Edith Oltay Hungarian Opposition Party Locked In

SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg., 4/2006

Edith Oltay*

Hungarian Opposition Party Locked in Power Struggle with the Government

Hungary's largest opposition party the Alliance of Young Democrats-Civic Alli- ance Fidesz (Fidesz-MPP) was the landside winner of the October municipal elections and is a key player in the political crisis that has engulfed the country since the middle of September. Following the April 2006 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Fidesz was forced into opposition for a second time in a row under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) obtained a stable majority in parliament and formed a coalition government. This marked the first time since the change of regime that a government was reelected in Hungary.1 Shortly after the elections, however, the government experienced a great loss of public support when it announced the introduction of tax rises and spending cuts. Drastic reforms of healthcare, state administration, higher education and energy prices are planned. The public was taken by surprise since during election campaign the coalition parties spoke of a "booming economy" and even promised tax cuts. In reality, Hungary's budget deficit swelled to 10% of the GDP and is by far the highest in the EU relative the size of the economy.2 It was only oil on the fire when on 17 September a tape recorded in May was leaked to the media on which Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány told a closed session of the MSZP parliamentary group that in the past one and a half years his government had "lied (to the population) morning, noon and night" about the state of the economy in order to be reelected. He called for an end to the lies and for the support of the MSZP deputies in implementing austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit.3 The speech spread like wild fire and soon thousands gathered

* Edith Oltay, M.A., political scientist and freelance journalist, Berlin. 1 Dieringer, Jürgen: Die ungarischen Parlamentswahlen vom 9./23. April 2006. In: Südosteuropa, 54 (2006) 2, pp. 147–163. 2 Hungary's Euro readiness is not in sight; , 09.11.2006; Havlik, Péter: Die Enttäuschung ist groß. Die Unruhen in Ungarn ahben wirt- schaftliche Gründe, die aber nicht auf die übrigen EU-Staaten in Osteuropa zu- treffen. In: Handelsblatt, 25.09.2006. 3 Gyurcsány Ferenc beszéde az MSZP-frakció május 26-i ülésén [Ferenc Gyur- csány’s speech at the May 26th session of the MSZP faction]. In: MTI, 18.09.2006; available at ; cf. Olt, Reinhard: Der Preis der Lüge. Der Ministerpräsident Ungarns hat die ganze Wahrheit gesagt – und sein Land in eine schwere Krise gestürzt. In: FAZ, 20.09.2006; Truth in Hungary. In: International Herald Tribune, 29.09.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 475 in front of the parliament demanding Gyurcsány's resignation. Demonstrations on a smaller scale took place in the countryside. President László Sólyom de- claredthat there was a "moral crisis" in the country and asked the coalition parties to resolve the crisis and to restore the trust in the government by using their parliamentary majority to elect a prime minister.4 Gyurcsány categorically refused to resign and defended himself by asserting that Hungarian politicians have been lying for the past 16 years. He presented himself as the only Hungarian politician brave enough to admit his lies and as the only one who is willing to take the harsh measures necessary to carry out much needed reforms. Fidesz took the lead in demanding Gyurcsány's resignation and declared that the municipal elections amounted to a referendum on his government. Voters vented their anger at the government in the municipal elections when they handed the MSZP and the SZDSZ their greatest defeat since the change of regime. Shortly after the elections, Gyurcsány won a vote of confidence in parliament. This did not resolve the crisis, however, and Hungary's two large political camps are now more embittered and divided than ever. For the first time since the peaceful change of regime 16 years ago violence emerged on the Hungarian political scene.

Cultural Politics – Increasing Political Polarization The already existing divide between Hungary's left/liberal-wing and right-wing political camps deepened in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's admission of lying. The two sides regard each other not as political opponents but as enemies whose coming to power would doom the country. According to political analyst and member of the European parliament for Fidesz George Schöpflin "It is no ex- aggeration, though outsiders find this hard to credit, that Hungary is in a state of cold civil war."5 Most common is the demonization of those belonging to the other political persuasion by emphasizing their communist past, depicting them as a danger to the democratic system, or leveling accusations of nationalism and anti-Semitism at them. A substantial number of voters rejected Orbán's person and elected the socialist-liberal coalition primarily in order to prevent him from coming to power. As the political scientist and Orbán biographer József Debreczeni formulated it before the parliamentary elections: 6

4 Sólyom László köztársasági elnök nyilatkozata 2006. szeptember 18. [The statement of László Sólyom President of the Republic 18 September 2006]; , . 5 Schöpflin, George: Hungary's cold civil war; , 14.11.2006. 6 Nagy, József: Debreczeni József kegyencrendszerről és a törzsi kérdésekről [Jó- zsef Debreczeni about the system of minions and tribal questions]. In: 168 óra, No. 26 (20.06.2005); . 476 Edith Oltay

"[Orbán] knows that the left-liberal side can only prevent Fidesz's victory if it can again awaken the feeling that Orbán poses a threat as /someone/ who seeks an intimidating concentration of power and dissolves the parliamentary institutions – in my opinion this is indeed a very severe and realistic danger." In this context, one can refer to the 2006 parliamentary elections as a protest vote.7 Similarly Gyurcsány became the main source of evil in the conservative camp.8 Orbán called Gyurcsány a "pathological liar" and reiterated that he had to resign because he was the source of the country's "moral, political and financial crisis."9 Opinion surveys confirm that supporters of the two political camps over- whelmingly reject the leader of the other camp. A November poll by Szonda Ip- sos found that in the period between September and November Gyurcsány's approval rating among Fidesz supporters ranged between 9 and 11 points. Orbán's popularity among MSZP followers fell from 21 points in September to 11 points in November. Both politicians are popular in their own camps; Orbán has 82 points and Gyurcsány 78 points.10 The cultural conflicts run along the themes of anti-communism and the representation of national interests and values on the one hand, and that of globaliza- tion and cosmopolitan values, on the other. The left wing sees itself as the sole guarantor of the Westernization of Hungary and of implementing the reforms needed for the introduction of modern capitalism. In a publication of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Michael Ehrke found that the MSZP acts as an agent of the exter- nal demands of the EU and of international investors with little regard for the needs of Hungarian society. In his view, the MSZP is convinced that there is no alternative to its policy of reforms and presents hardly any facts and statistics to the public to justify the introduction of economic austerity measures.11 The right wing perceives itself as the sole representative of the national interests and the guardian of national traditions. Referring to Fidesz's victory at the municipal elections Orbán repeated12 what he had said in the aftermath of his

