THE ANATOMY OF [Ragadja meg az olvasó figyelmét egy érdekes idézettel a dokumentumból, vagy használja ezt a területet egy THE HUNGARIAN RIGHT lényeges pont kiemelésére. A szövegdobozt húzással bárhová helyezheti az oldalon.]

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THE ANATOMY OF THE HUNGARIAN RIGHT

Preface

Centre for Fair Political Analysis published its essay Anatomy of the Right – Why is Fidesz the way it is and could it be different? for a Hungarian audience. Nevertheless we feel it may be a useful resource for our foreign followers as well. Some additional explanations are necessary though to better understand the text as well as our motivation for writing it.

Three fundamental remarks on our study:

1. Concerning the title; we must make it clear right at the beginning that this essay focuses solely on Fidesz and the reasons that led to its actions in the past three years. The essay does not aim to evaluate or judge these actions, or to take into account their success. We have focused on the rate of realization of the government program in other analyses. This time we wanted to uncover the deeper reasons behind Fidesz policies and the evolution of the party’s approach to politics over time. What brought about its current mentality? What drives them to take head on all the foreign conflicts the government and the country have to endure? What is their vision? We feel that beyond the easy explanation of an “authoritarian narrative” lies a conscious theoretical “backbone” that has evaded mapping so far.

2. Why equate Fidesz with the Hungarian right? Because it is the single dominant party in the classical right wing hemisphere of Hungarian politics. In this case we have to make a clear distinction between the right and extreme right. While Fidesz is radical in its actions nevertheless Jobbik does not belong in the same category as Fidesz and all other formerly relevant conservative/right wing parties, such as MDF, have lost significance.

3. Last but not least, expect the unexpected from this study. Centre for Fair Political Analysis is a non-party funded independent think tank, Unbound by political loyalties we feel that from time to time it is important to go beyond everyday political analysis and write theoretical pieces as well. Regardless of political sympathy, we cannot understand Hungarian politics without the study of a party that has been an important actor in it for over twenty years now. We hope our essay contributes to a better understanding of Fidesz actions both at home and abroad.

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Why is Fidesz the way it is, and could it be different?

Following the 25th anniversary of the right? The “facts” speak for themselves: Hungary is if the changes reach a certain founding of Fidesz, Centre for Fair a party – but primarily its leader – has limit – a point of no return – from which Political Analysis1 felt it was high time gone “crazy” therefore the community of the internal forces can not reverse to evaluate the past three years of “normal” people have to bring them to reforms. This is at the center of Fidesz’s governance. The aim of the essay is to order. In such a situation any analysis government policy from 2010. While we map and understand the characteristics of about the “what’s and why’s” of Fidesz’s do not say that Fidesz’s changes are in the Hungarian right; their motivations as (and the government’s) actions might any way connected to Bokros’s, however well as the ideology behind their actions. seem as a pro-government apology. the starting point in both cases is that the We avoid repeating the usual criticism structures behind stagnation have to be against Fidesz, which does not mean we Beyond the autocratic narrative radically dismantled. The Hungarian do not have critical remarks. We feel that right has committed itself to radically these critiques neither help to understand We must make it clear that for us Fidesz changing everything. the underlying “secret”, nor do they reach is not an object of our sympathy but the the essence of the problems. primary source to understanding Road to constitutional crisis Hungary’s problems. Naturally the We feel that through the analysis of this interpretation according to which Fidesz- The style of governance from 2010 that question we can get closer to rule is primarily autocratic is legitimate prefers radical change created a understanding Hungary’s deeper however in our view false. This narrative constitutional crisis. This situation is not problems (above and beyond Fidesz). does not explain adequately the Fidesz without antecedents, there have been Therefore the writing focuses on how phenomenon or the important question of several such cases in our history. much the current state of the right is due if this narrative were true how is it Currently we are faced with the inverse to “structural” causes, such as the possible that Hungary became autocratic? of the constitutional crisis that broke out individual structure of Hungarian society, If Hungary is a stable in the summer of 2006, following the as well as the traditions that formed it. democracy, how can this stability leaking of the Őszöd speech. The content We aim to give a set of criteria and a suddenly come to an end from one day to of the speech was just one cause for the framework for understanding, in order to the other replaced by despotism? In such crisis. The second is much less frequently generate a new debate on the right (and a country there had to be already a mentioned –: Ferenc Gyurcsány was the of course on Hungary as well). problem with the system of checks and first Hungarian prime minister since the balances, the opposition and society itself change of regime who proposed a The essay consists of four parts. The first which allowed this to happen. program of basically complete structural describes the standpoint from which Furthermore if this could happen then the renewal. In the shadow of Őszöd its CFPA wrote the analysis. The second nature of the East-West relations were completion was impossible. At that time, presents the most important ideological quite poor as the West did not have the right complained of a constitutional cornerstones of Fidesz’s political strategy enough power to avert such a change. crisis and of illegitimate governance. The and governance. In the third part we The autocratic narrative raises too many constitutional crises became complete not confront these cornerstones one by one questions and explains too few, this is so long ago when the new constitution with the independent – primarily Western why we search for an alternative written by Fidesz came into effect. Since European – receptions. Finally, in the interpretation. 2011 all fault lines that have existed since fourth part we evaluate the achievements the change of regime (e.g. left-right or of the Hungarian right based on the Our approach to understanding the liberal-conservative) have transformed, aspect of democratic theory and a Hungarian right is that there is a reason giving way to the “historical” fault line of historical approach. behind the “radical” approach which can the “constitution protecting” opposition be clearly defined. Fidesz’s 2/3’s and the “pro-constitutional change” I. Is it possible to write an analysis majority could not have come about government. This is a deeply rooted fault of Fidesz? without the political and economic line missing from the history of the stagnation which characterized Hungary luckier Western European countries, In face of the strong anti-government from about 2005. This stagnation was however not at all unknown to emotions the question must be posed: is observed much earlier by economist Hungarians. there place for political analysis aiming Lajos Bokros as well, who first wrote to “dissect” the intentions and about the need for the “critical mass of If the political competition is not between motivations of the government and the reforms”. What is this if not a way out of liberals, conservatives etc. but between stagnation? Bokros and Fidesz, however “the protectors of the constitution” and strange a pair they make, while very those that “destroy it” then the party  different in their ideology, are both right competition that normal liberal The essay appeared as the supplement of Élet és Irodalom on May 17, 2013. The authors are: Ervin in this case. The only way a democracies are used to becomes Csizmadia, Péter Csery, András Jenei, Júlia Lakatos, transformation can be successful in impossible. If the opposition holds not Attila Tibor Nagy, Zoltán Novák, Ádám Paár

