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EPP Party Barometer August 2020

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EPP Party Barometer August 2020 EPP Party Barometer August 2020 The Situation of the European People’s Party in the EU (as of: 12 August 2020) prepared by Dr Olaf Wientzek (Graphic template: Janine www.kas.de Höhle, HA Kommunikation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) Summary and latest developments • In national polls, the EPP is the strongest political family in 11 countries (including the Hungarian Fidesz), the socialist political family in 6, the liberals/Renew in 3, far-right populists (ID) in 2, the Eurosceptic/national conservative ECR in 1, and the European Left / left-wing populists in 1. Added together, independent parties lead in Latvia. Slovakia is a special case: depending on where the Slovakian ‘Ordinary People’ party, represented in the EPP Group but not belonging to the EPP, is located, either the Independents or the EPP get another country added. No (parliamentary) polls/elections have taken place in France since the EP elections • The picture is similar if we look at the strongest single party and not the largest party family (Slide 5): Then the EPP leads in 11–12 countries (including Fidesz), the Socialists in 6–7 (in Latvia the EPP and Socialists are equal), Liberals in 3, right-wing populists (ID) in 2, EKR and European Left / left-wing populists in 1 each. See above re: Slovakia. • 10 (9 without Orban) of the 27 Heads of State and Government in the European Council currently belong to the EPP family, 7 to the Liberals/Renew, 6 to the Social Democrats / Socialists, 1 to the Eurosceptic conservatives, and 2 are formally independent. The Slovakian Head of Government’s party belongs to the EPP bloc but does not belong to the EPP as a party. • In many countries the lead is extremely narrow, or in some polls another party family is ahead (especially Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ireland, Belgium, Poland). Picture credits: fotolia.com Strongest political family in national polls (August 2020) Sweden Finland EPP family (shaded: membership suspended) PES/S&D Family (Social Democrats, Socialists) ACRE/ECR Family (Eurosceptic Conservatives) Estonia ALDE + Renew Family (Liberals) Far-right populists (ID et al.) Latvia Misc. populists Denmark GUE/NGL (far-left populists) Lithuania The Greens/EFA Ireland Netherlands Independents Poland: Scenario which presumes that former presidential candidate No polls since Poland Holownia runs with his new movement the EP election Germany Slovakia Belgium Czech Republic Luxembourg Hungary* 4. Romania France Slovenia Italy Croatia Bulgaria 2. 1. Austria Portugal Spain Greece Cyprus Malta Created by: Olaf Wientzek Picture credits: fotolia.com Strongest single party in national polls (August 2020) Sweden Finland EPP Family PES/S&D Family (Social Democrats, Socialists) ACRE/ECR Family (Eurosceptic Conservatives) Estonia ALDE + Renew Family (Liberals) Far-right populists (ID et al.) Latvia Misc. populists Denmark GUE/NGL (far-left populists) Lithuania The Greens/EFA Ireland Netherlands Independents Poland Germany Slovakia Belgium Czech Republic Luxembourg Hungary 4. Romania France Slovenia Italy Croatia Bulgaria 2. 1. Austria Portugal Spain Greece Cyprus Malta Created by: Olaf Wientzek Strength of the EPP family in EU member states Picture credits: fotolia.com Cumulated election results of all EPP parties at the last national parliamentary elections as a percentage/initials of the strongest EPP party in the polls Sweden in bold & brackets//ratings of parties belonging to the EPP bloc 26.16 but not to the party shown as numerical value in brackets Legend Finland 20.90 0 – 5% 5 – 10% Estonia 10 – 15% 11.41 15 – 20% Latvia 20 – 25% 6.69 25 – 30% Denmark Lithuania 30 – 35% 8.30 Ireland 22.63 35 – 40% 20.90 Netherlands 40 – 50% 12.40 (18.80) Poland > 50% United Kingdom 35.95 Germany 0.00 Slovakia 32.90 11.11 (16.41) 14.08 (39.10) Belgium Czech Republic 12.59 Luxembourg 28.31 Hungary 4. 49.27 Romania France* 31.58 22.23 Italy 15.72 Croatia 37.26 Bulgaria 2. 35.71 1. Austria Portugal Spain 37.46 32.00 Greece 20.82 Slovenia 39.85 34.70 Cyprus Malta 30.69 43.68 Created by: Olaf Wientzek Picture credits: fotolia.com Cumulated poll ratings of all EPP parties in national polls as of: August 2020 as a percentage/initials of the strongest EPP party in the polls in bold & brackets//ratings of parties belonging to the EPP bloc Sweden (2022) but not to the party shown as numerical value in brackets 27.20 Legend Finland (2023) 0 – 5% 20.90 5 – 10% 10 – 15% Estonia (2023) 15 – 20% 6.40 20 – 25% Latvia (2022) The Latvian JKP announced in the European Parliament that it wanted to join 16.00 25 – 30% the EPP bloc but is not yet part of the EPP. It is currently on 11% in the polls Denmark (2023) 30 – 35% Lithuania (2020) 9.50 35 – 40% Ireland (2025) 22.84 29.00 Netherlands (2021) 40 – 50% Poland: Scenario which presumes 11.30 (16.64) that former presidential candidate > 50% Poland (2023) Holownia runs with his new 34.09 movement Germany (2021) Slovakia (2024) 38.00 10.00 (16.00) 8.70 (32.20) Belgium*** (2019) Czech Republic (2021) 10.22 Luxembourg*** (2023) *Fidesz’s membership of the EPP was 27.50 Hungary* (2022) suspended by both the EPP and 4. 