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Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary: Defeating Orbán Is Impossible Without Jobbik’S Votes

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PERSPECTIVE Budapest Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary: Defeating Orbán is Impossible without Jobbik’s Votes PÉTER KREKÓ December 2017 While the general view in Hungarian progressive and liberal circles, as well as in other European countries has generally been that Viktor Orbán is a guarantee against the Hungarian Far Right, in this paper I will argue that it is no longer the case. I will underline this argument on the basis of three points: n Viktor Orbán and Fidesz have become more radical than the far-right Jobbik party on numerous issues. n Fidesz is more of a threat to democracy and the integrity of the EU these days than Jobbik, and 2018 might be the last chance to defeat Orbán. n The Hungarian Left is mathematically unable to defeat Fidesz alone – Jobbik’s votes and mandates are needed to deny Fidesz the majority of seats in the National As- sembly. Of course, Jobbik still keeps large chunks of its former radicalism, so argu ments about the price of coordinating or cooperating with Jobbik in any forms are valid. PÉTER KREKÓ | RETHINKING THE FAR RIGHT IN HUNGARY 1. Fidesz has become more radical than er of the party since 2006, Gábor Vona – who the far-right Jobbik on numerous issues gave the party momentum by expressing hatred against Roma and politicians, and formed the Since the second Orbán government was elected party’s paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard – in 2010, the political landscape in Hungary has decided to bring his party closer to the political been characterized by the permanent presence of mainstream, hoping to be able to replace Fidesz a populist right-wing party (Fidesz) and an ex- after the 2018 general election. The party, follow- treme right-wing party (Jobbik). But times are ing the examples of the French far-right leader changing. Jobbik and Fidesz have practically trad- Marine Le Pen and Serbian President Alexander ed places. This is the consequence of two parallel Vucic, was successfully and substantially re- tendencies: Fidesz’s shift to the right and Jobbik’s branded in a few years. turn towards the centre. Before 2013, Jobbik was the most rejected party, First, Fidesz has been gradually shifting to an in- according to polls. Today, the Socialist Party is creasingly authoritarian, illiberal right-wing posi- subject to far more hostility from voters than tion, which accelerated in 2015 at the beginning Jobbik. This ‘centrist shift’ is far from being com- of the refugee crisis. Viktor Orbán is the only po- pletely consistent. Although some extremist pol- litical leader in Central and Eastern Europe who is iticians (Előd Novák, former vice president) have not just constructing an illiberal regime, using been sidelined, others are still in leading positions Russia as a model, but also proudly labels it ‘illib- (for example, László Toroczkai, mayor of Ásot- eral’. Domestically, Fidesz implemented most of thalom). Vona’s intention to occupy the centre of the measures proposed by Jobbik between 2010 the political spectrum that Fidesz has abandoned and 2014. seems to be genuine. His motivations are, beyond doubt, rational and self-interested: to gain gov- However, a number of things changed after Or- ernment power. Nevertheless, his efforts have bán’s re-election in 2014. First, Orbán decided to brought about a substantial change in the parties’ launch his personal ‘freedom fight’, getting rid of politics and policies: Jobbik has turned down the the oligarchic structures that constrained him and volume of hate speech and has transformed itself replacing them with structures more loyal to him. into a pro-European party from a party that was Viktor Orbán’s war with his previously favoured burning EU flags just a few years ago. Its main oligarch, Lajos Simicska, began in 2015, when the topics are no longer refugees or Roma anymore, prime minister tried to sideline previously the but corruption, education and health care. Re- most then on, Simicska started to support Jobbik, cently Jobbik even defended the Central Europe- then the strongest opposition party. Fidesz, feel- an University (CEU) and voted against the law ing threatened, turned against the far-right party. that aims to restrict it, criticized the Hungarian Coincidentally, soon after that the refugee crisis government’s anti-Soros campaign and also vot- broke out, and Hungary became one of the front- ed against the NGO law, which is pretty similar to line states on the Balkans Route. The increasingly the Russian legislation on ‘foreign agents’ – even unpopular Orbán grasped his big opportunity to though it had drafted a similar bill quite recently. take back political control and regain popularity by On most issues, Jobbik takes a softer