DOCSLIB.ORG

The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist a Dissertation Submitted In

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist a Dissertation Submitted In The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair Professor Jason Wittenberg Professor Jacob Citrin Professor Katerina Linos Spring 2015 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe Copyright 2015 by Kimberly Ann Twist Abstract The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann Twist Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair As long as far-right parties { known chiefly for their vehement opposition to immigration { have competed in contemporary Western Europe, scholars and observers have been concerned about these parties' implications for liberal democracy. Many originally believed that far- right parties would fade away due to a lack of voter support and their isolation by mainstream parties. Since 1994, however, far-right parties have been included in 17 governing coalitions across Western Europe. What explains the switch from exclusion to inclusion in Europe, and what drives mainstream-right parties' decisions to include or exclude the far right from coalitions today? My argument is centered on the cost of far-right exclusion, in terms of both office and policy goals for the mainstream right. I argue, first, that the major mainstream parties of Western Europe initially maintained the exclusion of the far right because it was relatively costless: They could govern and achieve policy goals without the far right. During this period of exclusion, however, major parties of both the left and right attempted to win back voters lost to the far right by enacting more restrictive immigration policies; they would borrow from the far right as long as it was beneficial. Second, I argue that the mainstream right has increasingly treated the far right as it would any other party during coalition decisions. Major mainstream parties prioritize being in government, and will select the coalition that offers both stability and the ability to achieve policy goals in areas of greatest importance to them at the time. As the far right continued to attract voters throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the mainstream right realized that working with the far right { which was now a more useful partner, as it had more legislative seats { might result in more advantageous policy compromises. Once far-right parties could be useful to the mainstream right, exclusion became a more costly strategy. Third, far-right parties can be attractive coalition partners to the mainstream right be- cause they are flexible on most issues { immigration excepted { and thus more willing to give the mainstream right its preferred policies in exchange for gains in immigration. Addi- tionally, far-right parties are nearly always smaller than the major mainstream-right parties, 1 so the mainstream parties are able to carry more weight in coalition decisions and obtain important ministerial positions. I demonstrate my argument through in-depth case studies of Austria and the Netherlands, from the 1980s through the present. Both countries have had far-right parties in and out of government, providing important variation on the dependent variable. Finally, I show the wider applicability of my argument in two ways by extending my arguments about inclusion and exclusion to coalition-like agreements in the United Kingdom and France, as well as to mainstream left responses to far-left parties in Europe. 2 To Stephen. i Contents Contents ii List of Figures iv List of Tables v 1 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in West- ern Europe 1 1.1 Mainstream-right and far-right parties . 2 1.2 The far right in government: A record of growing collaboration . 4 1.3 Existing literature . 9 1.4 My argument . 16 1.5 Data and methods . 25 1.6 Chapter overview . 28 1.7 Appendix: Party names . 30 1.8 Appendix 2: Mainstream-right and far-right seat shares . 32 2 Changing Electoral Realities and the Mainstream Right 34 2.1 Mainstream voters up for grabs . 34 2.2 Opportunities for new parties . 39 2.3 The importance of immigration . 45 2.4 The far right beyond immigration . 51 2.5 Conclusion . 55 3 Dutch and Austrian Parties 56 3.1 Mainstream parties in the Netherlands . 56 3.2 Mainstream parties in Austria . 64 3.3 The politics of the past . 70 3.4 The far right in the Netherlands . 72 3.5 The far right in Austria . 79 3.6 Voter support for the far right . 84 3.7 Conclusion . 86 ii 4 Borrowing from the Far Right: The Mainstream Right and Immigration 87 4.1 The (end of the) Dutch consensus about multiculturalism . 88 4.2 The politicization of immigration in Austria . 97 4.3 Conclusion . 104 5 Coalition Formation in Austria 105 5.1 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 108 5.2 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 111 5.3 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 118 5.4 Far right not mathematically part of coalition options (Scenario 4) . 133 5.5 Conclusion . 136 6 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands 138 6.1 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands . 139 6.2 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right (Scenario 1) . 145 6.3 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition with the far right, but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . 152 6.4 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far right (Scenario 3) . 155 6.5 Conclusion . 160 7 The Mainstream Right and Far Right in Majoritarian Systems: France and the United Kingdom 163 7.1 The mainstream right and far right in France . 163 7.2 The mainstream right and far right in the United Kingdom . 174 8 Conclusion: Mainstream and Extreme Parties in Western Europe 185 8.1 The mainstream left and extreme parties . 185 8.2 The future of mainstream right and far right cooperation . 193 Bibliography 196 iii List of Figures 2.1 Alford Index, 1947-1986 . 36 7.1 Immigration tagline in the Conservative Party manifesto, 2005 . 179 7.2 \Go home" vans (Conservative-Lib Dem coalition, 2013) . 183 iv List of Tables 1.1 Formal and informal governmental inclusion of the far right . 6 1.2 Elections: Would a mainstream-far right coalition have a majority of seats? . 7 1.3 Elections: If the mainstream right and far right had enough seats to govern, did a coalition form? . 7 1.4 Elections: Could a right-wing coalition be formed without the far right? . 8 1.5 Replication of de Lange's (2008) results: Variables affecting far-right inclusion . 12 1.6 Test of party distance as a predictor of far-right inclusion . 13 1.7 Austrian coalitions and CMP distance measures . 15 1.8 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 1990 (CMP scores in parentheses) 15 1.9 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 2008 (CMP scores in parentheses) 16 1.10 Predictions of coalition formation, Austria 2008, using traditional theories . 17 1.11 Three measures of party placements, Dutch parliamentary parties . 19 1.12 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2001 . 20 1.13 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2010 . 21 1.14 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 23 1.15 Expectations: Mainstream right inclusion of the far right . 24 1.16 Coalition cases, by country and scenario . 27 1.17 Far-right parties in Western Europe, 1980s-present . 30 1.18 Current major mainstream-right parties in Western Europe . 31 2.1 Working-class as percent of active work force, 1950s-1980s . 36 2.2 Change in religious affiliation of Europeans, 1970-97 . 37 2.3 Percent of population attending religious services at least once per week, 1970-98 37 2.4 Percent change in number of party members, 1980-2000 . 38 2.5 Real GDP growth, 1960-1989 . 39 2.6 Left-right distance between the major parties of left and right, 1983 to 1993 . 42 2.7 Vote shares for \old" parties, 1960 and 1990 . 43 2.8 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after 1980 . 44 2.9 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after the far right's first successful national election (> 5%) . 44 2.10 Percent of British respondents feeling there are too many immigrants in the UK 45 2.11 Percent wanting immigration partially or totally restricted . 46 v 2.12 Foreigners/immigration as an important problem in the Netherlands, 1971-2012 47 2.13 Foreign residents as percentage of the total population, 1950-1990 . 47 2.14 Percentage of new immigrants from outside the EU . 48 2.15 Asylum applications, 1985-99 (in thousands) . 49 2.16 Far right party positioning and issue importance . 50 2.17 Percent agreeing they \would not want an immigrant" as a neighbor . 50 2.18 Percent saying that there are too many immigrants in their country . 52 2.19 Far right parties' average vote share in national elections since 1980 . 53 3.1 Major Dutch parties' Tweede Kamer votes and seat totals, 1946-2012 . 59 3.2 Dutch governments, 1946-2012 . 60 3.3 Percentage of votes accounted for by the `structural model' . 60 3.4 Percentage of Dutch population in each of the pillars, 1986-2006 .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Parliamentary Elections in Austria -‐ Social Democrats Remain Stable, Gains for P
    Parliamentary elections in Austria - Social Democrats remain stable, gains for right-wing parties By Maria Maltschnig, director of the Karl-Renner-Institute1 October 2017 The SPÖ has retained its 52 mandates, but has had to hand over first place to the conservative ÖVP, which gained 7.5 percentage points. The SPÖ gained more than 100,000 votes in total. The SPÖ was able to win votes mostly from non-voters and former green voters, but mostly lost votes to the right-wing populist FPÖ. Overall, we see a shift of about 4% points from the left-wing parties to the right. The liberal NEOS, which cannot be attributed to either of the two camps, remained stable, while the Greens suffered heavy losses and remained below the 4% hurdle to enter the National Parliament. Even if this is hardly a landslide victory for the right-wing parties, there is still a clear shift to the right. In addition to the percentage movement in favour of the right-wing parties, a clear rhetorical and substantive reorientation of the ÖVP from being a classical conservative party to being a party with right-wing populist tendencies can also be observed. The programmes of the ÖVP and FPÖ extensively overlap. There are three major reasons for this result: 1) Since the summer of 2015, when hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants travelled through Austria - many of whom have stayed - the issues of asylum, migration and integration have dominated the debate and are strongly associated with issues of internal security and crime. Many Austrians perceived the events of 2015 and thereafter as a severe loss of control by the state and politicians.