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just certain actions of the government to towards the government. Our external rarely ever attempt to take such a stance be incompetent but the complete surroundings (whatever we may think of as changing everything means violating existence of it to be unconstitutional them) are given; the prominent members interests risking their popularity amongst (going against even the constitution it of Fidesz should come to terms with the a varied circle of actors that influence had created) then the possibility of even a fact that it is exactly because of the politics. minimal interaction or cooperation comes Hungarian right’s radical country to an end and the government claim transforming actions (and the philosophy However this is just the sphere of the which had placed the creation of behind it) that the international and “elite” and the level of citizens or voters “national unity” at the top of its priorities domestic critiques multiplied. It is is equally important. Radical governance in 2010 will be in vain. interesting that the right does not try to changes the everyday lives of voters as give a more detailed answer to these well. While voters prefer stability we II. The paradigm of radical critiques – whereas it has a rather have to call attention to two things: 1) change complex message. Despite the amount of changes Fidesz’s relative support has not dropped The intellectual self-representation of Radicalism: concept and examples drastically; 2) It is not at all certain that Fidesz If we say that Fidesz is the proponent of stability is a trademark of governments radical change we must define what that avoid greater transformations. Aside The ideological groundings of a party can radicalism means in this context. Fidesz from the economic crisis, it is exactly be pieced together from 1) party is not radical the way Jobbik is (and not stagnation that unseated the former manifestos; 2) speeches, interviews given an extreme right party). However in its liberal-left government. Nevertheless the by members of the party 3) from the basic attitude it is radical and this is in 2014 elections will decide to what extent works of connected think tanks and the radical transformation of the status the voters “reward” the current grandiose intellectuals. Whichever category we quo even at the expense of changing the changes. look at, Fidesz has not been active existing legal frameworks. Governments recently. Whereas following the 2006 Őszöd speech it was active in all three fields2. After coming to power in 2010 the diverse activities that characterized it in opposition came to an end. Anyone trying to find a written ideological, FROM STAGNATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS theoretical core behind the past three years of governance will have a hard time.

Ever since its ascent to power the government has paid less than enough attention to formulating their ideas on governance and the transformation of the country. It presented the System of National Cooperation (Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere) furthermore it created its Constitution, however aside from this neither the government, nor the right-wing think tanks or ideologists wrote texts that interpreted what was happening for the wider public (not to mention foreigners). This does not mean that the leaders of Fidesz and the intellectuals close to the party are not active verbally.

It is apparent however to what extent members of the government avoid the topic of interpreting the government’s intentions for radical change concentrating instead on another topic; that of Hungary being misunderstood by foreigners and the opposition. Even Fidesz can not think that the foreign and domestic critiques stem purely from “misunderstandings” or “animosity”

2 See Viktor Orbán’s series of articles: Vízválasztó, I. II. III., Magyar Nemzet, 2006 July 29, August 5 and September 9. Between 2006 and 2010 Fidesz accepted several new programs, documents and proclamations for example: Erős Magyarország – Egy európai program, December 2007. The common element of these is the constant voicing of the moral princples of politics.

