DOCSLIB.ORG

Edith Oltay Hungarian Opposition Party Locked In

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Edith Oltay Hungarian Opposition Party Locked In SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg., 4/2006 Edith Oltay* Hungarian Opposition Party Locked in Power Struggle with the Government Hungary's largest opposition party the Alliance of Young Democrats-Civic Alli- ance Fidesz (Fidesz-MPP) was the landside winner of the October municipal elec- tions and is a key player in the political crisis that has engulfed the country since the middle of September. Following the April 2006 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Fidesz was forced into opposition for a second time in a row under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) obtained a stable majority in parlia- ment and formed a coalition government. This marked the first time since the change of regime that a government was reelected in Hungary.1 Shortly after the elections, however, the government experienced a great loss of public support when it announced the introduction of tax rises and spending cuts. Drastic re- forms of healthcare, state administration, higher education and energy prices are planned. The public was taken by surprise since during election campaign the coalition parties spoke of a "booming economy" and even promised tax cuts. In reality, Hungary's budget deficit swelled to 10% of the GDP and is by far the highest in the EU relative the size of the economy.2 It was only oil on the fire when on 17 September a tape recorded in May was leaked to the media on which Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány told a closed ses- sion of the MSZP parliamentary group that in the past one and a half years his government had "lied (to the population) morning, noon and night" about the state of the economy in order to be reelected. He called for an end to the lies and for the support of the MSZP deputies in implementing austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit.3 The speech spread like wild fire and soon thousands gathered * Edith Oltay, M.A., political scientist and freelance journalist, Berlin. 1 Dieringer, Jürgen: Die ungarischen Parlamentswahlen vom 9./23. April 2006. In: Südosteuropa, 54 (2006) 2, pp. 147–163. 2 Hungary's Euro readiness is not in sight; <http://www.portfolio.hu>, 09.11.2006; Havlik, Péter: Die Enttäuschung ist groß. Die Unruhen in Ungarn ahben wirt- schaftliche Gründe, die aber nicht auf die übrigen EU-Staaten in Osteuropa zu- treffen. In: Handelsblatt, 25.09.2006. 3 Gyurcsány Ferenc beszéde az MSZP-frakció május 26-i ülésén [Ferenc Gyur- csány’s speech at the May 26th session of the MSZP faction]. In: MTI, 18.09.2006; available at <http://blog.amoba.hu/blog-3.php?oid=Tf145f91364e455c31125bf838ae21b6>; cf. Olt, Reinhard: Der Preis der Lüge. Der Ministerpräsident Ungarns hat die ganze Wahrheit gesagt – und sein Land in eine schwere Krise gestürzt. In: FAZ, 20.09.2006; Truth in Hungary. In: International Herald Tribune, 29.09.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 475 in front of the parliament demanding Gyurcsány's resignation. Demonstrations on a smaller scale took place in the countryside. President László Sólyom de- claredthat there was a "moral crisis" in the country and asked the coalition parties to resolve the crisis and to restore the trust in the government by using their par- liamentary majority to elect a prime minister.4 Gyurcsány categorically refused to resign and defended himself by asserting that Hungarian politicians have been ly- ing for the past 16 years. He presented himself as the only Hungarian politician brave enough to admit his lies and as the only one who is willing to take the harsh measures necessary to carry out much needed reforms. Fidesz took the lead in demanding Gyurcsány's resignation and declared that the municipal elections amounted to a referendum on his government. Voters vented their anger at the government in the municipal elections when they handed the MSZP and the SZDSZ their greatest defeat since the change of regime. Shortly after the elections, Gyurcsány won a vote of confidence in parliament. This did not resolve the crisis, however, and Hungary's two large political camps are now more embittered and divided than ever. For the first time since the peace- ful change of regime 16 years ago violence emerged on the Hungarian political scene. Cultural Politics – Increasing Political Polarization The already existing divide between Hungary's left/liberal-wing and right-wing political camps deepened in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's admission of lying. The two sides regard each other not as political opponents but as enemies whose coming to power would doom the country. According to political analyst and member of the European parliament for Fidesz George Schöpflin "It is no ex- aggeration, though outsiders find this hard to credit, that Hungary is in a state of cold civil war."5 Most common is the demonization of those belonging to the other political persuasion by emphasizing their communist past, depicting them as a danger to the democratic system, or leveling accusations of nationalism and anti-Semitism at them. A substantial number of voters rejected Orbán's person and elected the social- ist-liberal coalition primarily in order to prevent him from coming to power. As the political scientist and Orbán biographer József Debreczeni formulated it be- fore the parliamentary elections: 6 4 Sólyom László köztársasági elnök nyilatkozata 2006. szeptember 18. [The state- ment of László Sólyom President of the Republic 18 September 2006]; <http://www.keh.hu/keh/beszedek/20060918nyilatkozat.html>, <http://mti.hu/dokumentumok/cikk/160570/>. 5 Schöpflin, George: Hungary's cold civil war; <http://www.opendemocracy.net/ democracy-protest/hungary_civil_4093.jsp>, 14.11.2006. 6 Nagy, József: Debreczeni József kegyencrendszerről és a törzsi kérdésekről [Jó- zsef Debreczeni about the system of minions and tribal questions]. In: 168 óra, No. 26 (20.06.2005); <http://www.168ora.hu/cikk.php?id=3698>. 476 Edith Oltay "[Orbán] knows that the left-liberal side can only prevent Fidesz's victory if it can again awaken the feeling that Orbán poses a threat as /someone/ who seeks an intimidating concentration of power and dissolves the parliamentary institutions – in my opinion this is indeed a very severe and realistic danger." In this context, one can refer to the 2006 parliamentary elections as a protest vote.7 Similarly Gyurcsány became the main source of evil in the conservative camp.8 Orbán called Gyurcsány a "pathological liar" and reiterated that he had to resign because he was the source of the country's "moral, political and financial crisis."9 Opinion surveys confirm that supporters of the two political camps over- whelmingly reject the leader of the other camp. A November poll by Szonda Ip- sos found that in the period between September and November Gyurcsány's ap- proval rating among Fidesz supporters ranged between 9 and 11 points. Orbán's popularity among MSZP followers fell from 21 points in September to 11 points in November. Both politicians are popular in their own camps; Orbán has 82 points and Gyurcsány 78 points.10 The cultural conflicts run along the themes of anti-communism and the repre- sentation of national interests and values on the one hand, and that of globaliza- tion and cosmopolitan values, on the other. The left wing sees itself as the sole guarantor of the Westernization of Hungary and of implementing the reforms needed for the introduction of modern capitalism. In a publication of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Michael Ehrke found that the MSZP acts as an agent of the exter- nal demands of the EU and of international investors with little regard for the needs of Hungarian society. In his view, the MSZP is convinced that there is no alternative to its policy of reforms and presents hardly any facts and statistics to the public to justify the introduction of economic austerity measures.11 The right wing perceives itself as the sole representative of the national inter- ests and the guardian of national traditions. Referring to Fidesz's victory at the municipal elections Orbán repeated12 what he had said in the aftermath of his 7 Kis, János: Pengeélen [At the blade's edge] In: Élet és Irodalom, 50 (06.10.2006) 40; <http://www.es.hu/pd/display.asp?channel=PUBLICISZTIKA0640&article=200 6-1008-2107-00KGSR>. 8 Orbán megerősítette: a Fidesz élén marad [Orbán reiterated: he will continue to lead Fidesz]; <http://hvg.hu/velemeny.interju/20060929fridi.aspx>, 29.09.2006. 9 Orbán: A kormány szándékosan ki akar rekeszteni a felemelkedésből [Orbán: The government prevents people from improving their lives]; <http://www.mno.hu/index.mno?cikk=385056&rvt=2>, 27.11.06 10 Megmaradt, de kisebb lett Orbán előnye Gyurcsánnyal szemben [Orbán's lead over Gyurcsány stays but decreases]; <http://www.mtv.hu/cikk.php?id=167521>, 04.12. 2006. 11 Ehrke, Michael: Ungarische Unruhen – ein Symptom der zentraleuropäischen Beitrittskrise? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Internationale Politikanalyse, Politik Info, Oktober 2006; <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/03950.pdf>. 12 Csuhaj, Ildikó: Fidesz-kongresszus a szocialisták ellen [Fidesz congress against the socialists]. In: Népszabadság, 27.11.2006; Orbán megismételte a nemzet nem Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 477 party's defeat at the 2002 national elections "the nation cannot be in opposition." The left-liberal camp interpreted the statement as populist attempt to exclude its followers from the Hungarian nation. Dissatisfaction with how the change of re- gime was negotiated 16 years ago is also a recurring theme. At the Fidesz rally at Astoria on October 23, Orbán addressed those who are not satisfied with how the change of regime was carried out and or are losers of the economic transforma- tion.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Electorate, 1990-1998 by Gergely Karácsony and Gábor Tóka
