
However, social change has come to the core of the
basic social structure—the family institution, and this poses
problems for further change. The maintenance of the family
line and the ensuring of security to the elderly, are the
basic goals of the Chinese family. "To have a son" is to
achieve this goal. This value still retains a strong place
in the family life of Taiwan. As shown in a recent attitude survey conducted by the Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family
Planning, from 1956 to 1973, preferred family size fell from
4.0 to 3.2 persons; the preferred number of sons fell from
2.2 to 1.9 persons, and the preferred number of daughters fell from 1,8 to 1,3 persons (Sun, 1975:20). The reduction of preferred family size is largely accounted for by a drop in the preferred number of daughters, and there is still a strong son preference. This preference for sons can lead to more live births, regardless of the overall decline in preferred family size, because the Taiwanese couple would not be likely to practice birth control until the desired number of sons is attained (Chow, 1974). For example, the gap between preferred family size and the actual number of live births among women age 35-39 remained the same from
1967 to 1973 (Sun, 1975:20).
In this connection we may note that pension systems 183 already exist in Taiwan; however, membership is so far confined
to a few groups, notably government employers, and retirement
benefits are very small. Most elderly parents are not in
a.position to become economically self-reliant. Therefore,
the old saying that "one’s future is in one's children" has meant a great deal in traditional China, and it is still
important in contemporary Taiwan. This situation could impede
the progress of family limitation. At the same time, the
large family in the context of changing economic and social
conditions has become disadvantageous. It seems to be char
acteristic of the demographic transition.in Taiwan that family
planning is surrounded by conflicting sentiments. How to
reduce the preference for sons and how to make parents less
dependent financially on children are the policy questions.
Any measure relating to changes in this family value will have significant implications for the attainment of family planning goals.
Relevance of Transition Theory to Demographic Change in Taiwan
The theory of demographic transition is based on the
European experience, and its relevance to the present situ ation of developing countries has been questioned. The present findings about population change in Taiwan provide an oppor tunity to observe transition theory's hypothesized relation ship between demographic and socioeconomic change. When the demographic transition in Taiwan is related to that of Europe, 184
both differences and similarities can no noted. The major
differences between the situations of the European transition
and that of Taiwan are as follows:
(1) Pace and source of mortality decline. The declines
in mortality in European countries were gradual, and were
generally related to the social and economic forces of develop
ment and industrialization. The same is not completely true
for Taiwan, where mortality decline was brought about by imported medical technology and public health measures, and
by agricultural-industrial development simultaneously, and where it was reinforced by the force of continued social and economic development. As a result, the pace of mortality decline in Taiwan was much faster than in Europe, even though
Taiwan had a much higher level of mortality at the outset.
To illustrate, during the 1906-1969 period, mortality declined in Taiwan at a rate that was twice as fast as those observed in Europe.
(2) Fertility levels before decline. Pre-transition fertility in Taiwan was much higher than in Europe. For example, the crude birth rate was about 37 in pre-revolutionary
France, 32 to 35 in Sweden and 29 to 33 in Norway in the
18th century, and 35 in early 19th century Britain (United
Nations, 1973: 65); but it was 40 per 1000 population in
Taiwan. Natality in Europe was limited by relatively late marriage, extensive non-marriage and probably deliberate birth control as well (Freedman, 1963; Hajnal, 1965; Bacci, 185
1971:48-79; Peterson, 1969:383-384). In contrast, the higher
birth rate in Taiwan was due primarily to the practice of
early and near-universal marriage.
(3) The timing and mechanism of fertility decline.
Although the timing of fertility decline in European countries
is not identical, it seems to have begun around the mid-1800's.
In general, European fertility declines appear to have been
based upon increased and more effective use of fertility
control measures such as coitus interruptus, abortion and
contraception (Carlsson, 1966; Hawthorn, 1970:33-43). Fertility
in Taiwan did not decline significantly until after 1956,
almost 100 years later than in European countries; but, as
with mortality, the pace of fertility decline in Taiwan was
much faster, falling by 46 percent in just 16 years.
