Balcells, Laia & Stathis Kalyvas. 2014. Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(8)

Please use citation above if you use data from the replication datasets and/or from the online appendix

ONLINE APPENDIXg

Appendix I. Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A1. Technologies of Rebellion and Rebel Group Size 60,000 40,000 mean of rebestimate of mean 20,000 0 Conventional Irregular SNC

Figure A2. Duration of Civil Wars by Technology of Rebellion, in Months (PRIO100 Dataset)

Figure A3. Outcomes by Decade (% Within Decade). PRIO100 Dataset

100

90

80

70 Rebels 60 Won

50 Draw 40 Incumbent 30 Won 20

10

0 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s

Figure A4. Outcomes by Decade (% Within Decade). TR Dataset

90%

80%

70%

60% Rebels Won 50% Draw 40% Inc. Won 30%

20%

10%

0% 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s

Table A1. Cases in the TR dataset that changed over time

Country Name Year Start Year End TR Start TR End

Afghanistan 1978 1992 Irregular Conventional Cambodia 1970 1975 Irregular Conventional Colombia 1948 1966 SNC Irregular Cuba 1958 1959 Irregular Conventional Ethiopia 1974 1991 Irregular Conventional Ethiopia 1978 1991 Irregular Conventional Greece 1944 1949 Irregular Conventional Nicaragua 1978 1979 Irregular Conventional Russia 1994 1996 Conventional Irregular Uganda 1981 1987 Irregular Conventional Vietnam 1960 1975 Irregular Conventional Sudan 2003 2011 SNC Irregular

Table A2. Technologies of Rebellion and Fearon’s (2004) Civil War Categories

POPULAR COUPS SONS OF THE SOIL REVOLUTIONS

No Yes Total No Yes Total No Yes Total

Conv 22 14 36 33 3 36 36 0 36 61.11 38.89 100 91.67 8.33 100 100 0.00 100

Irregular 58 3 61 47 14 61 58 3 61 95.08 4.92 100 77.05 22.95 100 95.08 4.92 100

SNC 8 2 10 10 0 10 10 0 10 80.00 20.00 100 100.00 0.00 100 100 0.00 100

Total 88 19 107 90 17 107 104 3 107 82.24 17.76 100 84.11 15.89 100 97.20 2.80 100

Table A3. Multinomial Logit on Civil War Outcomes. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric civil wars (TR Dataset)

M1 M2 M3 Rebel Victory Symmetric War 1.81*** 1.34** 1.55** (0.47) (0.56) (0.64) New State -0.34 -0.85 (0.60) (0.68) Rough Terrain 0.0038 0.0089 (0.0089) (0.0098) Population (Log) -0.072 -0.098 (0.18) (0.23) Per capita inc (FL) -0.12 -0.33 (0.18) (0.26) Oil (FL) -0.93 -0.055 (0.76) (0.89) Ethfrac (FL) -0.25 -0.14 (1.02) (1.30) Dem (Lag) (FL) -0.85 -1.41 (0.70) (0.88) Extsupp_gov_bi -0.73 -0.67 (0.57) (0.71) Extsupp_reb_bi 1.24** 1.62** (0.59) (0.72) Post 1990 1.71** 1.64** (0.67) (0.70) Eurasia 1.44 (1.03) Latin America 1.44 (1.21) MENA -1.49 (1.27) Sub-saharan Africa -0.31 (1.04) Constant -1.77*** -0.97 -1.06 (0.38) (2.19) (2.90)

Draw Symmetric War 0.86** 0.26 0.27 (0.41) (0.47) (0.51) New State -0.023 -0.019 (0.75) (0.83) Rough Terrain 0.0042 0.0088 (0.0089) (0.0098) Population (Log) -0.26 -0.26 (0.18) (0.22) Per capita inc (FL) -0.17 -0.23 (0.26) (0.31) Oil (FL) -1.29 -0.82 (0.81) (0.90) Ethfrac (FL) 0.34 0.44 (0.95) (1.09) Dem (Lag) (FL) -0.16 -0.037 (0.60) (0.72) Extsupp_gov_bi 0.39 0.55 (0.64) (0.72) Extsupp_reb_bi 0.82* 0.98* (0.49) (0.53) Post 1990 1.61** 1.61** (0.68) (0.65) Eurasia 0.84 (1.27) Latin America 1.07 (1.05) MENA -0.14 (1.06) Sub-saharan Africa 0.14 (0.86) Constant -1.08*** 0.76 0.17 (0.29) (1.86) (2.59) Observations 145 133 133 Pseudo R2 0.059 0.187 0.220 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 In these Multinomial Logit models, Incumbent Won is the base category

Table A4. Binomial Logit on Rebel Gains (Rebel Victories and Draws) (TR Dataset)

M1 M2 M3

Conv (Final year) 1.16*** 0.77* 0.81* (0.37) (0.43) (0.46) SNC (Final year) 1.77*** 0.50 0.56 (0.63) (0.80) (0.88) New State -0.20 -0.34 (0.59) (0.68) Rough Terrain 0.0036 0.0077 (0.0088) (0.0099) Population (Log) -0.20 -0.20 (0.16) (0.20) Per capita inc (FL) -0.12 -0.21 (0.18) (0.22) Oil (FL) -1.20* -0.60 (0.63) (0.71) Ethnic Fract (FL) 0.12 0.19 (0.83) (1.00) Democracy (FL) -0.38 -0.42 (0.52) (0.70) Extsupp_gov_bi -0.10 0.062 (0.49) (0.57) Extsupp_reb_bi 0.97** 1.18** (0.44) (0.49) Post 1990 1.71*** 1.68*** (0.59) (0.58) Eurasia 1.02 (1.04) Latin America 1.17 (0.97) MENA -0.74 (0.96) Sub-saharan Africa -0.014 (0.82) Constant -0.67*** 0.91 0.52 (0.25) (1.76) (2.44) Observations 145 133 133 Pseudo R2 0.076 0.220 0.252 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table A5. Multinomial Logit on Civil War Outcomes (PRIO100)

M1 M2 M3 Rebel Victory Conv 1.23* 0.91 0.91 (0.63) (0.68) (0.68) SNC -0.14 -0.46 -0.46 (1.34) (1.48) (1.48) New State 0.90 0.81 0.81 (1.01) (1.07) (1.07) Oil (FL) -0.020 0.14 0.14 (0.70) (0.82) (0.82) Ethnic Fract (FL) -1.84* -1.39 -1.39 (1.01) (1.05) (1.05) Democracy (FL) -2.02* -2.11 -2.11 (1.20) (1.30) (1.30) Rough Terrain -0.14 -0.085 -0.085 (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) Population (Log) -0.023 -0.28 -0.28 (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) Per capita inc (Penn) -0.095 -0.25** -0.25** (0.087) (0.13) (0.13) Post 1990 0.30 0.24 0.24 (0.57) (0.68) (0.68) Western & Japan -8.88*** -8.88*** (3.35) (3.35) E. Europe 4.58*** 4.58*** (1.34) (1.34) Asia (-Japan) 0.68 0.68 (1.11) (1.11) Sub-Saharan Africa 0.085 0.085 (1.10) (1.10) Latin America 0.77 0.77 (1.19) (1.19) Constant 0.68 2.64 2.64 (1.95) (2.25) (2.25) Draw Conv 0.96 0.78 0.78 (0.63) (0.72) (0.72) SNC 1.22 0.90 0.90 (0.82) (0.88) (0.88) New State -0.26 -0.11 -0.11 (1.40) (1.47) (1.47) Oil (FL) -0.87 -0.75 -0.75 (0.73) (0.93) (0.93) Ethnic Fract (FL) 0.0089 0.74 0.74 (1.04) (1.18) (1.18) Democracy (FL) -0.50 -0.57 -0.57 (0.61) (0.74) (0.74) Rough Terrain -0.19 -0.054 -0.054 (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) Population (Log) -0.16 -0.55** -0.55** (0.18) (0.27) (0.27) Per capita inc (Penn) 0.054 -0.039 -0.039 (0.057) (0.11) (0.11) Post 1990 0.70 1.13** 1.13** (0.48) (0.54) (0.54) Western & Japan 6.00** 6.00** (2.47) (2.47) E. Europe 4.49*** 4.49*** (1.45) (1.45) Asia (-Japan) 1.40 1.40 (1.58) (1.58) Sub-Saharan Africa 0.94 0.94 (1.61) (1.61) Latin America 1.84 1.84 (1.46) (1.46) Constant 0.67 2.44 2.44 (1.59) (2.78) (2.78) Observations 130 130 130 Pseudo R2 0.131 0.223 0.223 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 In these Multinomial Logit models, Incumbent Won is the base category

Table A6. Multinomial Logit on Civil War Outcomes. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric civil wars (PRIO100 Dataset)

M1 M2 M3 Rebel Victory Symmetric War 1.14* 0.69 0.69 (0.62) (0.68) (0.68) New State 1.02 1.27 1.27 (1.28) (1.39) (1.39) Oil (FL) 0.16 0.33 0.33 (0.75) (0.88) (0.88) Ethnic Fract (FL) -0.83 -0.80 -0.80 (1.08) (1.15) (1.15) Democracy (FL) -16.0*** -18.0*** -18.0*** (0.60) (0.78) (0.78) Rough Terrain -0.021 0.12 0.12 (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) Population (Log) 0.038 -0.31 -0.31 (0.23) (0.28) (0.28) Per capita inc (Penn) -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) Post 1990 0.62 0.66 0.66 (0.58) (0.70) (0.70) Western & Japan -11.2*** -11.2*** (3.64) (3.64) E. Europe 4.74*** 4.74*** (1.62) (1.62) Asia (-Japan) 1.81 1.81 (1.26) (1.26) Sub-Saharan Africa 1.10 1.10 (1.26) (1.26) Latin America 0.55 0.55 (1.40) (1.40) Constant -1.10 0.86 0.86 (2.47) (2.76) (2.76)