7 Kis, János: Pengeélen [At the blade's edge] In: Élet és Irodalom, 50 (06.10.2006) 40; . 8 Orbán megerősítette: a Fidesz élén marad [Orbán reiterated: he will continue to lead Fidesz]; , 29.09.2006. 9 Orbán: A kormány szándékosan ki akar rekeszteni a felemelkedésből [Orbán: The government prevents people from improving their lives]; , 27.11.06 10 Megmaradt, de kisebb lett Orbán előnye Gyurcsánnyal szemben [Orbán's lead over Gyurcsány stays but decreases]; , 04.12. 2006. 11 Ehrke, Michael: Ungarische Unruhen – ein Symptom der zentraleuropäischen Beitrittskrise? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Internationale Politikanalyse, Politik Info, Oktober 2006; . 12 Csuhaj, Ildikó: Fidesz-kongresszus a szocialisták ellen [Fidesz congress against the socialists]. In: Népszabadság, 27.11.2006; Orbán megismételte a nemzet nem Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 477 party's defeat at the 2002 national elections "the nation cannot be in opposition." The left-liberal camp interpreted the statement as populist attempt to exclude its followers from the Hungarian nation. Dissatisfaction with how the change of regime was negotiated 16 years ago is also a recurring theme. At the Fidesz rally at Astoria on October 23, Orbán addressed those who are not satisfied with how the change of regime was carried out and or are losers of the economic transformation. He told the crowd that the freedom that Hungary regained following the change of regime was "fragile […] because the change of regime was carried out in an ambiguous way, it was not cleared who was responsible for the bankruptcy of socialism, the calling to account of those responsible failed to take place." That made it possible that "lies returned and again plunged Hungary into a financial crisis." This also caused a crisis among several hundred thousand families who now face great difficulties in making ends meet. Orbán stressed that "those who caused the economic crisis are using them [the families] to pay the price of their deceitful and unprofessional rule."13 Fidesz also continues to emphasize the communist roots of the MSZP. It stresses that the MSZP's style of organization, the background of its supporters and the composition of its leadership still reflects its communist past. Orbán declared that it was the MSZP, the "fallen party [...] the interest group which presents itself as a party," which bore the real responsibility for the current crisis. Gyurcsány was merely a "means to keep [that party's] power." Orbán reiterated that the MSZP has not changed "in the last two years it was caught again and again as it returned to its old passion just like and incurable gambler. Indeed, it indulges in its passion the policy of despotism ever more openly and greedily." And he predicted that "it could have two consequences if the MSZP's support falls to an all-time low, either the party renews itself, or it will fall to pieces." 14 The anti-communist theme still finds resonance among the public is because the MSZP has still not been able to transform itself into a modern European-style party. Fidesz accuses Gyurcsány, a former communist youth leader turned mil- lionaire businessman, of using his communist links to illegally accumulate his wealth.

lehet ellenzékben [Orbán repeated: the nation cannot be in opposition]; , 25.11.2006. 13 Orbán Viktor az Astoriánál elmondott beszéde [Viktor Orbán's speech at Astoria]; , 23.10.2006. 14 Orbán Viktor írása a Magyar Nemzetben [Viktor Orbán's article in Magyar Nemzet]. In: Magyar Nemzet, 14.10.2006; . 478 Edith Oltay

The philosopher and former SZDSZ chairman János Kis points out that those in the forefront of the "cultural struggle" make up only a minority in the two political camps. A he puts it "the majority of the Hungarian citizens has no understanding for the cold war of internal politics and suffers under the atmosphere of political hatred. This is not only true for undecided voters but also to a larger extent for those who consciously and firmly stand on the right or left side." 15 Opinion polls support the view that the population has had enough of the political upheavals. A survey commissioned by Hungarian television and carried out by Szonda-Ipsos in November found that while the respondents were divided among party lines, 73% of those polled disapproved the street demonstrations. The overwhelming majority, some 95% spoke out in favor of the parties reaching agreement, with little difference between the political camps.16 Opinion surveys taken by Gallup in October 2006 registered a greater difference than ever between the sociological makeup of Fidesz and MSZP voters. They found that the proportion of Fidesz voters was far higher among those with the lowest per capita income than among the wealthier segments. This reflects the success of Fidesz's efforts to attract the losers of the economic transformation.17 Among those with a university education, almost twice as many support Fidesz (34%) than the MSZP (17%). As in the past most of the MSZP's loyal voters are pensioners. While in the age groups 18 to 29, the number of Fidesz adherents is 44% and the MSZP supporter account for only 13%. Both camps have the same number of supporters in the age group 50 to 59 while among those over 70 the more voters support the socialists (22% and 30%).18

Lies and Legitimacy Prime Minister Gyurcsány's admission of lying stimulated a debate in Hungary about politicians' lies. The overwhelming majority of the intellectuals belonging to the left/liberal camp tried to play down the significance of Gyurcsány's lies by pointing out that all politicians lie but most are not brave enough to admit it.19

15 Kis, János: Pengeélen – 2 (At the blade's edge – 2) In: Élet és Irodalom, 50 (03.11.2006) 44; . 16 Közvéleménykutatás: valóban az ország szakadt-e ketté, vagy inkább a politika és a társadalom között tátong szakadék [Opinion Survey: is the country really torn into two parts or is there rather a precipice between policy makers and society]; In: MTV Magazin; , 13.11.06 17 Magyar Gallup Intézet (ed.): A Gallup pártpreferencia adatai 2006. október [The Gallup Party Preferences Data]; . 18 Ibid. 19 Mi történik itt? [What is happening here?] In: 168 óra, Nr. 41, 13.10.2006; . Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 479

Kis noted, however, that although voters tend to think that politicians lie "it does not leave them cold about how politicians talk about their lies." This is why people experienced a "terrible moral shock" when "the prime minister threw into their face that for the past year and a half were spent with conscious and conse- quent lying." Kis describes as "one of the important characteristics of the condition of democracies whether one can get away with the revelation of all political lies or whether there are standards whose violation results in suffering consequences." 20 Another debate centers on the subjects of legality and legitimacy of the government. After the overwhelming defeat of the coalition parties in the municipal elections, Fidesz argued that the government is no longer politically legitimate because it lost much of its popular support. According to Fidesz's view, it was not reconcilable with the democratic functioning of the political system that such a government continued to exercise its power even if it maintained its majority in parliament.21 Prime Minister Gyurcsány and his coalition partners, on the other hand, asserted that the parliamentary majority ensured that the government stood on democratic foundations. Schöpflin sums up the dilemma: "the Hungarian political system has become completely blocked. There is no possibility of movement in parliament while the left maintains its unity and, thereby, its majority. In formal legal terms, the government is covered. But politically the division is so deep as to make democratic politics effectively impossible." 22 There is a precedent in Hungary for questioning the legitimacy of the legally elected government. In the fall of 1990 Hungary's first democratically elected government under Prime Minister József Antall was confronted with the so-called "taxi blockade" that paralyzed the Hungarian capital and parts of the country. The protest was triggered by an unexpected hike in gasoline prices. At that time some SZDSZ leaders questioned the legitimacy of the government and called for its resignation.23 The political division runs so deep because each side has what it considers legitimate grievances and makes the other side responsible for the current crisis. The coalition parties regard the right wing demonstrations as an unacceptable pressure from the street to bring down the legitimate government and bring Orbán back into power. They accuse Fidesz of seeking to topple the government through demonstrations because it cannot accept that if lost the parliamentary elections for a second time. In the coalition parties' view, Fidesz laid the ground for the vio-

