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The Hungarian Tragedy

JAN-WERNER MÜLLER that twenty years later might be the first postcommunist country west of Minsk— and the first member state of the European A nationalist has Union—to slide back into . In triumphed in ; its leaders are busy April 2010, the conservative-nationalist dismantling constitutionalism and the rule of Party won more than two-thirds of parlia - law. How could this have happened? And can mentary seats, replacing a socialist the Western Left do anything about it? government that had been in power for eight There was a time when Hungary seemed years. Under the leadership of the highly the best hope for a liberal postcommunism. charismatic Viktor Orbán, the party has begun The country had produced some of the leading systematically to remove checks and balances, dissidents of the region in the 1970s and to undermine the rule of law and effectively 1980s (such as ex-Marxist philosopher János curtail the media. A new constitution this year Kis); had developed rapidly even is to top off a process that the Economist has before the official end of state socialism in called “Putinization.” 1989. After the revolt of 1956 (which the How could this have happened, after two Soviet Union brutally suppressed), the decades of what seemed like fairly stable Hungarian government had slowly liberalized, democratic rule? The immediate answer is that introducing “goulash communism” and the Socialists not only led the country to the inverting the old totalitarian maxim to read: brink of financial disaster in 2009, but that the “who is not against us, is with us.” To be sure, party was also morally discredited in a way state socialism was discredited—but not ideals that has few parallels in . The prime of social . minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, admitted in a The transition from state socialism was not secret speech to a party meeting in 2006 that only gradual—it was to a significant degree he had been lying to the electorate about the initiated by the old regime. Even the old dire financial situation of the country, that no Stalinist constitution remained nominally European country had “done anything as intact, amended beyond recognition through boneheaded” as Hungary, and that it was time carefully crafted compromises. Fundamental to tell citizens that their belts needed to be changes were made, but it was, in the words tightened—even if at the risk of losing the of the political scientist Andrew Arato, very next election. Like all secret speeches, much a revolution against The Revolution— Gyurcsány’s remarks—littered with obscen - that is to say, against the idea of revolution as ities, to boot—became public. They provoked a violent rupture with the past. For some time, huge and violent demonstrations against the it even seemed as if the mild-mannered Kis government, even if in retrospect they look might be the first postcommunist prime like an admirable attempt at honesty (at least minister. He was beaten by a Christian within his own party). Rather than resigning, Democrat, but, typically, one who had been the prime minister held on, implementing an trained as a historian and who in a different austerity program, only effectively to hand world probably would have been a university over power to a “government of experts” (in professor. As in other Central and East fact, technocrats who were Socialists or all European countries, it was the hour of the closely associated with the Socialists) in early intellectuals. 2009, after the country had to be bailed out by Hardly anyone could have imagined, then, other members. The experts

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then pursued an even harsher economic Politics Can Be Different policy. All this explains why the Left imploded in More problematic still was what is widely last year’s elections. But it does not explain perceived as years of Socialist corruption and Putinization. For this we need to ask what clientelism. In the very same years, Socialist Fidesz is and what makes it different from politicians were seen as mainly advancing the other conservative nationalist forces in Central interests of major multinational corporations— and Eastern Europe. And we need to ask who and working hand in hand with neoliberal Viktor Orbán is. Brussels bureaucrats. Entry to the European It’s here that the Hungarian story has a Union in 2004 under Socialist auspices was truly tragic twist. For Orbán was once a fiery widely perceived as having destroyed many young liberal (though more in the European local businesses. Gyurcsány himself is a sense, shading into ). He had co- millionaire who made his fortune in business founded the Fidesz movement in the late before entering politics (or by mixing 1980s—with Fidesz standing for “Alliance of business and politics all along, as critics Young .” When the founders said charge). “young,” they meant it: nobody over thirty- This disastrous combination—a left-wing five was to be a party member. Orbán had party doing ’s bidding, while appar - studied in the dissidents’ “invisible college”; ently helping party leaders enrich them - he first made a name for himself nationally selves—was not exclusive to the Socialists. when he appeared at the public reburial of The Free Democrats—once the party of the —the Socialist prime minister in dissidents, which had nominated Kis for power in October–November 1956, later prime minister—governed with the Socialists executed—long-haired and looking rather until 2008 and were tarred with the same Byronesque, called for the withdrawal of the brush: capitalism and corruption. As one of its Russians. One can debate how daring such a leaders later admitted, “We had to pay the call was in the summer of 1989. But it price of capitalism to put an end to the dicta - certainly was a bravura performance. torship. At first we were saying that it was a Yet, this budding politician got nowhere price that had to be paid, and then it was, alas, with a liberal agenda. So Orbán changed love for it.” course and reinvented Fidesz as a nationalist, Intellectuals like the writer István Eörsi, morally conservative, and religious party. He who thought that their ideals had found a resented being treated as a student movement reliable advocate in what—to be sure—was leader by the established liberals in the Free always a minority party, turned their backs in Democratic Alliance. And he also seems to disgust. Others never forgave the Free have concluded that in Hungary only control Democrats for forming a coalition with the of all the levers of state power can yield Socialists, the successor party to the lasting political success. Many of his former Communists who had persecuted the dissi - allies left and joined the Free Democrats, dents. The Free Democrats dissolved before while Fidesz withdrew from the Liberal the 2010 election; a new party—called International. Orbán appeared to be vindi - “Politics can be different,” mixing a green and cated in 1998 when Fidesz replaced a Socialist a liberal agenda—appealed to those who had government (which had done more for marke - once voted for them. But it was also suspected tization and privatization than the nominally of being amateurish and too idealistic. To be right-wing parties). It came as a shock to the sure, politics could be different, but in a way Fidesz leader when his party was defeated in directly opposed to —both in the 2002 and the Socialists took over once again. classical European and the contemporary Orbán explained that “the nation” could not American sense. be in opposition and formed “civic committees” that were to mobilize civil society against the state. In a twisted way, he seemed to be using a dissident strategy in what had become a fairly stable liberal .