Draw Symmetric 0.96* 0.65 0.65 (0.54) (0.61) (0.61) New State -0.24 -0.14 -0.14 (1.41) (1.65) (1.65) Oil (FL) -0.91 -0.82 -0.82 (0.76) (1.05) (1.05) Ethnic Fract (FL) 0.21 0.76 0.76 (1.06) (1.20) (1.20) Democracy (FL) -0.50 -0.67 -0.67 (0.64) (0.81) (0.81) Rough Terrain -0.19 0.00090 0.00090 (0.18) (0.23) (0.23) Population (Log) -0.17 -0.55** -0.55** (0.17) (0.26) (0.26) Per capita inc (Penn) 0.050 -0.024 -0.024 (0.056) (0.11) (0.11) Post 1990 0.76 1.20** 1.20** (0.50) (0.58) (0.58) Western & Japan 6.01** 6.01** (2.48) (2.48) E. Europe 4.58*** 4.58*** (1.52) (1.52) Asia (-Japan) 1.58 1.58 (1.72) (1.72) Sub-Saharan Africa 1.28 1.28 (1.79) (1.79) Latin America 1.76 1.76 (1.63) (1.63) Constant 0.75 2.19 2.19 (1.53) (2.91) (2.91) Observations 121 121 121 Pseudo R2 0.141 0.237 0.237 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 In these Multinomial Logit models, Incumbent Won is the base category

Table A7. Binomial Logits on Rebel Gains (Draws and Rebel Victories) (PRIO100 dataset)

M1 M2 M3

Conv 1.09** 0.81 0.81 (0.54) (0.60) (0.60) SNC 0.88 0.59 0.59 (0.77) (0.83) (0.83) New State 0.37 0.38 0.38 (0.99) (1.08) (1.08) Oil (FL) -0.52 -0.29 -0.29 (0.56) (0.65) (0.65) Ethnic Fract (FL) -0.95 -0.57 -0.57 (0.84) (0.88) (0.88) Democracy (FL) -0.93* -1.08 -1.08 (0.55) (0.70) (0.70) Rough Terrain -0.21 -0.094 -0.094 (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) Population (Log) -0.083 -0.37** -0.37** (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) Per capita inc (Penn) 0.011 -0.12 -0.12 (0.052) (0.11) (0.11) Post 1990 0.55 0.77 0.77 (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) Western & Japan 5.81* 5.81* (3.12) (3.12) E. Europe 3.96*** 3.96*** (1.23) (1.23) Asia (-Japan) 0.90 0.90 (1.03) (1.03) Sub-Saharan Africa 0.44 0.44 (1.07) (1.07) Latin America 1.09 1.09 (0.99) (0.99) Constant 1.37 3.15 3.15 (1.35) (2.00) (2.00) Observations 130 130 130 Pseudo R2 0.111 0.219 0.219 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A8. Determinants of Technologies of Rebellion (TR Dataset) M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Conv Rough Terr 0.0041 0.0028 0.0085 0.0026 0.0027 0.0048 (0.0078) (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0088) Ethnic War 0.17 0.12 -0.42 -0.099 -0.044 -0.55 (0.45) (0.43) (0.53) (0.46) (0.45) (0.55) Per capita inc 0.039 -0.020 0.24 0.0012 0.014 0.15 (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) Post 1990 1.42*** 1.09** (0.49) (0.53) New 2.58** 1.31 postcomm (1.15) (1.39) Marxist ins -1.63** -1.40** (0.64) (0.67) Mil. Personnel -0.000035 -0.000083 -0.00011 (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00020) Constant -1.11** -0.77* -0.41 -0.76* -0.61 -0.13 (0.46) (0.42) (0.50) (0.44) (0.44) (0.53) SNC Rough Terr -0.025 -0.034 -0.030 -0.026* -0.028* -0.025 (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) Ethnic War -0.24 -0.28 -1.20* 0.61 -0.086 -0.71 (0.61) (0.56) (0.62) (0.86) (0.59) (0.65) Per capita inc -0.47* -0.28 -0.17 0.42 -0.080 0.26 (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.43) (0.31) (0.32) Post 1990 2.76*** 3.40*** (0.68) (0.81) New -10.7*** -11.6*** postcomm (1.28) (1.80) Marxist ins -17.1*** -16.9*** (0.50) (0.54) Mil. Personnel -0.031** -0.017** -0.018** (0.014) (0.0079) (0.0091) Constant -1.22** -0.36 0.53 -1.89* 0.076 0.58 (0.53) (0.65) (0.67) (0.99) (0.68) (0.65) Observations 137 137 137 124 124 124 Pseudo R2 0.131 0.075 0.125 0.177 0.090 0.157 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Irregular is the base category. This Table is a replication of Table 3 in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) Table A9. Determinants of Technologies of Rebellion (PRIO100 Dataset)

M1 M4 Conventional Rough Terrain 0.23* 0.18 (0.12) (0.11) Per capita inc (Maddison) -0.20** -0.18** (0.086) (0.076) Post 1990 0.52** 0.69*** (0.21) (0.24) Military Personnel (COW) -0.0012** (0.00059) Constant -2.35*** -1.91*** (0.38) (0.37) SNC Rough Terrain -0.92*** -0.65*** (0.21) (0.25) Per capita inc (Maddison) -0.59 -1.09* (0.53) (0.62) Post 1990 1.59*** 1.28** (0.48) (0.50) Military Personnel (COW) -0.043*** (0.013) Constant -1.42* 0.45 (0.72) (0.90) Observations 882 801 Pseudo R2 0.085 0.158 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Irregular is the base category This Table is a replication of Table 3 in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) with the PRIO100 dataset, and without the variables Ethnic War, Marxist Insurgents and the New Postcommunist State (they are unavailable in this dataset).

Table A10. Ordinal Logit on Intentional Victimization of Civilians (1956-2004) with Original 5-Categories Ordinal Variable

M1 M2 M3

Conventional -0.12 -0.94*** -0.92*** (0.27) (0.32) (0.35) SNC -1.65 -2.19** -2.08* (1.01) (1.05) (1.08) Population (Log) (FL) -0.12 -0.11 (0.089) (0.14) Democracy (FL) -1.15** -1.27*** (0.45) (0.45) Oil Exporter (FL) 1.52*** 1.71*** (0.25) (0.27) Ethnic Fract. (FL) 0.35 0.041 (0.53) (0.54) Rough Terrain (FL) 0.32*** 0.34*** (0.11) (0.13) Per capia income (Maddison) (thousands -0.51*** -0.44** of 1990 int. $) (0.12) (0.20) Western D & Japan -6.76*** (1.57) E. Europe 3.23*** (1.11) Asia (-Japan) 3.17*** (1.05) Sub-Saharan Africa 3.14*** (1.04) Latin America 3.33*** (0.97) cut1 Constant 1.26*** -0.15 2.96** (0.099) (0.79) (1.34) cut2 Constant 1.36*** -0.0021 3.12** (0.10) (0.79) (1.33) cut3 Constant 1.48*** 0.17 3.30** (0.10) (0.78) (1.33) cut4 Constant 1.60*** 0.35 3.49*** (0.11) (0.79) (1.34) cut5 Constant 1.72*** 0.53 3.67*** (0.11) (0.79) (1.34) cut6 Constant 1.97*** 0.81 3.96*** (0.12) (0.79) (1.34) cut7 Constant 2.36*** 1.26 4.41*** (0.14) (0.79) (1.34) cut8 Constant 3.15*** 2.17*** 5.33*** (0.19) (0.81) (1.34) cut9 Constant 4.11*** 3.16*** 6.33*** (0.30) (0.87) (1.37) cut10 Constant 5.14*** 4.09*** 7.26*** (0.50) (0.96) (1.43) Observations 710 584 584 Pseudo R2 0.003 0.115 0.135 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Descripitive Statistics. TR Dataset

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Technology of Rebellion 147 1.782313 0.646561 1 3 TR at the End of the War 147 1.714286 0.6516575 1 3 Civil War Outcome 145 1.262069 0.8251321 0 2 New State 146 0.130137 0.3376123 0 1 Rough Terrain 146 55.12364 288.0988 0 3043 Population (Log) 140 9.373869 1.851905 3.959942 13.65242 GDP per Capita (FL) 137 1.55531 1.365132 0.05 6.243 Oil Exporter (FL) 147 0.2040816 0.4044068 0 1 Ethnic Fractionalization (FL) 147 0.510994 0.2921278 0.0041175 0.9016318 Democracy (FL) 145 0.1655172 0.3729349 0 1 External Government Support (Dummy) 147 0.7278912 0.4465672 0 1 External Rebel Support (Dummy) 147 0.5510204 0.4990906 0 1 Asia (Dummy) 147 0.2585034 0.4393088 0 1 Eurasia (Dummy) 147 0.122449 0.3289243 0 1 Latin America (Dummy) 147 0.1020408 0.3037369 0 1 MENA (Dummy) 147 0.1564626 0.3645354 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa (Dummy) 147 0.3605442 0.4818 0 1 Duration (Months) 142 80.19014 92.66786 1 480 Post 1990 (Dummy) 147 0.3129252 0.4652694 0 1 Battledeaths (Lacina) 98 70328.66 246952.1 50 2097705 Battledeaths/Month 98 1889.567 5404.087 1.388889 35585.29 New Post Communist State 147 0.0816327 0.2747403 0 1 Marxist Insurgency 147 0.2312925 0.4231005 0 1 Military Personnel (COW) 129 421.4884 1090.373 1 5112

Descripitive Statistics. PRIO100 Dataset

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Technology of Rebellion 902 1.892461 0.3864646 1 3 Post 1990 (Dummy) 913 0.422782 0.4942722 0 1 Population (Log) 644 9.946 1.71 6.1 13.79 Rough Terrain (FL) 913 2.623216 1.116881 0 4.421247 GDP per capita (Pen World Tables) 797 3.688466 4.651956 0.1172273 25.47547 GDP per capita (Maddison) 893 2.669222 2.9423 0.2176754 17.54863 GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin) 818 2.266176 2.286453 0.05 13.08761 Military Personnel (COW) 820 377.85 620.84 0 4158 Oil Exporter (FL) 913 0.1380066 0.3450959 0 1 Non Contiguous Territory (FL) 913 0.3285871 0.4699569 0 1 Ethnic Fractionalization (FL) 913 0.5550296 0.2827423 0.0355107 0.9016318 Democracy (FL) 652 0.34 0.47 0 1 Civil War Outcome 845 1.310059 0.7824834 0 2 Final Year Outcome 212 1.382075 0.7910994 0 2 Western D. & Japan (Dummy) 913 0.0186199 0.1352526 0 1 Eastern Europe (Dummy) 913 0.0536692 0.2254873 0 1 Asia (Dummy) 913 0.3559693 0.4790684 0 1 Sub-Saharan Africa (Dummy) 913 0.2782037 0.4483599 0 1 Latin America (Dummy) 913 0.1347207 0.3416121 0 1 MENA (Dummy) 913 0.1588171 0.3657058 0 1 Battledeaths (Lacina) 913 7237.094 26853.9 100 350000 Battledeaths/Month 913 646.8359 2451.87 8.333333 38888.89 Civilian Victimization (Melander) 883 0.6234428 1.26529 0 5