    [Show full text]
  • Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies Are Often Classified According to the Form of Government That They Have
    Parliamentary, Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies Democracies are often classified according to the form of government that they have: • Parliamentary • Presidential • Semi-Presidential Legislative responsibility refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the incumbent loses a vote of no confidence. A vote of confidence is initiated by the government { the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. The defining feature of presidential democracies is that they do not have legislative responsibility. • US Government Shutdown, click here In contrast, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies both have legislative responsibility. • PM Question Time (UK), click here In addition to legislative responsibility, semi-presidential democracies also have a head of state who is popularly elected for a fixed term. A head of state is popularly elected if she is elected through a process where voters either (i) cast a ballot directly for a candidate or (ii) they cast ballots to elect an electoral college, whose sole purpose is to elect the head of state.
    [Show full text]
  • Lega Nord and Anti-Immigrationism: the Importance of Hegemony Critique for Social Media Analysis and Protest
    International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 3553–3579 1932–8036/20180005 Lega Nord and Anti-Immigrationism: The Importance of Hegemony Critique for Social Media Analysis and Protest CINZIA PADOVANI1 Southern Illinois University Carbondale, USA In this study, I implement Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony critique to analyze the anti- immigration rhetoric promoted by the Italian ultraright party Lega Nord [Northern League]. Specifically, this case study focuses on the discourse that developed on the microblogging site Twitter during the Stop Invasione [Stop Invasion] rally, organized by Matteo Salvini’s party on October 18, 2014, in Milan. I argue that hegemony critique is helpful to investigate political discourse on social media and to theorize the struggle surrounding contentious topics such as immigration. The method, which is multilayered and includes content analysis and interpretative analysis, allows for the exploration of a considerable data corpus but also an in-depth reading of each tweet. The result is a nuanced understanding of the anti-immigration discourse and of the discourse that developed in favor of immigration and in support of a countermarch, which progressive movements organized in response to Lega’s mobilization on the same day in Milan. Keywords: Lega Nord, ultraright media, far-right media, anti-immigrationism, Twitter, critical social media analysis, mobilization, Gramsci, hegemony critique The rise of ultraright movements in Western Europe and the United States is an indication of the continuous crisis of capitalism and neoliberal ideologies. The financial and economic downturn that plagued Europe and North America beginning in late 2008 and the consequent Brussels-imposed austerity in the European Union have exacerbated the rift between the haves and the have-nots.
