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Centenary Propaganda and Nationalism with Xi Jinping Characteristics for a New Era

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Centenary Propaganda and Nationalism with Xi Jinping Characteristics for a New Era ISSUE BRIEF 07.19.21 Reflections on the July 1, 2021, Centenary of the Chinese Communist Party Part Two: Centenary Propaganda and Nationalism with Xi Jinping Characteristics for a New Era Brandon Zheng, Research Associate, China Studies Program As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was the Ili Rebellion of 1944 that created the celebrates its 100th anniversary this month, Second East Turkestan Republic in Xinjiang, a persistent theme of the speeches and supported by the Soviet government.2 parades has been the extent to which the The Communist conquests of areas like country has changed under the party’s rule. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet were The speech given by party leader Xi Jinping often achieved as much through astute on July 1 in Beijing had a deeply nationalistic political negotiation as through military tone, extolling China’s geopolitical strength, with Communist leaders forming strength and “morph[ing] the Party and agreements with local Uyghur, Mongol, the machinery of government and the Tibetan, and other ethnic minority leaders in perception of the nation of China into one.”1 order to assume control of these regions. While Xi emphasized the positive changes This was relatively easy to do because of that have occurred in China, the party has widespread opposition to the Kuomintang’s changed in other ways, ones that its leaders version of Chinese nationalism. Throughout prefer not to explicitly acknowledge. In order the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chiang Kai- for the state, the party, and the nation to shek gave multiple speeches supporting be conflated as one, the nation itself must the notion of the Chinese nation as a single be united behind the party. The Chinese group, claiming that the different ethnicities The Chinese Communist Communist Party under Xi has adopted a new were “clans” within a single Chinese nation Party under Xi has ideology of Chinese nationalism, creating a rather than separate nations in themselves.3 party that not only operates differently from The Communists initially contrasted adopted a new ideology how its founders envisioned, but also in ways themselves against the Kuomintang view, of Chinese nationalism that explicitly go against what the party pushing an idea of China as a multinational ... that explicitly goes historically stood for. state united around Marxism. Some of the against what the party Events such as the ongoing genocide concessions given to ethnic minorities after of the Uyghur people are particularly tragic the Communist victory in the war included historically stood for. and ironic in light of the party’s rise to the renaming of several major cities, such power. During the chaos of the final years as Dihua, which was changed to Ürümqi, of the Chinese Civil War, multiple ethnicities and Guisui, which became Hohhot. In these in China’s outer provinces were engaged instances, the Chinese names were replaced in revolts against the Kuomintang-ruled with indigenous ones, and autonomous central government. The most notable revolt regions were created in places with large RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 07.19.21 ethnic minority populations. In 1953, Mao first special economic zone under Deng Zedong even wrote an internal memo to Xiaoping’s reforms and went from a rural the rest of the Party Central Committee county of 500,000 in 1970 to a mega-city condemning Han nationalism as a feature of 14.6 million in 2021, is heavily associated of the previous Kuomintang regime and with China’s economic transformation. Its associating it with “the landlord class and population also primarily speaks Mandarin, the bourgeoisie.”4 since most of its growth has been the result Contrast this with Xi Jinping’s 100th of migration from other provinces. Thus, anniversary speech, which emphasized Ren Zhongyi, the former party secretary of the strength and unity of China and Guangdong, was quoted in 1999 as saying, barely mentioned the party’s historic role “Guangdong’s different languages should all in opposing capitalism and economic be united using Mandarin, with Shenzhen exploitation. Instead of a country united as the model.”8 Ren may have connected around Marxism, Xi’s China is a country Mandarin with Shenzhen not only because of united around being Chinese. His references Shenzhen’s association with wealth, but also to China as a single entity evoke Chiang’s its reputation as China’s Silicon Valley and vision of China more than Mao’s. In a country thus, China’s future.9 Later developments, where approximately 92% of Chinese people such as the Guangdong National Language belong to the Han majority ethnic