Online Appendix II. Coding Protocols i. Technology of Rebellion

1. Conventional = State (Heavy weaponry) and Rebels (Heavy Weaponry) 2. Irregular = State (Heavy weaponry) and Rebels (Light Weaponry) 3. Symmetric non-conventional (SNC) = State (Light Weaponry) and Rebels (Light Weaponry)

Coding Procedure for Technology of Rebellion

With the help of research assistants we examined several reference works (see below) and case studies to ascertain whether rebels and governments in each conflict relied on military technology predominantly characterized by the use (a) of heavy armor and weaponry or (b) light weaponry. Our focus was on the first full year of the conflict.1 Examples of weaponry: Light [small arms, handheld guns, field mortar (ex. M120), small rockets and missiles (ex. RPG-7s antitank rocket propelled grenade weapon)]; heavy [tanks, helicopters, military vessels, artillery with exclusion of small rockets, missiles, and mortar]

We used the following coding procedure. We first asked whether the rebels used heavy armor and artillery during the entire first year of the conflict; if yes, we checked to see if the government used similar weapons. If it did, we coded the war as conventional. If the rebels relied instead on light weapons we, again, turned to the government’s military. If the government was able to field heavy armor and artillery, we coded the war as irregular; if not, we coded the war as symmetric non-conventional (SNC). In the codebooks, we include a list with all our cases, their value in the Technology of Rebellion variable, and supporting evidence from bibliographic sources,

1 We take the initial phase of a conflict to be the first year after this conflict enters in the dataset, i.e. once it reaches the 1,000 battledeath threshold. as well as from the experts. We also report alternative codifications for some of the cases, which we have used in robustness checks.2

TR Dataset: We also contacted 78 experts of the 147 conflicts in the 78 countries that enter in our dataset, and queried them about the military technology prevalent in these conflicts. We received responses from 23 experts who supplied us with information on 37 conflicts in 28 countries.

PRIO100 dataset: In order to build the PRIO100 dataset we used UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2009)

Using the data from “Battle Deaths Dataset” version 3.0 (Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population 21(2–3): 145–166.), we selected only those cases in which the number of deaths was over 100.

Given that the Battle Deaths dataset goes up to 2008, our PRIO100 dataset is bounded to this year.

- We took out all the international conflicts from the PRIO100 dataset. These amounted to a total of 43 conflicts taking place in a total of 76 years (the list of all the international conflicts available upon request). We kept decolonization wars in the dataset.

The codebooks with all cases in the TR and PRIO100 dataset, and their respective coding on the TR variable, as well as the sources used to code each of the cases will be made available from the author’s websites upon publication.

2 In the PRIO100 alternative coding we also include categories 4. Successful Military Coup; 5. Failed Military coup; these are not included the APSR2010 coding because it is a dataset of wars and does not have coups.

ii. Civil War Outcomes

Values:

0: Rebels Won 1: Draw 2: Incumbent Won

Definition: We follow Lyall and Wilson’s definition of outcome, despite we code some cases differently from them (See list below). From “Rage Against the Machines” Codebook and Replication Information (pp 1-2):

“Our dependent variable, outcome, is coded from the incumbent’s viewpoint. Following standard practice in studies of war, we operationalize outcome as a threefold variable (Win, Draw, Loss). A win occurs when the insurgency is militarily defeated and its organization destroyed, or the war ends without any political concessions granted to insurgent forces. Examples include Argentina’s defeat of the ERP (1973–77), the second Boer War (1899–1902), and the crushing of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines (1946–51). A draw occurs when an incumbent is forced to concede to some, but not all, insurgent demands, and neither side obtains its maximal aims. Typical examples of concessions include the voluntary disarmament of insurgents in exchange for greater participation in the state’s political affairs (that is, as a political party or as members of a power-sharing government) or the granting of greater regional autonomy (but not independence). The political settlement reached between Colombia’s government and the M-19 insurgent group, in which M-19 voluntarily demobilized in exchange for its participation as a political party, is one example of a draw. Similarly, Djibouti’s government struck a deal with its secessionist Afar rebels (FRUD) that traded FRUD’s demobilization for two of its leaders becoming cabinet members, thus ending the Afar insurgency (1991–94). We define a loss as a situation in which the incumbent unilaterally concedes to all, or nearly all, insurgent demands, including the granting of independence or the deposition of current leaders+ Examples include the United States in Vietnam, the USSR in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom against nationalist insurgents in Aden (1963–67) and the Chinese Nationalist government against PLA insurgents (1945– 49). (…) Our codings therefore reflect the political, rather than military, outcome of a given war.”

We have not followed Lyall and Wilson’s codification in all the cases. See below the list of civil wars and the corresponding value in the outcome variable. Brackets indicate Lyall and Wilson’s coding when it does not match ours. Note however that the list of civil wars Lyall and Wilson’s is not exactly the same as ours.

Country Name Year Start Outcome Greece 1944 Incumbent Won USSR (Latvia/LTSPA,etc.) 1944 Incumbent Won USSR (Lithuania/BDPS) 1944 Incumbent Won USSR (Estonia, Forest 1944 brothers) Incumbent Won USSR (Ukraine/UPA) 1944 Incumbent Won China 1946 Rebels Won China 1947 Incumbent Won (Incumbent Lost) Paraguay 1947 Incumbent Won Colombia 1948 Draw Costa Rica 1948 Rebels Won Korea 1948 Incumbent Won Myanmar/Burma 1948 (Communist Insurgency) Incumbent Won Myanmar/Burma (Karen 1948 Incumbent Won Rebellion) Yemen AR 1948 Incumbent Won China 1950 Incumbent Won Indonesia 1950 Incumbent Won Philippines 1950 Incumbent Won Bolivia 1952 Rebels Won Indonesia 1953 Incumbent Won Argentina 1955 Incumbent Won China 1956 Incumbent Won Indonesia 1956 Incumbent Won Cuba 1958 Rebels Won Lebanon 1958 Draw Iraq 1959 Incumbent Won Laos 1960 Draw Myanmar/Burma 1960 Draw Vietnam 1960 Rebels Won Congo-Zaire 1960 Incumbent Won Iraq 1961 Incumbent Won Yemen AR 1962 Draw (Incumbent Lost) Algeria 1962 Incumbent Won Cyprus 1963 Draw Kenya 1963 Incumbent Won Rwanda 1963 Incumbent Won Sudan 1963 Incumbent Won Burundi 1965 Incumbent Won Chad 1965 Rebels Won Dominican Republic 1965 Incumbent Won Guatemala 1966 Incumbent Won Thailand 1966 Incumbent Won Uganda 1966 Incumbent Won Nigeria 1967 Incumbent Won Congo-Zaire 1967 Incumbent Won Cambodia 1970 Rebels Won Jordan 1970 Incumbent Won Oman 1971 Incumbent Won Pakistan 1971 Rebels Won Philippines 1971 Draw (Incumbent Won) Sri Lanka 1971 Incumbent Won Philippines 1972 Incumbent Won Zimbabwe 1972 Draw (Incumbent Won) Burundi 1972 Incumbent Won Namibia 1973 Rebels Won Pakistan 1973 Incumbent Won (Draw) Bangladesh 1974 Draw Ethiopia 1974 Rebels Won Iraq 1974 Incumbent Won Cyprus 1974 Rebels Won Angola 1975 Draw Cambodia 1975 Draw Indonesia 1975 Rebels Won Lebanon 1975 Draw Morocco/Western Sahara 1975 Incumbent Won Ethiopia 1976 Incumbent Won Indonesia 1976 Incumbent Won Mozambique 1976 Draw Congo-Zaire 1977 Incumbent Won Afghanistan 1978 Rebels Won Colombia 1978 Ongoing Ethiopia 1978 Rebels Won Guatemala 1978 Draw Nicaragua 1978 Rebels Won (Draw) Uganda 1978 Rebels Won Iran 1979 Incumbent Won El Salvador 1979 Draw Chad 1980 Draw Nigeria 1980 Incumbent Won Peru 1980 Incumbent Won Nicaragua 1981 Draw Uganda 1981 Rebels Won Sri Lanka 1983 Draw Sudan 1983 Draw Zimbabwe 1983 Incumbent Won India 1984 Incumbent Won Turkey 1984 Incumbent Won (Draw) Iraq 1985 Incumbent Won (Draw) Yemen PR 1986 Incumbent Won Sri Lanka 1987 Incumbent Won Burundi 1988 Incumbent Won Papua New Guinea 1988 Incumbent Won Somalia 1988 Rebels Won (Incumbent Won) India (Kashmir) 1989 Incumbent Won India (Naxalites) 1989 Incumbent Won Liberia 1989 Draw Senegal 1989 Incumbent Won Indonesia 1990 Incumbent Won India 1990 Incumbent Won Mali 1990 Draw Rwanda 1990 Rebels Won Uganda 1990 Incumbent Won Azerbaijan 1991 Rebels Won Burundi 1991 Rebels Won Yugoslavia (Croatia) 1991 Rebels Won Djibouti 1991 Draw Georgia 1991 Rebels Won Haiti 1991 Rebels Won Iraq 1991 Incumbent Won (Draw) Kenya 1991 Draw Moldova 1991 Rebels Won Sierra Leone 1991 Incumbent Won Somalia 1991 Draw Afghanistan 1992 Rebels Won Algeria 1992 Incumbent Won Angola 1992 Draw Bosnia 1992 Draw (Incumbent Won) Croatia 1992 Incumbent Won Georgia 1992 Rebels Won Liberia 1992 Draw Tajikistan 1992 Draw (Incumbent Won) Congo-Brazzaville 1993 Rebels Won Angola 1994 Incumbent Won Chad 1994 Draw Egypt 1994 Incumbent Won Russia (Chechnya) 1994 Draw Rwanda 1994 Rebels Won Yemen 1994 Incumbent Won Uganda 1995 Incumbent Won (Draw) Afghanistan 1996 Rebels Won Central African Republic 1996 Draw (Incumbent Lost) Nepal 1996 Draw Congo-Zaire 1996 Rebels Won Angola 1997 Incumbent Won Congo-Brazzaville 1998 Rebels Won Guinea-Bissau 1998 Rebels Won Yugoslavia 1998 Rebels Won Congo-Zaire 1998 Draw Indonesia 1999 Draw Liberia 1999 Rebels Won Russia 1999 Incumbent Won Afghanistan 2001 Ongoing Ivory Coast 2002 Draw* Chad 2003 Incumbent Won Iraq 2003 Incumbent Won Sri Lanka 2003 Incumbent Won Sudan 2003 Draw Thailand 2004 Incumbent Won

*This does not include the 2010-2011 relapse of the conflict, which ended in Rebel Victory.

iii. Coding of Conflict End and Duration in the PRIO100 dataset

The main analyses in the paper are survival analysis with one failure. "warid_alt" identifies separately each conflict episode which ends (or is censored) as signaled by "ended_surv_alt". Here Colombia (id=92) and Zaire (327<=id2<=329) each appears as one conflict that has gaps and which ends (or is censored) only once.