20 Kis, Pengeélen, op. cit. (above n. 7). 21 Budapest Analyses (ed.): A demokrácia feszültségei – legalitás és legitimitás [Di- chotomies of democracy – legality and legitimacy]. Analysis No. 111, 13.10.2006; . 22 Schöpflin, Hungary's cold civil war, op. cit. (above n. 5). 23 Debreczeni, József: A Miniszterelnök [The Prime Minister]. Budapest: Osiris, 1998, pp.156–170. 480 Edith Oltay lence by collaborating with the radical right in order to pressure the government to resign. The conservative side, on the other hand, is convinced that the coalition parties deceived the population about the economy in order to prevent Orbán's return to power. In Fidesz's view the demonstrators are only using their constitutional right of assembly to protest against being deceived and burdened with severe austerity measures. Although Prime Minister Gyurcsány has called for "rebuilding trust" between the government and the opposition, he still owes an admission to the public that the methods he used to secure his reelection were wrong.24 President Sólyom criticized Gyurcsány shortly after the local elections for "continuously avoiding the basic question. He does not admit that he used inadmissible methods in order hold on to power and to begin afterwards to put the state finances in order. This undermines the trust vested in democracy." 25 He repeated his indirect call for the election of a new prime minister by stating that the parliament could restore public confidence in the government by using its majority to elect a prime minister. Lying has been the major theme of Fidesz's criticism of the government since the parliamentary elections. Orbán declared that "in 2006 for the first time since the change of regime an organized and open political deception took place."26 Fidesz depicted itself as a victim of the government's "organized political lies" and gave this as the major explanation for losing the 2006 parliamentary elections. This explanation contributed to Orbán's political survival after two lost elections and diverted attention from the deficiencies of Fidesz's election strategy. Orbán began to question the legitimacy of the government shortly after the elections. As Orbán put it "the Gyurcsány package is not a government program with democratic approval but an arbitrary dictate that is not legitimate, which means that the government has no right to carry out the program." 27 He also predicted that the "people will reply to the mendacious, illegitimate and stubborn policy with open and hidden resistance." The latter in the form of tax evasion, turning to the second and third economy, corruption and the slowing down of work. Open resistance will mean strikes, demonstrations, civil disobedi- ence, and road blockages.28

24 Gyurcsány: "bizalmat kell újraépíteni" [Gyurcsány: "trust has to be rebuilt"]; , 13.11.2006. 25 Sólyom: A megtisztulás elmaradt [Sólyom: There was no clarification]; , 01.10.2006. 26 Orbán, Viktor: Vízválasztó 1 [Watershed 1] In: Magyar Nemzet, 29.07.2006; , 29.07.2006. 27 Orbán Viktor: Vízválasztó 3 [Watershed 3] In: Magyar Nemzet, 09.09.2006; , 09.09.2006. 28 Ibid. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 481

The coalition parties claimed that Fidesz had also lied to the public when it promised even more tax cuts than the MSZP in its election campaign and made no mention of the budget deficit. Indeed, Fidesz's economic program failed to address the question of reducing the budget deficit and to present a detailed program of how the party would put the economy in order. Even after the elections Orbán regarded not the state of the economy as the real problem, as he put it "the real problem is the government's lies, the conscious twisting of the facts, the policy without /popular/ authorization and the fact that Hungarian democracy could not protect itself from these things." 29 Orbán admitted only in October that austerity measures were needed and econo- mists still miss a comprehensive Fidesz program that would solve the country's economic problems.30 When pressed what he would do to lead Hungary out of its current economic difficulties Orbán suggested the setting up of a Hungarian Re- form Fund into which wealthy entrepreneurs would pay contributions to finance the reforms.31 Foreign investors and business circles signaled that they had more confidence in the Gyurcsány government to carry out the economic reforms than a government led by Orbán. Fidesz supporters maintain that the reason for this is that the Gyurcsány government is less willing than Fidesz to protect Hungarian interests.32

From Ultimatum to Referenda Fidesz declared Gyurcsány persona non grata and made his resignation is the center piece of its policy toward the government. Fidesz deputies, except for the parliamentary faction leader, walk out each time the Prime Minister addresses the parliament. They attended the parliamentary session in which the vote of confidence on Gyurcsány was taken only at the urging of President Sólyom that the opposition should participate in the parliamentary decision-making process.33 Fidesz ignored, however, Sólyom's advice as he called for restoring of the "nor- mal functioning of parliament" by ending the Fidesz walkout during Gyurcsány's speeches. Sólyom argued that while leaving the parliamentary chamber was "an

29 Ibid. 30 Hegedűs, Miklós: Van-e alternatíva? (Is there an alternative?) In: Világgazdaság, 02.12.2006, p. 16. 31 Hirschler, Richard: Exkluzív interjú Orbán Viktorral a nagygyűlés előtt [Exclu- sive interview with Viktor Orbán before the big rally]; , 06.10.2006; , 06.10.2006. 32 Lovas, István: A nyugat, pénz és a Gyurcsány kormány [The West, money, and the Gyurcsány government] In: Magyar Nemzet, 21.11.2006, p. 6; , 21.11.2006. 33 Tömeggyűlés nem pótolhatja a parlamentet – Sólyom figyelmeztetése a pártoknak (Mass rally cannot substitute for the parliament – Sólyom's warning to the parties); , 04.10.2006. 482 Edith Oltay exceptional institution that had its own weight and significance" if it is used on a daily basis, however, "it deprived the opposition of the opportunity to participate in parliamentary work." 34 Following the government's defeat at the municipal elections Orbán declared that "the Hungarian citizens have replaced the prime minister today" and gave Gyurcsány a 72 hour ultimatum to resign. Orbán proposed that a government be built either made up of experts or headed by a new prime minister elected by the coalition parties. He ruled out early elections on the ground that the long preparations for it would destabilize the economy and scare off investors. Orbán stressed that s party wanted to win through parliamentary elections.35 The ultimatum back- fired, however, because the MSZP closed ranks behind the Prime Minister and helped him win the confidence vote in parliament. The coalition charged that by declaring the municipal elections to be a referendum on the government Orbán lay the ground for the violent protests of the radical right. As Gyurcsány ignored the ultimatum, Orbán called on his supporters to dem- onstrate every day for one hour in front of the parliament building to press for his resignation36 Fidesz rallies took place next to the demonstrators who have been protesting there for weeks. The most conspicuous of these were marginal radical right groups such as the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, and the "Move- ment for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom). Dressed up in old Hungarian costumes these fringe groups bickered among themselves over who should lead the demonstrations and were ridiculed in the media.37 Aware that being seen together with the radical right would damage its image in the eyes of its moderate voters, Fidesz sought to steer clear of any association with the radical right during its demonstrations. Fidesz speakers addressed the demonstrators from their own stage and employed their own security guards. The coalition parties took every opportunity to accuse Fidesz of acting in collusion with, or at least tacitly cooperating with the representatives of the radical right. Fidesz, in turn, accused the government of manipulating the country's far-right fringe in order to discredit it. In the beginning when prominent Fidesz leaders addressed the demonstrators Fidesz drew huge crowds, later, however, less and less demonstrators came. In the end, only the radical right groups still held out. Police cleared Kossuth square of the demonstrators in preparation for the official ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary the 1956 revolution on October 23. Street protests have died