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Equating Fidesz with the nation as such the extreme Right—after all, it’s in the party’s foreshadowed what Orbán has been doing own electoral interest. But in many ways the since his election victory last year: a “national seemingly respectable that Fidesz revolution” in the name of “national values,” represents keeps legitimating the beliefs of namely “work, home, family, health, and supporters. One of the first things order.” The election, according to the Fidesz Orbán did in power was to establish a Trianon leader, had signaled the formation of a memorial day; he also created a new kind of “national center” and given a mandate for a citizenship for ethnic Hungarians living in “system of national cooperation.” neighboring states, thereby stoking conflict All the nation-talk reveals a profoundly with Slovakia in particular. In fact, he started problematic characteristic of Hungarian nothing less than a comprehensive political culture: a deep-seated nationalism Kulturkampf , arguing that Fidesz had a and a feeling of resentment and victimization mandate to reshape the political system that goes back at least to the post–First World according to the true values of the “national War and the huge losses of center” (and, to use a distinction prominent on territory imposed by the Allies in 1920. the Hungarian Right, the “well-rooted” Arguably, there has never been anything like Hungarians, as opposed to the “foreign- a public “coming-to-terms with the past” that hearted”). All public buildings were supposed would allow Hungarians to accept their much- to display a declaration of the “national diminished political role in Europe. Instead, values”; and these values—and an explicit nationalism reaches deep into the supposedly endorsement of Hungary as a Christian bourgeois moderate center. In fact, it partly nation—are to be at the heart of the new defines that center; when I lived in Hungary constitution. toward the end of the last decade, I was struck This kind of rhetoric is, of course, a staple by the many bumper stickers that depicted the of populism: declare yourself the spokesper - shape of Hungary in the borders of 1918. son of the people’s true voice or the faithful People would explain that this was not a call executor of the national will and claim that to annex Croatia and parts of Romania, but thereby you are the real democrat, as opposed merely a sign of pride in what a great country to unelected bodies like courts and snooty Hungary had once been. In a spa in , urban elites of liberal journalists. Fidesz has close to the Austrian border, a very wealthy- been governing accordingly: it has tried to looking family man would take everything weaken all independent bodies charged with off—except a silver chain around his neck oversight of the government, curtailing the with a medallion in the shape of Greater powers of the constitutional court (which had Hungary. He explained to this ignorant been closely modeled on the West German ex - foreigner that he was the star in a widely ample). It also installed a man widely seen as popular nationalist rock opera about the great a puppet figure, a onetime Olympic fencing Hungarian past. champion, as president, replacing a former But this rather abstract and nostalgia- constitutional court judge who had once been driven nationalism also has an ugly face: that supported by Fidesz but fallen out of favor, of Jobbik, an extreme right-wing, anti-Roma not least because he refused to display the and anti-Semitic party that placed third in the declaration of the national revolution in the 2010 elections, just after the Socialists. Jobbik presidential palace. Most notably, the govern - has a paramilitary unit, the Hungarian Guard, ment passed a draconian media law, which which has been officially banned but keeps the Organization for Security and Co-opera - reappearing in new guises. I often saw young tion in Europe has criticized as comparable to people dressed in the Guard’s tell-tale black what we know from totalitarian regimes. shirts (yes, black shirts) and with knives on Is there a model for all this? Orbán has their belts that supposedly are ancient never mentioned Putin. But he openly admires Hungarian symbols—nationalism as a life- . And maybe if Berlusconi style. had a two-thirds majority in the Italian legis - Fidesz is officially committed to destroying lature, some of his policies would be similar.