Stata Code: drop warend destring(ended_surv_alt), gen(warend) drop warbegin gen warbegin=0 sort warid_alt year by warid_alt: replace warbegin=1 if _n==1 drop origyear gen origyear=. replace origyear=date("0101"+string(year), "DMY") if warbegin==1 replace origyear=date("3112"+string(year-1), "DMY") stset curyear, id(warid_alt) failure(warend==1) time0(origyear) origin(time origyear) scale(30.41667) //

//

In an alternative specification, we run a survival analysis with multiple failures. Each conflict is identified using "id" and has multiple episodes which end as signaled by "ended_surv". Here Colombia (id=92) and Zaire (327<=id2<=329) each appears as one conflict with multiple episodes that end (or censored).

Stata Code: gen warbegin=0 sort id year by id: replace warbegin=1 if _n==1 gen origyear=. replace origyear=date("0101"+string(year), "DMY") if warbegin==1 replace origyear=date("0101"+string(year), "DMY") replace origyear=date("3112"+string(year-1), "DMY") stset curyear, id(id) failure(warend==1) origin (time origyear) time0(origyear) scale(30.41667) exit(time .)

// //

iii. External Support

We code all cases in the TR dataset for external support received by rebels and by governments. We classify the cases in four different categories: No Support, Low, Medium and High. All coding decisions are backed up with sources.

ID Country yr start Gvt extSupp Rebel extSupp Notes

1 Afghanistan 1978 High: Soviet support for PDPA (military and economic High: US, Saudi Arabia, PDPA successfully overthrew government in April 1978. Strong assistance)1 Pakistan, China, British bilateral relations with Soviet Union (Treaty of Friendship and (Mujahideen, PDPA) support for Mujahideen Cooperation). Mounting tensions in 1979, installment of Soviet (arms, training, economic troops, assassination of HoS Amin and installment of Karmal. support)2 High Soviet presence until 1989.

2 Afghanistan 1992 Low: withdrawal of Superpowers, failure of High: Pakistan first Hezb-i-Islami’s failure to topple Afghani government led to government of national unity3 supported Hezb-i-Islami,4 decline in Pakistani support in 1994. Instead, Pakistan started (Taliban v. then shifted support to assisting Taliban. Burhanuddin Rabbani) Taliban

3 Afghanistan 1996 High: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia (arms, economic High: Russia, Tajikistan, assistance, training) for Taliban56 Uzbekistan, Iran, India (United Front v. support Northern Alliance Taliban) (weapons, fuel, training)7

4 Algeria 1992 High: France, Tunisia, Morrocco, Egypt (arms, Low: Sudan (arms), coordinated attacks)8, Soviet Union/Russia (FIS, AIS, GIA, GSPC) (substantial arms supply)9

5 Angola 1975 High: Cuba (troops), USSR (training, advisors, High: US (material Zaire and US withdrew support for FNLA during the late 1970s. material support)1011 support, advisors) South US shifted support to UNITA, FNLA collapsed. (UNITA) Africa (air support, troops, military advisors), Zaire (territory)12

6 Angola 1992 Low: withdrawal of communist support in Low: after US withdrawal 1988(UCDP), finance from oil exports13 of assistance in mid-80s, (UNITA) UNITA financed fight with diamonds. DRC and Congo allow retreat on their territory14

7 Angola 1997 High: Namibia (troops, territory) starting in 1999, Low: no support for leading to UNITA defeat15 UNITA, funding through (UNITA) diamonds (UCDP)

8 Angola 1994 Low: no significant support (Gold 2007) Low: DRC, Congo (territory)16 (Cabinda; FLEC)

9 Argentina 1955 Low: Peron received some economic support from Low: Argentinian military the US (loans and knowledge to build steel mills)17 supported by catholic (Peron vs. military) church (ideological support)18

11 Azerbaijan 1991 Medium: Turkey (military and economic assistance)19 High: Armenia for Since 2001, US support for Azerbaijan (Coalition War against Nagorno-Karabakh Terrorism)22. (Nagorno-Karabakh) (troops, budget transfers)2021 Russia plays ambiguous role: Supports both sides, seems to obstruct peace process to keep both sides weak and keep its influence (Khalid)

12 Bangladesh 1974 High: British and US provide training, financial Medium: Possibly Indian support since 1975. Large dependence on foreign support (arms, territory, (Chittagong aid.23 24 training) for JSS25 Hills/Shanti Bahini) 13 Bolivia 1952 Low: US-Bolivian tensions had led to economic crisis Low: armed through the Massive dependence of MNR after 1952 on US: US bought and before coup.26 ceisure of national processed most of Bolivian tin. MNR had to accede many US (MNR rebellion in La arsenals, mobilized miners demands because of this economic dependence2728 Paz) (ACED 2000)

14 Bosnia 1992 High: 1992-1994: UNPROFOR (Peacekeeper), NATO High: Greece (weapons, The change in policy of NATO originated from the massacres of (small scale airstrikes), Iran (weapons, advisors); intelligence), increase in thousands of civilians in Srebrenitza and Bihak by the Army of (Rep. Srpska/Croats) 1995: NATO (massive airstrikes), Croatia (troops)29 Greek support 1994-1995. Republika Srpska and supporting militias. Massive Serbian support for VRS (troops, US support for Iranian weapon supplies since 1994 (Wiebes weapons)30 2003: 167 ff.)

17 Burundi 1965 Low: Belgium (training)31 Low: no major external support for Hutu rebels32 (Hutu uprising)

18 Burundi 1988 High: France (troops, training) since 196933 Low: no major external Belgium terminates its military cooperation with Burundi in support for Hutus. 34 1972 after massacres of tens of thousands of Hutus35. After (Factional fighting) massacres in 1988 large-scale condemnation by US and EC (Lemarchand 1994: 128).

17 Burundi 1991 High: France (troops, training) until 19963637 Medium: Tanzania and Rwanda for Palipehutu (Hutu groups v. govt) (safe havens, possibly arms and equipment (MAR 2010, UCDP 2011).

18 Central African High: France (troops, financial support)3839 Low: no known external Republic 1996 support to mutinying soldiers40 (Factional fighting)

19 Cambodia 1970 High: US, South Vietnam for Lon Nol (financial Medium: North- US and South Vietnamese attacks on Cambodia started in 1965 Vietnamese support for to destroy bases of Vietcong. Strategic bombing turned into (FUNK; Khmer) support, airstrikes, ground invasion)4142 Khmer Rouge (Supplies, carpet bombing in 1970. In 1973, numbers peaked to prevent arms, cooperation)43 the Khmer Rouge from taking Pnomh Penh (Owen/Kiernan 2006:67)

20 Cambodia 1975 High: China (food, arms)4445 High: massive Vietnamese support (troops) for (Khmer Rouge, KNUFNS4647 FUNCINPEC, etc)

21 Chad 1965 High: France (troops, weapons, advisors), starting in Low: Sudan and Libya 196848 provide territory but no (FROLINAT, various ...) other support49

22 Chad 1980 High: France (troops, weapons, advisors), US High: Libya (troops), see Habré government since 1982. 1980-1982: Transitional (financial support) peaking in 1983. See Global Global Security, Government. External support was granted from 1983-1987. (FARF; FROLINAT) Security50. UCDP51, Fearon/Laitin52 Fearon/Laitin

23 Chad 1994 High: France (troops, airsupport), Libya (arms, Medium: Sudan (arms, Relations between Chad and Sudan deteriorated from friendly ammunition), US (arms, training, ammunition)53 territory) (NOREF, in early 1990 to open hostility in 2003. Both countries accuse (FARF; FROLINAT) Thomas-Jensen)54 each other of supporting rebel movements on their territory. Sudanese-backed rebels repeatedly tried to stage coups against Déby (2006, 2008, 2009), see UCDP and NOREF.

US is involved with counter-terrorism programs in Chad since the mid-2000s. Additionally, the US is the biggest purchaser of Chadian oil (90% of oil exports go to US, 80% of Chad’s exports are oil (NOREF)).

24 China 1946 Medium: US (economic loans) for KMT5556 High: extensive Soviet Soviet assistance to the CCP was curved by the Friendship support; Japanese arms, Treaty between Soviets and Nationalists of 1945. (PLA) networks57

25 China 1947 Medium: US (arms and ammunition)58 Low (Taiwanese v. Nationalist soldiers)

26 China 1950 High: Soviet Union (arms, equipment, training)59 Low: no significant support60 (re-annexation)

27 China 1956 Medium: Soviet Union (training, equipment, arms)61 Low: US (arms, Soviet assistance decreased over the mid and late 1950s due to training)6263 saturation and replacement with own equipment and arms (Tibetan uprising) (Garthoff 1963:86).

29 Colombia 1948 Medium: US (equipment, arms, advice)6465 Low: No support66 La Violencia ended in 1958. During the early and mid- 1960s, the US was massively involved in destroying remainders of la (La Violencia) violencia in cooperation with the Columbian army (training, troops, heavy equipment, economic assistance) (Villar/Cottle 2011)

30 Colombia 1978 High: US (military and police training, military No support 6869 US massively stepped up its support for the government of support)67 (3) Colombia in 2000 (War on Drugs, Plan Columbia) (FARC, ELN, drug cartels, etc)

31 Congo – Brazzaville Medium: France (continued investments through High: Angolan support Pre-Conflict: Close relations between France and Congo 1993 Elf)70, US (cultural exchange, election aid, economic (Troops) for Cobras7374. Government through Elf (Oil), military cooperation etc. From cooperation, mainly through Exxon, Chevron France (arms)75 1991 onwards, economic and military aid was reduced (Clark (Lissouba v. Sassou- (Oil)).7172 2002:197 f.). Nguesso) Relations between France and President Lissouba worsened continuously until his removal in 1997.

