DOCSLIB.ORG

Family Affair: How Cross-Straits Ties Have Grown in The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Family Affair: How Cross-Straits Ties Have Grown in The Sunday, November 8, 2015 CHINA DAILY 6 CROSS-STRAITS MEETING 7 Behind us is history stretching for 60 years. Now We are brothers connected by flesh even if before our eyes there are fruits of conciliation our bones are broken, we are a family whose instead of confrontation.” — Ma Ying-jeou blood is thicker than water.” — Xi Jinping The Standing Committee of the National People’s Former SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu holds his second Congress issues a meeting with then-ARATS chairman Wang Daohan and message to Taiwan meets former president Jiang Zemin during his six-day declaring the Chinese visit to Shanghai and Beijing. government’s position regarding peaceful Former Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui settlement of the Taiwan puts forward the infamous “two question. states” theory in which he defines The Association cross-Straits relations as a for Relations “state-to-state or special Across the state-to-state relationship”. Taiwan Straits Former NPC Standing and the Straits Committee chairman Ye Exchange Former ARATS chairman Wang Daohan (left) and former SEF Chen Shui-bian from Jianying issues a Foundation reach statement further chairman Koo Chen-fu hold a historic meeting in Singapore. the “pro-independence” an informal Democratic Progressive elaborating on the agreement that policy and principles for Party comes into “the two sides of power, ending the the settlement of the the Straits Former general secretary of the Central Taiwan question. Kuomintang’s 51-year adhere to the Committee of the Communist Party of China rule of the island. Taiwan authorities allow Taiwan one-China and president Jiang Zemin puts forward eight people to visit their relatives on principle.” It is propositions on the development of relations the mainland, ending 38 years of the “1992 between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits isolation across the Taiwan Straits. Consensus”. and the peaceful reunification of China. January September 1987 1992 April January October July May 1979 1981 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 FAMILY AFFAIR A look at how ties across the Taiwan Straits have grown in the past three decades March April May June July December August June June Feburary March June July May June May June Nov 7 2005 2005 2005 2008 2008 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015 Xi Jinping meets Ma • James Soong, • The mainland- • Cross-Straits weekend charter The Economic Coopera- Xi Jinping, Yuan Yuan, a Ying-jeou in Singapore, Former chairman of the based Association flights begin. Eleven airlines — tion Framework Agree- general panda the main- marking the first meeting president Hu People First Party for Relations six from the mainland and five ment, a comprehensive secretary of land donated to between leaders of the Jintao puts in Taiwan, visits Across the Taiwan from Taiwan — operate 144 cross-Straits economic the CPC Taiwan, gives birth two sides in more than forward a the mainland. Straits and the cross-Straits return-trip flights. pact, was signed to Central to its first baby. six decades. Xi says the four-point Taiwan-based reduce taris and Committee, Chinese mainland and guideline on Lien Chan (left), former chair- • Former president Hu Jintao Straits Exchange commercial barriers meets Lien Communist Taiwan are at the cross- the develop- man of the Kuomintang, leads a meets Wu Po-hsiung, then- Foundation restart between the two sides. Chan, Party of China roads for choosing the ment of delegation to the mainland to direction and path for chairman of the KMT, in Beijing. talks in Beijing honorary chief Xi cross-Straits meet with then-president Hu future development in Hu urges the mainland’s ARATS after a nine-year chairman of Jinping meets relations. Jintao. It is the first time that cross-Straits relations. and the Taiwan-based SEF to suspension. the KMT, in Kuomintang the top leaders of the Commu- resume talks as soon as The first group of individual tourists Beijing. It is Honorary nist Party of China and the KMT • Two pandas, Tuan Tuan swimmers, 50 possible. • ARATS and SEF 100 from the mainland visit Taiwan. the first time Chairman Wu have had a dialogue in the past and Yuan Yuan, are each from the mainland The first batch of students from resumes talks in Previously, tourists were only allowed that Xi has Po-hsiung in six decades. donated to Taiwan by and Taiwan, swim across the mainland graduate in Taiwan. Beijing after nine to travel in groups. met a Taiwan Beijing. mainland authorities. the Straits from Xiamen, years. The bodies, delegation Fujian province, to Xi Jinping meets visiting Kuomintang channels for since • people join the first • Direct shipping, air Kinmen in Taiwan. Chairman Eric Chu in Beijing. high-level cross- 760 becoming tourist group from the mainland transport and postal Straits dialogue, CPC chief in to Taiwan since 1949. services between the Hundreds of students Xi Jinping, halted talks in 1999 November mainland and Taiwan stormed Taiwan’s general due to the Taiwan 2012. were formally launched. legislative chamber to secretary of authorities’ “pro- protest a cross-Straits the Communist independence” service