    1 The Electorate, 1990-1998 by Gergely Karácsony and Gábor Tóka Published in Hungary: Government and Politics 1848-2000, ed. by Mária Ormos and Béla K. Király. Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc. and Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, pp. 495-518. In this chapter we review the voters' behavior in the parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, and 1998.1 As the reader will recall, these were not the only competitive elections in Hungarian history in which a large majority of citizens could vote. However, unlike, for instance, the elections of 1920, 1938, 1945 or 1947, the electoral contests of the 1990's took place in a political context characterized by widespread consensus on fundamental democratic values among the relevant political parties. For the first time ever, no relevant political player was intimidated or barred from participating in the elections, and citizens could reasonably expect both that the votes were to be counted fairly and that the democratic game was to continue indefinitely after the election. The lawful revolution of 1988-1990 produced an unexpectedly stable institutional framework. The rules regarding executive-legislative relations, the checks and balances provided in the constitution, the electoral system, and the number and name of the major party alternatives remained largely unchanged throughout the 1990s. Despite disagreements about various details of the institutional framework, every relevant political camp retained a basic loyalty to the rules of the game as defined in the process of democratic transition. This comprehensive elite consensus was manufactured at a price, though, which introduced a large dose of unpredictability into the new political system.
    [Show full text]
  • Preventing the Spread of Violent Nationalism
    ODUMUNC 2019 Issue Brief UN Security Council Addressing the Spread of Violent Nationalism ODU Model United Nations Society Introduction on international cooperation but differentiation, deliberately choosing conflict over consensus. The rising global appeal of nationalism is a The difficulty comes because of the great public challenge to the ability of the United Nations to appeal of nationalism. Emphasizing the solve problems. When Member States choose uniqueness and superiority of each nation, polices based on national superiority instead of nationalism often is the easiest way to unite the global cooperation, the UN loses the consensus largest number of people in a country’s borders. it requires to act effectively. Yet a growing It has enormous appeal to rising leaders in number of leaders find the political rewards of democracies especially, but also can be useful enhancing nationalism hard to resist. With for leaders of authoritarian governments, stronger nationalism comes a not just less ability seeking a way to enhance the legitimacy of their to solve international problems, but greater risk power. In every case, nationalism often is the of conflict and war. For the UN Security easiest way to strengthen a government, to win Council, coping with the rise of nationalism may elections and unify an electoral majority of the be essential to remaining relevant and effective. people. But it is possible? Nationalism has the advantage of unifying most The nationalism problem raises s fundamental or many of the people in a territory, making difficulties for the UN. The United Nations is them willing to sacrifice together on behalf of based on conflicting principles.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Context of Eu Accession in Hungary
    European Programme November 2002 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EU ACCESSION IN HUNGARY Agnes Batory Introduction For the second time since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty – seen by many as a watershed in the history of European integration – the European Union (EU) is set to expand. Unlike in 1995, when the group joining the Union consisted of wealthy, established liberal democracies, ten of the current applicants are post-communist countries which recently completed, or are still in various stages of completing, democratic transitions and large-scale economic reconstruction. It is envisaged that the candidates furthest ahead will become members in time for their citizens to participate in the next elections to the European Parliament due in June 2004. The challenge the absorption of the central and east European countries