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Or would they? There is another twist in the shading into racism, on the other. Berlusconi story here: Orbán keeps portraying the wants Italian citizens to be passive consumers, Socialists as the party of multinational corpo - spectators of politics (or even better, of his rations and Fidesz as the defender of ordinary television shows). Pseudo-liberal populists folk from the forces of globalization. Even the like the Dutch politician want most casual visitor to Budapest will under - to stoke fear and resentment vis-à-vis stand why this plays well: in terms of brand Muslims in the name of freedom, ostensibly names, the city feels like an economic colony identifying with Israel and making a point of Germany and Austria—most of the major that they are not nationalists. shops, from drugstores to supermarkets, are Orbán is different: he wants citizens to hold the same as in Berlin or Vienna. And Orbán’s the right national values, but also to be is not just rhetoric: he engaged in politics; he wants them to conform has put a levy on banks and is trying to to an ideal of what the Germans call reverse the privatization of pension schemes Bürgerlichkeit —that is, an ideal of hard work, (again, initially introduced by the Socialists). , and civic engagement. Fidesz The government officially has declared that appeals to a middle class that feels threatened the state should come before the market, and by the economic situation, a middle class that Orbán has talked about an as yet undefined ideally wants to be like German Bürger , or form of “plebeian democracy.” proper polgári , in the Hungarian phrase, which means different from the Roma and others A Different Kind of Populism who supposedly live off welfare, but also proudly standing up to foreign capital. When Fidesz, then, is pursuing its own nationalist Hungary assumed the (automatically rotating) “primacy of politics.” But what is emerging in EU presidency this January, its program was Hungary is not , as some in the precisely focused on values that Western Western media have been too quick to Europe has supposedly forgotten, especially conclude (a German paper—a conservative the moral worth of the nation. one, no less—called present-day Hungary a And how has the EU responded to this Führerstaat ). It’s the work of an immensely authoritarian-nationalist-bourgeois vision that skilled, immensely power hungry politician is supposed to protect the Hungarian nation who does not want to lose power again and is from foreign capitalists (and the “foreign- effectively building a one-party state. hearted” within Hungary’s own borders)? Tragically and paradoxically, Fidesz at the After all, the Union was supposed to “lock” moment is polarizing—but without any post-authoritarian countries—first Greece, opposite pole; the opposition remains Spain, and Portugal in the 1980s, later the dysfunctional and disunited, suffering another postcommunist states—into democratic disastrous defeat in the local elections this commitments and protect rights with suprana - past fall. Left-wing intellectuals, meanwhile, tional institutions like the European Court of are protesting, to be sure, but seem to be in Justice. shock that all this could be happening (and Alas, European governments have been that so many of their fellow citizens can be so too preoccupied with the fate of the euro and easily swayed by a strong leader promising to their own economic woes to pay much atten - restore the nation’s grandeur). tion to small neighbors about which many Of course, the political analysis of Hungary Europeans know next to nothing. When the is not exhausted by Orbánology. It is crucial to Western European press finally started mak - understand the nature of Fidesz’s populism, ing noises in connection with the new media and why it appeals to so many. Its ideology law, some left-wing politicians—including (and political strategy) is fundamentally the foreign minister of Luxembourg and the different from two other versions of populism leader of the Socialists in the European Par - that have gained strength in Europe recently: liament—asked loudly whether Hungary was the Berlusconi variety, on the one hand, and suited to preside over the EU. Brussels itself what I would call pseudo-liberal populism began to scrutinize the media law, and it now