group, his Regulations passed in 2012, which limited rhetoric of a unified nation seeks to erase the amount of Cantonese that could be used ways of being Chinese that do not conform in Guangdong-based television broadcasts, to that of the Han majority. seem to corroborate this sensibility of a Of course, the very idea of a single Han Mandarin-speaking future.10 Instead of a country nation is fraught. China is a land of great This may explain the particular hostility united around Marxism, regional differences. Contrasts within the against Cantonese that is associated Han ethnic group are most obvious in the with Chinese rule in Hong Kong after the Xi’s China is a country south of China, where the majority of the handover in 1997. Unlike Wu, Gan, or united around population is Han but historically did not Xiang, Cantonese’s widespread use in being Chinese. speak Mandarin. The first concerted attempts the public sphere and its possession of a to promote Mandarin as the national developed writing system and widely used language began in the Republican period of romanizations have given it a tangible China from 1912 to 1949, when such features identity that most other Sinitic languages of the language as the Zhuyin Fuhao5 system do not have. Even so, written Cantonese of transcribing the pronunciation of Chinese is not used in official settings, but mostly characters and the Gwoyeu Romatzyh6 online, and while Cantonese is the medium system of romanization were created. These of instruction in most Hong Kong classrooms, can be contrasted with the many other Sinitic the Hong Kong curriculum does not provide languages. For example, since Shanghai was for classes on Cantonese itself.11 After the a major center of the Chinese publishing recent crackdown on civil liberties in the industry, Shanghainese experienced a city, including the shuttering of the largest brief period of popularity in novels in the pro-democracy and Cantonese-language 1910s and 1920s before its lack of written newspaper, Apple Daily, Cantonese is likely standardization—in contrast to Mandarin— to become even more marginalized. eventually caused the latter to eclipse it.7 Despite the increasing influence of a Chinese policy toward non-Mandarin Chinese nationalism that aims to suppress Sinitic languages shifted from neglect to differences—not just ideological but also more open hostility in the late 20th and ethnic and linguistic differences—Chinese early 21st centuries. Propaganda posters media outlets are willing to promote promoting Putonghua, the standardized diversity, but only when it serves their version of Mandarin that serves as the purposes and only differences that are official language of China, associate speaking superficial in nature. A recent article in Mandarin with being educated and cultured. China Daily extols a television drama about Shenzhen, Guangdong, which became the a group of party officials sent from Fujian to 2 CENTENARY PROPAGANDA AND NATIONALISM WITH XI JINPING CHARACTERISTICS FOR A NEW ERA a small village in Ningxia for highlighting the The new nationalist China under importance of linguistic diversity in China, Xi Jinping is one in which diversity is a but it does so by referring to the language marketing buzzword, where ethnic minorities spoken by Chen Jinshan, the official from are trotted out as dancing showpieces to Fujian, as “Fujian dialect” instead of its promote China as a harmonious, multiethnic traditional name, Hokkien.12 While the article state while simultaneously engaging in briefly alludes to the cultural importance of genocide.15 Propaganda in Xi’s China these minority languages, this is downplayed highlights incidents like the murder of in favor of discussion about how the contrast George Floyd in the United States and the between Hokkien and Zhongyuan Mandarin protests and riots that occurred afterward, makes the show interesting and affects while simultaneously covering up its own certain plotlines, rather than any serious even more blatant problems with racial discussion of the Sinitic languages or even discrimination, not only against Uyghurs,16 acknowledgment that these are separate but Africans as well.17 Elsewhere, cities languages. Instead, the term “dialects” is like Xiamen will put Hokkien phrases on insistently used. subway ads but write them using nonsense A similar phenomenon could be seen in characters meant to be pronounced in the party’s centennial celebrations, during Mandarin for the benefit of tourists,18 to the which 56 cannons were shot for the 55 ethnic chagrin and mockery of locals who do speak groups of China, plus the “Gaoshan,” the Hokkien19 (see Image 1). Xi’s China is a China term used in China for the indigenous peoples where ethnic and linguistic minority groups of Taiwan.13 Setting aside the question as are tools to bolster the nation’s image when to whether a people based in Taiwan count they behave, and
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