represents for the Union has triggered a need for internal institutional reform and new thinking among the policy-makers of the existing member states. However, despite the imminence of the ‘changeover’ to a considerably larger and more heterogeneous Union, the domestic profiles of the accession countries have remained relatively little known from the west European perspective. In particular, the implications of enlargement in terms of the attitudes and preferences of the new (or soon to be) players are still, to a great extent, unclear. How will they view their rights and obligations as EU members? How committed will they be to the implementation of the acquis communautaire? In what way will they fill formal rules with practical content? BRIEFING PAPER 2 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EU ACCESSION IN HUNGARY Naturally, the answers to these questions can only government under the premiership of Miklós Németh be tentative at this stage.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • Hungary: Early Illiberalism Adopter
    COVER PHOTO ADOBE STOCK 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com ISBN 978-1-4422-7958-2 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington,Ë|xHSLEOCy279582z DC 20036v*:+:!:+:! 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Appendix. Case Studies HUNGARY: EARLY ILLIBERALISM ADOPTER Of the five case countries considered under the scope of this proj ect, Hungary has experienced the most dramatic reversal in national policy orientation during the 2004–2014 period. At the begin- ning of the study period, Hungary was among the best performers in Central Eu rope in terms of its good governance practices and was steadfast in its Euro- Atlantic orientation, having acceded to NATO in 1999 and the Eu ro pean Union in 2004. Yet, as the de cade progressed, Hungary experi- enced a marked deterioration in demo cratic governance standards following its 2010 parliamentary elections. The center- right Fidesz majority government under the leadership of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has taken steps to consolidate the government’s control over and restrict demo cratic institutions and has advocated for an illiberal approach toward governance. The Orban administration has revised the Hungarian constitution five times since 2010 by redefining voting and election laws, and the Fidesz- led parliament has passed legislation that increases the government’s control over Hungary’s judiciary, media, and central bank. The government has also been criticized for passing laws that fail to protect civil liberties and the rights of minorities.
    [Show full text]
  • RSCAS 2017/37 Rebuilding the Hungarian Right Through Civil
    RSCAS 2017/37 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Civil Organization and Contention: The Civic Circles Movement Béla Greskovits European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Civil Organization and Contention: The Civic Circles Movement Béla Greskovits EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/37 This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. ISSN 1028-3625 © Béla Greskovits, 2017 Printed in Italy, July 2017 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. Details of the research of the Centre can be found on: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Policy Briefs, Distinguished Lectures, Research Project Reports and Books.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Conflict, Social Inequality and Electoral Cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-2018
    World Inequality Lab – Working Paper N° 2020/25 Political conflict, social inequality and electoral cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-2018 Attila Lindner Filip Novokmet Thomas Piketty Tomasz Zawisza November 2020 Political conflict, social inequality and electoral cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-20181 Attila Lindner, Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty, Tomasz Zawisza Abstract This paper analyses the electoral cleavages in three Central European countries countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—since the fall of communism until today. In all three countries, the left has seen a prolonged decline in support. On the other hand, the “populist” parties increased their support and recently attained power in each country. We relate this to specific trajectories of post-communist transition. Former communist parties in Hungary and Poland transformed themselves into social- democratic parties. These parties' pro-market policies prevented them from establishing themselves predominantly among a lower-income electorate. Meanwhile, the liberal right in the Czech Republic and Poland became representative of both high-income and high-educated voters. This has opened up space for populist parties and influenced their character, assuming more ‘nativist’ outlook in Poland and Hungary and more ‘centrist’ in the Czech Republic. 