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Looking at historical examples of this 1. Hungary in the world: a new sort of submission.5 Fidesz is the only party in type of transformative politics, we have interpretation of the West Hungarian politics that – starting from to mention two historical periods. One is the mid 90s – had advocated the renewal the 1930’s the other is the Hungarian We cannot understand Fidesz’s actions of the West as well and can only imagine Reform Era. The opponents of Fidesz and their reasons if at first we do not Hungary’s improving Western relations basically only speak of the first and relate point out the fact that at the center of the with a changing Western Europe. the current events with the horrible party’s whole approach lays the aim of transformation of the country of the time. completing a mission which is to turn 2) The final rollback of post-communism: We understand this historical analogy, around trends that go back centuries. This unorthodox public policy and we have to admit that there are intention is based on two fundaments: 1) several similarities concerning the the external surroundings of Hungary Another key element of the Orbán “politics of independence” economic have to be analyzed and understood government’s nation transforming heterodoxy as well as the anti-bank and much more extensively in Hungarian politics is the aspiration for a new elite policy. However we do not hold this politics, starting with the developed interpretation of public law. One of the parallel to be fully explanatory. The Western countries so that the country elements that determine the current claim for radical transformation is much does not continuously look for the transformation of Hungary is the older, coming from the Reform Era, even reasons of its internal failures in the postulate that the events between 1944 though it was only realized in the 1930’s. alignment of the stars and unfavorable and 1990 are qualified as illegitimate, as The notion that Hungary is in need of external conditions; 2) At the same time, they did not take place within the radical reparation, in other words of the the country should not get stuck in the frameworks of a sovereign country. elimination of stagnation appears for the Hungarian political elites “follower” Fidesz does not recognize the happenings first time in this era. mentality concerning the West but it that resulted from the power structures should become active with own that arose as a result of the German and By mentioning these historical initiatives. It doesn’t come as a surprise Soviet occupations as legitimate from precedents we would like to emphasize for us (as Centre for Fair Political which only one conclusion can be drawn, that the intention to radically change the Analysis has been talking about this for a that in an “unorthodox” era of country is not a curiosity, however it is long time)3 that these ideas are “recommencement” these heritages have also a fact that the claim for radical formulated the most clearly by the to be eliminated radically, above all the transformation as an imperative above current President of the Central Bank, constitutional structure which qualifies as everything else only appeared in the former Minister of Finance György the legacy of “post-communism”. It second term of Fidesz following 2010. Matolcsy (still as a civilian) in the follows logically from this consideration As in the Reform Era the aim was to preface to his 2004 book American that the modified constitution of 1989 dismantle completely the dysfunctional Empire. We are not implying that he is (regardless of whether it is called feudal structure, Fidesz would like to the official ideologist of the Hungarian Stalinist or something else) is not fit to be surpass post-communism which right nevertheless it is worth noticing the constitution of a country in need of according to them still lives on. This is how recognizable these two aspects are renewal therefore a completely new one not a new element in Fidesz’s policy. in governing, especially the second one. has to be created. If we continue along They have been voicing it since 1996. According to Matolcsy, “in the past this line of logic however, then the new The new element is a technical one, that centuries the Hungarian political elite constitution has to connect to the period of the 2/3’s majority. knew relatively little about the before 1944 and ultimately to the old surroundings which eventually unwritten constitution. Therefore a The problems connected to the determined its fate. Not only did it know peculiar situation arises, namely that the Hungarian right stem not so much from too little, it also misled itself: in decisive newly created constitution is directly their ideas but from the extent of their historical moments its compass was not connected to the “spirit” of the unwritten power. A government majority that reality but the illusions constructed from constitution. Before we go ahead and call surpasses 2/3’s is a huge temptation to its own ignorance.” He goes on to say: this standpoint absurd we have to point fulfill the long-existing wish for change “If Hungarian interests that opposed out that this solution is not completely however it is also a huge challenge. those of the United States led us astray in unique in Europe: the Baltic countries Parties and the governments they create 2002 then first of all we have to made a similar break in public law when are confronted with never before seen understand America. If aside from the they separated from the Soviet Union and emotions and alliances forming against United States the interests of other created their own nation-states. them. The fact that the current European powers were in conflict with government has gotten into serious the Hungarian political aspirations before 3. Maximizing governance: striving to conflict with practically the whole of 2002 then these could have played a role govern for several terms Europe (and most of North America as in the outcome of the 2002 elections as well) can be explained by none other than well.”4 At the same time – as we have Great changes characterize the position the institutional triumph of the policy of already referred to this – in the programs of the right within the whole of the party radical change. of Fidesz, starting from 1996, this system as well. This process didn’t start “harmonious cooperation” always meant in 2010 either, but not even in 1998 with The seven ideological cornerstones a critical European policy, never Fidesz’s first time in power, but in 1994 when Fidesz (with the consciousness that We can see that there are complex ideas characterizes it) started to construct the behind the actions that define the right-wing pole of Hungarian party Hungarian right’s policies it is not at all 3 politics that had practically disappeared See: A nyugattalan Magyarország. Variációk improvisation. From hereon we will hagyományváltásra. Eds.: Zoltán Novák and Richard with MDF. The process was completed concentrate on the fundamental elements Nagy Szentpéteri. Méltányosság Politikaelemző later on as basically no significant party of this coherent theory. Központ – L’Harmattan, 2012. 4 György Matolcsy: Amerikai birodalom. A jövő forgatókönyvei. Heti Válasz Lap és Könyvkiadó Kft., 5 This first appeared in Fidesz’s 1996 A Polgári Válasz Könyvkiadó, 2004. 11-12. Magyarországét program.

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remained on this side other than Fidesz. the monopolization of decision making however in this essay we are not The fact that following 2010 we can not (let’s call this hard government)6 is quite speaking of whether or not Fidesz’s only talk about the birth of a mammoth unusual compared to the former models nation transforming activity is successful party but also about the return of the of government and creates serious but about what the basis of their actions dominant party type of Hungarian history conflicts of interest with the social and are. And the base is this all-around (which the liberal-left – mistakenly – business partners that had been taken into transformation to which the economic identifies with converting to a one-party consideration before. However, to give a policy makers “logically” add the idea system, whereas in a one-party system picture of how conscious these steps are, for boosting the micro world and there is no possibility for alternative the idea of strong governance was first neglecting the macro sphere. parties to organize) is connected to this formulated by the right in opposition in success. On the contrary, in a dominant 2007.7 We have pointed out the origin of party system there is a highly virulent this concept several times in the opposition, even if – and this is why the Norwegian political scientist Stein system is dominant – they are not able to Ringen’s radical critique of multi-actor govern. The measure of Fidesz’s success government’s,8 which appeared is that by now it is capable of significantly in the actions of Fidesz simultaneously showing two things for during the past three years. itself: 1) itself as basically the only party able to govern; 2) a fragmented 5. Economic policy: breaking with opposition (as the supplementary element mainstream devices of a dominant party system). The possibility of changing to a dominant By elevating György Matolcsy into a party system (in other words that one decisive leading economic position in party alliance governs for several terms) 2010, a radically new line of economic in the new democracies of Central policy emerged compared to that of the Eastern Europe which are based on (at earlier liberal-left government. Naturally best) four year cycles is a radical all this happened deliberately with the innovation in itself. In Hungary, between intention of transforming the whole 1990 and 2006 there were always one- economic policy. However before we term governments. Though it is true that jump to the conclusion that this is just the liberal-left broke this pattern for the György Matolcsy “running amuck” let’s first time, however the chances of them go back in time a little and read the study being able to govern extensively seem to which (uniquely in the Hungarian market have evaporated in 2010 for a long period of political analyses) tried to grasp the of time. If Fidesz wins in 2014 the elite main point of Fidesz’s economic compromise of the change of regime that philosophy, as well as the radical institutionalized frequent (though never differences compared to the ideas of their premature) changes in government for rivals in 1997 when they were aspiring to the sake of stability will ultimately end. rule for the first time. Political scientist Péter Csigó described Fidesz’s economic 4. Hard government: the elimination of philosophy with the term the multi-actor model microeconomic-fixation in face of the liberal-left’s macroeconomic-fixation.9 Fidesz’s notion of governing goes Sixteen years later we cannot say that the completely against the “celebrated” antecedents were not known, though it is European trend according to which: 1) a fact that at the second half of the 90’s global governance is taking place in the term heterodoxy was unknown. Once today’s world in which the national again we have to say that when analyzing interests are rather subordinated; 2) a Fidesz’s activity it is fitting that we name high number of economic, social, the fundaments of their economic policy, financial and lobby actors participate in which by the way are far from unknown governing who have a defining role in internationally. It is true that this decision making as well. This concept of economic policy is not yet successful governing is called governance or multi- actor governing and basically this was what the liberal-left governments 6 Centre for Fair Political Analysis’s expert Zoltán represented between 2002 and 2010. The Novák has written extensively about the topic. See: Az erőpolitika kormányzati karaktere, Hvg.hu. Hungarian right broke sharply with this March 9, 2011. notion when from the beginning of its 7 Gábor.G.Fodor – István Stumpf: A „jó term it made governing a one-man act, kormányzás” két értelme. Avagy a demokratikus taking away decision-making powers and kormányzás programja és feltételei. Századvég Alapítvány, 2007. placing them exclusively in the hand of 8 Ringen Stein: What Democracy Is For: On Freedom the government. This is not and Moral Government: Princeton University Press, authoritarianism but a concept which the 2007. Also: What is Democratic Quality. Prepared for the conference. The Attractiveness of the European international literature calls a government and American Social Models for the New Members or singular approach. It is by far not and Candidate Countries of the European Union. Orbán’s invention, though it is true that Berlin, 2007. May 7-8. 9 Péter Csigó: A Bokros-csomag jelentősége a politikai diskurzusban. Politikatudományi Szemle, 1997/4. 27-58.