51.00 Romania(2020) Fidesz on 20 March 2019 France (2022) 42.90 Italy (2023) Croatia (2024) 7.00 Bulgaria (2021) 2. 39.00 1. Austria (2024) Portugal (2023) Spain (2023) 41.00 28.80 Greece (2023) 25.20 Slovenia (2022) 46.50 37.57 Cyprus (2021) Malta 38.90 Created by: Olaf Wientzek 41.00 Picture credits: fotolia.com Comparison of August 2020 poll results of all EPP parties compared to last national elections (cumulative) Sweden as a percentage +1.04 Legend Finland -10 to - 20% +-0 - 5 to - 10% - 1 to - 5% Estonia - 1 to + 1% -5.01 + 1 to + 5% Latvia +9.31 + 5 to + 10% Denmark Above + 10% Lithuania +1.20 +0.21 No polls since Ireland election or election +8.10 Netherlands took place fewer -1.10 (-2.16) Poland: Scenario which presumes than six weeks ago that former presidential candidate Poland Holownia runs with his new -1.86 movement Germany Slovakia +5.10 Belgium*** Czech Republic -5.38 (-6.90) +2.37 -1.11 (-0.41) Luxembourg *Fidesz’s membership of the EPP was -0.81 Hungary* suspended by both the EPP and 4. +1.73 Romania Fidesz on 20 March 2019 France +11.32 Italy Croatia -8.72 Bulgaria 2. +3.29 1. Austria Portugal Spain +3.54 -3.20 +4.38 Greece Slovenia +6.65 +2.87 Cyprus Malta +8.21 Created by: Olaf Wientzek -2.68 Will the “corona crisis effect” continue? Will the “corona crisis effect” continue? • Short answer: For the most part yes, but not to the same extent as in May • Long answer: In 16 of the 27 EU countries, the party of the incumbent head of state or government can report a significant boost in support compared to March 2020 (in the case of France, only support for the president can be measured), so one can to a certain extent speak of a solidarity effect – In only a few countries has the largest ruling party lost support • Romania (although coming from a very high level), Slovakia (although the government only took office until March), Bulgaria (current protests are focussed on non-corona issues) – It is evident that the corona crisis boost is already subsiding in some countries. This is also happening in countries where this effect is still persisting – but now to a lesser extent than in May – in Germany, the increase in support for the larger governing party is – in comparison to other European countries – very pronounced – Junior coalition partners profit much less frequently from the COVID-19 solidarity effect – In some countries with a low polling frequency (Cyprus, Luxembourg, Belgium), the term “corona crisis effect” should be used with great caution. – In general, changes in the polls may also involve aspects that are NOT related to corona Picture credits: fotolia.com Comparison of the poll ratings of the head of state/government’s party or the largest governing party (IT, LIT), March vs. August 2020 A number of polls were considered here. Ratings prior to the coronavirus and current poll ratings are compared. Shaded: Polls Sweden exhibit a mixed picture Legend Finland Very negative (losses of more than 10%) Negative (losses of 5 to 10%) Lower losses (2 to 5%) Estonia No significant change or contradictory results Slightly positive (up to 5%) Latvia Positive (+ 5 to + 10%) Denmark Extremely positive (gains Lithuania*** of more than 10%) Unknown/ / Ireland (only based on FG) *No polls since the beginning of the corona crisis No polls since Netherlands **As no up-to-date polls are available election or from France, the comparison only election took Poland relates to the regularly surveyed place fewer than popularity of the president six weeks ago Germany Slovakia *** The prime ministers of Italy and Lithuania are independent. In this Czech Republic case, the poll ratings relate to the Belgium largest governing party or the party the prime ministers belonged to Luxembourg previously Hungary 4. Romania France** Italy*** Croatia Bulgaria* 2. 1. Austria Portugal Spain Greece Slovenia Cyprus Malta Created by: Olaf Wientzek The EPP family’s participation in government Picture credits: fotolia.com The participation of EPP family parties in government, as of 12 August 2020 Sweden ₁ Finland Government without the participation of an EPP party, but with a representative in the European Council belonging to the EPP family Estonia Parties in the EPP family involved in government (shaded top left to bottom right: Latvia outgoing government; participation unclear) Head of state/government belongs to EPP family Denmark Lithuania Ireland Netherlands Poland United Kingdom Germany Slovakia** **The party to which Slovakia’s head of government belongs is part of the EPP Group in the European Parliament but Belgium Czech Republic is not part of the EPP party Luxembourg *Fidesz’s membership of the EPP was Hungary* suspended by both the EPP and 4.
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