SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg., 4/2006 Edith Oltay* Hungarian Opposition Party Locked in Power Struggle with the Government Hungary's largest opposition party the Alliance of Young Democrats-Civic Alli- ance Fidesz (Fidesz-MPP) was the landside winner of the October municipal elec- tions and is a key player in the political crisis that has engulfed the country since the middle of September. Following the April 2006 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Fidesz was forced into opposition for a second time in a row under the leadership of Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) obtained a stable majority in parlia- ment and formed a coalition government. This marked the first time since the change of regime that a government was reelected in Hungary.1 Shortly after the elections, however, the government experienced a great loss of public support when it announced the introduction of tax rises and spending cuts. Drastic re- forms of healthcare, state administration, higher education and energy prices are planned. The public was taken by surprise since during election campaign the coalition parties spoke of a "booming economy" and even promised tax cuts. In reality, Hungary's budget deficit swelled to 10% of the GDP and is by far the highest in the EU relative the size of the economy.2 It was only oil on the fire when on 17 September a tape recorded in May was leaked to the media on which Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány told a closed ses- sion of the MSZP parliamentary group that in the past one and a half years his government had "lied (to the population) morning, noon and night" about the state of the economy in order to be reelected. He called for an end to the lies and for the support of the MSZP deputies in implementing austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit.3 The speech spread like wild fire and soon thousands gathered * Edith Oltay, M.A., political scientist and freelance journalist, Berlin. 1 Dieringer, Jürgen: Die ungarischen Parlamentswahlen vom 9./23. April 2006. In: Südosteuropa, 54 (2006) 2, pp. 147–163. 2 Hungary's Euro readiness is not in sight; <http://www.portfolio.hu>, 09.11.2006; Havlik, Péter: Die Enttäuschung ist groß. Die Unruhen in Ungarn ahben wirt- schaftliche Gründe, die aber nicht auf die übrigen EU-Staaten in Osteuropa zu- treffen. In: Handelsblatt, 25.09.2006. 3 Gyurcsány Ferenc beszéde az MSZP-frakció május 26-i ülésén [Ferenc Gyur- csány’s speech at the May 26th session of the MSZP faction]. In: MTI, 18.09.2006; available at <http://blog.amoba.hu/blog-3.php?oid=Tf145f91364e455c31125bf838ae21b6>; cf. Olt, Reinhard: Der Preis der Lüge. Der Ministerpräsident Ungarns hat die ganze Wahrheit gesagt – und sein Land in eine schwere Krise gestürzt. In: FAZ, 20.09.2006; Truth in Hungary. In: International Herald Tribune, 29.09.2006. Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 475 in front of the parliament demanding Gyurcsány's resignation. Demonstrations on a smaller scale took place in the countryside. President László Sólyom de- claredthat there was a "moral crisis" in the country and asked the coalition parties to resolve the crisis and to restore the trust in the government by using their par- liamentary majority to elect a prime minister.4 Gyurcsány categorically refused to resign and defended himself by asserting that Hungarian politicians have been ly- ing for the past 16 years. He presented himself as the only Hungarian politician brave enough to admit his lies and as the only one who is willing to take the harsh measures necessary to carry out much needed reforms. Fidesz took the lead in demanding Gyurcsány's resignation and declared that the municipal elections amounted to a referendum on his government. Voters vented their anger at the government in the municipal elections when they handed the MSZP and the SZDSZ their greatest defeat since the change of regime. Shortly after the elections, Gyurcsány won a vote of confidence in parliament. This did not resolve the crisis, however, and Hungary's two large political camps are now more embittered and divided than ever. For the first time since the peace- ful change of regime 16 years ago violence emerged on the Hungarian political scene. Cultural Politics – Increasing Political Polarization The already existing divide between Hungary's left/liberal-wing and right-wing political camps deepened in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's admission of lying. The two sides regard each other not as political opponents but as enemies whose coming to power would doom the country. According to political analyst and member of the European parliament for Fidesz George Schöpflin "It is no ex- aggeration, though outsiders find this hard to credit, that Hungary is in a state of cold civil war."5 Most common is the demonization of those belonging to the other political persuasion by emphasizing their communist past, depicting them as a danger to the democratic system, or leveling accusations of nationalism and anti-Semitism at them. A substantial number of voters rejected Orbán's person and elected the social- ist-liberal coalition primarily in order to prevent him from coming to power. As the political scientist and Orbán biographer József Debreczeni formulated it be- fore the parliamentary elections: 6 4 Sólyom László köztársasági elnök nyilatkozata 2006. szeptember 18. [The state- ment of László Sólyom President of the Republic 18 September 2006]; <http://www.keh.hu/keh/beszedek/20060918nyilatkozat.html>, <http://mti.hu/dokumentumok/cikk/160570/>. 