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Moving on, it is clear that the Hungarian positions. As a recent example we can comes about as a result of the government has more knowledge about mention one of György Matolcsy’s first transformation. the permanent debate between the actions as President of the National Bank Western schools of economic policy and which reduced the credit interest rates for We have to mention here as well that this wants to take a stand in this dispute. small and medium enterprises completely is exactly why Fidesz is not sensitive to György Matolcsy’s book review series in verifying what we have said earlier about the liberal demand of upholding the rule Heti Válasz was written based upon the the micro-fixation. of law because at the center of its otherwise correct stance to at least inform approach is a uniquely interpreted notion the Hungarian readers of the existence of 6. Social policy: the radical rollback of of achievement, the increase of which it this debate. At the same time he elite politics in the name of society does not see guaranteed in the liberal

THE SEVEN IDEOLOGICAL CORNERSTONES OF FIDESZ

practically only selected works from One of the most criticized elements of the institutions created by the elites of the representatives of the heterodox10 school right-wing nation transforming change of regime. The elite – according who permanently criticized the radicalism is that in Fidesz’s policy the to this approach – was not able to place mainstream or neoliberal teachings. emphasis was transferred from the elite Hungary on a new track during a time Naturally this does not mean that on the to society, the nation, the people, that is, span of two decades. Ultimately this is international level the balance has tipped Fidesz is a populist party. Fidesz’s the reason why the right turned against in favor of heterodoxy in the orthodox- approach towards society is grounded in the achievements in the area of rule of heterodox debate; the bastions of the experience that not only did the law that had been dominated by the mainstream economy are very solid both change of regime based upon elite liberal-left. Viktor Orbán formulated in domestically and abroad. Matolcsy (and compromise not increase Hungary’s several of his speeches just what the the Hungarian government) obviously efficacy and competitiveness, it actually difference is between the approach to want to deliberately “rock” these decreased it. According to this approach freedom and society of the liberal-left freeing the capacities of society is and the right is, emphasizing all along perhaps the best guarantee for the that the left wants to change society 10 The Hungarian public knows very little about increase of output. Fidesz started the while on the contrary the right accepts it 11 heterodox economics and its role in international transformation of the different systems in for what it is. At the same time the right economic debates therefore it often seems as if it the past three years exactly in order to were György Matolcsy’s invention. From the huge free up these energies – and once again literature see: Ali Douai-Andrew Mearman-Ioana 11 Negru: Prospects for a heterodox economics of the we just state this here without dealing Orbán spoke frequently about these topics for environment and sustainability. Cambridge Journal with the assessment of the situation that example in Tusnádfürdő. Ervin Csizmadia analyzed of Economics, 2012. 36. 1019-1032. the content of the speaches between 2007-2011 on