32 Congo — Brazzaville High: Angola (troops), Chad (troops), France (troops, No support 77 1998 economic recovery, training)76

(Cobras vs. Ninjas) 33 Costa Rica 1948 Medium: Nicaragua (arms, troops)78, Honduras, El Medium: Guatemala Nicaraguan intervention was not demanded by Costa Rica and Salvador (arms)79 80 (arms), Cuba (arms)81 see rather originated out of Nicaraguan initiative (Olander (NLA) Olander 1996:474 ff. 1996:476). US pressure on Honduras and El Salvador led to strong decrease of support for Costa Rican government during war (Longley 1993:165 f.)

34 Yugoslavia 1991 No support 82 No support 83

(Croatia/Krajina)

35 Croatia 1992 Medium: US (training)8485 High: Serbia (arms, troops)86 (Krajina, Medak, Western Slavonia)

36 Cuba 1958 Low: US (intelligence) 87 Low: no systematic Previous US support for Batista-regime (Weapons, training). support for Castro88 Withdrawal of aid in 1957/1958.89 Economic and Military (Castro Revolution) assistance by SU to Castro regime beginning in early 196090

37 Cyprus 1963 Low: SU (few arms) to Greek Cypriots91 High: Turkish air support and bombing campaigns (GC-TC civil war) for Turkish Cypriots92

38 Djibouti 1991 High: France (information, planning, troops)93 Low: no significant France support (in cooperation with Ethiopia and Eritrea) support for FRUD9495 included the blockade of humanitarian assistance to civilians (FRUD) under rebel control. In 1992, French soldiers separated the warring parties and later assisted the government in the defeat of FRUD (Kadamy 1996:518 f.)

39 Dominican Republic Low: no significant support for constitutionalists96 High: US (troops)97 Installment of OAS-led peacekeeping mission in mid-1965. 1965

(Military Coup) 40 Egypt 1994 High: US (training, arms, equipment, economic Low: Sudan (territory, Al-Qaeda supporting al-Gama (UCDP). assistance)98 training), Iran ( arms, (Gamaat Islamiya; equipment, training)99100 Islamic Jihad)

41 Ethiopia 1974 High: US (weapons, financial support, advisors)101 102 No support 103

(Eritrean war of independence)

42 Ethiopia 1978 High: Soviet (troops, arms, advisors) and Cuban Medium: Sudan (territory, Soviet and Cuban troops deployed to Ethiopia for Ogaden war (troops) support104105 logistics, arms), EPLF with Somalia beginning in 1977. Arms and advisors also helped (Ideological; Tigrean) (arms, financial in fight against rebels (UCDP 2011). assistance, training)106107

43 Ethiopia 1976 High: US (weapons, financial support, advisors), SU Medium: Sudan (territory US withdraws military assistance in 1977, SU starts assisting the (weapons, financial support, advisors) logistics, arms), Eritrean same year (UCDP 2011). (Ogaden; Somalis) rebels EPLF (training, arms, financial support)108109

44 Guinea-Bissau 1998 High: Senegal (troops) Guinea (troops)110 Medium: Senegalese rebels MFDC (troops)111 (Vieira v. Mane mutiny)

45 Greece 1944 High: UK (troops, financial support) and US (advisors, High: Yugoslavia, Albania, Withdrawal of British assistance and beginning of US assistance financial support, equipment, arms)112113 Bulgaria (retreat, supplies, in 1947. (EDES/ELAS; EAM) arms)114115

46 Georgia 1991 No support 116 Low (Global Security Opposition and government captured arms and equipment 2012) from Soviet units.117 (South Ossetia)

47 Georgia 1992 No support.118 Medium: Russia (air Partial involvement (biased disarmament) of Russian peacekeepers starting in 1993. Georgian cooperation with ( Abkhazia (& support, arms)119120 Russia in late 1993 led to more impartial enforcement 121 Gamsakhurdia)

48 Guatemala 1966 High: US (advisors, intelligence, training, Low: Cuba (logistics)124125 equipment)122123 (Communists)

49 Guatemala 1978 High: US (weapons, equipment, training, financial Low: No significant Withdrawal of US aid in 1977. Massive increase of aid under support)126127 support128 Reagan (1981-1989) (Communists; Indigenous)

50 Haiti 1991 Low: no significant support129 Low: US (diplomat US-led and UN-authorized mission pressured military regime to pressure, trade step down in 1994. (Cedras v. Aristide) embargo)130

51 Indonesia 1950 Medium: Australia (trade, advice in economic Low: no significant US assistance from 1950-52 (National Archives 1995) rehabilitation)131, US (equipment, training)132 support133 (Rep. S. Moluccas)

52 Indonesia 1953 Low: no significant support Low: no significant Rebels captured arms from police and army134 military assistance (ACED (Darul Islam) 2000)

53 Indonesia 1956 High: Soviet Union (economic and technical Low: no significant Coup d’état. Income from smuggling (Frederick/Worden 1993) cooperation, military equipment)135 support136 (Darul Islam, PRRI, US military assistance 1958-1965, National Archives (1995) Permesta)

54 Indonesia 1976 High: US and Western European states, i.e. Germany, Low: no significant UK, Fance (training, arms, equipment)137 138, Japan support140 (OPM (West Papua)) (development aid, economic cooperation)139

55 Indonesia 1975 High: US and Western European states, i.e. Germany, Low: no significant UK, Fance (training, arms, equipment)141 142, Japan (East Timor) (development aid, economic cooperation)143 support144

56 Indonesia 1990 Medium: US (training, weapons, equipment)145, Low: Libya (training)147, Libyan traning for GAM fighters 1986-89 (UCDP 2012) (Aceh) Australia (training, arms, equipment)146 Ross (2005:43) US support diminished since 1991. 1994-1995 significant decrease in training and weapons (East Timor Action Network 2000).

57 Indonesia 1999 Medium: US cuts military assistance in 99, restarts No support (Ross GAM financed through extortion, taxation, diaspora, program in 2001 (training, financial assistance, 2005:48). contraband (Ross 2005:48). (Aceh) equipment)148

58 India 1989 High: Soviet Union/Russia (technology, traning)149 No support 150 Bodo

(Kashmir)

59 India 1984 High: Soviet Union (technology, traning)151 Medium: Pakistan Pakistani support beginning in late 1987/1988. (logistics, arms, (Sikhs) training)152153

60 India 1989 High: Soviet Union/Russia (technology, traning)154 High: Pakistan (territory, Kashmir financial support, (Naxalites (CPI-M; intelligence)155156 PWG; MCC))

61 India 1990 High: Soviet Union/Russia (technology, training)157 Medium: CPN-M (arms, Cooperation with CPN-M starting in 1995 (UCDP 2012) training)158 ( Assam; Northeast States)

63 Iran 1979 Medium: US (arms, technology, training, advice)159 160 Low: no significant Despite high presence of US in Iran, no decisive policy support161 regarding Iran was developed (KDPI (Kurds))

64 Iraq 1959 High: Soviet Union (arms, training, equipment)162 Low: No significant support163 (Shammar)

65 Iraq 1961 High: Syria (starting 1963), Soviet Union (arms, Medium: Iran (arms, training, equipment)164, Britain (arms, equipment, ammunition)166167, Israel ( KDP, PUK (Kurds)) training)165 (UCDP)

66 Iraq 1974 High: Soviet Union (equipment, advisors, training, Medium: Iran (financial Support for Kurds by Turkish and Syrian Kurds (logistics, arms)168, France (arms, equipment)169 support, territory, financial support). Van Bruinessen 1986:14). ( KDP, PUK (Kurds)) arms)170, US (arms, advisors, intelligence, Israel (advisors). Ending 1975171 172

67 Iraq 1985 High: Soviet Union (equipment, advisors, training, Medium: Iran (arms, arms)173, France (arms, equipment)174 financial support)175 ( Kurds; Anfal)

68 Iraq 1991 Low: no significant support176 Low: US (airstrikes) in Kurds. Establishment of Safe-Havens under international 1996177 protection in 1991 (US, Britain, France) ( Shiite uprising)

71 Jordan 1970 Low: no significant support (ACED 2000) High: Syria (troops, tanks)178 ( Fedeyeen/Syria v. govt)

72 Kenya 1963 High: Britain (arms, equipment, training, financial High: Somalia (training, support)179 arms, logistic and financial ( Shifta war (Somalis)) support)180

73 Kenya 1991 Medium: US (equipment, training, arms)181 Low: no significant US and other donors froze military and economic aid in support182 1992.183 General levels of assistance decreased over 1990s.184 ( Rift valley ethnic violence) 74 Korea 1948 High: US (arms, equipment, training, advisors, Low: no significant troops)185 support186 ( Yosu Rebellion)

75 Laos 1960 High: US (training, financial assistance, air support)187 High: North Vietnam Soviet-American agreement in 1962 to withdraw assistance (troops), Soviet Union (air from Laos. However, covert support was sustained through ( Pathet Lao) support, arms) China Eastern European states, North Vietnam and China 188. Equally, (advisors, intelligence, US military and economic aid continued flowing after the 1962 troops) (Global Security agreement189 2011)

76 Liberia 1989 Medium: Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone (troops, Medium: Burkina Faso Installment of ECOWAS mission ECOMOG in 1990 to support equipment, training)190, United States (advisors)191 (arms, training, troops), interim government ( Doe v. rebels) Ivory Coast (territory, advice), Libya (training, Ivory Coast withdrew support in 1990 after Doe’s assassination arms, financial support) (UCDP) (Sesay 1996:38, UCDP)

77 Liberia 1992 Medium: Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone (troops, Medium: Burkina Faso equipment, training)192, United States (advisors)193 (arms, training, troops), (NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; Libya (training, arms, LPC; LDF) financial support) (Sesay 1996:38, UCDP)

78 Liberia 1999 Medium: Liberia (arms), Ivory Coast (territory, logistic Medium: Guinea (troops, Ivorian support for Taylor stopped in 2000 and turned to the and financial support)194 territory, Cote d’Ivoire rebels (Advocates for Human Rights 2009:267 f.). (anti-Taylor resistance) (territory, financial assistance, arms, equipment)195

79 Lebanon 1958 Medium: US (troops)196 Low: no significant US troops landing in Lebanon but not engaging in fights (UCDP, support197 Collelo) (Nasserites vs. Chamoun)

80 Lebanon 1975 Low High: most factions Syrian presence in Lebanon was transformed into received lots of external Peacekeeping mission in 1976 (Aoun; militias; PLO; support198 Israel)

81 Moldova 1991 Low: no significant support199 High: Russia (troops)200 14th Russian army partially supported PMR until mid-1992, then installed a buffer zone between Moldova and PMR201 (Transdniestria)

82 Mali 1990 Low: France (financial assistance)202 203 No support 204

(Tuaregs; Maurs)

83 Morocco/Western High: Algeria (arms, 205206 Sahara 1975 High: US (arms, financial assistance, intelligence) training, financial support, logistics)207 (Polisario)

84 Mozambique 1976 Medium: Zimbabwe (troops), Tanzania (troops), High: Rhodesia (territory, After Rhodesian/Zimbabwean independence in 1980, South Soviet Union (arms, logistics) training, arms), South Africa replaced its role as RENAMO supporter (UCDP 2012). (RENAMO; FRELIMO) Africa (territory, training, arms)208 Independent Zimbabwe started support for FRELIMO in 1981. Tanzanian support from 1986-1988 (UCDP 2012).