    [Show full text]
  • Abbreviations
    AbbreviAtions ABI Associazione Bancaria Italiana (Italian Banking Association) ALD Autonomie Liberté Démocratie (Autonomy Liberty Democracy) ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe AN Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) ANCI Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani (National Association of Italian Municipalities) ANM Associazione Nazionale Magistrati (National Magistrates Association) BdI Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy) BMPS Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena CD Centro Democratico—Diritti e Libertà (Democratic Center—Rights and Freedom) CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labor) CIR Compagnie Industriali Riunite (an Italian holding company) CISE Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (Italian Center for Electoral Studies) CISL Confederazione Italiana Sindicati dei Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions) CISR Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza della Repubblica (Committee for the Security of the Republic) CLN Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (National Liberation Committee) CN Centrodestra Nazionale (National Center-Right) COPASIR Comitato Parlamentare di Controllo per i Servizi di Informazione e Sicurezza e per il Segreto di Stato Italian Politics: Still Waiting for the Transformation 29 (2014): vii–ix © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2014.290101 viii Abbreviations (Parliamentary Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services and for State Secret Control) CSD Consiglio Supremo di Difesa (Supreme Council of Defense) CSM Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura
    [Show full text]
  • Australian Institute of International Affairs National Conference
    Australian Institute of International Affairs National Conference Australian Foreign Policy: Navigating the New International Disorder Monday 21 November 2016 Hotel Realm Canberra, National Circuit, Barton Arrival 8:30 – 9:00am Australian Foreign Policy 9:00am – 11:00am The Hon Julie Bishop MP (Invited) Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop is the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Australia's Federal Coalition Government. She is also the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party and has served as the Member for Curtin since 1998. Minister Bishop was sworn in as Australia's first female Foreign Minister on 18 September 2013 following four years in the role of Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. She previously served as a Cabinet Minister in the Howard Government as Minister for Education, Science and Training and as the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women's Issues. Prior to this, Minister Bishop was Minister for Ageing. Minister Bishop has also served on a number of parliamentary and policy committees including as Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. Before entering Parliament Minister Bishop was a commercial litigation lawyer at Perth firm Clayton Utz, becoming a partner in 1985, and managing partner in 1994. The Hon Kim Beazley AC FAIIA AIIA National President Mr Beazley was elected to the Federal Parliament in 1980 and represented the electorates of Swan (1980-96) and Brand (1996- 2007). Mr Beazley was a Minister in the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments (1983-96) holding, at various times, the portfolios of Defence, Finance, Transport and Communications, Employment Education and Training, Aviation, and Special Minister of State.
    [Show full text]
  • Online Zeitungen Im Vergleich
    Vergleich österreichischer Online-Zeitungen und Magazine Projektleitung: Mag. Norbert Zellhofer Studien-Zeitraum: August-September 2006 Mehr Nutzen durch USABILITY. Praterstrasse. 33/12, 1020 Wien Tel: 1/204 86 50, Fax: 1/2048654 [email protected] http://www.usability.at Vergleich österreichischer Online-Zeitungen und Magazine Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis ......................................................................... 2 Einleitung .................................................................................... 6 Tageszeitungen ............................................................................ 9 Die Presse: www.diePresse.com ................................................ 10 Der Standard: www.derstandard.at............................................ 11 Oberösterreichische Nachrichten: www.nachrichten.at .................. 11 Tiroler Tageszeitung: www.tirol.com .......................................... 11 Kleine Zeitung: www.kleine.co.at............................................... 11 Salzburger Nachrichten: www.salzburg.com ................................ 11 Wiener Zeitung: www.wienerzeitung.at ...................................... 11 Kurier: www.kurier.at .............................................................. 11 Österreich: www.oe24.at.......................................................... 11 Wirtschaftsblatt: www.wirtschaftsblatt.at .................................... 11 Heute: www.heute.at............................................................... 11 Neue Kärntner Tageszeitung:
    [Show full text]
  • Circular Economy Action Plan for a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe
    Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe #EU GreenDeal 2 Contents 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 4 2. A SUSTAINABLE PRODUCT POLICY FRAMEWORK ................. 6 2.1. Designing sustainable products .................................................................. 6 2.2. Empowering consumers and public buyers .................................................... 7 2.3. Circularity in production processes ............................................................................... 8 3. KEY PRODUCT VALUE CHAINS .................................................................................................. 10 3.1. Electronics and ICT ............................................................................................................................. 10 3.2. Batteries and vehicles ........................................................................................................................... 11 3.3. Packaging .......................................................................................................................................................... 11 3.4. Plastics ................................................................................................................................................................... 12 3.5. Textiles ....................................................................................................................................................................... 13 3.6.
