ARI Projects Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform

April

2012

British Colonial Policies in the Arab Region: Sowing the Seeds of Contemporary Middle Eastern Security Sectors?

Jessica Watkins* Arab security sectors across the Middle East today appear to share a number of generally negative characteristics, including the use of coercion and of the military to control internal dissent, the exclusion of particular ethnic or religious groups from the highest ranks of the security services, allegiance to the state as opposed to the citizen, and pervasive corruption in the judicial and policing systems. These common characteristics are frequently attributed to the role played by the colonial powers during their formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter explores some of the strategies pursued by the British in four of its Arab territories: Egypt, , and and assesses their effects and long term influences. In the late nineteenth and first half of the War, parts of the crumbling twentieth centuries, Britain was responsible acquired a new significance on account of for creating or reforming a number of security their geo-strategic positions or resources. sectors within its colonies, and After 1919, commercial interests in the region mandates. Britain’s ambitions for the military, were renewed by the promise of oil. At the police and intelligence services in its various same time, the newly formed League of territories were diverse, depending on its Nations began to outline the rights and regional strategic goals, financial responsibilities of nation states, obligating considerations, and the pre-existing socio- Britain to prepare the security forces of its political context of each country. In the Arab mandated territories for eventual self rule. region, the prevailing rationale behind British Nevertheless, despite the decline of the rule or military occupation in the nineteenth Empire, the granting of independence to Arab century was to safeguard maritime access to states, and the growing influence of new . Subsequently, during the First World powers in the region, Britain continued to

* Jessica Watkins is a PhD candidate at the War Studies Department, King's College , researching state policing and societal dispute resolution in Jordan. 2 promote its own military agenda across the British involvement in the subsequent Middle East during the Second World War development of those services. and beyond. This had long-term effects on the development of the armed forces and SECTION ONE: CONTEXTUALIZING intelligence services in its former territories. BRITISH INVOLVEMENT This paper is divided into three sections: the first introducing Britain’s role and objectives Britain’s interests in developing the security in the development of the security services in sectors in her Arab territories were linked to each country, the second looking in greater the nature of her control over each. Table No. detail at the strategies it used to achieve those 1 below summarises Britain’s relationships aims, and the third considering the legacy of with each of the four territories:

Table No. 1: Britain and Armed Forces in Four Arab Countries Type of British Created or Developed Country Period of British control Modern Armed Forces 1882-1914 (Egypt remained

formally under Ottoman ‘Veiled’ suzerainty) Developed Egypt 1914-1922 (strong influence remained until 1952) 1921 -1932 (strong influence Iraq Mandate Created remained until 1958) 1920 -1946 (and influence Jordan Mandate Created remains) Officially none – part of 1891-1970 (and influence Oman Created informal Empire remains)

None of these countries were ever British short-lived expedition in 1798 failed to colonies per se, and the mandates in Iraq and achieve colonial ambitions, but severely Jordan were established in a climate of weakened the ruling Mamluk power base and decolonisation, with the expectation that they created a vacuum filled by ‘Ali in would become self-governing within a given 1805. The French retained significant cultural period. influence and economic ties in Egypt after their military withdrawal, and in the 1820s 1. Egypt Muhammad ‘Ali employed a number of a. Background: Britain was not the first French veteran officers of the Napoleonic European power to exercise military control wars in his military academies. In 1825 an over modern Egypt. Napoleon Bonaparte’s official French military mission was

3 introduced [McGregor 2006: 79]. Ottoman Empire. Egypt remained After the British military takeover in 1882, strategically important during World War the British operated a ‘veiled protectorate Two and from 1940-1942 British forces system’ whereby its administrators occupied repelled Axis Powers offensives on Egypt. key positions in the Egyptian government. At During the war, Britain periodically employed the beginning of World War One, Britain the Egyptian Air Force alongside the RAF, declared a full protectorate over Egypt and made occasional use of the Egyptian replacing the anti-British khedive with his Army [McGregor 2006: 232]. uncle. Egypt gained independence in 1922 c. Britain’s Role in the Security Services: after mass popular uprisings orchestrated by Nineteenth century Egypt differed markedly the nationalist Wafd delegation. Nonetheless, in terms of socio-economic and military Britain maintained control of the Suez and development from other Ottoman Arab strongly influenced governance until 1952. In provinces that subsequently came under July 1952, King Farouk was deposed and the British control. The Egypt that British forces Free Officers movement took over. Gamal took over was an Ottoman province in little ‘Abd al-Nasser subsequently emerged as ruler more than name and had been autonomously of the new republic. Britain was forced to ruled for centuries by successive Mamluk withdraw from the Suez in 1956. dynasties and then the Albanian commander b. British Objectives: Over the seventy year Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, under whom a huge 1882 - 1956 period, British objectives in modern army had been created and new Egypt shifted. The initial stimulus for legislation and policing systems developed. intervention was a military takeover staged by Britain was therefore presented with an an Arab-Egyptian Ahmed ‘Urabi, already developed security infrastructure in designed to wrest power from the Turco- Egypt, although during its occupation it did Circassian khedive. Britain moved to protect introduce reforms to the organisation of the her privileged rights to the Suez Canal, which army and police and in 1886 created a new provided access to India. A second area of police intelligence service, the Special interest was Egypt’s cotton production, which Division in Cairo [Tollefson 1957: 38]. by 1914 made up 92% of Egyptian exports. [Mitchell 1988: 16]. Territorially, Egypt 2. Iraq became important in its own right during a. Background: Iraq – formerly World War One. Again, the Suez was vital as – came gradually under British military a transportation hub, and the Allies used control during World War One as British Egypt as a staging post for attacking the forces wrested power from the Ottoman army.