trade pact. The Party of China activities. protest lasted for Central weeks until the pact Committee, was sent to the meets Taiwan’s island’s “legislative People First Party Chair- chamber” for detailed Zhang Zhijun, chief of the State man James review. Council Taiwan Aairs Oce, Soong. pays a four-day visit to Taiwan. Exports from the mainland to Taiwan Year-on-year change of exports from FDI from Taiwan to the mainland FDI from the mainland to Taiwan Imports from Taiwan to the mainland Year-on-year change of imports from Taiwan Visits fromTaiwan to mainland Visits from mainland to Taiwan ($ billion) the mainland to Taiwan (%) ($ million) ($ million) ($ billion) to the mainland (%) (million) (million) 50 50 200 40 46 44.8 35 6 200 184 6 40 40 3,000 2,847 177 157 5.26 5.34 5.37 152 30 5.14 5.16 40 37 2,476 150 5 5 35 150 4.48 30 25.3 2,136 2,088 4.36 2,152 1,899 2,183 116 4 4.04 2,018 113 132 18.5 4 22.2 2,000 1,881 101 103 125 20 16.6 33 20 18.3 1,774 100 100 15.3 16 30 26 87 3 2.92 13.1 13.9 104 3 2.63 23 29 10.3 10.5 10 Jan 85 7.9 21 - 50 10 Jan 2 1.85 4.8 Sept 75 5.8 - 2 1.66 20 1,000 17 50 ’15 11 2.3 Sept 0.99 20 0 0.04 ’14 ’15 1 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 0 0 1 16 -2.8 -0.03 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 0.28 -0.05 0 10 -10 -0.06 0 -2.8 0 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 0 -50 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 Jan ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 -10 -6.3 - Jan Sept -20 - -20.8 Sept Source: Wind Photos by AFP and provided to China Daily -17 TIAN CHI AND FENG XIUXIA / CHINA DAILY.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Internet Surveillance in China
    The Architecture of Control: Internet Su rveillance in China James A. Lewis , Center for Strategic and International Studies July 200 6 Security concerns shape China’s official internet and information technology strateg ies . Th ese include concerns shared by many cou nt ries: promoting a strong and growing economy , providing information assurance , and defending against foreign intrusions into China’s information space . Most importantly for the Chinese, information security include s a political element not foun d in many other nations – c ontrol by the party and the state over communications and the flow of informa tion . The rapid spread of internet access and mobile communications pose a serious challenge to this goal. In response, China’s security apparatus is reorienting its informational defenses. In the past, the emphasi s was on blocking access - the “great firewall.” In the future, the emphasis will be on the monitoring and surveillance of online activities. China’s primary objective in internet securi ty is political – preventing IT from eroding the regime’s authority. Information security is defined in China as “a comprehensive concept understood in a broad sense, and it involves political, economic, cultural, ideological, media, social and military l evel or field. ” It includes “data, system, network, infrastructure .”1 Chin ese officials worry about the potential of the Internet to contribute to the loss of state secrets , offer new avenues for organizing dissent and opposition , and spread “harmful inf ormation. ” This makes controlling access to "harmful network information” and the ability to monitor and intercept communications top priorities .2 For China’s leadership, one particular set of event s demonstrated the risks of not securing networks.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries the Size Of
    Who Set the Narrative? Assessing the Influence of Chinese Media in News Coverage of COVID-19 in 30 African Countries The size of China’s State-owned media’s operations in Africa has grown significantly since the early 2000s. Previous research on the impact of increased Sino-African mediated engagements has been inconclusive. Some researchers hold that public opinion towards China in African nations has been improving because of the increased media presence. Others argue that the impact is rather limited, particularly when it comes to affecting how African media cover China- related stories. This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by exploring the extent to which news media in 30 African countries relied on Chinese news sources to cover China and the COVID-19 outbreak during the first half of 2020. By computationally analyzing a corpus of 500,000 news stories, I show that, compared to other major global players (e.g. Reuters, AFP), content distributed by Chinese media (e.g. Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily) is much less likely to be used by African news organizations, both in English and French speaking countries. The analysis also reveals a gap in the prevailing themes in Chinese and African media’s coverage of the pandemic. The implications of these findings for the sub-field of Sino-African media relations, and the study of global news flows is discussed. Keywords: China-Africa, Xinhua, news agencies, computational text analysis, big data, intermedia agenda setting Beginning in the mid-2010s, Chinese media began to substantially increase their presence in many African countries, as part of China’s ambitious going out strategy that covered a myriad of economic activities, including entertainment, telecommunications and news content (Keane, 2016).