1 We are grateful to Anna Becker for the outstanding research assistance, to Gábor Tóka for his help with obtaining survey data on Hungary and to Lukáš Linek for helping with obtaining the data of the 2017 Czech elections. We would also like to thank Ferenc Szűcs who provided invaluable insights. 1 1. Introduction The legacy of the communist regime and the rapid transition from a central planning economy to a market-based economy had a profound impact on the access to economic opportunities, challenged social identities and shaped party politics in all Central European countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections As Opinion Polls
    Slovak Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh votruba “at” pitt “dot” edu http://www.pitt.edu/~votruba American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies National Convention, Seattle, WA, November 1997 Session 6, Friday, 11/21/1997, 5:45 pm - 7:45 pm Panel 8-02 The Anomalies of Slovak Electoral Politics in Central European Perspective Elections as O pinion Polls : A Comparison of the Voting Patterns in Post-Communist Central Europe and Slovakia Introduction to the roundtable Martin Votruba Only this Monday, several prominent opposition leaders and former activists of the Vel- vet Revolution in Slovakia commemorated the 8th anniversary of its beginning. Ladislav Chudík, a well respected actor and Slovakia’s first post-communist Minister of Culture, told some 15,000 people gathered where the mass demonstrations started in Bratislava that the way Slovakia was living now was the result of how Slovakia voted, and the way it’ll vote next year will determine the way it will live in the future. In the given context, he vas voicing Slovak opposition’s complaints about the ruling party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS1), often seen as personified in its leader and Prime Minis- ter Vladimír Mečiar. The opposition criticizes the ruling coalition for a number of un- democratic acts and finds itself incapable of passing bills in Parliament and influencing the cabinet’s policies. The West shares the opposition’s concerns about Slovakia’s gov- ernment and turned Slovakia down for early membership in NATO. Ladislav Chudík’s words reflected the view generally held by Slovak opposition poli- ticians and often expressed not only by the Western media, the media in its former fed- eral partner, the Czech Republic, as well as in Slovakia, but also by Slovakia’s opposi- tion intellectuals and scholars.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections and Fears in the European Periphery: Populism and Euroscepticism1
    Elections and Fears in the European Periphery: Populism and Euroscepticism1 Daniel Smilov Elections in many EU member states are being decided on the basis of wide-spread fears. Successful parties and candidates are normally those, who best express and probably even fan such fears. As a result, the political mainstream is under significant pressure: more and more voters distrust pro- European, supra-national, progressive type of politics which relies on the coordination among a plurality of equal actors. Instead, there is a tendency to support more clear-cut chains of command and authority, expedience, narrowly defined national interests. This, I argue, is the platform of what could be called ‘populism of fear’ – a specific type of ideology, which becomes more and more successful as a tool for voter mobilization. Recent events – the crisis in the Eurozone, the refugee crisis and the terrorist acts are only going to amplify this tendency. Daniel Smilov is Associate Professor at the Political Science Department, University of Sofia, and Programme Director at the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia. He is also Recurrent Visiting Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the Central European University, Budapest. Smilov holds doctorates from the University of Oxford (DPhil, 2003) and the Central European University, Budapest (SJD, 1999). He has published extensively on the topics of populism and constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, and comparative party and campaign finance. Smilov is a regular commentator on Bulgarian political developments in the Bulgarian press and in the international media. ‘The Rise of Populism’ has become an umbrella concept used to explain political developments in a striking variety of contexts.2 The brand ‘populists’ is associated with political actors as diverse as the Tea Party in the US, Berlusconi and his associates in Italy, the UKIP in the UK, Fidesz in Hungary, Smer in Slovakia, PiS in Poland, and the former tzar of Bulgaria Simeon Sax Cobburg Gotha and his body guard/successor Boyko Borissov.