34 Ami nem maradhat válasz nélkül – Sólyom László a morális válságról, október 23-ról és a rendszerváltás becsületéről [That which could not be left unanswered – László Sólyom about the moral crisis, October 23, and the honor of the change of regime]. In: Népszabadság, 25.11.2006; , 25.11. 2006. 35 Orbán Viktor írása a Magyar Nemzetben, op. cit. (above n. 14). 36 Minden este tüntetés a Kossuth téren [Demonstration every evening on Kossuth square]; 07.10.06. 37 Kik játszanak forradalmat a Kossuth téren? [Who play revolution on Kossuth square?]; , 26.09.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 483 down in the aftermath of the clashes between police and protesters on October 23. The last mass demonstration took place on November 4 when Fidesz led a torch- light procession to commemorate the suppression of the revolution by Soviet troops and to protest against "brutal police attacks" on October 23.38 After the option of forcing Gyurcsány's resignation through demonstrations was exhausted, Fidesz changed its strategy. Orbán announced that "one road is left, a democratic road, a last democratic opportunity, the referendum." 39 Fidesz initiated a referendum on seven questions about controversial topics most of which touch upon measures that the government is preparing to take. Voters are asked whether they agree that a "visiting" fee should be paid to physicians, tuition fees should be introduced at universities, pensioners should continue to work under existing regulations, the responsibility of the government for budget deficits should be formulated in a law, hospitals should stay in state ownership, drugs should only be sold in pharmacies, and family farmers should have the privilege of purchasing arable land before others.40 The National Election Committee (Országos Választási Bizottság, OVB) approved only the last three questions for a referendum. It argued that the other questions affected the government's program. (The government also maintained that the initiatives were designed to undermine its program). Fidesz accused the OVB of being biased in favor of the government and announced that it would turn to the constitutional court over the questions not approved by the OVB.41 Under Hungarian law, referenda cannot be held on questions dealing with the constitu- tion, the budget or international contracts. The idea of the referendum provided Orbán with an opportunity to call off the street rallies without losing prestige. Preparations for the referenda are expected to last at least until the spring of 2007. During this time the topics raised by the referenda will be discussed in the media and force the government to take a position on them. By the spring the population will be more receptive to the issues because it will feel the effects of the austerity measures. Fidesz supporters will be

38 Több tízezren vettek részt a Fidesz szolidaritási menetén [Several ten thousands participated in Fidesz's solidarity rally]; , 05.11.2006. 39 Orbán: szerencsétlenül viselkedett az unió [Orbán: the Union behaved in an unfortunate way]; , 28.10.2006. 40 Tüske, Erika: Fidesz: hétkérdéses népszavazás [Fidesz: referendum on seven questions]; , 25.10.2006. 41 Az OVB három népszavazási kezdeményezést hitelesített [The National Election Committee endorses three referendum initiatives]; , 22.11.2006. Három népszavazási kérdés kapott zöld utat [Three referendum questions got green light]; , 21.11.2006. 484 Edith Oltay provided with a new forum for their activities as they gather signatures for and campaign for the referenda. In the past, referenda were marked by a clear lack of voters' interest. The last plebiscite was held in November 2004 and dealt with the question of whether Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries should be granted Hungarian citi- zenship. The referendum was rendered invalid because of the low turnout of fewer than 20%. In an opinion survey conducted by Szonda-Ipsos only 31% of the respondents said yes they would vote in a referendum, of these 62% were Fidesz voters. Among those who said they would not vote under any circumstances 59% were MSZP voters.42 Another survey conducted by Századvég in November found that 49% of those surveyed said that they would definitely vote in the referendum, down from 61% in October.43

Municipal Elections Gain New Political Significance While municipal politics usually do not carry much weight in the national arena, this year's elections were an exception. The political significance of the elections increased because Orbán declared that they were a referendum on the Gyurcsány government. The municipal governments will also for the first time play a major role in the distribution of substantial EU funds of €22 to 24 billion for regional development that Hungary is to receive in the coming 7 years. Fidesz's gains in the local elections strengthened Orbán's position in the party and the Fidesz majority in the municipal governments gave him a chance to build up an alternative power base to the government. Fidesz deputy chairman Zoltán Pokorni spoke of the formation of two power centers in Hungary, the government on the one side and the local governments on the other.44 In the heated political atmosphere, a record 53.12% of the eligible voters went to the polls. Fidesz received 52.62% of the votes and the MSZP/SZDSZ coalition collected 37.73%. (By comparison, in the 2002 municipal elections the MSZP/SZDSZ coalition won 49% of the votes while Fidesz received 33%.)45 Fidesz won in 18 of 19 counties and 15 out of 23 large towns. The MSZP and the SZDSZ retained control in only 6 of 16 the large towns where they governed. In one town, Eger, independents won. In Budapest, a liberal and social democratic

42 Közvéleménykutatás: valóban az ország szakadt-e ketté, vagy inkább a politika és a társadalom között tátong szakadék [Opinion Survey: is the country really torn into two parts or is there rather a precipice between policy makers and society]; , 13.11.2006. 43 Századvég: a Fidesz tartja előnyét, az MDF kétszámjegyű eredmény közelében [Századvég: Fidesz retains its lead, the MDF close to a two-digit result]; , 01.12.06. 44 Pokorni: Gyurcsány nem tartható az ország élén [Pokorni: Gyurcsány cannot be kept as the country's leader]; , 28.11. 2006. 45 2006. évi önkormányzati választások [Local Elections 2006]; . Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 485 stronghold, Gábor Demszky was reelected as Mayor for a fifth term only with a narrow majority. Demszky has held this post for 16 years and was until now reelected with a great to comfortable majority. This time Demszky gained 46.86% of the votes only 1.66% more than his challenger István Tarlós, an independent candidate supported by Fidesz. Of the 23 Budapest municipal districts Fidesz won 8 districts compared to only 2 in the last municipal elections. The MSZP won 7 districts and governs in 6 other districts in coalition with the SZDSZ. Independ- ents took over the two remaining districts. Of the 66 seats in the Budapest municipal council the MSZP won 24 seats and the SZDSZ 9. Together they have 33 seats the same amount as Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, 30 and 3 respectively. This amounts to a cliff hanger situation where the vote of Mayor Demszky is needed to achieve a majority. In Western Hungary, which has tradi- tionally been conservative, the MSZP was only able hold on to the town of Szombathely. The outcome of the elections was especially painful for the SZDSZ which lost most of its support in the countryside. This prompted MSZP deputy chairman Imre Szekeres to wonder whether the MSZP should not rethink its coalition options and orient itself toward the MDF.46 The power struggle over the allocation of EU funds begun shortly after the elections. Hungarian Radio broadcast part of a speech by Monika Lamperth, Min- ister of Local Government and Regional Development in which she promised at a closed session of the MSZP national board that she would introduce amendments to the regional development law that would give the MSZP more control over the EU funds despite the fact that the Socialists had lost the elections. (Lamperth's statements were made at a closed meeting but were leaked to Radio Budapest by a dissatisfied MSZP member József Sipos, the manager of the social political sec- tion of the MSZP, who later resigned from his post). A minor amendment to the law could change the composition of the council and increase the number of MSZP delegates giving them a greater say in the allocation of the funds. Fidesz parliamentary leader Tibor Navracsics interpreted the speech as an attempt by the government to punish Fidesz voters. He accused Gyurcsány of lying when he promised to cooperate with the local councils regardless of their party alle- giance.47 In November, Gyurcsány invited Fidesz local government representatives to discuss the allocation of funds but the two sides could not agree on the composition and jurisdiction of a committee that would oversee the distribution of the al- locations. At the meeting, Gyurcsány openly ridiculed the Fidesz delegates for accepting his invitation saying that Fidesz is ready to negotiate when money is at stake.48 Pokorni stressed that the funds in question were not Gyurcsány's money

