An improbable success story in the Balkans Bulgarian Democracy’s Organizational Weapon M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks ne of the most remarkable—and least Muslims, and relations between the two groups in celebrated and understood—political stories Bulgaria were much worse during the Soviet era than Oof the postcommunist region is the relative those between the two groups in Yugoslavia. In short, success of democratization in Bulgaria. Not only has Bulgaria did not enter the postcommunist era as a democratization taken place but democracy has taken leading candidate for robust democratization. Yet hold. Bulgaria has avoided the slide toward democracy came nonetheless, and it appears to be authoritarianism that occurred in Russia, Ukraine, holding, perhaps even deepening. Belarus, Albania, Armenia, and all the countries of After the beginning of the regime change Central Asia in the second half of the 1990s. at the end of the 1980s, Bulgaria did develop one Explaining Bulgaria’s experience is difficult. Most of noteworthy asset: an array of reasonably strong polit- the usual explanations for success do not work. ical parties. Like Romania and Mongolia, arguably Bulgaria does not have a hardy democratic tradition. the postcommunist region’s two other pleasant The brand of Sovietism practiced in Bulgaria was surprises in the realm of democratization, Bulgaria similar to that found in the USSR. Dissent was dealt has had a relatively high rate of popular participation with harshly. In contrast with Hungary or Poland, no in parties. Seven percent of voting-age Bulgarians, 12 substantial political or economic liberalization percent of Romanians, and 20 percent of Mongolians occurred during the 1970s or 1980s. At the onset of belong to parties. The numbers are all high by post- the regime change, Bulgaria was poor even by regional communist standards and are far greater than in standards, and the economic trauma it endured during Russia and Ukraine, where rates of party member- the early years of transition was as severe as that ship are one or two percent (Marc Howard, experienced by Russia and Ukraine. Neighborhood Demobilized Societies: Understanding the Weakness of effects cannot be considered particularly auspicious. Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe [Ph.D. disserta- Bulgaria shares a long border with Serbia, and Sofia is tion, University of California, Berkeley, 1999]; M. located close to that border. To its south, Bulgaria is Steven Fish, “Mongolia: Democracy without bounded by Greece and Turkey; it is the only country Prerequisites,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 [July to share a border with both. Bulgaria does not border 1998]). In Bulgaria, as in Romania and Mongolia, a West or Central European country. Nor does it have the communist-successor party or parties account for an ethnically homogeneous population. It has a large a substantial proportion of overall party membership, Turkish minority, geographically concentrated in the but major liberal or otherwise noncommunist- south, as well as substantial populations of Roma and successor parties emerged as well. It is difficult to Pomaks. The precommunist history of relations locate anything other than political parties to account between Bulgarians and Turks was bloodier than that for the Bulgarian (or for that matter, Romanian and between Serbs and the people now called Bosnian Mongolian) advantage in democratization. SUMMER 2000 63 In Bulgaria, the most impressive party to emerge identified with the UDF’s essentially liberal agenda. since the dawn of open politics is the Union of The fruits of these efforts showed in November 1996, Democratic Forces (UDF). It is not only the strongest when Petar Stoyanov, the UDF candidate and former party in Bulgaria; it is arguably the mightiest right- deputy minister of justice during the UDF’s brief spell center party in postcommunist Europe. Only Vaclav in power early in the decade, soundly defeated his BSP Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party even compares to the rival in presidential elections. The presidency, the UDF in terms of membership magnitude, organiza- powers of which are strictly limited in Bulgaria’s tional coherence, and depth of rootedness in society. parliamentary regime, had previously been occupied by Zhelyu Zhelev, the courageous former dissident Where the UDF came from who had enjoyed UDF’s support. After over a year and The UDF started life as a mélange of over a dozen a half of organization building, UDF finally held its diminutive groups that coalesced loosely during the founding conference as a political party in February early phase of the regime change. It lost the first parlia- 1997. Kostov was elected chairman. mentary elections to the Bulgarian Socialist Party The party’s inaugural conference took place just (BSP), the main communist-successor party. It fared a week after the BSP government, under the pressure better in the 1991 elections and from November 1991 of mass demonstrations, agreed to hold early until September 1992 enjoyed a brief stint as the parliamentary elections. The UDF did not organize or leading party in government. It also did well in races initiate the torrent of civil unrest that swept Bulgaria for local offices, especially in urban areas. It subse- in early 1997. The demonstrations occurred in quently underwent hard times. It lost control of the response to economic disaster as well as the corruption government to the BSP in the fall of 1992 and ineptitude of the BSP government and were and was drubbed by them at the polls in 1994, locking largely spontaneous. But the UDF reacted quickly and it out of government for nearly a half decade. In local established some mastery over the unrest. The party’s elections in 1995 it suffered setbacks as well. During parliamentary leaders successfully forged a coalition of the early 1990s, the UDF was the major liberal force all parliamentary factions opposed to the BSP. In addi- in Bulgaria, but it did not succeed in either holding tion, UDF activists mobilized crowds, displaying power or building a sturdy organization. sympathy with the demonstrators and amplifying their This situation began to shift during the summer demands. Party leaders also restrained the mobs, of 1995. The leading force for change was Ivan successfully persuading a huge crowd not to invade the Kostov, an economist who had served as minister of parliament building in order to attack the hapless finance in the short-lived UDF government. Socialist politicians holed up inside. Thus the UDF Kostov intended to create a centralized, disciplined helped convert mass discontent into political power. In mass-membership political party out of the band of late April, in alliance with several tiny parties, the bantam groups that constituted the UDF. This UDF captured 52 percent of the popular vote and 57 involved inducing these groups to submerge their percent of the seats in parliamentary elections. The identities in a larger, hierarchical organization that Socialists and their partners, the Ecoglasnost move- identified itself as a right-center political party rather ment, finished with 22 percent of the vote and 24 than as a “democratic movement.” While building a percent of seats. The election ended an era of stulti- party apparatus and identity, Kostov and his allies also fying, sclerotic Socialist rule and established the UDF inserted their organization deeply into society. They as Bulgaria’s dominant political force and one of the founded party clubs around the country to boost most dynamic parties in postcommunist Europe. popular participation. They opened UDF cafés for young people, sports facilities for children, and reading How the UDF did it rooms for older folks. They forged close contacts with Other right-center parties in the postcommunist nonstate associations, including journalists’ groups, region have managed to win elections, but few human-rights organizations, and other groups that have ever established the rootedness in society and 64 EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW political dominance that the UDF did in Bulgaria. Poland and Mongolia, have semipresidential regimes; How has the party done it? More specifically, how still others, such as Moldova and Lithuania, have can one account for the rise of so formidable a moderate presidential systems. All systems that adopted right-center party in Bulgaria? “superpresidential” constitutions—those that invest As with the emergence of democracy in general, modest capacity in the legislature and give the UDF’s emergence is not readily accounted for overwhelming powers to the president, such as by the standard explanations or expectations. The Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia—subsequently failed UDF is not a historical party. Unlike Slovakia’s to develop strong party systems. liberal Democratic Party and nationalist Slovak Institutional stimuli are important, but they National Party (SNP), Bulgaria’s UDF cannot clearly are also present in many other postcommunist claim precommunist lineage. It cannot draw on a polities whose party systems do not include a right- ready-made name, symbols, or other sources of center organization as formidable as the UDF. identification. Unlike Hungary’s liberal Alliance of The UDF’s prosperity is due largely to two other Free Democrats and Federation of Young Democrats, phenomena. The first is the character and trajectory of the UDF does not enjoy roots in a communist-era political competition since the beginning of the informal dissident movement. Nor has the UDF, in regime change. Specifically,