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Slovenia External Relations Briefing: Slovenian-Hungarian Relations on Different Political Levels Helena Motoh

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Slovenia External Relations Briefing: Slovenian-Hungarian Relations on Different Political Levels Helena Motoh ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 16, No. 4 (SI) March 2019 Slovenia external relations briefing: Slovenian-Hungarian relations on different political levels Helena Motoh 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Slovenian-Hungarian relations on different political levels Summary Several recent events have brought the relationship between Slovenia and Hungary to the attention of media and the public. While the economic exchange between the two neighbouring countries is low in comparison with other Slovenian neighbours, this aspect seems to be improving through joint attempts such as the recent Slovenian-Hungarian B2B economic forum. Political relations, on the other hand, are complicated due to several reasons, one being an issue of a recent cover of a Slovenian journal featuring a caricature of Hungarian Prime Minister. In addition, Slovenian political sphere was greatly divided upon the vote in European People’s Party on the expulsion/suspension of Viktor Orban’s party Fidesz from this political group. Background: Neighbouring countries relations and economic relations Neighbouring countries have established diplomatic relations in 1992 and have had strong political contacts ever since. One of the factors which make good contacts even more necessary are the two ethnic minorities in the border regions of the two countries, mostly a consequence of shifting political borders in the 20th century. According to the last census in Slovenia, which registered ethnic identity, in 2002, 6243 people declared themselves as Hungarians and 7713 said their mother tongue was Hungarian. In the ethnically mixed areas, Hungarian is an additional official language and schools are bilingual. Hungarian minority has its own organisation (Muravidéki magyar önkormányzati nemzeti közösség) and a number of cultural associations. On the Hungarian side, several Slovenian villages centre around Monošter (Szentgotthárd), while Slovenian minority also lives in the wider region and has 2820 people according to the 2011 census. They are organized in two associations (Zveza Slovencev na Madžarskem and Državna slovenska samouprava). Apart from the issues related to the minority regions and their challenges, the exchange between the two countries in economic terms is comparably small. According to 2018 figures, imports from Hungary to Slovenia amount to 1.1 billion Euros, making up 3.6% of Slovenian imports from all countries, considerably smaller than the imports from other neighbouring 1 countries (15% from Italy, 10% from Austria and 6% from Croatia). In 2018, the main groups of products imported from Hungary were electric machines and equipment (19%), pharmaceutical products (9%), mineral oils, fuels and related products (9%), vehicles (9%), nuclear reactors and related products (7%) and plastic and gum materials (5%). On the export side, Hungary imports 0.9 billion Euros worth, i. e. 3% of Slovenian exports, which is again less compared to other neighbours (12% imported by Italy, 8% by Austria, 8% by Croatia). In 2018 the main groups of products exported to Hungary, were vehicles (12%), pharmaceutical products (12%), electric machines and equipment (11%), mineral oils, fuels and related products (10%), nuclear reactors and related products (9%), and plastic and gum materials (5%). Relations on the level of political parties While the economic and state connections between the two countries are not exceptional in any way, there are strong political links on the level of political parties. The closest relation in this regard is between the political party Fidesz of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Slovenian right wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS). In 2017 several Hungarian companies, which are close to Fidesz, became partial owners of two SDS-related media: the journal Demokracija and the Nova24TV Television channel. Together with Prime Minister Orbán's engagement in SDS election campaign, this move was criticized by media as violating the principle, according to which political parties in Slovenia are not allowed to be supported from abroad. In EU context, the Fidesz allegiances in EU countries, especially among similar right-wing parties in Central and Eastern European countries, became an issue again in March this year. Hungary was put under special scrutiny for human rights violations already in May 2017 by a resolution by European Parliament. The resolution called for invoking the Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, according to which serious violation of human rights in a certain EU member can be sanctioned by loss of voting rights. According to Article 7 procedure, a formal warning was issued in September 2018, but no sanctions followed due to disagreements between EU member states on this issue. A turbulent period followed within European People’s Party group, which both Fidesz and Slovenian Democratic Party belong to, especially after the harsh campaign by the leading Hungarian political party against European Commission and EU policies. Two potential measures were proposed. First was to suspend the Fidesz membership in EPP until a comprehensive evaluation is made on how Hungary corrected the violations, the committee consisting of the by former head of European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, former president of European Parliament, Hans-Gert Poettering, and former Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuesse. The other option was to exclude it from EPP completely. Among three Slovenian political parties that are members of European People’s 2 Party, the positions differed. Before the vote, New Slovenia Party (NSi) supported the suspension, while the other two political parties, Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) opposed any punitive measures against Fidesz. Before the vote, the majority gravitated towards the suspension option, and that was finally supported even by the two Fidesz strongest supporters in Slovenia, the SDS and SLS. Protest against the Mladina journal caricature On March 22, a left-wing Slovenian journal Mladina featured a satirical cover by its main caricaturist portraying Viktor Orbán together with three main protagonists of Slovenian Democratic Party, its president Janez Janša and Branko Grims and Milan Zver. Especially the part of the caricature which shows Orbán saluting with an extended arm made the caricature quickly spread on internet, both among the supporters and the critics of his policies. In a response to this, the Hungarian embassy in Slovenia addressed a verbal note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia on March 25th, claiming that the published cover of Mladina violates the principles of freedom of press and freedom of expression and that it is politically irresponsible. It expressed its protest and asked Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their help in preventing similar incidents in the future. Hungarian Ambassador to Slovenia also addressed a protest note to the editorial board of Mladina. The response on the Slovenian side was very critical. Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that they strictly obey the principle of freedom of press and freedom of expression and do not interfere with or evaluate the editorial policies of Slovenian media. An even more critical response followed from the Association of Journalists of Slovenia, warning against any form of political pressure on media as a dangerous precedent and a return to the political control of media, which both countries still have a memory of in the recent past. Following these events, members of the parliament also called a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Policy. Slovenian-Hungarian business forum Almost simultaneously with these tense political situation, economic relations between the two countries were being promoted on the Slovenian-Hungarian Business Forum and B2B meetings in Terme Vivat in Moravske Toplice in Slovenia on March 27th. Event was organized on the Slovenian side by the regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pomurje together with the Ministry for Economic Development and Technology, with the partnering Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Zala County in Hungary. The event was welcomed by two general 3 consuls in the bordering region, Slovenian consul in Monošter, Boris Jesih, and the Hungarian consul in Lendava, Foldes Gyula. The most important part of the meeting was the facilitation of B2B meetings between Slovenian and Hungarian companies especially in the bordering region. Forty-nine companies with over seventy representatives took part in the meetings. The main issue addressed by the forum was the deprivileged status of the bordering regions on both sides of the Slovenian-Hungarian border. Compared to their respective countries as a whole, these regions are severely underdeveloped and have higher poverty rates than the national averages. In addition, such an unfavourable economic situation forces a considerable part of the working age population to go and seek employment in the neighbouring Austria. This is mostly the case with higher qualified employees, which additionally hinders the development of sustainable economy in this area. One of the main issues that the participants identified was the lacking infrastructure across the border and between these border regions and centres of their countries. They especially stressed the importance of the railway project Zalaegerszeg-Redics-Lendava-Beltinci.
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