46 Dobszay, János: Bizalmi szavazás után: tér és idő [After the vote of confidence: space and time]. In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (14.10.2006) 41, pp. 8–12. 47 Ibid. 48 Csúcstalálkozó a kormány és ellenzéke között! Bizalom és együttmüködés az ön- kormányzatokban? [Summit between the government and its opposition! Trust and cooperation in the local governments?]; , 22.11.2006. 486 Edith Oltay but that of the taxpayers and interpreted Gyurcsány's invitation to local government representatives as a public relations gag to help him break out of his isolation.49 The local governments will, however, have to cooperate with the government in order to draw on the EU funds, thus their leaders' emphasis is likely to be on cooperation rather than on confrontation and isolation as propagated by the Fidesz leadership. Orbán reacted to the possible conflict of interests at Fidesz's extraor- dinary congress in November by setting up a new forum, the Forum of Local Government Deputies, to act as a "coordinating body which discussed the most important questions of the party's policy with local government leaders."50 The Forum is to provide a united Fidesz local government policy through a new local government structure consisting of three levels whose leaders are appointed by Orbán who also heads the Forum.51 The Forum was widely seen in the Hungarian media as an organization that was to supervise the work of Fidesz local government representatives to make sure that any agreements they reached with the government conformed to Fidesz policy.52 A charge Orbán denied.

Demonstrations and Violence The first outbreak of violence occurred on September 18, a day after Gyurcsány's admission of lying was leaked. A group of rioters broke away from a gathering of peaceful demonstrators on Kossuth square and stormed the Hungarian state television building. Most of those in the forefront of the siege and looting of the building were football hooligans. Police were outnumbered and although the battle to take over the building lasted several hours and was even broadcast on the Hír TV television channel the police received no reinforcement.53 Rumors circled that a special riot police unit was nearby but was not asked to help its colleagues. Many Fidesz supporters are convinced that the government organized the attack

49 Pokorni: Gyurcsány nem tartható, op. cit. (above n. 44). 50 Harc az Uniós támogatásért! Nagypolitika önkormányzati köntösben [Battle for the Union funds! Big politics in local government clothes]; , 25.11.2006. 52 Besenyei, Zsolt: Fidesz-kongresszus előtt: Ellenőrző állomás [Ahead of the Fi- desz congress: Control station]. In: Magyar Narancs, 23.11.2006. 53 Papp, László Tamás: Vasprefektus: rozsda marja, nem ragyog [The iron prefect, rusty?]; , 29.11.2006; [], 30.11.2006; Fahidi, Gergely: Erőszak a választások előtt: rend-szabályok [Violence before the elections: regulations]. In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (22.09.2006) 38, p. 12. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 487 on the television building in order to regain some of its lost popularity by present- ing itself as the representative of law and order.54 In the end, police fled the building leaving without protection the television staff working there. An investigation of the incident failed to clear who was responsible for the events. Public quarrels between high ranking police officials over responsibility and contradictory accounts of what happened only reinforced in the public's eyes the impression of police incompetence.55 While little is known about the identity of the demonstrators who resorted to violence, a number of rioters were known to the police as football hooligans or members of radical right groups. The violence also sparked a discussion about how many supporters the radical right has. A new opinion survey by the Socio- logical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences found that 11% of the respondents placed themselves on the radical right on a scale of 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) compared to 6 to 7% in previous surveys. The director of the Institute the sociologist Pál Tamás said that until now the great majority of the respondents placed themselves in the middle between 4 and 7. In the age group 18 to 29 the number of those who placed themselves on the radical right was 27%. Those living in provincial cities, in county seats, young people and state employ- ees were particularly prone to radical right ideologies.56 On October 23, the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian revolution, police and demonstrators clashed in Budapest. It is a matter of contention what happened.57 Police had been battling violent demonstrators from the early hours of that day. Rioters threw stones at the police and drove a historic tank on display for the anniversary towards the police lines.58 The violent demonstrators then went to the site where Fidesz was holding its rally where they merged with the peaceful demonstrators. According to Fidesz, police intentionally drove the riot-

54 Dobszay, János: Erőszak a választások előtt: sajnálatos események [Violence before the elections: unfortunate events.] In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (22.09.2006) 38, pp. 6–14. 55 Rendőri Lózungok – Gergényi koncepciós eljárást valószínűsít [Police Passwords – Gergényi expects trumped up proceedings]; , 28.11.2006; Tölgyessy, Péter: Válságban a magyar modell [The crisis of the Hungarian model]; , 23.09.2006. 56 Erőre kapnak-e a szélsőségek Magyarországon? [Will radicalism gain new strength in Hungary]; , 30.10.2006. 57 Dobszay, János: Október 23-a után: ősz becsavarodva [After October 23: Twisted autumn]. In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (28.10.2006) 43, pp. 8–11; Politológusok a hétfői eseményekről [Political scientists about the events]; , 28.10.2006; Bodis, András: A szabadság vihara [Freedom's Fury]; , 26.10.2006. 58 Süvítő lövedékek és elszabadult tank – közeli videó [Whistling bullets and a run- away tank, video close up]; , 26.10.2006. 488 Edith Oltay ers into its rally.59 By other accounts rioters affiliated with Fidesz led the police into the peaceful demonstrators in order to escalate the conflict.60 As the two groups merged police came down on the demonstrators with overwhelming violence. Many peaceful demonstrators were beaten up. Police fired rubber bullets at close distance at demonstrators, kicked and beat demonstrators while they already lay on the ground. Police used tear gas grenades, water- cannons, steel truncheons and fired rubber bullets at people's head at close range. Two people were partially blinded, and dozens are suing the police for their inju- ries.61 Policemen were not wearing their badges as required under Hungarian law. Budapest Police Chief Péter Gergényi commented that the badges "fell off." Ger- gényi handed in his resignation but Gyurcsány refused to accept it. Budapest Mayor Gabor Demszky, a member of the SZDSZ, asked Gyurcsány to intervene so that Gergenyi stays in office.62 Orbán accused the government of giving in- structions to the police to use excessive violence against demonstrators. As he put it: "I venture to say that the police relied on the approval and encouragement of the government as [it carried out] its brutal and violent actions against peaceful people." 63 The mass demonstrations caused fear among the coalition parties. They expect more demonstrations in the spring when the austerity measures make their influence felt. The coalition parties tried to shield the police from criticism because they felt that such criticism would weaken it and make it more difficult for it to prevent further violence. Political analyst and constitutional lawyer Péter Tölgyessy, a former member of the SZDSZ and Fidesz, saw "war logic gaining ground on the left wing."64 It was in this context that the government failed to make public some of the most important files concerning the behavior of the police. The government was hoping that the public would get tired of the turmoil and sympathize with the government as the guarantor for the restoration of law and order. Gyurcsány told parliament in his evaluation of the events of October 23

