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There Has Been No Bulgarian Tradition of Any Long-Standing Resistance to the Communist Regime

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There Has Been No Bulgarian Tradition of Any Long-Standing Resistance to the Communist Regime There has been no Bulgarian tradition of any long-standing resistance to the communist regime. There was neither any political opposition, nor any other kind of an influential dissident movement. Bulgaria never went through the purgatory of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, or the “Prague spring” of 1968. It is indeed difficult to find any counter arguments whatsoever against the cliché that Bul- garia was the closest satellite of the Soviet Union. The fundamental contradictions within the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) coalition were present from the very first day of its inception. There were Marxists who were longing for “socialism with a human face”, intellectuals with liberal ideas, social democrats and Christian democrats, conservatives and radical demo- crats, monarchists and republicans. The members of the center-right coalition did not delude themselves about their differences; they rather shared the clear un- derstanding that only a painful compromise could stand some chances against the Goliath of the totalitarian Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP). It was this unani- mous opposition to the communist regime and its legacy that made the coalition possible. But only for a limited period of time. The United Democratic Forces (ODS) government under Prime Minister Ivan Kostov (1997-2001) completed the reformist agenda of anti-communism. At the end of the ODS term of office, Bulgaria was a country with a functioning market economy, stable democracy, and a clearly outlined foreign policy course towards the country’s accession to the European Union and NATO, which was accepted by all significant political formations, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) included. Since that time, no successive government has ever questioned these achieve- ments. But anti-communism was doomed to fall prey to its own success. It is not its enemies, but rather its achievements that depleted its strength. Paradoxically, it is the implementation of its programme that made it dispensable. And just when the Bulgarian Right Wing was in the position to point at the indisputable achievements of its governance, it had to face the cumbersome task of renewing itself, this renewal being of an ideological, organizational, personal, and behavioural nature. Without denying the achievements, the right-wing vot- ers came to pose new requirements. The emergence of a new party, Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) seems to meet their expectations and offers the possibility for finding a new formula for the development of the center- right political environment, namely the “peaceful and competitive” co-existence of the “new” and “old” Right Wing. November 2010 The Bulgarian Center Right - Victories, Defeats, Transformations 1 CONTENTS Contents ......................................................................................................................................................1 1. The Birth of the SDS and the First Democratic General Election (1989-1990) ............................................2 1.1. The Communist Legacy .........................................................................................................................2 1.2. The “Founding Fathers” of the SDS ......................................................................................................3 1.3. The Round Table Talks ...........................................................................................................................5 1.4. The General Election for a Grand National Assembly .............................................................................5 2. The First Seven Years (1990-1997) ...........................................................................................................6 2.1. The SDS at the Grand National Assembly ..............................................................................................6 2.2. The New Constitution and the First Split within the SDS ........................................................................7 2.3. The First SDS Government ....................................................................................................................8 2.4. The SDS in Opposition (1993-1996) ......................................................................................................9 2.5. The Collapse of the BSP Government (1995-1996) ..............................................................................11 2.6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................12 3. The Center Right in Power (1997-2001) .................................................................................................13 3.1. The Achievements of the ODS Government ......................................................................................13 3.2. The Reasons for the ODS Defeat in June 2001 ..................................................................................14 3.2.1. Reasons for the Defeat: the Government .........................................................................................14 3.2.2. Reasons for the Defeat: the Party .....................................................................................................15 4. The Center Right in Opposition (2001-2008) ..........................................................................................16 4.1. What Should Have Been Done ............................................................................................................16 4.2. What Actually Happened (2001 - 2008) ..............................................................................................17 5. The Birth of GERB and the Latest General Election (2007-2009) .............................................................20 5.1. The “Birth” of Boiko Borissov as a Political Figure ................................................................................20 5.2. The Birth of GERB as a Political Party ..................................................................................................21 5.3. The 2009 General Election: The Center Right Comes to Power Yet Again ............................................21 6. The Next Seven Years (2010-2017) ........................................................................................................22 2 The Bulgarian Center Right - Victories, Defeats, Transformations 1. The Birth of the SDS and the This sudden change, later called “a peaceful First Democratic General Election coup d’état”, opened a new chapter in Bulgar- (1989-1990) ian history and was followed by an outburst of political activity. Taking advantage of the altered The Bulgarian center-right parties in their essence political climate, Bulgarian citizens quickly orga- are new political forces. They were called to life nized themselves into parties, civil movements, by the political disintegration of the totalitarian committees, and even trade unions. After more regime at the end of 1989. At that time, Bul- than 40 years of totalitarian communist rule, garian society had no channels for communica- political freedom was quickly recovered. tion with the West and was kept in ignorance about values, procedures, and the institutions 1.1. The Communist Legacy of democracy. The decades of severe censor- The burden of the past was far too heavy to be ship, which were consistently imposing spiritual properly assessed in these first days of unbridled and ideological uniformity, isolated the citizenry enthusiasm. In comparison with the other East- from the cultural and political traditions of the ern European countries, Bulgaria’s communist re- free world; as all the outlets for free expression gime was strikingly more stable. It never faced any of thought and ideas were altogether blocked. real challenge from within. The extent to which For a certain period of time, even the very the totalitarian regime of a Soviet type was im- combination of the words “political”, “center” posed on Bulgaria was much greater than on any and “right” was incomprehensible for the Bul- other East European country. Any opposition was garian public; some came to argue that self- physically eliminated and ever since 1948, when identification with any version of the “political the country was quickly pushed into the tight right” is destructive and should be avoided. iron strait-jacket of Stalinism, the BKP operated Those belonging to the right part of the political as a fully subordinated branch of the Communist spectrum preferred the designations of “dem- Party of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria was isolated ocrats”, “reformers” or “anti-communists” from the Western world and there was no coun- which seemed more respectable and acceptable ter-balancing influence against the Soviet power. in the beginning of the transition. This is just a This was combined with severe and systematic tiny illustration of the inevitable localization of repressions against the former elite of the nation both western models and vocabulary. Both the in all spheres of social and political life. Terror was typical features and peculiarities of the Bulgari- unleashed by the murders of thousands of Bul- an center-right parties are shaped by the politics garian citizens in the first months and years after of post-communist transition and the post-Cold the 9th of September 1944, and continued with War geopolitical realignment. These provided sending or deporting people for political reasons the Center Right with its first but inevitably
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