    [Show full text]
  • Police Increase Crackdown to Prevent Human Trafficking
    4 | Thursday, May 6, 2021 HONG KONG EDITION | CHINA DAILY CHINA Grow together Courier service ZTO Farmers lay out rice slammed for inhumane seedling beds to raise them collectively in Lujiang county, Hefei, Anhui prov- delivery of dogs, cats ince, on Wednesday. The practice can By LI LEI save labor costs and [email protected] reduce pests and other crop diseases. The courier giant ZTO Express The healthy ZUO XUEZHANG / was recently put under fire after development of FOR CHINA DAILY one of its business outlets in Chengdu, Sichuan province, was courier companies is found to have transported puppies reliant on … a proper and kittens as part of the contro- versial pet blind box sales on value toward life.” e-commerce sites. A statement from courier com- In a statement late on Tuesday, pany ZTO Express ZTO apologized for collecting live animals from e-retailers for ship- ment, which it said breached rules. postal services, and courier com- The New York listed firm said it panies shall not violate the rules has shut the outlet in question for knowingly,” it said on its Weibo rectification. account. A worker overseeing safety The online crusade came after affairs in the province has also volunteers from Chengdu Aizhijia been suspended from work with Animal Rescue Center, a local ani- the year’s performance-based sala- mal welfare group, late on Monday ry deducted, it added. intercepted about 160 packages “The healthy development of containing such pets at the ZTO courier companies is reliant on the outlet. Police increase crackdown strict application of industrial Videos posted on the group’s standards and safety manage- Weibo account showed cube cages ment, as well as a proper value muffled with braided cloth being toward life,” the statement said.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Dalei Jie University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Jie, Dalei, "The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 524. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Abstract How to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? As the Taiwan Strait is still the only conceivable scenario where a major power war can break out and Taiwan's words and deeds can significantly affect the prospect of a cross-strait military conflict, ot answer this question is not just a scholarly inquiry. I define the aiwanT independence policy as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. Although two existing prevailing explanations--electoral politics and shifting identity--have some merits, they are inadequate to explain policy change over the past twenty years. Instead, I argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate sovereignty. Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power--the international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty--for a shortfall in military- economic-diplomatic assets.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Benefits? China-Africa Relations Through the Prism of Culture
    3/2008 3/20083/2008 3/2008 Call for Papers Call for Papers China aktuell – Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an inter- ChinaCall aktuellnationally for – Papers Journal refereed of academicCurrent Chinesejournal published Affairs isby anthe inter-GIGA Institute nationally ofrefereed Asian Studies,academic Hamburg. journal published The quar terlyby the journal GIGA focuses Institute on current 3/2008 China aktuell – Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an inter- 3/2008 3/2008 3/2008 of Asiannationally Studies,developments refereed Hamburg. inacademic Greater The quar journalChina.terly publishedjournalIt has a focuses circulation by the on GIGA currentof 1,200 Institute copies, developmentsof Asianmaking Studies,in Greaterit one Hamburg. of China. the world’s ItThe has quar amost circulationterly widely journal ofdistributed focuses1,200 copies, onperiodicals current on 3/2008 makingdevelopments it Asianone of affairs,the in world’sGreater and mostChina.reaches widely It hasa distributed broada circulation readership periodicals of 1,200 in oncopies,academia, Asianmaking affairs,administration it oneand ofreaches the and world’s businessa broadmost circles. widelyreadership distributedArticles in shouldacademia, periodicals be written on in administrationAsianGerman affairs, and or businessEnglishand reaches and circles. submitted a Articlesbroad exclusively shouldreadership tobe this writtenin publication. academia, in German or English and submitted exclusively to this publication. administrationChina aktuell and is businessdevoted
    [Show full text]
  • United States - China Relations: a Complex Balance Between Cooperation and Confrontation
    DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS United States - China relations: a complex balance between cooperation and confrontation Author: Roberto BENDINI ABSTRACT China’s rise is a real game-changer both economically and geopolitically, and represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the major global power, namely the United States. China’s new economic and political weight fosters further cooperation with the US on a number of global issues, as well as increased collaboration within multilateral organisations. Given their sheer influence, both countries have global interests that make it difficult to find a solution for one without the consent of the other. China’s rise and expanding global interests have resulted in a drastic change in the global geopolitical order. Frustrations over the US’s predominance, especially in Asia, have raised tensions between the two powers. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, China has adopted a more assertive approach towards multilateral organisations which it sees as controlled by and for Western powers, but also towards its direct neighbours. This approach represents a direct challenge to the world order established and sustained by the US and is therefore a potential reason for conflict. DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2016_86 EN March 2016, PE 570.464 © European Union, 2016 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies This paper is an initiative of the Policy Department, DG EXPO English-language manuscript was completed on 4 March 2016. Printed in Belgium. Authors: Roberto BENDINI with input from Emilie GRIFFITHS and Antoine ARNAUD (trainees) Editorial Assistant: Jakub PRZETACZNIK Feedback of all kind is welcome.
    [Show full text]
  • The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’S Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World
    The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance By Sarah Cook October 22, 2013 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent media development throughout the world. The Center provides information, builds networks, conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways to attract additional U.S. private sector interest in and support for international media development. CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering the effectiveness of media assistance. Don Podesta Interim Senior Director Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street, N.W., 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 378-9700 Fax: (202) 378-9407 Email: [email protected] URL: http://cima.ned.org Design and Layout by Valerie Popper About the Author Sarah Cook Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House. She manages the editorial team producing the China Media Bulletin, a biweekly news digest of media freedom developments related to the People’s Republic of China.
    [Show full text]
  • Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control Many
    PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control by Deborah Fallows, Senior Research Fellow, Pew Internet & American Life Project March 27, 2008 Many Americans assume that China’s internet users are both aware of and unhappy about their government’s oversight and control of the internet. But in a new survey, most Chinese say they approve of internet control and management, especially when it comes from their government. According to findings from the fourth and most recent of a series of surveys about internet use in China from 2000 to 2007,1 over 80% of respondents say they think the internet should be managed or controlled, and in 2007, almost 85% say they think the government should be responsible for doing it. This survey was funded by the New York-based Markle Foundation and directed by an internationally respected research team at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.2 As required of all public-opinion polling in China, either the survey or the surveyors must be approved by the government, and some topics that Westerners might have liked to see addressed directly, such as censorship, were not. But a close reading of the results and findings highlights the Chinese perspective on some sensitive issues. The Chinese government has long tried to control its internet in many ways. It censors or blocks politically-outspoken blogs. It has arrested citizens on charges of “inciting subversion” for posting articles in chat rooms critical of the Communist Party. It passes internet traffic through a “Great Firewall” designed to deny access to such international websites as Wikipedia, Technorati, all blogs hosted by Blogspot, and many sites maintained by the BBC.