59 Kövér, László: Lopakodó diktatúra korszakát éljük öt év óta [We have been living in a stealthy dictatorship in the last five years]; , 25.10. 2006. 60 Debreczeni, József: Hétfrontos harc [Battle on seven fronts]; , 03.11.2006. 61 Rauschenberger, Péter: Gáz és könny [Gas and tears]; , 03.11.2006. 62 Papp, Vasprefektus, op. cit. (above n.53). 63 Orbán, A kormány szándékosan ki akar rekeszteni, op. cit. (above n. 9). 64 Tölgyessy Péter: akár évtizedekre rögzülhet a két oldal engesztelhetetlen szem- benállása [The relentless confrontation of the two sides could possibly last for decades. Interview with Péter Tölgyessy]; , 27.11.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 489 that everyone has to decide whether he stands on the side of order or on the side of the trouble-makers. He warned that "they had the capacity to create disorder in the country, no matter, we'll act [to make sure] that peace will return to the country."65 Thus far, no one has been called to account for the police excesses despite many eye witnesses and the recording of many of the incidents on video.66 Prime Minister Gyurcsány set up a commission of experts to explain the "social-psycho- logical background" of the protests but not, however, to identify those responsible for the violence. Fidesz criticizes the commission's member for being biased in favor of the government.67 President Sólyom urged that the government investigate the police abuses because this would help restore trust in public institutions. In his view, restoring public confidence in the rule of law was central to resolving the moral crisis.68 Tölgyessy also called for a "rigorous" investigation of police excesses because this would "interrupt for a minute the logic of civil war" and help restore confidence in the police. He warned that if investigations are not carried out "the right wing community will perceive itself even less as a citizen of the republic. The right wing's trust in the police could be permanently lost." 69 Measures taken and/or planned by the coalition parties are likely to further deepen the mistrust between the two political camps. Budapest Mayor Demszky took measures to restrict demonstrations around the parliament building. A planned demonstration by farmers was prevented by putting up signs in down- town Budapest that forbid the entering of tractors, the vehicles that farmers had planned to use during their protest.70 The government also examined the possibility of amending the law on assembly although in the current atmosphere of mistrust any amendment would be met with suspicion.71 As Tölgyessy put it: "If the law were be tightened the chances of rioting would increase. Those who wish to express their constitutional right to protest could easily interpret this as a provocation. It is after all the major source of concern that one half of the political community does not identify enough with order of the third Hungarian republic." 72

65 Tüske, Fidesz: hétkérdeses nepszavazás, op. cit. (above n. 40). 66 Már 42 napja nem tudni, kit terhel a felelősség [It's been 42 days and we still do not know who is responsible]; , 04.12.2006. 67 Thorpe, Nick: Hungary probes street clashes. In: BBC, News, 06.12.2006; http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6209958.stm>, 06.12.2006. 68 Ami nem maradhat válasz nélkül, loc. cit. (above n. 34). 69 Tölgyessy Péter: akár évtizedekre, op. cit. (above n. 64). 70 Kis János: kifulladt a narancsos forradalom [János Kis: the orange revolution was puffed out]; , 08.11.2006. 71 Juhász, Gábor: Október 23-a után: kié itt a tér? [After October 23: Whose square is this?] In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (28.10.2006) 43, p. 9. 72 Tölgyessy Péter: akár évtizedekre, op. cit. (above n. 64) 490 Edith Oltay

European People's Party Supports Fidesz The conflict between Fidesz and the coalition parties has reached the European Union. Orbán stated that since Hungary is a member of the EU the Union is obliged to monitor the political developments in the country. Thus, Fidesz invited EU observers to investigate allegations of police brutality against demonstrators.73 Fidesz EU deputy Kinga Gál also raised the issue of the alleged lack of objec- tivity of the members of the commission set up by the government to investigate the background of the October 23 demonstrations.74 The head of the European People's Party (EPP) Wilfried Martens expressed open support for Fidesz by at- tending Fidesz's commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revolution instead of the government celebrations. He was criticized for this by the head of the European Socialist Party Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. A public debate broke out between the two chairmen about the circumstances of the commemorations and the role of the police in breaking up the demonstrations.75 The leadership of the EPP condemned the use of excessive violence by the police against peaceful demonstrators at the October 23 demonstrations.76 Orbán also called on the European Union "not to lend a helping hand to the lying post-communist governments." This statement was interpreted by the gov- erning coalition as a call for withdrawing EU financial assistance from Hungary. Orbán was branded a "traitor" who did not have Hungary's interests at heart. Or- bán insisted that he meant that the EU should not condone it when the government unwarrantedly postponed a scheduled release of public information or ex- tended the deadlines for submitting reports to the EU for political gain. Orbán cited the refusal of the finance minister to release statistical data until after the elections in order to hide from the voters the true state of the economy.77

73 Az Európai Néppárt tovább nyomoz az október 23-án történtek ügyében [The European People's Party continues its investigation regarding the events of Octo- ber 23]; , 01.12.2006. 74 Független vizsgálóbizottságot a rendőri brutalitások kivizsgálására [Independent investigative committee to investigate police brutality]; , 10.11.2006. 75 Martens válaszolt Rasmussennek [Martens answered Rasmussen]; , 26.10.2006. 76 Az Európai Néppárt megdöbbent a magyar rendőrség módszerein [European People's Party was shocked about the methods used by Hungarian Police]; , 10.11.2006; cf. EEP- European People's Party: Martens congratulates Fidesz for success in Hungarian elections; http://www.ep.eu/news/newsdetail.php?hoofdmenuID=4&newsID= 163&submenuID=49, 02.10.2006. 77 Mondta, nem mondta, hogyan mondta [He said it, he did not say it, how did he say it]; , 31.10.2006; cf. "Seit der Wende hat kein Politiker in Ungarn korrekt gerechnet". Wirt- schaftsminister Kóka legt sich auf einen Termin für den Euro nicht mehr fest und verlangt Opfer für die Haushaltssanierung. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.09.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 491

Lack of Coalition Partners In the last two elections, Fidesz failed to win enough votes to enable it govern alone but had no coalition partner to help it into government. Fidesz's declared policy of uniting the right-wing under its wings has succeeded in winning over most of the radical right voters. The radical right-wing party, the Hungarian Jus- tice and Life Party (MIÉP), which was in parliament from 1998 to 2002, failed to make it into parliament in the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections. The other radical right-wing organization "Jobbik" also fell far short of the 5% of the votes needed to gain parliamentary representation. Fidesz has not, however, been able to win over all moderate right-wing voters. Fidesz was able to form a government following the 1998 parliamentary elections because it entered into a coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum MDF and the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP).78 The latter disintegrated and the relationship between the MDF and Fidesz has deteriorated so much that a coalition is unlikely. In 2002, the MDF still ran on a joint list of candidates with Fidesz and reached the 5% hurdle only with Fidesz's help. While Fidesz and the MDF received almost 2% more votes than their largest contender the MSZP, the latter was able to secure a majority in parliament in coalition with the SZDSZ which made it into parliament with 5.2%. As the 2006 elections came, the conflict between Fidesz and the MDF escalated; MDF Chairwoman Ibolya David even refused to field a joint list of candidates with Fidesz and did not withdraw the MDF candidates in the second round of the elections to help Fidesz candidates. She even rebuked Orbán's offer shortly before the second round to give up the premiership in return for MDF support for Fidesz candidates. With this she helped the coalition parties to victory. The MDF made it into parliament in 2006 with 5.04% of the votes.79 David rejected a merger of her party with Fidesz main- taining that the MDF had to reserve a separate identity because only it represented real conservative values. She regards Orbán as more of a populist than a conservative. Civil organizations and entrepreneurs close to government circles give financial support to the MDF which restricts its freedom of movement and makes it less credible in the eyes of right wing voters.80 The question is whether Orbán is in a position to address every group in the very heterogeneous conservative camp. Several parties representing segments of the right wing might be in a better position to address potential voters.81 The chal-