5 Schöpflin, George: Hungary's cold civil war; <http://www.opendemocracy.net/ democracy-protest/hungary_civil_4093.jsp>, 14.11.2006. 6 Nagy, József: Debreczeni József kegyencrendszerről és a törzsi kérdésekről [Jó- zsef Debreczeni about the system of minions and tribal questions]. In: 168 óra, No. 26 (20.06.2005); <http://www.168ora.hu/cikk.php?id=3698>. 476 Edith Oltay "[Orbán] knows that the left-liberal side can only prevent Fidesz's victory if it can again awaken the feeling that Orbán poses a threat as /someone/ who seeks an intimidating concentration of power and dissolves the parliamentary institutions – in my opinion this is indeed a very severe and realistic danger." In this context, one can refer to the 2006 parliamentary elections as a protest vote.7 Similarly Gyurcsány became the main source of evil in the conservative camp.8 Orbán called Gyurcsány a "pathological liar" and reiterated that he had to resign because he was the source of the country's "moral, political and financial crisis."9 Opinion surveys confirm that supporters of the two political camps over- whelmingly reject the leader of the other camp. A November poll by Szonda Ip- sos found that in the period between September and November Gyurcsány's ap- proval rating among Fidesz supporters ranged between 9 and 11 points. Orbán's popularity among MSZP followers fell from 21 points in September to 11 points in November. Both politicians are popular in their own camps; Orbán has 82 points and Gyurcsány 78 points.10 The cultural conflicts run along the themes of anti-communism and the repre- sentation of national interests and values on the one hand, and that of globaliza- tion and cosmopolitan values, on the other. The left wing sees itself as the sole guarantor of the Westernization of Hungary and of implementing the reforms needed for the introduction of modern capitalism. In a publication of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Michael Ehrke found that the MSZP acts as an agent of the exter- nal demands of the EU and of international investors with little regard for the needs of Hungarian society. In his view, the MSZP is convinced that there is no alternative to its policy of reforms and presents hardly any facts and statistics to the public to justify the introduction of economic austerity measures.11 The right wing perceives itself as the sole representative of the national inter- ests and the guardian of national traditions. Referring to Fidesz's victory at the municipal elections Orbán repeated12 what he had said in the aftermath of his 7 Kis, János: Pengeélen [At the blade's edge] In: Élet és Irodalom, 50 (06.10.2006) 40; <http://www.es.hu/pd/display.asp?channel=PUBLICISZTIKA0640&article=200 6-1008-2107-00KGSR>. 8 Orbán megerősítette: a Fidesz élén marad [Orbán reiterated: he will continue to lead Fidesz]; <http://hvg.hu/velemeny.interju/20060929fridi.aspx>, 29.09.2006. 9 Orbán: A kormány szándékosan ki akar rekeszteni a felemelkedésből [Orbán: The government prevents people from improving their lives]; <http://www.mno.hu/index.mno?cikk=385056&rvt=2>, 27.11.06 10 Megmaradt, de kisebb lett Orbán előnye Gyurcsánnyal szemben [Orbán's lead over Gyurcsány stays but decreases]; <http://www.mtv.hu/cikk.php?id=167521>, 04.12. 2006. 11 Ehrke, Michael: Ungarische Unruhen – ein Symptom der zentraleuropäischen Beitrittskrise? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Internationale Politikanalyse, Politik Info, Oktober 2006; <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/03950.pdf>. 12 Csuhaj, Ildikó: Fidesz-kongresszus a szocialisták ellen [Fidesz congress against the socialists]. In: Népszabadság, 27.11.2006; Orbán megismételte a nemzet nem Fidesz-MPP Locked in Power Struggle with the Government 477 party's defeat at the 2002 national elections "the nation cannot be in opposition." The left-liberal camp interpreted the statement as populist attempt to exclude its followers from the Hungarian nation. Dissatisfaction with how the change of re- gime was negotiated 16 years ago is also a recurring theme. At the Fidesz rally at Astoria on October 23, Orbán addressed those who are not satisfied with how the change of regime was carried out and or are losers of the economic transforma- tion.