85 Myanmar/Burma Low: no significant support209 (0) No support 210 1948

( Karen rebellion 1)

86 Myanmar/Burma Low: no significant support211 (0) Medium : Thailand Thailand withdraws support for Karen rebels during 1990s 1948 (territory, arms, training), US (intelligence)212 213 (Communist insurgency)

87 Myanmar/Burma Medium: Japan (economic cooperation and Medium: Thailand Beginning in 1954, Japan paid reparations to Burma for ten 1960 development), US (training, equipment, financial (territory, arms, training), years217 assistance)214 US (intelligence)215 216 (various ethnic groups; US military assistance stopped in 1963 (Ross 1987). Karen rebellion 2)

88 Namibia 1973 High: South Africa (occupation=political, military, High: Angola (territory, economic government)218219 arms), Cuba (training)220 (SWAPO; SWANU; SWATF)

89 Nicaragua 1978 No support 221 Medium: Cuba (political US-aid to government was diminished in 1977 (UCDP). support, training, financial (FSLN) assistance, advice), Panama (financial assistance), Venezuela (financial assistance), Costa Rica (logistics)222 223 224

90 Nicaragua 1981 High: US (financial US-aid to rebels was diminished from 1984-86 (ACED) High: Soviet Union (equipment, arms, financial support, training, 225 226 227 ( Contras & Miskitos) support), Cuba (advice, arms, troops) advice)228

91 Nigeria 1967 High: Soviet Union (equipment, arms), Britain (arms, Medium: France (arms, British support for Nigeria was perceived as meager and ammunition)229 equipment)230231 insufficient (Ojo, Metz) (Biafra)

92 Nigeria 1980 No support 232 No support 233

( Muslims; Maitatsine rebellion) 93 Nepal 1996 Medium: India (arms, equipment, training), Britain No support 235 Reduction of Indian, British, US aid after 2005 (AI) (training, equipment), US (training, equipment)234 (CPN-M/UPF (Maoists))

94 Oman 1971 High: Britain (troops, training), Iran (troops), Jordan High: South Yemen (troops), Saudi Arabia (financial assistance, training), (territory), China (training, (Dhofar rebellion) Kuwait (financial assistance), Pakistan (training)236237 arms), Cuba (advisors), Libya (arms)238239240

95 Pakistan 1971 High: China (economic assistance, arms, equipment, High: India (equipment, Invasion of Indian forces after Pakistani airstrikes on northern training)241242 training, troops)243 India (Blood 1994) (Bangladesh secession)

96 Pakistan 1973 High: Iran (equipment, troops)244 Medium: Afghanistan (financial support, (Baluchistan) territory, arms)

97 Paraguay 1947 Medium: Argentina (arms) 245 No significant support 246

(Febreristas, Libs, Comms)

98 Peru 1980 High: Soviet Union (arms, equipment, economic No significant support 251 US steps up military assistance in early 1990s (Mauceri cooperation, advisors)247 248 249, US (financial 252 1991:104). ( Sendero Luminoso, assistance, arms, equipment)250 Tupac Amaru)

99 Philippines 1950 High: US (training, equipment, arms, troops, advice, No significant support 254 financial support)253 (Huks)

100 Philippines 1972 High: US (arms, equipment, financial support)255 Medium: Libya (arms, financial assistance), (NPA) Malaysia (training, territory)256257

101 Philippines 1971 High: US (arms, equipment, financial support)258 No support259260

(MNLF, MILF)

102 Papua New Guinea Medium: Australia (arms, equipment) 261 No support262 1988

103 Russia 1994 No support 263 No support 264

(Chechnya 1)

104 Russia 1999 No support 265 Medium: support from foreign Jihadists (Chechnya 2) (personnel, training, financial support)266267

105 Rwanda 1963 No support Low: Burundi (territory)268269 (Tutsi uprising)

106 Rwanda 1990 High: France (training, advice, arms, equipment), High: Uganda (territory, Zaire (troops) 270271 arms, equipment)272 (Hutu vs. Tutsi groups)

107 Rwanda 1994 High: France, Egypt (arms), South Africa (arms)273274 High: Uganda (territory, French intervention installing safe zones in late June training)275 (RPF; genocide)

109 El Salvador 1979 High: USA (economic aid, equipment, training, Medium: Nicaragua US assistance was withdrawn in late 1980 after the death of advisers )276 (arms), Cuba (financial four churchwomen. Recommencement in 1981279 (FMLN) aid, training, equipment)277278 Nicaraguan and Cuban support peaked in 1981 with the ‘Final Offensive’ 110 Senegal 1989 High: US (arms, training), France (arms, training, Low: Guinea-Bissau advice), Germany (arms)280281 (arms, territory), Iraq ( MFDC (Casamance) (arms), Libya (arms)282

111 Sierra Leone 1991 High: Guinea (troops), Nigeria (troops), South Africa Medium: Libya (training, ECOMOG intervention on government side under Nigerian (troops, advisors, training)283 financial support, arms), leadership in 1997. Other contributing countries: Ivory Coast, ( RUF, AFRC, etc.) Burkina Faso (arms, Guinea, Ghana.285 personnel, training), Liberia (contraband trade, South African intervention in 1995 through private security personnel, territory, firm (Executive Outcomes) (Africa Confidential 1998). logistics, arms)284

112 Somalia 1988 Low: US (training) 286 No support 287 Ethiopian support for SNM was withdrawn in 1988 (Metz 1992)

(SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)) US military assistance suspended in 1989 (Metz 1992).

113 Somalia 1991 Medium: Saudi Arabia (financial assistance, training, Medium: al-Qaeda UN and US intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophe equipment), Libya (financial assistance)288 (training, logistics)289, and stop rebels in 1992. Eritrea (military, financial assistance, logistics), Rebel assistance fluctuated highly over the years through the Ethiopia (military 1990s and 2000s (ICG 2002, UCDP 2012). support)290,

114 USSR 1944 Medium: US, Great Britain (arms, equipment, Medium: Great Britain, No significant outside interference in the USSR in 1944 and financial assistance)291 US, Sweden (supplies, thereafter (Latvia) advisors, logistics)292293

115 USSR 1944 Medium: US, Great Britain (arms, equipment, Medium: Great Britain, No significant outside interference in the USSR in 1944 and financial assistance)294 US, Sweden (supplies, thereafter (Lithuania) advisors, logistics)295

116 USSR 1944 Medium: US, Great Britain (arms, equipment, Medium: Great Britain, No significant outside interference in the USSR in 1944 and financial assistance)296 US, Sweden (supplies, thereafter (Estonia) advisors, logistics)297298

117 USSR 1944 Medium: US, Great Britain (arms, equipment, No support No significant outside interference in the USSR in 1944 and financial assistance)299 thereafter (Ukraine)

118 Sri Lanka 1971 High: India (troops, equipment, arms)300 No support 301

(JVP)

119 Sri Lanka 1983 Low: no significant support302 (0) Medium: India (safe havens, arms, training)303 (LTTE, etc.)

120 Sri Lanka 1987 Medium: India (massive troops)304 No support305306 (0) Initially impartial peacekeeping intervention by Indian forces (IPKF). Was gradually transformed into intervention on (JVP II) government side. IPKF was withdrawn in 1990.307

121 Sudan 1963 Medium: Soviet Union (economic cooperation, Medium: Israel (arms, Israeli support for Anya Nya beginning in 1969. equipment, arms, advice), Egypt (arms)308 training, financial ( Anya Nya) assistance), Congo, Soviet support for GoS beginning in 68/69 to 71. Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya (logistic support)309 see Chapin Metz (1991).