approach playing the role of the crusader, keeping Muslims than Fidesz these days. away from Hungary and Europe. Consequently, Fidesz became a genuine far-right party as it put The real moments of truth lie in parliamentary de- xenophobia at the heart of its politics – even ac- bates. In the National Assembly, Orbán has re- cording to some most notable scholars of the Far peatedly attacked Vona for being too soft, and Right, including Cas Mudde. has also suggested he is gay, a view Orbán’s pro- paganda machine is trying to spread in order to At the same time, Jobbik has gradually been discredit Vona in the eyes of his supporters. moving towards the centre since 2013. The lead- 2 PÉTER KREKÓ | RETHINKING THE FAR RIGHT IN HUNGARY There are practically too far-right parties in Hun- litical umbrella provided by a mainstream Europe- gary today: a genuine one and a softer version. an party group can, paradoxically, serve as a mod- Fidesz and Jobbik. Jobbik is only ‘Fidesz light’ erating factor. these days – but that makes it far less dangerous Also, Jobbik, when in power, would not intend to to democracy than Fidesz. erode democratic institutions further. While some assume that Jobbik’s hidden agenda is to imple- 2. Fidesz is more of a threat to democra- ment its ‘original’ racist programme, once in gov- cy than Jobbik nowadays ernment, it would be too much of a risk. More like- ly, they would follow a more moderate, more In recent years, Fidesz has built up a highly effi- predictable centrist political line to secure the sup- cient, nepotistic corruption machine. Furthermore, port of the mainstream. with the help of EU funds, it has built up an unprec- But what is important to underline: a coordination edentedly powerful business empire in Hungary – with Jobbik does not necessarily means giving a structure that would remain in place even after a them the executive power. change of government. 3. The Hungarian Left is mathematically On top of that, Orbán weeded out practically all unable to defeat Fidesz alone institutional elements hostile to him, as well as the consensual approach of the German political sys- As Orbán’s illiberal state continues to be built at an tem that had previously characterized Hungarian increasing pace, 2018 might be the last chance to politics to a certain extent since the democratic defeat it. The 2014 elections were highly unfair, al- transition. The Constitutional Court has almost beit still ‘free’, but the 2018 general election will be become a puppet of the government and the even more unfair and its degree of freedom highly mixed electoral system has been shifted towards questionable. Due to regulations introduced by Fi- a majoritarian one. His measures have led to an desz, opposition parties are unable to reach the unprecedented concentration of the media in electorate through political advertisements via Hungary; he has made the Chief Prosecutor’s Of- television, while the government is pushing its fice his extended hand; and he makes every effort narrative frantically, on every front. Opposition to suppress civil society. The harm Fidesz has parties are singled out by the Prosecutor’s Office done to Hungarian democracy is worse than that and by the State Audit Office as well. Jobbik is not of any government since the transition. Further- an exception but the rule – one Hungarian govern- more, a destructive campaign is ongoing against ment-organized think tank raised the issue of the European Union, blaming ‘Brussels’ as the banning the party, as they think Jobbik’s party fi- puppet of George Soros for every ill in the world nances are not transparent enough. Also, Jobbik and making it the centre of conspiracy theories. received the biggest fine from the State Audit Of- fice- more than 2 million euros, for highly ques- Jobbik, even on government, would have no tools tionable reasons. to further erode democracy. They have no eco- nomic background and no external and political There is an even larger problem. Fidesz’s support- support comparable to that of Fidesz. Further- ers easily outnumber the supporters of Hungarian more, while Fidesz is a member of the European left-wing and liberal parties. According to a recent People’s Party, Jobbik is at the margins of Europe- poll by Závecz Research Institute, Fidesz has 50 an politics – even the far-right EP group Europe of per cent of the votes among certain voters with a Nations and Freedom refused to include them. preferred party. The Hungarian Left has close to This means that they should do everything they 35 per cent – and leftist forces are more divided can to calm the nerves of the international com- than ever, with questionable willingness for step- munity by demonstrating they are no longer ex- ping back. Jobbik is favoured by almost 15 per tremist and generally ‘being a good boy’ in the cent of voters. It means that Jobbik and the eyes of the world.
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