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– while it wants to protect society from criticism Orbán receives internationally “sovereignty protecting” approach as the the transformative effects of the and domestically from the Hungarian construction of an authoritarian rule. As opposition – touches the current structure opposition, at the moment this doesn’t we have mentioned above, the policy of of society quite seriously as well, mean a thing concerning his authority: he radical change is different in nature from outlining preferences, aims, ideals and is the same unquestionable authority as authoritarianism. Nevertheless we also ultimately trying to create a new sort of he was while in opposition. With this, the have to acknowledge that the West can social integration. In theory this intention figure of the “authoritarian” leader is a only react to it in line with their historical could even be productive as not one constant and huge challenge in itself for traditions, values and ideology. government could manage to contribute mainstream Hungarian politics in which to the strengthening of social integration there is not much place for politicians The Hungarian right’s foreign policy and cohesion in the past almost a quarter with exceptional qualities. Nowadays we as seen by the West of a century. We say that “in theory’ can hardly find highly talented and because the furthering of social cohesion popular politicians in Western Europe or Fidesz has an alternative approach to the with government methods is familiar in Hungary. However strange it may seem, West which is completely different from the daily practices of Western European from this point of view Orbán is an the liberal-left interpretation. As we have democracies. However, while in Western exception and one of the primary sources seen, this interpretation has an Europe these government aspirations can of the uncompetitiveness of the “intellectual” core: several times during build on evolutionary processes that have opposition is that they cannot produce a the course of its history Hungarian come about over long periods of time, the leader of similar caliber and authority. intellectuals have attributed the trauma essence of Fidesz’s governing is to that befell the country to the West and quickly and effectively break the public III. Critical perceptions: Western misinterpreted its role. This could be – or opinion influencing power of the “status Europe and the Hungarian right rather could have been – a good starting quo elite” and the social groups Even the most “nationalistic” point for Fidesz because it includes (as “connected” to it (Milla, HaHa etc.). government’s can not disregard what we have quoted György Matolcsy) the their surroundings think of them. need for the revision of this historical 7. The role of “personality”: the political However popular a policy might be at bias as well as the acknowledgment of leader as an institution replacing home their governance depends on the their own responsibility. Matolcsy’s authority approval of the international community book, the American Empire is full of as well. Every government has to come praise for America at times even at the Last but not least, according to mentality to terms with the fact that in a global expense of the European commitment. of the Hungarian right the political leader world the aspects of evaluation go has an emphasized significance; he is the beyond borders as well. Global credit This U.S-Western Europe-Europe final source of authority. Once again, rating agencies are just as good examples differentiation has been present quite many people see this as the outlet of of this as the institutes that examine in a strongly in Fidesz’s documents from the authoritarianism whereas in fact the comparative way the state of middle of the 90’s. We could say that in tradition of leadership authority comes democracies, freedom of the press, the the past fifteen years the Hungarian right much more from Christianity. Therefore constitutional system and many other has been completely consistent in its in Fidesz’s perception, the political aspects of life as well. These critique concerning the European leader is not like what the other side assessments, rankings, influence political arena and the European wants to believe (e.g. dictator) but much international opinion. Not to mention that institutions; in this case it is basically more someone who people see as a the framework of Hungary’s European receiving strong contra-critique from person who is capable of taking action presence, the European Union is perhaps Western Europe. It is surprising however and dislodging the country from itself the most important source of how little it could improve its relation stagnation. It is not an accident that evaluation. with the United States. Is it warranted Viktor Orbán’s idols are Konrad that the whole of the West turned against Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle or Margaret We feel that instead of protecting the the Hungarian right? What is the Thatcher. They were politicians who in country from these, governance should explanation for this? their time were “great transformers” and be harmonized with them. This aspect steadfast “warriors” who while they would be far from strange to the right, on In our opinion the main explanation of divided society also reached a high level the contrary; it would fit right in the their failure lies in Fidesz’s radical of authority amongst their supporters and “Matolcsy-project”. It is exactly foreign policy, meaning that the even internationally. Matolcsy who wrote that the primary Hungarian right wants to “correct” reason for the historical Hungary’s relation to the West which in According to the interpretation of the underachievement of the Hungarian elite their view is asymmetric. According to right, the “good leader” is pre-eminent is the misunderstanding of the West. Fidesz asymmetric is not precise enough, not in precisely keeping to the criteria of What if Fidesz is making exactly the hierarchic is much more fitting, therefore the rule of law but in improving the mistake that Matolcsy warned not to do? it would like to solve this by trying to comparative state of the country, the way make Hungary “equal”. Naturally, for the great predecessors did. It is important Nevertheless, we have to establish that several reasons, this approach goes to mention however that for the right the government has trouble accepting the against the West’s (European Union and pragmatism is also a criterion of the external situation as well as these the United States) idea of the region and “good leader”. If his actions are not systems of evaluation moreover it builds of Hungary’s role within. Viktor Orbán’s successful in the West he will quickly on the exact same “protective” reflexes government would like a Hungary switch and look for other (e.g. Eastern) with which their predecessors “defended” ascending from a several century long international forms of cooperation. It is the nation in face of external – at times role of subordination. According to not an accident that no matter how much but not always, imperial – “attacks”. It is Western perception however, Hungary’s clear that Hungary can not win in this status is completely different and from Centre for Fair Political Analysis’s website: A conflict. However it is erroneous to this approach the radical manner of the Tusnádfüdői ív. interpret the Hungarian government’s Hungarian government aimed at

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changing Hungary’s status is completely values) and the West that its right-about uncalled for. However this approach built on turn concerning public policy does not discontinuity clashes harshly with mean the rehabilitation of the 30’s. This The government’s “revolutionary” Western Europe’s experiences of the ill judgment cost dearly for the rhetoric – used from time to time – transitions and democratizations that took Hungarian right, amongst other reasons, originates from this conflict. This place at the end of the socialist era. Let’s because today the sanctity of the rhetoric results in Hungary seeming to be just think over what an extensive system constitutional system is a basic norm for even more the most problematic country of relations Western powers kept up with EU member states (this was not always in the region whose Atlantic commitment for example the Hungarian democratic so). can be questioned. Here we are faced opposition at that time, not in order to with a serious source of conflict which is persuade them to start a “traditional” The theory of the interweavement of unquestionably provoked by the full- revolution, but in order to find a potent the right and the extreme right blooded approach of the Hungarian right actor to carry out a peaceful change of to changing the East-West status quo. As regime. Even if not through a revolution As we have shown, a commotion arose in we have said before: not only did the in the streets the West still stimulated a the Hungarian party system in 2006 and government fail to improve the revolutionary change; this is what we call by 2010 Fidesz reached a massively American-Hungarian relations (which a constitutional change of regime. The dominant position which it has retained György Matolcsy called attention to in constitutional revolution, focused on the to this day. Minor and major changes 2004) it further deteriorated. rule of law, replaced dictatorship with happen in Western party systems as well, The cast-off “revolutionary” public democracy. With this the revolution was but nothing triggers such strong criticism policy over as far as the West was concerned. It as the appearance and functioning of is not an accident that in the middle of radical and extreme parties. Naturally The current government’s policy on the 1990’s Western Europe was already Western Europe has a several decade public law goes against the West’s talking about the consolidation of the head start in this question (as well): opinion about the continuity of the new democracies, meaning under this radical parties appeared there in three Hungarian system of public law in that in their eyes the new democracies waves in the period since 1945. First in several ways. This opposition of the West were equivalent institutionally to the the 50’s, however these weren’t really concerns the acceptance of the new liberal democracies of the West which successful in the heyday of the welfare constitution and the annulment of the old had evolved over long periods of time. states. The second time in the 70’s when constitution but by now it extends also to the consensus on welfare was exhausted certain amendments as well as to the The first time this interpretation was and the Western European countries critique of provisions placed within the challenged was at the time of Fidesz’s showed signs of crises. This is when the constitution. 1998 election victory (where it was French National Front, the Austrian pronounced that what is needed is “more Freedom Party as well as the Northern Fidesz’s argument’s concerning than a change of government but less (Norvegian and Danish) radical parties constitutional “discontinuity” is not than a change of regime”); the second strengthened. The third time was in the really interesting for the external challenge was the 2010 Fidesz 2/3’s early 2000’s when with the augmentation community. It is worth consideration majority win, while the third was the of the problem of immigration radical though that between 1944 and 1990 we acceptance of the new constitution. parties turned against the newcomers, can not speak of right-wing politics in Fidesz’s “recommencement” goes against abandoning at the same time their former Hungary and though following the the West’s perception of the change of anti-democracy, anti-system attitudes. change of regime right-wing parties regime as a unique, unrepeatable moment The essence of the Western European could come about, as a result of the in history. Fidesz should recognize this if process is that there the parties appearing decades of interruption, the conservative- it would like a rich and varied relation in different waves are integrated into the Christian democratic political culture that with the West, if it would like to system, hence meaning far less of a threat could be handed down in Western understand it. It should see for example than before. However Fidesz is feared Europe was simply didn’t exist. This is a that the West has also changed a lot abroad. They are afraid that with the great disadvantage for the right to this during the past decade. For example it “dismantling” of the multiparty system day. The Hungarian right’s “offer” is to took steps in order for it to be not just an Fidesz wants to return to the “one party make up the left out right-wing culture of economic but a political community of system”. We have already shown that this Western Europe radically fast, in other values too. Values are very important for is mistaken as a dominant party system words to complete the path that several the Hungarian right as well, nevertheless does not mean a one party system. Western European countries had covered when forming its new public policy and However we have to refer here as well to following World War II, creating the constitution it paid little attention to the fact that with the change of regime social market economy and the welfare make clear for the changing EU (which the West received a Central Europe that state in the process. now expects and refers the similarity of could be easily “managed” in which

