State of Populism in Europe 2020

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State of Populism in Europe 2020 2020 STATE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE – 2020 STATE Tamás BOROS STATE OF Maria FREITAS POPULISM Gábor GYŐRI IN EUROPE Gergely LAKI 2020 STATE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE 2020 Published by: Table of Contents FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies Rue Montoyer 40, 4th floor – 1000 Brussels, Belgium T: +32 2 234 69 00 Foreword .........................................................................................................................................6 Email: [email protected] Austria ............................................................................................................................................10 Website: www.feps-europe.eu Belgium ..........................................................................................................................................14 Bulgaria ..........................................................................................................................................18 Croatia ............................................................................................................................................22 Policy Solutions Cyprus .............................................................................................................................................26 Révay utca 10 – 1065 Budapest, Hungary Czechia ...........................................................................................................................................30 T: +36 1 4 748 748 Email: [email protected] Denmark .......................................................................................................................................36 Website: www.policysolutions.eu Estonia ...........................................................................................................................................40 Finland ............................................................................................................................................44 France .............................................................................................................................................48 Copyright: FEPS and Policy Solutions, March 2020 ISBN: 978-2-930769-39-4 9782930769394 Germany .......................................................................................................................................52 Greece .............................................................................................................................................58 Hungary .........................................................................................................................................64 Responsible editors: Ireland .............................................................................................................................................70 Tamas BOROS, Co-Director of Policy Solutions Maria FREITAS, FEPS Senior Policy Advisor Italy ...................................................................................................................................................74 Ania SKRZYPEK, FEPS Director of Research and Training Latvia ...............................................................................................................................................80 Lithuania ........................................................................................................................................84 Luxembourg ................................................................................................................................88 Authors: Tamás BOROS, Gergely LAKI, Gábor GYŐRI Malta ...............................................................................................................................................92 The Netherlands.......................................................................................................................96 Page layout and printing: Ferling Ltd. – Hungary Poland ..........................................................................................................................................102 Portugal ......................................................................................................................................106 Romania .....................................................................................................................................110 This study does not represent the collective views of FEPS and Policy Solutions. The responsibility of FEPS and Policy Solutions is limited to approving its publication as worthy of consideration of the European progressive Slovakia .......................................................................................................................................114 movement. Slovenia ......................................................................................................................................118 Spain .............................................................................................................................................122 Sweden .......................................................................................................................................126 Conclusion: The State of Populism in the European Union .........................130 Index: List of Populist Parties in the European Union .....................................136 With the financial support of the European Parliament. This report does not represent the European Parliament’s views but only of the respective authors. Foreword net; and the increasing convergence in the policies Just as in the case with the previous volumes in this advocated by the centre-left and the centre-right. series, our goal is not merely to present figures and At the same time, voters realised that the era of political events but also to highlight the emerging Foreword grand economic visions has come to an end, and trends and to help prepare our readers for the globalisation, market economy and multinational changes on the horizon. Over the past five years, corporations are apparently gobbling up everything. we have highlighted numerous such developments. As a result, the political fault lines are increasingly Allow us to emphasise five important trends and less likely to be organised around economic insights from these five years: policies, and they are more likely to centre on social or cultural concerns. In other words, people and Back in 2015, we saw both left-wing populist parties Populism in Europe 2020 public discourse do not tend to be mainly divided – that is parties which are opposed to multinational along the lines of their respective ideas about the corporations and are critical of globalisation and future of the economy but based on what they think capitalism – as well as right-wing populists – that about social values, lifestyles, migration, the nation is xenophobic, anti-EU and nationalist parties – – Ending half a decade and supranational entities, such as multinational increase their respective levels of public support. corporations or the European Union. But while the latter were surging only in Western and Central and Eastern Europe, the former were These changes do not imply, of course, that the almost exclusively limited to Southern Europe. dilemmas that previously defined politics are gone These days, this once conspicuous regional fault for good, that old political parties have been rendered line has vanished, and in all but a few countries completely obsolete. In fact, some countries have left-wing populism has declined massively, and not changed at all in this respect over the past so they are anywhere near a position of winning decade. All we claim here is that, to varying degrees elections. Right-wing populists, by contrast, have If we had to name a single concept from the last democracies. in each country, the trends mentioned above have increased their support even in countries where decade that has spilled over from political science manifested themselves and now decisively shape such formations did not even exist a year or two jargon into public discourse, spreading through The alternation in government of centre-left and politics – jointly with the earlier trends. ago, and they have ascended to government either the latter like wildfire, then populism would most centre-right political forces that had dominated on their own or as part of coalition governments in likely be the word to spring to everyone’s mind. In the post-World War II era disappeared and When the Foundation for European Progressive numerous countries of the EU. We can conclude, political science, populism has been a major topic has been replaced by a tripartite or even more Studies (FEPS) launched the Populism Tracker therefore, that all sorts of previous constraints that for decades now, and over time it has occasionally fragmented political scene, with all the concomitant project jointly with the Budapest-based Policy once served to put a ceiling on the popularity of also cropped up in public discourse – often unpredictability and tensions. The traditional Solutions in 2015, they set out to gauge the impact right-wing populists have recently crumbled. This erroneously used to refer to demagogy. But during parties of the centre-right and the centre-left have of these changing trends, to present their insights shift has turned them into potentially major players the past decade, it has emerged as the top issue experienced unprecedented declines in their levels about this phenomenon
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