(4) Rate of population growth. In Taiwan, the earlier
and rapid mortality decline, coupled with a high and rising
level of fertility, produced an unprecedented rate of popu
lation growth. For example, the average rate of population
growth during the 1906-1972 period was 2.5 percent, and it prevailed at a level of 3.5 percent for about 20 years. In contrast, European countries undergoing their demographic transition rarely experienced an average population growth rate in excess of 1.5 percent. (5) Pace of social and economic development. In recent decades, Taiwan has achieved more rapid social and economic development than in 19th century Europe; and this more rapid 186
development has served to expedite its demographic transition.
(6) Increased interest and planning capability of
government. Unlike much of 19th century Europe, the govern
ment in Taiwan has been actively concerned with and involved
in the administration of family planning and the control of
fertility behavior.
On the other hand, the demographic transition in Taiwan
also reveals patterns similar to those of the European countries
Among the similarities are the following:
(1) An increase of fertility came about when economic-
industrial development took place in the initial stage of
societal transformation. A similar increase in European fertility during the earlier days of industrialization has been noted in the studies of Krause (1954) , Habakkuk (1953) and Peterson (1960) .
(2) The decline of fertility and mortality is associated with socioeconomic development. (3) Mortality decline occurs prior to fertility decline.
(4) In the course of societal development, a shift from agricultural to nonagricultural labor, greater female participation in the labor force, the expansion of educational opportunities, mortality decline and a rising standard of living have created the conditions essential for changes in demographic behavior.
The previous comparison has shown that the traditional theory of demographic transition cannot be precisely applied 187
to the present situation of Taiwan. However, the general
propositions of transition theory, that the decline of fertility
and mortality is associated with socioeconomic development,
and that mortality decline occurs prior to fertility decline
appear sound. Although mortality decline can be caused by
medical technology and public health measures independent
of socioeconomic development, the progress of socioeconomic
development will still reinforce its decline. When the process
of development is carried to the high levels achieved in
Europe as well as Taiwan, it appears to be sufficient to
establish the preconditions for fertility decline.
The level of development that will determine the timing of fertility decline cannot be determined by this study, but the differences we mentioned above suggest several conditions:
(1) the timing of fertility decline will be earlier as develop ment progresses more quickly; (2) the timing of fertility decline may vary with socio-cultural background; and (3) the timing of fertility decline can be influenced by the interest and planning capability of government. For example, rapid socioeconomic development, a socio-cultural background favour able to the nuclear family or individualism, and/or more active participation of government in the implementation of birth control programs will induce an earlier timing of fertility decline. On the other hand, a low rate of socioeconomic development, a strong familistic society, and government apathy or noninvolvement in family planning will postpone the onset 188
of fertility decline. The different combination of these
conditions in a given situation will determine the timing
of fertility decline.
The basic causal structure of transition theory at a
high level of generality seems to be true, but its explanatory
power is limited by variations in the timing of fertility
decline. Therefore, if the causal process of transition theory
can be presented in a different fashion, one which includes a description of the effect of these conditions on fertility,
its explanatory power will be improved.
Policy Implications for the Developing Countries
The developing countries have been undergoing rapid population growth which has been caused by decreasing mor tality in the presence of a persistent high level of fertility.
This demographic change represents a temporary stage in the transition of these countries from an agrarian to an industrial society. The rapid population growth in these developing countries has become an important issue of international con cern pertaining to the world population problem, and the question of how to reduce population growth, particularly how to reduce fertility, has become a major policy problem in the world.
The theory of the demographic transition has played a dominant role in efforts to analyze this problem, "Develop ment" has been viewed as an alternative way to bring about fertility decline. Development is not seen as a direct cause 189
of fertility decline, but it does involve certain processes
by which the conditions essential for change in fertility
are created. As far as fertility decline is concerned, social
change is the most important stage in the development process.