    [Show full text]
  • Populism, Voters and Cleavages in Bulgarian Politics*
    56 POLITOLOGICKÝ ČASOPIS / CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1/2017 Populism, Voters and Cleavages in Bulgarian Politics* EMILIA ZANKINA** Abstract The growing success of populist parties from across the political spectrum in Europe calls for an examination of the link between populist parties and voters and the new (if new indeed) cleavages that such parties exploit. Scholars have pointed to the erosion of traditional cleavages as one rea- son for the success of populist parties. Such analysis fits well with the established democracies of Europe but has little application in the East European context. Traditional cleavages have taken root in few places in Eastern Europe before communist takeover and became even less relevant follow- ing four and a half decades of communist rule. With the fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe, the only meaningful division within society was that of anti-communists and supporters of the old regime. Similarly, concepts of Left and Right had (and to a great extend continue to have) lit- tle relevance in the East European context where the Left came to be dominated by former commu- nist parties and the Right engulfed an ideologically incoherent opposition. The stronger the former communists were (such as in Bulgaria and Romania) the more fragmented the Right was, as it was the only available space for political competition. The present paper aims to examine voter support for populist parties in Bulgaria and analyze on the cleavages that those parties exploit or create. Thus, the paper examines the impact of populist parties on the political landscape in terms of the changes that those parties result in in voter behavior and cleavage formation.
    [Show full text]
  • Forming a Government in the Event of a Hung Parliament: the UK's Recognition Rules in Comparative
    Forming a government in the event of a hung parliament The UK’s recognition rules in comparative context Petra Schleiter Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford Valerie Belu Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford (Graduate Student) Robert Hazell The Constitution Unit University College London May 2016 ISBN: 978-1-903903-73-5 Published by: The Constitution Unit School of Public Policy University College London 29-31 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9QU United Kingdom Tel: 020 7679 4977 Fax: 020 7679 4978 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/ Department of Politics and International Relations Manor Road Building Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UQ United Kingdom Tel: 01865 278700 Email: [email protected] Web: www.politics.ox.ac.uk © The Constitution Unit, UCL & DPIR, University of Oxford 2016 This report is sold subject to the condition that is shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. First Published May 2016 Front cover image copyright Crown Copyright/ Number 10 Flickr 2009 Contents Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 The need for clearer rules on government formation ....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • There Has Been No Bulgarian Tradition of Any Long-Standing Resistance to the Communist Regime
    There has been no Bulgarian tradition of any long-standing resistance to the communist regime. There was neither any political opposition, nor any other kind of an influential dissident movement. Bulgaria never went through the purgatory of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, or the “Prague spring” of 1968. It is indeed difficult to find any counter arguments whatsoever against the cliché that Bul- garia was the closest satellite of the Soviet Union. The fundamental contradictions within the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) coalition were present from the very first day of its inception. There were Marxists who were longing for “socialism with a human face”, intellectuals with liberal ideas, social democrats and Christian democrats, conservatives and radical demo- crats, monarchists and republicans. The members of the center-right coalition did not delude themselves about their differences; they rather shared the clear un- derstanding that only a painful compromise could stand some chances against the Goliath of the totalitarian Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP). It was this unani- mous opposition to the communist regime and its legacy that made the coalition possible. But only for a limited period of time. The United Democratic Forces (ODS) government under Prime Minister Ivan Kostov (1997-2001) completed the reformist agenda of anti-communism. At the end of the ODS term of office, Bulgaria was a country with a functioning market economy, stable democracy, and a clearly outlined foreign policy course towards the country’s accession to the European Union and NATO, which was accepted by all significant political formations, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) included.