122 Sudan 1983 High: China (arms, equipment, advice), Saudi Arabia Medium: Ethiopia, Withdrawal of Egyptian and Saudi assistance after 1990. (financial assistance), Egypt (arms, equipment), US Uganda (arms, territory), Withdrawal of US assistance in mid-1980s, formal end in 1989. ( SPLM, SPLA, NDA, (financial assistance, equipment, arms), Iran Eritrea (territory), US (Chapin Metz 1991). AnyanyaII) (financial assistance, training)310 (equipment)311 Ethiopian assistance to SPLM/A fluctuated heavily during the 1990s312

124 Tajikistan 1992 High: Russia, Uzbekistan (troops, equipment, Low: Afghanistan CIS Peacekeeping mission with Russian and Uzbek forces sided training)313 314 315 (territory, arms, with government. ( Popular Democratic Army; UTO) training)316 317 Afghan arms influx helped both sides318

125 Thailand 1966 High: US (advice, troops, training, financial High: China (territory, Since the 1960s, there had been continuous reports about CPT assistance)319 320 weapons), North Vietnam receiving support from mainly China but also North Vietnam ( Communists (CPT)) (training, expertise, and Laos.324 weapons), Laos (training, logistics, weapons, In March 1962 the Voice of People's Thailand (VOPT), a equipment, clandestine radio based in China, proclaimed the expertise)321322 323 organization of a rurally-based "people's war," and in August 1965 VOPT announced that the era of "armed struggle" had begun.325

The United States was the main backer of the Thai army. Aid was provided through various channels, such as Military Assistance Program grants, IMET training grants and Foreign Military Financing loans towards the purchase of US-made equipment. In 1975, total US aid amounted to 41.38 million US$.326

126 Turkey 1984 High: US (troops, advice, training, arms, equipment, Medium: Syria, Armenia In mid-June 1985 it was claimed that Iran had invited Turkish financial assistance)327 (territory)329 security forces into Iranian territory to pursue Kurdish rebels (PKK) active in the border area. The United States is a very important United States (Weapons, Material/Logistics, Iran (supported PKK with ally of Turkey, providing it with ample amounts of military Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support), Iraq access to Territory, support. In 1985, over 703.5 million US dollars were disbursed 328 (Access to Territory), Iran (Access to Territory). Funding/Economic in various forms of military aid to Turkey, as both direct Support), Syria (Access to financing and credits towards the purchase of US-made Territory), Kurdish equipment (through the Foreign Military Financing direct loans Diaspora and MAP grants), as well as through IMET training programs. (Funding/Economic While most aid was not specifically designated to fight the PKK, 330 Support). it is certain that at least part of the aid went to improve the military's capability against the PKK. 127 Uganda 1966 High: Israel (training, arms, equipment, advice), Medium: Libya Soviet Union (training, equipment, advice)331332 Cuba (Weapons), Sudan (Access ( Baganda rebellion) (Training/Expertise), Tanzania (Troops, to territory).334 Training/Expertise), Ethiopia (Training/Expertise), North Korea (Weapons,Training/Expertise),UK(Training/Expertise), Egypt(Weapons), Libya(Weapons)333

128 Uganda 1981 Medium: North Korea (advisers)335, Britain (training), Medium: Rwandan Tanzanian troops were massively reduced in 1982 (Byrnes). Tanzania (troops, training)336 refugees (personnel)338, ( NRA/Museveni, etc) Libya (arms)339, Sudan A team of senior North Korean military officers came to Cuba (Training/Expertise), Ethiopia (Access to territory).340 Uganda in 1981 with the mission to aid Obote in setting up a (Training/Expertise), North Korea plan to tackle unrest and rebellion in the West Nile region. (Weapons,Training/Expertise),UK(Training/Expertise), Furthermore, Pyongyang also sent more than 40 other Korean Egypt(Weapons), Soviet Union(Weapons), army advisors to Uganda in 1981, intended to train the army. Libya(Weapons)337 Also training the army were some 20 Cuban and 15 Ethiopian military instructors. Britain increased its military training team in Ugandan in 1985 from 13 to 20.Egypt began supplying the military government with modest arms supplies in October.

129 Uganda 1990 Medium: US (financial assistance, arms, equipment, Medium: Sudan (territory, Sudanese support for LRA beginning in 1994 (UCDP). training)341 arms, training)342 ( Kony (pre-LRA)) US support increased during the early 1990s.343

130 Uganda 1995 High: US (financial assistance, arms, equipment, High: Sudan (territory, WNBF and UNRF II training)344 Congo (Troops, Access to Territory, arms, equipment), Zaire ( LRA, West Nile, ADF, Access to military or intelligence infrastructure), (territory)346 Democratic During 1996, the United States provided 4.32 million US$ in etc.) UK(Training/Expertise), Sudan (Troops, Access to Republic of Congo military assistance to Uganda through the Foreign Military Territory), Central African Republic (Troops)345 (Weapons, Financing and International Military Education and Training Material/Logistics)347 programs with the stated goal of maintaining the stability of the government in front of Sudanese-sponsored rebel groups. Between January and June 1998 the armed forces of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo carried out joint military operations against the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) inside the Democratic Republic of Congo

132 Vietnam 1960 High: US (equipment, arms, financial assistance, High: China (equipment, By early 1964, America had about seventeen-thousand troops training, troops)348349,350. arms), USSR (arms, in Vietnam. The troops were there to advise and train the (NLF) equipment, financial South Vietnamese military. assistance, training)351 352,353. To frustrate North Vietnamese and Viet Cong efforts, and in part to "contain" China, the United States eventually fielded an army of over 500,000 men and engaged in extensive air and naval warfare against North Vietnam.[

In addition to political and technical cadres and replacements, he infiltrated regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) combat units into South Vietnam. By December 1964, a regiment of the NVA 325th Division was identified in the Central Highlands. The rest of the 325th was in action in the south by February 1965.

The North Vietnamese regime, which received outside assistance from the communist great powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, proved a formidable adversary.354

China spent an estimated two billion dollars in assisting Hanoi; at the height of its effort, it had more than 300,000 engineering, medical, and anti-aircraft artillery troops in the Democratic Repubc of Vietnam.

While the air raids continued, North Vietnam progressively strengthened its air defenses with the help of the latest radars, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and modern jet fighters supplied by the Soviets and Chinese.

Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong strongly supported the North Vietnamese offensive and promised to supply weapons and technical and logistical personnel. The Soviets, though now openly hostile to China, also decided to send aid to the North.

U.S. advisers were already working with the South Vietnamese to carry out small maritime raids and parachute drops of agents, saboteurs, and commandos into North Vietnam. 355

133 Yemen AR 1948 No support No support 356

( Yahaya rebellion)

134 Yemen 1994 Medium: Iraq (weapons)357 Medium: Saudi Arabia Southern officials claimed that Iraq had provided the north (weapons)358 with eight military aircrafts. ( South Yemen) Saudi Arabia reportedly provided southern Yemen with military support. According to a northern Yemen official the support consisted of MiG-29s and self-propelled artillery. The accusations were apparently not rejected by Saudi Arabia, and during the war the South occasionally used rocket artillery.359

135 Yemen AR 1962 High: Egypt (troops, supplies), Soviet Union High: Saudi Arabia The total Egyptian forces rose from 12,000 to an estimated (weapons)360,361. (supplies, money), 28,000, with a sharp increase of Russian and Soviet bloc ( Royalists) Jordan362,363. personnel.

Defensive equipment was also obtained from the Soviets.

The revolution was supported by Egypt who supplied troops and supplies, while Badr was supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Subsequently the Soviet Union carried out a massive emergency military airlift to the Yemen, including for the first time the use of Soviet Air Force pilots for combat missions.

Saudi Arabia, fearing the revolutionary upsurge on its borders, reacted by sending supplies and money to the pro-royalist forces

The Saudis spent $15 million to equip royalist tribes, hire hundreds of European mercenaries, and establish their own radio station.364

Egypt immediately began sending military supplies and troops to assist the Republicans... On the royalist side Jordan and Saudi Arabia were furnishing military aid, and Britain lent diplomatic support. In addition to the Egyptian aid, the Soviet Union allegedly supplied 24 Mig-19s to the republicans 365.

136 Yemen PR 1986 No support366 No support367 Civil war between two factions of the Yemeni Socialist Party.368

( Faction of Socialist Party)

137 Yugoslavia 1998 No support369 Medium: Albania Cross-border infiltrations of troops and supplies of armaments (territory, political from Albania took place without the interference of the (Kosovo) support), Albanian Albanian government. According to Serbian accounts, the UCK Diaspora (funding), was also allowed to use training camps in Albania. Contact Group (embargo), Furthermore, Albania offered political support to UCK and NATO (threat) 370, 371,372. Thaçi. The Albanian diaspora, both in Western countries and in Macedonia, supported the UCK, mainly financially, but also with volunteers to join the militant group.373

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which began as a small band of poorly equipped men but quickly swelled with volunteers and arms supplied by Albania. The "Contact Group" (consisting of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia on May 9.374

The North Atlantic Council had agreed that "the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory" to "[compel] compliance with the demands of the international community and [to achieve] a political settlement".375

NOTE: The NATO bombing of 1999 is not considered as part of this war.

138 Congo-Zaire 1960 High: UN (troops).376 Medium: South Africa, Moise Tshombe, supported by Belgian troops and industrialists, Some Europe States announced the secession of Katanga. ( Katanga, Kasai, Kwilu, (mercenaries), Belgium Eastern) (troops)377. Katanga forces, bolstered by South African and European mercenaries.

Greatly reinforced UN forces numbering more than 6,000 defeated the Katanga army.378

139 Congo-Zaire 1967 No support No support 379

( Kisangani mutiny)

140 Congo-Zaire 1977 High: United States (material/logistics), Belgium Low: Angola USA supported the Zairian government with non-lethal military (weapons), France (weapons, material/logistics, (territory)382,383. equipment. France sent advisors as well as Mirage fighters, ( FLNC; Shabba 1 & 2) training/expertise), Uganda (troops, weapons, Panhard armoured cars, and Puma helicopters. Belgium material/logistics), Morocco (troops), China supported the government with two C-130 transport planes (weapons, material/logistics). 380,381. with light weapons. China sent military supplies.

The MPLA government allowed FLNC to have bases on Angolan territory.384 Belgium, France, and the United States responded to Mobutu's request by immediately airlifting military supplies to Zaire. Other African states also supported Zaire during this crisis, and Egypt and Morocco joined Belgium, France, and the United States by providing assistance. Egypt provided fifty pilots and technicians. The pilots flew the French-built Mirage jets of the Zairian air force throughout the conflict. Morocco provided 1,500 combat troops. French aircraft airlifted these soldiers to Kolwezi on April 9, and on April 14, a combined Zairian and Moroccan force counterattacked.