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seems sure that Hungary will amend it in re - should become a credible threat, too. sponse to criticisms from the EU. Still, it has But it also means finding the right tone become painfully obvious that the Union has and, more important still, the right theoretical many instruments and incentives to get coun - language to make the case to Hungarians. As tries outside its borders to adopt liberal the leftist philosopher G. M. Tamás, once a democracy but precious few for changing the leading dissident alongside Kis, has pointed behavior of governments on the inside. In the out, it will do no good if Westerners simply wake of the failed EU Constitution, the focus lecture his compatriots with liberal democratic has all been on respecting national differ - pieties and pull out the handbook on “transi - ences, emphasizing Europe’s internal politi - tology" once more. cal diversity, and avoiding tough common In the eyes of many Hungarians, what European political standards. Tellingly, the unfolded in the twenty years since state latest European treaty—the quasi-constitu - socialism was —and it has tion—has a provision for a member state to failed. In other words, the perception is that leave voluntarily, but no mechanisms for Putinization, a combination of somewhat ejecting a country that has ceased to be dem - authoritarian politics and state-supervised ocratic. True, there is the possibility of with - economics, is the only model that will ulti - drawing voting rights from states that have mately work for ordinary people. In fact, some violated the EU’s “fundamental values,” but leading Hungarian intellectuals seem now to no leading politician has even mentioned have all but accepted the notion that the that possibility yet. country was never really democratic and might never get rid of the legacies of What Can Be Done? feudalism, self-pitying nationalism, and pater - nalistic state socialism. Some time ago, Tamás What, then, can outsiders do? For one thing, regretted that the seeming triumph of the concerned European citizens should make it dissidents’ human-rights-centered liberalism clear that they regard the supposed “internal in the early 1990s went hand in hand with affairs” of another member state as their inattention to the plight of the victims of post - business, too. They should remember that communism and thus sowed the seeds of its theirs is not primarily an economic but a own destruction. As he put it in 2009: “We, political union. It would leave a disastrous the froth at the top of it, were celebrating the impression if the EU finally took some action, triumph of freedom and openness and but only under pressure from the banks that plurality and fantasy and pleasure and all that. have been complaining to Brussels about That was frivolous, and I am deeply Orbán’s “crisis taxes.” ashamed.” That sense of the discrediting of the In practice, this means politicians and intel - highest liberal ideals—that it’s all just capi - lectuals must keep up the pressure via the talism, in its worst, corruption-ridden form to international press and citizen demonstrations boot—is the final element of the Hungarian (as happened when protests against the media tragedy. law outside the Budapest Parliament were To be sure, it is far too early for resignation, paralleled by smaller gatherings in Vienna and understandable as that might be in the face of Berlin). They can also support the initiatives of widespread cronyism on both sides of the prominent Hungarians, such as the petition and the seeming passivity addressed to artists and intellectuals by the of citizens witnessing Fidesz’s dismantling of conductor Ádám Fischer and the pianist the rule of law. But a form of social liberalism András Schiff, who also wrote an impassioned (a term that primarily makes sense in the letter to . Above all, it means European context, where “liberalism” and Western governments confronting Orbán social democracy have long been divorced) directly on his record and, if he keeps defying might yet be invented specifically for post- his critics, boycotting the prestigious events communist contexts. It would be a liberalism that the country holding the EU presidency of fear, perhaps, that takes seriously the usually puts on. Withdrawing voting rights anxiety of people who feel they have been

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robbed of their past, their international status, Western intellectuals should not ignore a and, not least, their livelihoods; a liberalism faraway country where liberal democracy that explains the long-term benefits of the rule might yet recover. of law beyond the economic advantages of getting into the EU. But in a sense the chal - Jan-Werner Müller teaches in the politics department, lenge of formulating an attractive, popular, but Princeton University. His book Contesting Democracy: not populist, liberalism is not that different in Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe is forthcoming the East and West. This is another reason why from Yale University Press in summer 2011.

Learning from the French Left: Lessons of the Pension Reform Battle

JEAN-CHRISTIAN VINEL abolish mandatory retirement, many in France see retirement in a positive way. To some, it is the complement of the eight-hour day: it offers “Check your Rolex. It’s time for a rebellion.” workers a kind of emancipation from wage In the fall of 2010, protesters against the work. For others, it produces solidarity reform of the French pension system lacked between the generations. At a time when the neither catchy slogans nor energy. For more Left is mostly a defensive movement, the right than a month, unionists and a variety of left to retire at sixty is an important symbol of its activists organized strikes and demonstrations past ability to craft social norms and to impose that brought up to three million protesters them upon the capitalist order. Mocking onto the streets and disrupted public trans - Nicolas Sarkozy’s campaign slogan in favor of portation and schools. Strikes and blockades the work ethic—“work more to earn more”— in oil refineries created a serious gas shortage. protesters brandished signs proclaiming they Opinion polls showed that a majority of the should “work more to die before they retire.” population supported the movement. At the In response, Sarkozy and his allies on the demonstrations, the phrase “ Rêve générale ”—a Right made a simple case: as people live pun on the French words for “dream” and longer, the pension system will come under “strike”—was ubiquitous on signs and increasing financial strain unless both the stickers. The protests were also a merry affair, retirement age and the number of years one with the usual dose of balloons, food, and needs to be a net contributor to the system music that symbolize people’s determination. evolve. Common sense, not politics, they One did not need to march all the way to argued, drove the change. the Place de la République in Paris to sense But protesters rejected this logic. They the collective optimism that ran through the argued that the reform would only be a protests. Fueling the movement was the idea temporary fix; it would protect the system that the government’s proposal to roll back the only through 2018, and a new review will be retirement age from sixty to sixty-two, held in 2013—after the next presidential allegedly to save it from financial collapse, election—to propose yet another plan. was fundamentally unfair. In France, the right Moreover, they maintained, the reform is to retire at sixty is a fairly recent victory—it grossly unfair to women, who often stop was enacted in 1981 by François Mitterrand’s working to raise children and are at a disad - left-wing government—but it quickly became vantage when it comes to validating forty- established as a social right. Although in the one-and-a-half years of net contributions. It United States there were legal battles to was equally unfair to workers who enter the

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