Before societies can achieve this stage, however, some economic industrial development is necessary, and this requires capital
and investment. Until significant social change occurs, a
rather long transition period as occurred in both Europe and
Taiwan, will have to be endured.
In the developing countries, the rapid growth of popu
lation, especially of youthful dependents, has produced large numbers who have absorbed large proportions of the develop mental effort, thus making it more difficult if not impossible for them to create capital for further development. At the same time, it must be remembered that economic-industrial development within an agrarian setting may lead to fertility increase, and given an added impulse to population growth.
How to break through this demographic barrier is the essential question. European countries mitigated their population pressure through emigration, while in Taiwan certain key social changes and the adoption of family planning occurred in time to alleviate the demographic situation. As a result, the progress of their development was accelerated. But for other developing countries, international migration is no longer a potential outlet for excessive population growth, and the only way out is through social change and family planning. 190
Effective family planning always depends upon social change.
In the developing countries, population pressures are already
so great that the systems of production do not seem to be
able to overcome the existing poverty. Under a subsistence
condition, further development of social and economic organ
ization can be impeded (Hawley, 1970). If the needed social
change does occur, will it occur soon enough and at a suf ficiently rapid pace to compensate for the sharply increased
pace of mortality decline and the higher initial fertility
levels of these countries?
No matter what happens to these countries, continued
population growth is virtually assured. The crucial problem
is to mitigate the population pressure, and in this endeavor
it is reasonable to promote social and economic development.
Not only can it alleviate the poverty of the existing popu
lation, but it can provide for the larger numbers that the
future is bound to bring (Notestein, 1975). The problem is complicated because there is no single factor associated with the desire for fewer children. In general, fertility has declined under the multiple impact of urban-industrial de velopment, the expansion of educational opportunities, rising income, and a change in social position of women. But these can only occur in. the context of general social and economic development. That is, these conditions of fertility decline are integral facts of a larger societal dynamics and cannot be viewed independently of it. In other words, fertility 191
decline will not be significant until societal transformation
has come about. It may not be wise to wait for societal dynamics
to bring about fertility decline, because it is a time-consuming
process. It is necessary to have family planning now. In
the course of social and economic development, there is a
natural tendency toward a lower fertility; but given the
gravity of the situation an attempt to speed up this tendency
with the aid of a purposeful demographic policy seems to be
well justified (Guzevatyi, 1975). The existance of family
planning or the availability of birth control may induce or
reinforce the motivation for using fertility control measures.
Evaluation and Suggestions for Future Research
The present study might be refined or extended in a
number of ways. First of all, socioeconomic development is
a multi-dimensional concept. The indicators chosen for this
study are limited by the available data; thus, they do not
completely represent the multidimensional character of develop
ment; and a broader selection of development indicators, once
data become available, would likely improve this study.
The time-series analysis presented here is limited
because the range of variation in characteristics of variables
over a short period is small' and the intercorrelation among
the independent variables is high. As a result, the accuracy of the estimated regression coefficients has been affected.
To avoid this statistical problem, an alternative would be the use of aggregate data for smaller areas (e.g., county and 192
city level or local administrative units in Taiwan), as
increasing the number of sample units will reduce the extent
of multicollinearity.
In this study we treated Taiwan as a homogeneous society
In fact, Taiwan includes many area units which differ notably
in terms of cultural, demographic, social and economic con ditions. Changes in these different areas do not occur at the same pace and time. This study did not take into con sideration the substantial differences among areas. As a result, the findings are limited to broad generalizations pertaining to the characteristic features of Taiwan as a whole.
A study including the area differences would provide a better opportunity to investigate the pattern of demographic trans ition in a given country.
The main body of our statistical analysis was based on empirical data for Taiwan over a relatively short period.
The findings are thus bound to a specific social and cultural setting. For conclusions of more general validity to be drawn from this kind of time-series approach and case study, similar analyses need to be repeated in other countries. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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