    [Show full text]
  • Hungary: Democracy Under Threat
    Hungary: Democracy under Threat Six Years of Attacks against the Rule of Law November 2016 / N° 684a November Cover photo: Thousands of people gathered outside parliament building in Kossuth Lajos Square call for Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s resignation with slogans of «for a European Hungary» in Budapest, Hungary on February 1, 2015. © Mehmet Yilmaz / ANADOLU AGENCY taBLE OF CONTENts 1. INTRODUCTION 4 1.1 METHODOLOGY 8 2. CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW : UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC CHECKS AND BALANCES 10 2.1 ESTABLISHED POWERS 10 2.1.1 Constitutional matters: Reshaping the constitutional framework 10 2.1.2 Reforming the judiciary 15 2.1.3 Electoral laws and other restrictions to the legislative power 21 2.2 NON-ESTABLISHED POWERS 24 2.2.1 Taking control of the media 24 2.2.2 Restricting freedom of information 37 2.2.3 A shrinking space for civil society 44 2.2.4 Churches and religious groups 43 3. CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW: VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 51 4.THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE RULE OF LAW 59 5. CONCLUSIONS 70 6. RECOMMENdatiONS 72 ANNEXES 79 ANNEX I. HISTORIC CHRONOLOGY 79 ANNEX II. CHRONOLOGY OF LAWS 80 ANNEX III. EUROPEAN UNION’S INSTITUTIONS’ MAIN REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY SINCE 2010 81 1. Introduction Since Prime Minister Viktor Orban took power in 2010 following the country’s general elections that saw its party, conservative Fidesz (the Hungarian Civic Party) and their small coalition partner the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) win the two-thirds (67,88% or 262 seats) in Parliament, Hungary has undergone a progressive shift away from the principles on which a democratic state is built.
    [Show full text]
  • The Analysis of the 2018 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections in the Aspect of the FIDESZ-KDNP
    Ádám Bohár (International Business School Budapest-Vienna) tHe analysis of tHe 2018 Hungarian parliamentary electiOns in tHe aspect of tHe FIDESZ-KDNP Keywords: Fidesz, KDNP, Election, 2018, parliament, Hungary, 1990, Jobbik, LMP, DK, Viktor Orbán, Gábor Vona, Bernadett Szél, Ferenc Gyurcsány, polariza- tion, sub-polarization 1.—Introduction In 2018, the 8th parliamentary election will be held in Hungary since the fall of the communist regime in 1989 and the first election in 1990. The election will answer a question that has never been asked in the history of Hungarian politics: will the Fidesz-KDNP coalition win the elections and gain the majority of the votes, and by that, the governing right for the third time in a row. This would be the first occasion that political parties elected and govern the country for such a long period of time in Hunga- ry. Both Fidesz (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance), and KDNP (Chris- tian Democratic People’s Party) part of the Hungarian political scene since 1990. With the help of articles and books written in the subject, this paper overviews both parties. In order to understand the current scene, I will re- visit the political scene in Hungary from 1990 until 2018, in the aspect of the number of parties whom qualified their selves to the Parliament. With each election, new challenges, and sometimes, new parties arise to compete. I will overview the 2010 election as a milestone in the change of the politi- cal scene, what led to the change, and how the changes affected it. As for the 2018 election, I will cover the main ideas and mottos of the party and 236—Á��������������������������������� — ádám bOHár its campaign and how the party reacted to the opposition and other events throughout the 2017–2018 period.
    [Show full text]
  • Patterns of Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe
    VETO ET PETO: Patterns of Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe __________________________ Philipp Köker UNVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 1 Declaration I, Philipp Köker confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where in- formation has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Date Signature 2 Abstract The powers of Central and East European presidents have been subject to a number studies. Paradoxically, only few scholars have tried to explain how presidents actually use them. This thesis maps and explains patterns in the activism of democratic presidents in Central and East- ern Europe (CEE). It proposes a new theoretical framework for the study of presidential activ- ism, defined as the discretionary use of formal presidential powers, and argues that it can be explained by the constitutional setting and the political environment. To test these hypotheses, the study employs a nested analysis approach. Thereby, the patterns of presidential activism are assessed using an original data set on the use of presidents’ legislative powers in nine CEE de- mocracies between 1990 and 2010, and the thesis provides one of the first cross-country empiri- cal analyses of the actual use of presidents’ reactive powers to date. Based on the predictions of the statistical model 12 president-cabinet pairings from four countries (Estonia, Hungary, Po- land, 4.) are selected for in-depth case studies. The qualitative analysis then uses the results of 65 semi-structured elite interviews and ample source material to examine the validity of the sta- tistical results.
    [Show full text]