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multiparty parliaments existed with Despite this the Hungarian right has been In order to understand the source of parties that were taking turns to govern. unable to comprehend for the past three international misgivings towards the However the “central force field” years why its policies are judged Hungarian right-wing government’s announced by Orbán brings to mind the “politically” instead of “professionally”. economic policy, we have to at least refer return to a governing party that can not It seems that in this case the Orbán on a basic level to the fact that we are be dismissed and Fidesz should take this government and the right have lost their talking about the protests of the into account. sense of reality. It was exactly the right representatives of a discipline that has who – for example in 2009 – advocated been institutionalized for at least a Fidesz has an even greater challenge for political governing in face of the century, against such an alternative however, and that is that the West does Bajnai government’s government of theory of economics which is growing, not really see any difference between experts. Let’s face it: it is right in this; in however is still marginal. This is true Fidesz and the Hungarian far right. a democracy professional aspects can even if in the past years several countries Though István Bibó warned in his works overrule political ones only in very have used new, heterodox approaches in not to confuse the right with the far right exceptional cases. practice. The former French Prime his “admonitions” didn’t survive the Minister Nicolas Sarkozy set up a period of the change of regime of which If this is so then why is the Hungarian working group based on the Bibó was an iconic figure of. The reason government so surprised that many recommendations of Professor Joseph the opinions about Orbánism and the people want to judge its work and mainly Stiglitz which made a proposal on a new Hungarian right are so negative is not upon professional aspects? During alternative way of measuring economic because Western Europe attributes the the past decades the Western public has and social well-being. distortion of Hungarian democracy that grown used to having the right to voice led to the strengthening of the far right to their opinion on politics even as laymen At the same time we have to see that Fidesz. Naturally the political analyses of therefore it does so in the case of every even if well-being is one of the success the symptoms are one thing (the demand EU member state. Viktor Orbán’s stories of theoretical economics14 the for radical parties evolve in every argument concerning “angry left-wing standard norm for the evaluation of country struggling with crisis); and the politicians” is based on a governments is how consistent they are interpretation of the reasons are another. misunderstanding. This misunderstanding in the application of orthodox methods We can say with quite certainty that the is founded on the fact that the laws he worked out by mainstream economics intention aimed at not distinguishing the made can only be judged based on their that have been implemented for several two poles are connected to Fidesz’s professional standards. Unfortunately (or decades. The world of economists radical nation transforming attitude, fortunately) not; what then? Sympathy especially unites when the ruling notions which in itself is capable of drawing for example. This can be reached through are challenged by a country which (as we critiques from all sides. Either way, the the construction of informal human have already seen above) is perceived to Hungarian right should be more aware of relations, through gaining friends and be on the road to authoritarianism. In the fact that Jobbik’s actions fall back on supporters. This is illuminated very well such cases there is a particularly small Fidesz mainly because of the racism and by the thematic issue of the International chance for a profound debate on the anti-Semitism attributed to the extreme Relations journal which bears the title of raison d’être for heterodox economic right party. Friendship in the International methods or for at least the acceptance of Relations.13 The moral here is that no the partial validity of such methods. The Western critique of the one man matter how determined a government is government in the representation of international We have to add also that György affairs, without sufficient informal Matolcsy’s personality obviously plays Moving on we can also diagnose that it is resources internationally, it will probably an important role in the judgment of the a further source of antipathy that the not be able to gain sufficient sympathy in Hungarian right’s economic policy. We Hungarian right completely neglects the long run, which may even be the are not thinking about his frequent those philosophical basics of government main cause of its failure. remarks which are at times funny or hard that have evolved in Western Europe in to understand (all politicians have off the past decades. There are two such Of course the Hungarian right is claiming days) but about the fact that aside from fundamental schools which the that the West misunderstands the his permanent literary activity he has Hungarian right disregards in the name of intentions of the Hungarian government. hardly spoken publicly and with this he Hungarian interests. One is the theme of There is no sign so far that the Hungarian have up on introducing, explaining and governance which we have already government is trying to strengthen its protecting the economic policy preferred mentioned; the other is new public informal presence, as perhaps the most by him in front of the Hungarian public. management. A huge amount of literature important instrument of modern political It is not known that he shows more has accumulated on both topics and communication. The steps taken in the activity on the international level Fidesz does not apply the conclusions of direction of making friends by Deputy therefore we have to say here as well that either one to its governing. The most Secretary of State Ferenc Kumin in order the lack of informal relations caused at important cause of problems in this case to influence the international least as great damage as the following of is that by restricting the scope of actors environment and gain trust for the heterodox principles. participating in political decisions the Hungarian government are important but Hungarian right is contradicting the far from enough. The critique of anti-elitism and the belief of Western Europe that not just the “elimination” of freedom formal agents influence decision making The rejection of heterodox economics but a whole lot of other groups besides 12 them called non governmental actors. 14 The fate of the concept of well-being is similarly adverse as that of hetrodox economic policy, whereas an incredible amount of literature appears management, governance and non governmental internationally concerning the topic and its economic 12 Fidesz’s whole governing aims to break with the actors. aspects. See e.g.: The fresh thematic issue of The long standing Western approach of new public 13 The thematic issue appeared in January 2011: Australian Economic Review. March 2013, 59-102.

