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The Political Context of Eu Accession in Hungary

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The Political Context of Eu Accession in Hungary European Programme November 2002 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EU ACCESSION IN HUNGARY Agnes Batory Introduction For the second time since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty – seen by many as a watershed in the history of European integration – the European Union (EU) is set to expand. Unlike in 1995, when the group joining the Union consisted of wealthy, established liberal democracies, ten of the current applicants are post-communist countries which recently completed, or are still in various stages of completing, democratic transitions and large-scale economic reconstruction. It is envisaged that the candidates furthest ahead will become members in time for their citizens to participate in the next elections to the European Parliament due in June 2004. The challenge the absorption of the central and east European countries represents for the Union has triggered a need for internal institutional reform and new thinking among the policy-makers of the existing member states. However, despite the imminence of the ‘changeover’ to a considerably larger and more heterogeneous Union, the domestic profiles of the accession countries have remained relatively little known from the west European perspective. In particular, the implications of enlargement in terms of the attitudes and preferences of the new (or soon to be) players are still, to a great extent, unclear. How will they view their rights and obligations as EU members? How committed will they be to the implementation of the acquis communautaire? In what way will they fill formal rules with practical content? BRIEFING PAPER 2 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EU ACCESSION IN HUNGARY Naturally, the answers to these questions can only government under the premiership of Miklós Németh be tentative at this stage. Nonetheless, the policies also established contacts with the European Parliament they have proposed, particularly since accession and applied for membership of the Council of Europe.2 negotiations started, and the rhetoric they use in the With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the CMEA debate on EU membership give some indication of the and the Soviet Union itself, the scope of Hungarian attitudes of central and east European political elites foreign policy expanded radically. József Antall, the to ‘Europe’. By analysing the domestic discourse in first post-communist prime minister, used this new some detail, this paper seeks to introduce the context independence to define his government’s basic goals in in which the issue of EU membership and European foreign policy in the early 1990s as Euro-Atlantic integration is played out in one of the leading integration, good relations with other countries of East candidates, Hungary. The paper is structured as Central Europe, and the representation of the interests follows. First, it gives a brief overview of Hungarian of ethnic Hungarians abroad, living in the countries foreign policy in the 1990s, focusing on the main neighbouring Hungary, primarily Romania, Slovakia developments in Hungary–EU relations to date. The and Ukraine. Although the extent to which a subsequent section introduces the party system and ‘European’ orientation or the role of Hungary as a ‘kin- looks at the attitudes of the main political parties: state’3 was emphasized changed over time according Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP) and its to the ideological colouring of the governing parties of coalition partners, which held office from 1998 to April the day, these objectives have remained at the core of 2002, on the one hand, and the current Hungarian Hungarian foreign policy to the present time. Socialist Party (MSZP)-Alliance of Free Democrats As for European integration, the agenda of Antall, (SZDSZ) coalition on the other. This analysis draws on as well as his counterparts elsewhere in East Central formal policies as articulated in party manifestos as Europe, was highly ambitious. The Hungarian well as the rhetoric of leading figures in the respective government’s 1990 ‘Programme of national renewal’ parties. Finally, the paper reviews the evolution of set the goal of the conclusion of an association public opinion on EU membership, showing the strong agreement with the EC to ‘provide the foundations for support for integration and considering the potential future full membership’, which was expected by 1995.4 for the increase of Euroscepticism that nonetheless (In the event, the association agreement entered into exists among the citizens. A brief conclusion sums up force in December 1991 and took full effect in the paper and offers an indication of how Hungary as February 1994.) This objective partly reflected the anti- a new member state may fit into the EU. communist, and therefore by default ‘Western’, orientation that characterized the first post-communist governments throughout the region. More Hungarian foreign policy and the importantly, membership of the EC (soon to be country’s relations with the EU transformed into the European Union) and NATO was seen to facilitate economic transformation and act as a Already in the late communist era Hungarian security guarantee in a new, post-Cold War governments went as far in their efforts to improve international environment.5 This perception was relations with the then European Community (EC) as it widely shared by the political elite, and was reflected was possible to do in the political climate of the day, in the fact that the parliamentary resolution granting a taking the lead among central and east European mandate to the Hungarian government to apply countries in this respect. The July 1988 Trade and formally for membership of the EU was adopted Cooperation Agreement between Hungary and the EC almost unanimously in March 1994. was concluded just one week after the EC and the However, progress towards full integration into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) of the EU was, from the candidates’ perspective, Eastern bloc had established diplomatic relations, but disappointingly slow. In the early 1990s, the EC, taken following five years of negotiations. At the time, it by surprise by the extent of change on its eastern ‘was generally accepted that this was the most far- borders and preoccupied with its own internal reforms reaching agreement that the EC was likely to sign with that ultimately led to the Treaty on European Union, any of the six Central European countries since responded in a more or less ad hoc manner to the Hungary had implemented the most radical economic challenge presented by the post-communist countries’ reform programme of the Communist East.’1 From the transformations. The Europe Agreement (EA) or Hungarian point of view, the agreement with the EC association formula first extended by the EC to the was part of a general policy of opening up to Western post-communist countries was little more than ‘a structures. The country had been admitted to the classical trade agreement, supplemented by a “political International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in dialogue”, … and backed by technical and financial 1982, and in the late 1980s the last communist assistance’.6 It was not until the Copenhagen THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EU ACCESSION IN HUNGARY 3 European Council of June 1993 that the (by then) EU By July 2002, Hungarian governments had endorsed the post-communist countries’ aspirations for completed negotiations with the European Commission membership and defined the conditions for achieving on 26 of the 31 chapters of the acquis. Although some it in terms of the candidates’ democratic stability and of the most difficult chapters, among them agriculture ability to integrate into the European market.7 The and financial and budgetary provisions, are still open, first of the European Commission’s annual reports the new Socialist-Free Democrat government (which (avis) reviewing the candidates’ progress resulted in entered into office in May 2002 under the premiership the decision to start accession negotiations in 1998 of Péter Medgyessy) hopes to finish negotiations by with five post-communist countries, including Hungary, the end of 2002. The amendment of the relevant selected by the Luxemburg European Council on the provisions of the constitution, allowing the basis of their ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria government to sign the accession protocol, is in the medium term. scheduled to take place in late 2002. The question of Preparing for membership and conducting the joining the Union will be put to a referendum in 2003. negotiations extended over four legislative terms in Hungary, with each election in this period – in 1994, 1998 and 2002 – bringing a change of government. Yet The Hungarian party system and the the accession process did not suffer major setbacks, main parties’ attitudes to the EU indicating robust political support for the country’s integration into the EU among the parties with From the domestic perspective, the first post- governing (or coalition) potential, even if there was communist Hungarian government’s quest for closer not necessarily agreement on the acceptable conditions ties with the EC/EU was not particularly visible or for achieving it, as will be shown below. Following the salient against the background of the party political formal application for membership by the first post- upheavals of the early 1990s. At that stage, pro- communist government, between mid-1994, when it European policies also required a lower level of entered office, and the 1998 election, the Socialist-Free engagement from the government in Budapest
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