    [Show full text]
  • The History and Politics of Taiwan's February 28
    The History and Politics of Taiwan’s February 28 Incident, 1947- 2008 by Yen-Kuang Kuo BA, National Taiwan Univeristy, Taiwan, 1991 BA, University of Victoria, 2007 MA, University of Victoria, 2009 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of History © Yen-Kuang Kuo, 2020 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This dissertation may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii Supervisory Committee The History and Politics of Taiwan’s February 28 Incident, 1947- 2008 by Yen-Kuang Kuo BA, National Taiwan Univeristy, Taiwan, 1991 BA, University of Victoria, 2007 MA, University of Victoria, 2009 Supervisory Committee Dr. Zhongping Chen, Supervisor Department of History Dr. Gregory Blue, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. John Price, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. Andrew Marton, Outside Member Department of Pacific and Asian Studies iii Abstract Taiwan’s February 28 Incident happened in 1947 as a set of popular protests against the postwar policies of the Nationalist Party, and it then sparked militant actions and political struggles of Taiwanese but ended with military suppression and political persecution by the Nanjing government. The Nationalist Party first defined the Incident as a rebellion by pro-Japanese forces and communist saboteurs. As the enemy of the Nationalist Party in China’s Civil War (1946-1949), the Chinese Communist Party initially interpreted the Incident as a Taiwanese fight for political autonomy in the party’s wartime propaganda, and then reinterpreted the event as an anti-Nationalist uprising under its own leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • The Taiwan Issue and the Normalization of US-China Relations Richard Bush, Brookings Institution Shelley Rigger, Davidson Colleg
    The Taiwan Issue and the Normalization of US-China Relations Richard Bush, Brookings Institution Shelley Rigger, Davidson College The Taiwan Issue in US-China Normalization After 1949, there were many obstacles to normalization of relations between the United States and the new People’s Republic of China (PRC), but Taiwan was no doubt a key obstacle. The Kuomintang-led Republic of China (ROC) government and armies had retreated there. Washington maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC government and, in 1954-55, acceded to Chiang Kai-shek’s entreaties for a mutual defense treaty. After June 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the United States took the position that the status of the island of Taiwan— whether it was part of the sovereign territory of China—was “yet to be determined.” More broadly, PRC leaders regarded the United States as a threat to their regime, particularly because of its support for the ROC, and American leaders viewed China as a threat to peace and stability in East Asia and to Taiwan, which they saw as an ally in the containment of Asian communism in general and China in particular. It was from Taiwan’s Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) airbase, for example, that U.S. B-52s flew bombing missions over North Vietnam. By the late 1960s, PRC and U.S. leaders recognized the strategic situation in Asia had changed, and that the geopolitical interests of the two countries were not in fundamental conflict. Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping not only reaffirmed that assessment but also recognized a basis for economic cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Quest for Global Primacy: an Analysis of Chinese International
    C O R P O R A T I O N TIMOTHY R. HEATH, DEREK GROSSMAN, ASHA CLARK China’s Quest for Global Primacy An Analysis of Chinese International and Defense Strategies to Outcompete the United States For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA447-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0615-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover images: prospective56/iStock/ Getty Images Plus; MF3d/iStock/Getty Images Plus Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This research explores possible international and defense strategies that China might employ to outcompete the United States and achieve a position of international primacy.
    [Show full text]
  • China Daily Distribution Corp
    Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 06/01/2020 12:20:30 PM OMB No. 1124-0003; Expires May 31, 2020 U.S. Department of Justice Amendment to Registration Statement Washington, dc 20530 Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended INSTRUCTIONS. File this amendment form for any changes to a registration. Compliance is accomplished by filing an electronic amendment to registration statement and uploading any supporting documents at https://www.fara.gov. Privacy Act Statement. The filing of this document is required for the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., for the purposes of registration under the Act and public disclosure. Provision of the information requested is mandatory, and failure to provide the information is subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions established in Section 8 of the Act. Eveiy registration statement, short form registration statement, supplemental statement, exhibit, amendment, copy of informational materials or other document or information filed with the Attorney General under this Act is a public record open to public examination, inspection and copying duiing the posted business hours of the FARA Unit in Washington, DC. Statements are also available online at the FARA Unit’s webpage: https://www.fara.gov. One copy of eveiy such document, other than informational materials, is automatically provided to the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, and copies of any and all documents are routinely made available to other agencies, departments and Congress pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Act. The Attorney General also transmits a semi-annual report to Congress on the administration of the Act which lists the names of all agents registered under the Act and the foreign principals they represent.
    [Show full text]