78 Oltay, Edith: Hungary's Largest Conservative Party Transforms into an Alliance. In: Südosteuropa, 52 (2003) 4–6, pp. 229–251. 79 Jürgen Dieringer: Die ungarischen Parlamentswahlen vom 9./23. April 2006 [The Hungarian Parliamentary Elections on the 9th and 23rd of April, 2006]. In: Südost- europa, 54 (2006) 2, pp. 147–163. 80 Budapest Analyses (ed.): The Prospects of the Rightwing Opposition. Analysis No. 90, 16.05.2006; . 81 Körösényi, András: Miért veszített a jobboldal? [Why did the right-wing lose?] In: Heti Válasz, 6 (25.05.2006) 21, melléklet; 492 Edith Oltay lenge for Fidesz is how not to alienate the moderate right voters and its potential voters from the other political camp through association with right-wing extrem- ists. In order to be successful in gathering enough votes to govern alone Fidesz has to be able to win over new voters without alienating the old ones The relationship between the SZDSZ and Fidesz is still too strained for the liberal party to become Fidesz's coalition partner in the near future. Fidesz criticized the SZDSZ for entering into a coalition with the former communists and stresses even today that the party betrayed the basic values and institutions of the new order that came into being in 1989/1990. The SZDSZ, on the other hand, questions Fidesz's democratic credentials accusing it of cooperating with the radical right. Currently the SZDSZ is only open to a coalition with the MSZP, a situation which leaves it no room for political movement and makes it dependent on the MSZP. The issue of developing a political profile that is distinct from that of the MSZP is currently being debated in the party by those who feel that the party's survival is at stake.82 A change in the leadership and orientation of the SZDSZ would make an opening toward Fidesz possible. One of the potential challengers of SZDSZ chairman Gábor Kuncze, István Szentiványi, urged in an open letter the investigation of alleged police excesses against demonstrators.83 This directly challenged the SZDSZ leadership which failed to call for investigations although the party had built its reputation on being a staunch defender of human rights. Another sign of an increased cooperation between the two parties is that the SZDSZ voted with Fidesz against the MSZP on an amendment on pension rights despite a coalition agreement to support the MSZP's proposal.84

Reflections of Political Polarization in Public Opinion While in 1990 ideological conflicts were still largely limited to the party elite they are now also reflected in the views of the population at large. Respondents tend to support the policy of the political camp that they belong to. A survey commissioned by Hungarian television and carried out by Szonda- Ipsos in November found that the respondents were divided among party lines.

. 82 Fodor: jelentős kormány-átalakításra van szükség [Fodor: a greater cabinet re- shuffle is needed]; , 13.11.2006; Fo- dor ismét beszélő viszonyba került Orbán Viktorral [Fodor is again on speaking terms with Viktor Orbán]; , 01.12.2006. 83 Vita az SZDSZ-ben – Szent-Iványi István: "pártom téves úton jár" [Debate in the SZDSZ – István Szent-Iványi: "my party is on the wrong path"]; , 13.11.06. 84 Dobszay, János: Koaliciós Feszültségek [Coalition Tensions]; , 10.12.2006; Együtt szavazott a Fidesz és az SZDSZ [Fidesz and SZDSZ voted together]; , 27.11.06 Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 493

When asked whether they approved street demonstrations 38% of the Fidesz voters said yes, 95% of the MSZP voters said that there was no need for them.85 Szonda-Ipsos measured the greatest difference between the adherents of the two political camps in how they viewed the situation of the country. To the question whether the country was heading in the right direction, 32% of the MSZP voters said yes and 90% of the Fidesz supporters said no. In the last two months the percentage of the voters who had very negative feelings toward members of the other political camp grew to 80%. The current survey shows that the number of MSZP voters who categorically reject Fidesz fell to 72%. The development is similar in the Fidesz camp where 73% would not vote for the socialists.86 Fidesz has been leading in the polls since the summer when Gyurcsány's budget reducing package of service cuts and tax hikes was announced. Since then Fidesz's lead has decreased somewhat. Opinion polls carried out by Szonda-Ipsos between November 16 and 23 among 1500 adults found that 32% of all respondents would vote for Fidesz if elections were held now. The MSZP would receive 25% of the votes while the SZDSZ and MDF would each collect 3%, the KDNP has 1%. Századvég measured more public support for the MDF and the SZDSZ, 9% and 7% respectively among those certain to cast their ballots.87 Among the certain voters 51% (53% in October) supported Fidesz and 37% (36% in October) the MSZP.88 Opinion surveys carried out by the opinion research institute Tárki in No- vember reached similar results. Here 51% of those who would definitely cast their ballots supported Fidesz and 36% the MSZP. 89 An opinion survey carried out by Századvég and Forsense between Novem- ber 20 and 29 found that of those who would definitely vote 48% would vote for Fidesz and 35% for the MSZP.90 Fidesz's advantage in the polls was, however, not reflected in people's preferences when they were asked which party they judged to be better prepared to govern. The majority of those surveyed were equally negative about the two parties and the number of those who were positive was also equally divided between the two camps. The relative majority (39%) found that Gyurcsány was better fit to be prime minister than Orbán (31%) while 21% found that neither of them was fit for that office. At the same time, 52% of those polled would like the Gyurcsány