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the occupation of the Fidesz headquarters by university students and the government reactions connected to them. These types of events and even harsher ones took place in the West in 1968 just to mention one example. Naturally, it is less frequently mentioned by the West what great conflicts surrounded the movements of ’68; the outcome is what is important, the effects reached by the students at that time as well as the flexibility finally shown by the institutional system. The attitude of the ruling Hungarian government towards the HaHa student movement can be presented without further ado as the actions of a dictatorial government. This image is strengthened by the actions taken by the police against certain student movements which evoke memories of the methods with which the policemen of the late Kádár-era stepped up against the opposition of the time.

Lashing out at the “authoritarianism” of Orbán The Hungarian right’s stand on society level of anti-elitism. In this case anti- All this is topped of by (a significant part plays an important role in the elitism appears in several ways. Fidesz is of) the West finding its “authoritarian” in international indignation concerning it. generally in a controversial relationship Seemingly this is completely in line with with the global political and financial Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to prove its the European approach. The Hungarian elite as well as with their domestic notion of an evolving authoritarian right follows the international trend “incarnations”. They have formulated the regime. according to which the government’s program of protecting Hungary in face of have to pay more and more attention to these elites in several speeches. Once Let’s begin by stating that in post-1990 Hungarian democracy two perceptions of the needs of citizens. The international again this strategy may lead Westerners political leadership face each other. The literature is full of writings on the “civic to the conclusion that the Orbán-regime right – ever since Fidesz belongs to this zeitgeist” and the governments are trying is not pro-Western, as if it were, it would side – believes in a singular leadership; feverishly to bridge the lack of aim at some sort of positive interaction confidence coming at them from the part with the actors that influence the ideal of the liberal-left is corporative of citizens.15 international processes. However we leadership. Ferenc Gyurcsány’s have explained above that in the experiment to create a charismatic, Furthermore the Fidesz-government had approach of the right the multi-actor prestigious leader on the left as well shook this belief for a short period of already introduced the different national political interaction extending even to time, however his experiment failed. consultations at the beginning of the global elites is a burden for the Within the current race on the side of the millennium which the liberal left side at government therefore should be avoided. opposition the question of “who will be the time labeled unnecessary and Once again it is not an aspiration towards fraudulent unaware of the fact that left authoritarianism which is behind this but the number one leader?” is very acute, wing governments in Europe favored the a nation-state centric approach to however the main goal of the opposition use of this method as well. Before 2010 – democracy where government has to parties (namely to overthrow Orbán) during the second Gyurcsány guard the intactness of the nation-states prolongs this problem at the moment. government’s huge social deficit – the sovereignty. Naturally this nation-state Apocalyptic pictures live in Europe (but mostly in the media) concerning Orbán’s right managed to persuade everyone that model is overridden for an average personality and it is frequent that he is it was the authentic representative of the Western European citizen who is living compared with Hitler or Mussolini. people, which was reinforced by the 2010 his life in the social terrain of “diversity” elections. allotted by globalization, Naturally these comparisons have multiculturalism and immigration. A nothing to do with reality, however – as On two points however, the Hungarian large and influential part of the West we have often emphasized – politics is right is doings something different than presumably cannot “forgive” Hungary not necessarily about reality. With a little to what the Western observers would that it suggests a picture of a closed imagination Orbán’s personality has traits which make him suitable to be wholeheartedly approve. One is that their introverted country contradicting presented as a dictator. One such support for society is coupled with a high Western experiences. example is his relentless, iron fisted Aside from the contraposition of “society” and the “elite”, a further source direction of the right-wing nation transformation. To live with a historical 15 The study of the relation of governments of Western incomprehension is towards (furthermore parliaments) and citizens has come into the “banning” of the newly appearing – comparison, this couples him with the the limelight in the past years. This is far more than spontaneous or just the opposite, very “dictator” Robespierre in face of the the traditional study of the relations of parties and conscious – youth protests. In this case “freedom loving” Danton and this is voters. Completely new theories are born for how more than enough for the public. governments could get into new sorts of interactions we mean the seizure of universities and with citizens without populist methods. Furthermore in the eyes of the foreign