The FLNC withdrew to Angola. Zaire's continued support for Angolan dissident groups ensured continued Angolan government support for the FLNC.385

141 Congo-Zaire 1996 No support.386 ,387 High: Zambia (territory, The AFDL received substantial backing by Uganda. Military weapons, support in the form of training, supplies and encouragement ( AFDL (Kabila)) material/logistics), was given to the rebels. It is possible that the Ugandan army Uganda (troops, also participated in the fighting with troops. However, there is weapons, no clear proof for these allegations. Zambia was also accused material/logistics, of providing AFDL with help. Zambia co-operated by letting the training/expertise), AFDL cross its land to win access to Lubumbashi and the South. Rwanda (troops), Angola To prepare for an evacuation from Lubumbashi, Zambia (troops, weapons, refused to allow the stationing of Belgian troops at Ndola on material/logistics, the Zambian side of the border. There were established supply training/expertise), lines of arms and communications between Zambia and Zaire Zimbabwe (weapons, in 1996. Africa Research Bulletin reports that in early 1996 150 material/logistics),US tons of weapons and communication equipment were mercenary company MPRI distributed from Zambia into Zaire. (military or intelligence infrastructure, In the late stages of the conflict the Zimbabwean Air Force training/expertise), provided transports and logistical support to the AFDL. AFDL also made a commercial deal with the state-owned Zimbabwe Barrick Gold Corporation Defence Industries (ZDI) which provided them weapons and (funding) .388 uniforms. The US mercenary company MPRI has, unlike most firms in this line of business, close ties with the government. MPRI works in cooperation with the Pentagon and recruits almost exclusively among former US servicemen. Technical support from US mercenaries, used as artillery advisors, as well as the logistical support of Galaxy planes, was an important support for Kabila in his successful offensive against Kisangani and Kinshasa. (The MPRI operation was financed by Barrick Gold Corp, a huge US conglomerate whose directors include former President George Bush and William Gate, a former chief at the CIA). MPRI's involvement was therefore able to disguise an overt intervention of the US in the Congolese crisis. US assistance was also of great importance for a training programme for Ugandan and Rwandan army officers. The Pentagon sent out staff from the green berets

142 Congo-Zaire 1998 High: Chad (troops), Angola (troops), Zimbabwe High: UNITA(unknown Rwanda's Minister of Defense Paul Kagame (1957?-) appeared (troops), Namibia (troops), Sudan (weapons)389,390. type), Uganda (troops, to back the rebellion in the eastern Congo, with the hope ( RCD, etc v. govt) material/logistics, perhaps to redraw the borders there to protect his Tutsi traning/expertise, brothers. Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe (1924-) funding), Burundi deployed troops to help Kabila fight off rebels advancing on the (unknown type), Rwanda Congo's capital (troops, weapons, material/logistics, Angolan troops soon crossed into the Congo in support of 393 training/expertise, Kabila's loyalist forces. funding)391,392

143 Zimbabwe 1972 Medium: South Africa (troops, weapons, High: Cuba (training, South Africa provided financial support, supplying half of material/logistics, funding)394. expertise), Zambia Rhodesia's defence budget for 1975-1976. Furthermore, when ( ZANU, ZAPU) (territory), Mozambique the South African forces withdrew from Rhodesia in August and Tanzania (territory 1975, they left behind military equipment including and financial support), helicopters, small arms and ammunition. They also established ANC of South Africa, USSR Operation Polo, a cooperation whereby South Africa provided and China (weapons, technical support in the construction of new military airfields. material, training/expertise), Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana provided safe havens, Angola and Botswana allowing the rebels to maintain camps and undergo training on (training, territory), Libya their territory. (weapons)395. PF troops received training and supplies from China, the Soviet Union and Cuba. Still de facto two separate armies, ZIPRA received training from Russian and Cuban instructors in Zambia and Angola, and ZANLA troops were trained by Chinese instructors in Mozambique and Tanzania

In 1978, Nkomo also stated that Libyan instructors were providing training in camps in Zambia. Angola also provided logistic support, airlifting trained ZIPRA fighters from Angola to Zambian camps396.

144 Zimbabwe 1983 Medium: North Korea (training)397. Medium: South Africa Prime Minister Mugabe enters into an agreement with North (training and funding)398. Korea for the training and arming of a brigade of the Zimbabwe ( Ndebele guerillas) defence forces.

South Africa exacerbated events by training and funding dissidents, known as Super ZAPU, with the intention of disrupting the newly Independent Zimbabwe.399

145 Cyprus 1974 Low: Greece 400. High: Turkey (troops)401. A detachment of the National Guard - allegedly led by officers from mainland Greece - toppled President Makarios in a ( TCs; GCs; Turkish bloodless coup in order to establish unification with Greece. invasion) Turkey invaded Cyprus.402 146 Uganda 1978 High: Soviet Union (Material/Logistics, Medium: Tanzania 404 Training/Expertise), Libya (Troops, Weapons, (troops) (Tanzanian war) Material/Logistics), Islamic Development Bank (Funding/Economic Support).403

147 Burundi 1972 Low: US (financial aid405)406 Low: Rwanda (Access to In the press there was a report on May 1973, that young Territory)407, militant Hutu student leaders in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire ( Hutu uprising (and Zaire/Mulelists (troops)408 inspired and coordinated a three-pronged attack on Burundi. govt massacres)) (There was an untold amount of how many Tutsis and Hutus were killed.) 409

148 Algeria 1962 No support 410 No support

( post-indepen strife, Kylie (border war?))

149 Chad 2003 Medium: France (Material/Logistics, Medium: Sudan (military Sudanese support for rebels fluctuated from 2005-2010 when a Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support), Libya support: weapons and peace-treaty was signed between GoC and GoS414 ( MDJT) (arms, equipment)411 , US (training, equipment, assistance, training, financial assistance)412 territory)413 US support for Chad beginning in 2008 (Hansen 2011).

150 Iraq 2003 High: United States;United Kingdom;Ukraine; Tonga High: Iran (Weapons, Iran and Al-Qaida support of the rebellions is alleged. ( Troops, Weapons, Training/Expertise, Material/Logistics, ( US/Coalition Funding/Economic Support), Netherlands; Spain; Training/Expertise)418, al- occupation and Iraqi Portugal; Poland; Czech Republic; Slovakia; Italy; Qaida ( Training/Expertise, civil war) Albania; Macedonia; Bulgaria; Romania; Estonia; Funding/Economic Latvia; Lithuania; Georgia; Azerbaijan; Norway; Support)419 Denmark; Dominican Republic; Kazakhstan; Mongolia; South Korea; Philippines; Australia; Honduras; El Salvador (Troops, Training/Expertise), Egypt;Jordan;Arabic Emirates (material/logistics)415 416 417 151 Thailand 2004 High: United States (Weapons, Material/Logistics, No support 422. (0) The Thai government accused neighbouring Malaysia for Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support).420 421 allowing the insurgents to cross the border into safety, but this ( Pachani; Pulo) was denied. There were also repeated reports of connections between the Patani insurgents and actors in Indonesia. It was suggested that parts of BRN-C, the RKK faction, had been trained in guerrilla tactics by the Indonesian (former) rebels GAM in Aceh

152 Sri Lanka 2003 High: United States (Weapons, Material/Logistics, Medium: Tamil Diaspora There is substantial evidence of the existence of large scale, Training/Expertise, Funding/Economic Support), (Funding/Economic highly organized remittance flow from the Tamil Diaspora, (LTTE) Pakistan (Training/Expertise, Intelligence material), Support)426 427 428 especially in Britain, Canada, the US, Switzerland and China (Weapons, Funding/Economic Support)423 424 Scandinavia to the LTTE, done through highly organized 425 collection systems and financial networks. Amounts given by the diaspora are highly significant, with estimates for 2000- 2001 ranging from between 24 million US$ annually to 500 million US$ annually. Moreover, the Tamil diaspora was highly politicized and controlled by the LTTE.

US economic and military assistance reduced from 2005 until LTTE defeat. Chinese assistance increased during that period429

153 Sudan 2003 High: China (arms, equipment, technology, financial High: Eritrea (Weapons, The government of Sudan is highly dependent on China for and economic assistance), Iran (equipment, arms)430, Material/Logistics, weapons and other military equipment. China has supplied (Darfur) Belarus (arms, equipment), Russia (equipment)431 Training, Sudan with small arms, anti-personnel mines, howitzers, tanks, Funding/Economic helicopters and ammunition. China has also established three Support), Chad arms factories in Sudan and there is a presence of Chinese- (Weapons, made AK47s and rocket propelled grenades and machine guns

Material/Logistics, all over Darfur. Also, Iran has supported Sudan with military Training/Expertise), Libya equipment in 2008. This is in clear breach of a UN arms (Weapons, embargo for Darfur. Despite this Sudanese dependence on Material/Logistics, Chinese and Iranian weapons this is not coded as secondary Training/Expertise, support. The reason for this is that the Chinese export of Funding/Economic weapons is linked to oil imports from Sudan, and not the Support)432 433 434 conflict itself. The details in this exchange programme are very fuzzy and it is not clear if it should be seen as ordinary export or some form of aid. Since the details are not clear and China has no official standpoint in the incompatibility China is not coded as giving secondary support to the government of Sudan. Neither, Iran is coded as secondary supporter to Khartoum as its unclear if the weapons they sell to Sudan is part of ordinary arms trade or given to Khartoum as a support in their conflict.

Government of Chad turning from Sudanese Government to Darfuri rebels in 2004/2005.

154 Afghanistan 2001 High: Pakistan (Weapons, Funding/Economic High: al-Qaida (Access to Although Pakistan denied it, aid was still flowing from Pakistan Support, Troops), Canada; New Zeland military or intelligence to the Taleban government according to a UN monitoring (Taliban vs. Gov't and (Training/Expertise, Intelligence material, Troops, infrastructure, team. After the attacks on 11 September 2001 Pakistan US/NATO coalition) Material/Logistics), US;UK;Italy;Germany;France ; Material/Logistics) 436437, officially suspended military supplies to the Taleban. Netherlands;Latvia; Pakistan’s NWFP Portugal;Romania;Slovakia;Spain;Sweden;Turkey (territory)438 439, Iran It is alleged that Iran supported Taleban with: Weapons, (Troops, Training/Expertise, Material/Logistics), (training, arms, Material/Logistic. Poland; Iceland;Jordan; Luxemburg, equipment)440 Macedonia;Switcerland; United Arab Emirates (Troops). Hungary (Weapons, Material/Logistics, Troops, Training), Albania ( Weapons, Training/Expertise, Troops), Slovenia ( Weapons, Material/Logistics), Bulgaria ( Weapons, Troops, Material/Logistics, Training/Expertise), Russia (Weapons), Finland (Training/Expertise), Norway (Troops, Trainiing, Material/Logistics), South Korea (Material/Logistics, Training/Expertise). Australia(Troops, Training/Expertise), Azerbaijan (Troops, Training/Expertise), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Troops), Belgium (Troops), Croatia (Troops, Material/Logistics, Training/Expertise), Czech Republic (Material/Logistics, Training/Expertise), Denmark (Troops, Training, Material/Logistics), Estonia (Troops), Ethiopia (Intelligence material), Greece (Troops, Material/Logistics) 435