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Appendix James Lo, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and Thomas Gschwend

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Appendix James Lo, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and Thomas Gschwend Appendix James Lo, Sven-Oliver Proksch, and Thomas Gschwend. 2013. “A Common Left-Right Scale for Voters and Parties in Europe.” Political Analysis. 1. European Parties on a Common Left-Right Scale (page 2) 2. Comparing Rescaled and Unscaled Party Estimates (page 3) 3. Di↵erences of our Scaling Procedure and Groseclose et al. (1999) (page 4) 4. Another Validation: Party System Polarization (page 5) 5. Estimation Details: A Spatial Model of Valence in the UK (page 8) 6. Problems of Extending our Approach to the European Integration Dimension (page 12) 7. Excluded Observations: Government Defection in the 2009 European Parliament Elec- tion (page 13) 1 Figure A-1: EuropeanCommon Parties European on a Common Left−Right Space Left-Right Scale (2009) EUL.NGL Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece) ● Socialist Party (The Netherlands) ● Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Czech Republic) ● Left Party (France) ● French Communist Party (France) ● Left Bloc (Portugal) ● Sinn Fein (Ireland) ● Democratic Union Coalition (Portuguese Communist Party and the Greens) (Portugal) ● Progressive Party of Working People (Cyprus) ● The Left (Germany) ● Communist Party of Greece (Greece) ● Greens.EFA Scottish National Party (United Kingdom) ● Plaid Cymru (United Kingdom) ● Green League (Finland) ● The Greens (France) ● The Greens (Luxembourg) ● Alliance 90 + The Greens (Germany) ● For Human Rights in United Latvia (Latvia) ● Green Party (United Kingdom) ● The Greens (Austria) ● Ecologist Greens (Greece) ● Green Left (The Netherlands) ● SD.PES Social Democrats (Slovenia) ● Democratic Party (Cyprus) ● Democratic Party (Italy) ● Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (Estonia) ● Social Democratic Party of Austria (Austria) ● Social Democratic Party (Germany) ● Socialist Party (Portugal) ● Direction − Social Democracy (Slovakia) ● Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungary) ● Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) ● Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party (Luxembourg) ● Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece) ● Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP) (Bulgaria) ● Harmony Centre (Latvia) ● Movement for Social Democracy (Cyprus) ● Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (Lithuania) ● Labour Party (Ireland) ● Labour Party (The Netherlands) ● Czech Social Democratic Party (Czech Republic) ● Left and Freedom (Italy) ● Socialist Party (France) ● Social Democratic Party (Romania) ● Social Democratic Party of Finland (Finland) ● Labour (United Kingdom) ● ALDE Eesti Reformierakond (Estonia) ● Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (The Netherlands) ● National Liberal Party (Romania) ● Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (Lithuania) ● Liberal and Centre Union (Lithuania) ● Fianna Fail (Ireland) ● Swedish Peoples Party (Finland) ● Centre Party (Finland) ● Latvias First Party/Latvias Way (Latvia) ● Free Forum (Slovakia) ● Free Democratic Party (Germany) ● National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) (Bulgaria) ● European Party (Cyprus) ● Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) (Bulgaria) ● Peoples Party − Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Slovakia) ● Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) ● Young Liberals (Austria) ● New Union Social Liberals (Lithuania) ● Democratic Party (Luxembourg) ● Democrats 66 (The Netherlands) ● Italy of Values (Italy) ● Democratic Movement (France) ● Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Slovenia) ● For Real (Slovenia) ● Labour Party (Lithuania) ● Liberal Democrats (United Kingdom) ● Eesti Keskerakond (Estonia) ● ECR Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic) ● Law and Justice (Poland) ● For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia) ● Conservatives (United Kingdom) ● Christian Union (The Netherlands) ● Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary) ● Election Action of Lithuanias Poles (Lithuania) ● EFD UK Independence Party (UKIP) (United Kingdom) ● North League (Italy) ● Reformed Political Party (The Netherlands) ● Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece) ● Slovak National Party (Slovakia) ● True Finns (Finland) ● Order and Justice Party (Lithuania) ● EPP Homeland Union − Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Lithuania) ● Fidesz−Hungarian Civic Union (Hungary) ● National Coalition Party (Finland) ● Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Romania) ● Union for a Popular Movement (France) ● The People of Freedom (Italy) ● Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (Estonia) ● New Slovenia − Christian Peoples Party (Slovenia) ● Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovakia) ● Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenia) ● Christian Social Peoples Party (Luxembourg) ● Democratic and Social Center − Peoples Party (Portugal) ● Blue Coalition (SDS−DSB) (Bulgaria) ● Austrian Peoples Party (Austria) ● Christian Democratic Movement (Slovakia) ● Civic Platform (Poland) ● New Era Party (Latvia) ● SMK (Slovakia) ● Democratic Rally (Cyprus) ● Peoples Party (Latvia) ● Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) (Bulgaria) ● Civic Union (Latvia) ● Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Germany) ● Social Democratic Party (Portugal) ● New Democracy (Greece) ● Fine Gael (Ireland) ● Christian Democratic Appeal (The Netherlands) ● Polish Peoples Party (Poland) ● Christian Democrats in Finland (Finland) ● Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (Italy) ● Christian and Democratic Union−Czechoslovak Peoples Party (Czech Republic) ● Democratic Liberal Party (Romania) ● No affiliation British National Party (BNP) (United Kingdom) ● Party for Freedom (The Netherlands) ● Freedom Party of Austria (Austria) ● Proud of the Netherlands (The Netherlands) ● Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria) ● National Front (France) ● Movement for a Better Hungary (Hungary) ● The Right (Italy) ● Christian−Democratic National Peasants Party (Romania) ● Christian Democratic Peoples Party (Hungary) ● Union of Greens and Farmers (Latvia) ● Libertas (Poland) ● Slovenian Peoples Party (Slovenia) ● Green Party (Czech Republic) ● Order, Lawfulness, and Justice (RZS) (Bulgaria) ● Society for Other Politics (Latvia) ● NAPRED (Bulgaria) ● National Resurrection Party (Lithuania) ● Slovenian National Party (Slovenia) ● National Union Attack (ATAKA) (Bulgaria) ● Conservative Party (Romania) ● Greater Romania Party (Romania) ● Youth Party (Slovenia) ● Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (Slovenia) ● Hans−Peter Martins List (Austria) ● Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Estonia) ● Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (Lithuania) ● Coalition Agreement for the Future − CenterLeft (Poland) ● Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Luxembourg) ● Eestimaa Rahvaliit (Estonia) ● Green Party (Ireland) ● Ecological and Environmental Movement (Cyprus) ● Party for Animals (The Netherlands) ● Hungarian Communist Workers Party (Hungary) ● Communist Party of Slovakia (Slovakia) ● Communist Refoundation Party (Italy) ● Libertas (Ireland) ● Citizens List (Luxembourg) ● Communist Party of Austria (Austria) ● Left Alliance (Finland) ● Extreme left (New Anticapitalist Party, Workers Struggle) (France) ● The Left (Luxembourg) ● Communist Party of Luxembourg (Luxembourg) ● −2 −1 0 1 2 3 2 Figure A-2: Comparing Rescaled and Unscaled Party Estimates (2009) 10 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 8 ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ●● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 6 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ●●●● ● Right Party Positions ● ● ●● ● ● − ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 4 ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● Unscaled Left ● ● ● 2 ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 Rescaled Left−Right Party Positions Note: N=162 national party positions are shown in this comparison. Unscaled left-right party positions are simple means of placements of parties in the EES survey, rescaled positions are our estimates. The two sets of estimates correlate at r =0.83. Outlier to far right is the British National Party, which is the most right-wing party in Europe after rescaling, but ranks 98th when placed using simple means. 3 Di↵erences of our Scaling Procedure and Groseclose et al. (1999) We further explain how our scaling procedure di↵ers from the ony by Groseclose et al. (1999). For Groseclose et al., ✓jkm are not party scores, but legislator ideal points obtained from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Moreover, Groseclose et al. calculate standard errors for their adjusted ADA scores by inverting the Hessian of the likelihood function. This may potentially understate the true uncertainty of the adjusted scores in two ways. First, ADA scores are treated as data that are measured without error, yet they are simply ideal points calculated using no more than 30 roll call votes each year. Secondly, the model specified assumes that the error term for an individual at any point in time is uncorrelated with past or future errors. While this assumption may be true, it is noteworthy that other dynamic scaling techniques (e.g. Martin and Quinn, 2002) explicitly make the opposite assumption of autocorrelated errors. By scaling across countries, we avoid the second issue entirely, and we address the first issue by estimating uncertainty via the non-parametric bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994) in both stages of estimation. Finally, a crucial di↵erence between the two methods lies in the interpretation of ✓m.For Groseclose et al., ✓m is an individual meta-parameter that captures the mean ideal point of the legislator over time in the common space and is largely a “nuisance” parameter. In our application, the estimates for ✓m instead represents the locations of the European political groups on the common left-right scale, a substantively important set of estimates that cannot otherwise be obtained from the EES. 4 Another Validation: Party System Polarization
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