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public he is seen as the conscious exclusively in a negative way. We could democracy) came from the international dismantler of public law. He is the one end our analysis here by saying that if consensus following 1945 and this who is constantly defying the European Fidesz would like to retain its power it connection characterized the 1989-90 Union moreover the European People’s needs to offer not just “good governance” Central Eastern European Party as well. His characteristics all point to its own public, but needs to win the transformations as well. However the in one direction and “predestine” him for support of the external community, or past decades questioned the sustainability the role of the dictator who cannot be from the other side, the opposition, which of the unity of the two elements reasoned with and is incapable of is much better received internationally (liberalism and democracy) in Western compromise. needs to defeat the currently governing Europe, not to mention Central Eastern party. However this is not enough. We Europe where the risk of the separation He is the “negative” authority with whom may expect Fidesz to change its tactics of the two components became a reality. the upholders of liberal democracy have but not its strategy. For the opposition to to take up the fight with. In our opinion come to power it needs to do something In this intensifying conflict Fidesz the Western observers are right in the completely different than currently, “naturally” stands on the side of national sense that Orbán is not a liberal starting with the reinterpretation of sovereignty and democracy and amidst democrat. However they fail to Fidesz. its transformative actions feels that this understand that despite this he is not element needs to be strengthened in face necessarily a “negative” authority for his IV. The evaluation of the Hungarian of the other component (liberalism). In own public and perhaps even for other right: ideological and historical this sense the Hungarian right comes into layers too. Such an interpretation saw aspects conflict concerning this aspect of light not long ago in Le Monde. democracy theory as well with the Even if it collides with international Western European consensus of the past Otherwise he would have had to fail from opinion we have to admit Fidesz has decades. all the things that had happened during well-defined notions about everything it Why (and in what direction) does the past three years. Aside from the fact would like to achieve in the world of Fidesz want to “develop” the system? that early elections are in short supply in politics. As we have shown in detail it Hungary, the fact that he did not may be has mobilized its whole apparatus in the The other important aspect to evaluate explained by the fact that there is a interest of radically renewing the country aside from the Western European chronic shortage of “positive” authority and basically wants to change everything. transformations of democracy is the in Hungarian politics. Even if Orbán The majority of the serious objections historical one. We have to analyze “passes” in Hungary, internationally his toward it stem from this. We haven’t Fidesz’s policy from this direction as position is problematic and the liberal spoken of two fundamental things so far. well in order to find different political scientist Giovanni Sartori One (which basically frames the above explanations behind the “facts” of the explains why. First of all, according to mentioned seven cornerstones) is past three years. him every democracy is in need of Fidesz’s approach to democracy. The authority. Second, “positive” authority other is positioning the Hungarian right We have to pose the question, how come increases, while “negative” authority in a wider historical context. The final Fidesz remains constantly the most decreases freedom.16 In the end, Orbán’s part of the analysis focuses on these popular party if Fidesz’s politics is “tyranny” is proved in his unflagging questions. rejected to such an extent as we have attacks against freedom. seen in the III. unit? This question can Why is Fidesz’s approach to not be answered from the “facts” of the According to us it is far from true that democracy the way it is? past three years we have to turn to Fidesz’s aim is to eliminate freedom, “softer” sociological, historical factors. however it is a fact that the government’s According to its critics the Hungarian Our hypothesis is that Fidesz holds on to actions are tough, conscious, right has not been following the model of its position despite its actions because the comprehensive and – as we have shown – liberal democracy for a long time now, style of governance better expresses the intend to transform the complete system. what then is its approach towards historical traditions than the politics of According to the Western critiques, the democracy? the liberal-left which is stuck in the complete transformation of democracy, present and pronouncedly at odds with or to put it more precisely the complete The claim for radical transformation is traditions. dismantling of democracy is just one step embedded in the Hungarian right’s away from the complete transformation approach to democracy, which appeared While Europe has basically rejected the of the system. Instead of the international worldwide in the 1990’s - completely radical politics of Fidesz we have to public viewing Orbán similar to his idols, independent from the Hungarian issues - establish that the Hungarian right’s the great transformative politicians of the as an answer to the newest wave of strength and advantage comes from this period following World War II, on the democratization. At that time Western as well. From a different aspect, that of contrary, the image that has evolved in political scientists had to acknowledge Hungarian history, the radical break the past years of Viktor Orbán is of a that the process of consolidation had which we have outlined above is in fact politician who means a threat to Western come to a halt and that liberal continuity. Continuity plays a great role values. democracies had transformed. Several in party politics. The processes of change categories arose for their definition such and continuity are handled together in We can see that in the seven areas where as defective, populist or illiberal Western European analyses of party Fidesz has massive and coherent ideas democracies, the last being perhaps the system change. The importance of the huge conflicts came about and the most well known. How to interpret these second element waned during the external medium react to them almost (democratic but not liberal) competitors Hungarian change of regime as no one of liberal democracy? wanted to identify with contemporary history (the Kádár-era) and even less 16 Sartori uses the terms „authoritarian authority” and „venerable authority” as well. See: Giovanni The notion of liberal democracy (the with the Horthy-era. For a long time Sartori: Demokrácia. Osiris Kiadó, 1999. 103. organic connection of liberalism and change was dominant in the development

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of the parties. Fidesz could rise above its opposite the pragmatic (mainly since they thought the transformation small party entity because it discovered macroeconomic) actions of the complete. the importance of the other element, that governments. This is why a majority of The intention of the Hungarian right to of continuity. It could authentically play the Hungarian society did not value the “develop” the system in order to finish the role of the party that preserves and macroeconomic recovery activities of the the change of regime equals the represents historical values. Bajnai-government between 2009-2010 “demolishment” of the transition for its and turned rather to Fidesz which opponents. Therefore if we pose the It is very hard to “erase” history from preferred traditional values and the question of whether Fidesz’s politics is politics. Great leaps forward are never “elevation” of society. Following 2006 it successful our answer is definitely not. without recoils or U-turns. We see a very became clear if Fidesz wins in 2010 it We understand the intentions of the strong counteraction from the beginning will not join the relative consensus of Hungarian right however (as of now) this of the millennium compared to 1989-90. party politics preceding 2006 but will experiment does not have a chance of If the elites of the Central Eastern break away in every sense from them truly renewing Hungarian politics, European transitions demolished the leading the country towards solutions however will lead to the permanence of Socialist systems under the flag of the unknown to the Hungarian public. the constitutional battles as long as the “end of history” (in other words the right remains in power. We see Fidesz’s global triumph of liberal democracy) then In our view the liberal-left side did not experiment as grandiose but – taking into the decisive trend of the start of the and does not pay enough attention to this consideration historical aspects – with a millennium was that history is far from “unexpected” return of history, it is small chance of success. Not because it “over” the debate and solution of constantly fighting against it. We can would lead to authoritarianism or historically unsolved questions has just establish that a part of its problems tyranny. Because we are doubtful begun. Without the general change of this comes from this bluntness. The liberal- whether at the beginning of the XXI. trend we could not explain the permanent left does not understand or does not want century it is possible to create such a type failure of the Hungarian liberal-left to acknowledge that history in Hungary of national transformation that was governments (between 2002-2010), the does not just consist of the inter-war suggested in the Reform Era. However great gain in popularity of Fidesz period. We have shown above that the we also see that Hungary can not stay in following 2006 or its 2/3’s victory in the political claim for the radical change of the state it was in 2010, and we have 2010 elections. An important part of this rigid structures originates from the learned from Lajos Bokros that only change of trend is that values and ethical Reform Era, except this idea was critical mass of reforms can be categories come into the forefront dismissed with the change of regime successful.

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