    [Show full text]
  • P5048b-5048B Hon Darren West
    Extract from Hansard [COUNCIL — Wednesday, 22 August 2018] p5048b-5048b Hon Darren West FEDERAL COALITION GOVERNMENT Statement HON DARREN WEST (Agricultural — Parliamentary Secretary) [6.46 pm]: I note that other members also wish to make a member’s statement, so I will be brief. Hon Simon O’Brien has given me a couple of good segues for my statement tonight. I believe that there will be a special meeting, and votes will be counted, and at the end of that we could have a new Prime Minister of Australia. This has been an extraordinary week in Canberra. For those of us who take a particular interest in political happenings in our national capital, I guess we could say we have seen it all before. However, this time I think there is an extra level of division and dysfunction than what we have seen in governments previous. It is extraordinary that there is potential for a second leadership spill in two days in the Liberal Party in Canberra to determine who will be this country’s next Prime Minister. This seems to be spreading from the Western Australian branch of the Liberal Party, although there is not a formal coalition in Western Australia, to its federal counterparts. It is extraordinary. I believe there will be a leadership spill in Canberra. There probably should also be a leadership spill in Western Australia, if anyone had the courage to challenge the current Leader of the Liberal Party. I am sure that will happen in due course, members. There is also potential for a change of leadership in the federal National Party in the coming days as the dysfunction spreads throughout the federal government.
    [Show full text]
  • Vertreter Aus Südtirol in Rom Und in Europa 154 Das Südtirol-Handbuch 2017 Vertreter Aus Südtirol in Rom Und in Europa
    Vertreter aus Südtirol in Rom und in Europa 154 Das Südtirol-Handbuch 2017 Vertreter aus Südtirol in Rom und in Europa Parlamentswahlen und Parlamentarier Parlamentswahlen am 18.4.1948 Kammer: Parteien Stimmen % SVP 107.059 62,70 DC 37.392 21,80 Volksfront 13.218 7,70 Vereinigte Sozialisten 10.262 5,90 Blocco Naz. 3.263 1,90 Insgesamt 171.149 100% Senat: Wahlkreis Bozen Wahlkreis Brixen Parteien Stimmen % Parteien Stimmen % SVP 36.378 48,90 SVP 58.852 82,55 DC 21.512 28,92 DC 8.802 12,34 PRI 4.065 5,46 PRI 1.754 2,46 Blocco Naz. 3.553 4,78 Social- Social- comunisti 8.889 11,95 comunisti 1.890 2,65 Abkürzungen: SVP = Südtiroler Volkspartei; DC = Democrazia Cristiana; PRI = Partito Repubblicano Italiano. Kammerabgeordnete der Provinz Bozen 1948-53: Otto von Guggenberg (SVP), Friedl Volgger (SVP), Toni Ebner (SVP), Angelo Facchin (DC); Senatoren: Karl von Braitenberg (SVP), Josef Raffeiner (SVP). Das Südtirol-Handbuch 2017 155 Parlamentswahlen am 7.6.1953 Kammer: Parteien Stimmen % SVP 118.394 60,06 DC 34.720 17,61 PSI 11.510 5,84 MSI 9.141 4,64 PCI 8.025 4,07 PSDI 6.286 3,19 PNM 4.764 2,42 U. Soc. Ind. 1.856 0,94 PLI 1.036 0,53 PRI 646 0,33 PPTT 393 0,20 Unitá Popol. 340 0,17 Insgesamt 197.111 100% Senat: Wahlkreis Bozen Wahlkreis Brixen Parteien Stimmen % Parteien Stimmen % SVP 40.591 45,53 SVP 66.548 83,78 DC 20.967 23,52 PSI 13.604 15,26 DC 10.420 13,12 MSI 6.100 6,84 PSDI 4.639 5,20 PNM 3.244 3,64 PCI 2.459 3,10 Insgesamt 89.145 100% Insgesamt 79.427 100% Abkürzungen: PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano; PSDI = Partito Socialista Democra- tico Italiano; MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano; PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano; PLI = Partito Liberale Italiano; PNM = Partito Nazionale Monarchico; Soc.
    [Show full text]