85 Közvéleménykutatás: valóban az ország szakadt-e ketté, loc. cit. (above n. 42) 86 Túl a mélyponton a közhangulat és az MSZP [Past the lowest point, public mood and the MSZP]; , 27.11.2006; . 87 Századvég: a Fidesz tartja előnyét, op. cit. (above n. 43). 88 Túl a mélyponton a közhangulat és az MSZP, loc. cit. (above n. 85); 89 Tárki: csökkent a Fidesz előnye [Tárki: Fidesz’s lead decreases]; , 22.11.2006; Tárki: Múlóban az izgalmi állapot [Tárki: the state of excitement is receding]; , 22.11.2006; 90 Századvég: a Fidesz tartja előnyét, op. cit. (above n. 43). 494 Edith Oltay government to stay in office, and only 36% spoke out in favor of a change of government.91 An opinion survey carried out by Median in October showed the public's am- bivalence toward Gyurcsány. When asked whether Gyurcsány should go or stay 39% wanted him to stay in office, at the same time the majority, 56% said that he should resign (5% had no opinion).92 According to Gallup's opinion surveys in November, the number of respondents who judge the work of the prime minister positively grew by 6% compared to October. Currently 30% of those interviewed find that Gyurcsány is doing a good job. The number of those who judge his work negatively has increased to 60% since August. 93 According to an opinion survey carried out by Figyelő and Szonda Ipsos in November, 500 Hungarian top managers answered the question whether there was a moral and political crisis, with 53 and 54 points respectively on a scale of 100. The population perceived the situation of the country even more negatively; it rated the moral and political crisis with 63 and 69 points, respectively. To the question whether an agreement between the two big parties on fundamental questions would be the best solution to resolving the crisis, 49% of the top managers and the population said yes. Only 4% of the managers expect, however, that such an agreement will come about. Of the managers interviewed 25% named Gyur- csány's staying in office and realizing the government program as the best solution and 56% expected that this will happen. Only 12% of the managers saw the replacing of the government with a government of experts as the best solution and a mere 3% expected this in reality. The designation of a new prime minister through the coalition parties was perceived only by 9% of the managers as an ideal solution but 18% expected that this will happen. Both the managers and the population rated the crisis of the state budget high with 72 and 78 points, respectively. On the crisis of the economy the managers and the population differed sharply with 41 and 70 points, respectively. The two sides obviously look at the situation from different angles. The managers have a lot more economic data at their disposal than the public, and the austerity measures affect the life of the public more directly.94

91 Ibid. 92 Hahn, Endre; Gergely Karácsony: Pártok és politikusok népszerűsége: sok hűhó – mennyiért? [The popularity of parties and politicians]. In: Heti Világgazdaság, 28 (14.10.2006) 41, pp. 130–133; . 93 Magyar Gallup Intézet (ed.): A Gallup pártprefernecia adatai 2006. november [The Gallup Party Preferences Data]; , 04.12.2006. 94 Szonda Ipsos: krízis van, válság nincs [Szonda Ipsos: there is a crisis but not an /economic/ crisis]; , 07.12. 2006; Poll shows Hungarians believe country going in wrong direction. In: BBC, News, 28.11. 2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 495

Low Esteem of Politicians and Institutions Opinion surveys indicate that the popularity of politicians has reached an all-time low. A survey taken by Szonda Ipsos in the middle of October showed that on a scale of 100 the average approval rate for a politician sank to an unprecedented 40 points. One year ago the average popularity rating was 46 points and two years ago 48. While voters have had a strong dislike for the politicians of the other political camp for some time now, it represents a new development that they now also see their own politicians in a more negative light. Their average approval rate fell from 65 to 70 to 55 to 60 points.95 A November poll by Szonda Ipsos showed that while politicians failed to regain the prestige they lost since May, their approval rate at least did not decline any further. Orbán's lead over Gyurcsány dropped by 6% in the last two months to 43 points while Gyurcsány's popularity increased by 2 points to 37 points. Parliamentary speaker Katalin Szili is again leading the popularity chart of politicians with 53 points. Since May President Sólyom's popularity has declined by 5 points to 51 points. The drop in his popularity among MSZP supporters (from 54 to 35 points) and among respondents without party preferences from (56 to 47 points) accounted for the overall decline in his rating. Sólyom's approval rating increased slightly among Fidesz supporters from 64 to 67 points. Two years ago he received 68 points from Fidesz followers and 64 points from MSZP supporters. Sólyom's statements concerning political issues apparently divided the respondents.96 According to Median's opinion polls in October trust toward the democratic institutional system, which has never been especially high, has declined markedly following the 2006 parliamentary elections and in reaction to the planned austerity measures in the summer. The average trust rating is now 51 points on a scale of 100. Most popular are those persons or institutions which supervise the democratic functioning of the institutional system, the president of the republic and the constitutional court, their average trust index of 12 months is 66 and 65 points, respectively. The trade unions, political parties, the government, parliament and the churches rated the least trustworthy.97

Toward a Dialogue? Despite declarations on both sides of the political spectrum that a dialogue is necessary neither side is interested in stopping the current confrontations. The head of the Károly Eötvös Public Policy Institute and former data protection commis- sioner László Majtényi pointed out:

95 Csökkenő Fidesz-támogatottság [Diminishing support for Fidesz] , 27.11.2006. 96 Megmaradt, de kisebb lett Orbán előnye, loc. cit. (above n. 10) 97 Csökkent a bizalmunk a demokratikus intézményekben [Our trust in democratic institutions declined]; , 30.10.2006. 496 Edith Oltay

"In the long run the solving of our problems is only then possible if the government and opposition establish contact on a high level. One is not the enemy of the nation, the other is not the enemy of progress, because if they are, there can be no movement forward." 98 A major obstacle to starting a dialogue is that leaders of the two political camps reject each other. Since both politicians have strong support in their own camp they are likely to dominate the Hungarian political scene in the near future. The local government elections consolidated Orbán's position; currently no one can seriously challenge him. Gyurcsány's position in the MSZP also seems strong and he plans consolidate his hold on the party by having him elected as MSZP chairman in February. The question is how Fidesz could return to daily politics without giving the impression that it recognizes Gyurcsány as Prime Minister. Any move on Orbán's part that would not directly result in Gyurcsány's removal would be regarded by his supporters as a concession to the left-liberal wing. The Gyurcsány government, on the other hand, is fighting for survival. It knows that if it crumbles it will have a similar fate as the left-wing in Poland. But further attempts to topple the government through demonstrations will hardly result in a "national revolution" similar to that in Poland but rather in a civil war. It would strengthen Fidesz's credibility in the eyes of the public very much if it would explain what measures it will take to solve the country's economic problems. Fidesz also still has to face up to the fact that it lost the 2006 elections because of its poor election strategy and not because it fell a victim to the government's lies. Fidesz's congress in 2007 will have a special importance for the direction the party will take. By that time the party will have digested the causes of the electoral defeat and can develop a new strategy that will make it more attractive to new voters. The alarming fall in the prestige of Hungarian politicians and institutions is related to the two political camps' persistent questioning of each other's legitimacy. This could in the long run undermine the trust of the population in democratic institutions. Trust in the government is essential if the public is to accept the harsh economic measures currently under way. The Gyurcsány government, however, lacks the support of a substantial part of the Hungarian public and has not been able to communicate the need for reforms to the population. Even the government's supporters are likely to experience the austerity measures as blows that are dictated to them unless the government explains the measures to them. As Kis puts it, "in a democracy, however, one cannot save oneself the tedious work of

98 Eötvös Károly Közpolitikai Intézet: Kiutat kell találni a politikai válságból [We have to find a way out of the political crisis]; ,16.11.2006; Orban bleibt auf Konfrontationskurs. Der Fidesz Vorsitzende droht Ungarns Re- gierungschef. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18.12.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 497

winning over the public " especially not in the current situation "when thousands and hundred thousands of voters are asking themselves what reason they have to believe the government which already deceived them badly once." 99 Unless the population comes to accept the reforms they will not survive the current government's term. While the street demonstrations against the government died down for now, the likelihood is that they will return in the spring when the measures aimed at cutting the huge budget deficit hit the population. Fidesz will have a central role to play in making sure that the demonstrations are not accom- panied by uncontrolled violence and stay within the framework of the rule of law.

99 Kis, Pengeélén – 2, op. cit. (above n.15).