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It was declared a British mandate by the peace and security as cheaply as possible at the 1919 Paris Peace [Sluglett 2007: 182]. Britain also had at least Conference, frustrating the aspirations of a nominal duty to prepare Iraq for self- who had supported Britain in the Arab government, in accordance with one of Revolt in the hope of winning independence. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the Iraq’s borders took little account of ethnic establishment of Iraq’s armed forces was a cohesion. Faced with an immediate anti- central aspect of the nation-building process. colonial revolt by predominantly Kurdish and c. Britain’s Role in the Security Services: Shi’ite regions, Britain offered Faisal bin al- When British forces first entered in Hussain the throne of Iraq in 1921 after his 1914 they found the Turkish Ottoman police expulsion by the French from . Iraq gone and deployed British and Indian military gained independence in 1932, but Britain police patrols. When they reached retained control over many areas of Iraqi they recruited local headmen to police smaller defence by means of a 1930 bilateral treaty. In towns, and irregular district police for 1941, four anti- generals allied patrolling the outlying areas. In addition to with the Axis powers briefly took over the the , created in 1921, and the Iraqi government, but were overthrown by detachment that Britain British Forces who subsequently imposed dedicated to Iraq’s defence, Britain had martial law, internment without trial, press frequent recourse to a predominantly Assyrian censorship and a ban on political parties. force known as the Iraq Levies. Britain’s Following World War Two British influence ambition for the Iraqi army to retain a purely in the region steadily diminished. An attempt internal role sparked ongoing friction between in 1948 to renegotiate British involvement in British and Iraqi administrators and British Iraq amid growing public hostility towards fears relating to the emergence of an overly- Britain was repudiated. Finally, in 1958, the powerful military elite were realized when a Hashemite Monarchy was overthrown in a military coup d’état toppled the Hashemite military coup, leading abruptly to the demise monarchy in 1958. of direct British influence in the country. b. British Objectives: Britain’s regional 3. Jordan interests in Iraq concerned the protection of a. Background: Transjordan, like Iraq, was the route to India and to the Persian – and created in the aftermath of World War One as later Iraqi – oilfields, and of several strategic a British Mandate along with Palestine, air stations situated there by defending Iraq though in practice the two territories were against invasions, and maintaining internal administered separately. Britain excluded

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Jordan from the area deemed eligible for the genuinely interested in developing an efficient creation of a Jewish national home, as it was Jordanian security service which could entitled to do under the terms of the Mandate. suppress internal tribal dissent and repel In late 1920, ‘Abdullah, brother to King foreign invasions. Faysal of , laid claim to the territory and c. Britain’s Role in the Security Services: was installed by the British as the founder of a Britain created the Jordanian security forces Hashemite Emirate. The population of from scratch. In 1920, a small collection of Transjordan was overwhelmingly Sunni, with policemen remained from the Ottoman era a small Christian population. The inhabitants and from Faysal’s brief reign in Syria of northern Jordan shared trading and cultural [Vatikiotis 1967: 57]. Britain dedicated a links with Syria, while those in southern Royal Air Force squadron and an Armoured Jordan had close ties with the Arabian Car Company to Jordan to assist in defence, peninsula. Many tribes throughout the region and in 1921, ‘Abdullah brought in around 200 rejected central authority. infantrymen and created a localized Transjordan was declared independent in gendarmerie (darak), a battalion of reserve 1923, but the Mandate apparatus continued to gendarmes, an infantry battalion and a camel regulate financial and military affairs until troop who formed his private guard. But the 1946 when Jordan became a Kingdom, and new state’s armed forces did not take real British influence in the security sector shape until 1923 when a British officer, remained until 1956. Captain Peake, merged the police and the b. British Objectives: In terms of natural military into what became known as the Arab resources, Transjordan was an unpromising Legion. The Legion’s role in defending territory, which Arab nationalists regarded as Transjordan’s borders was supplanted when little more than an arid wasteland, but it did the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) was provide land routes accessing the more created in 1926, commanded by the British critical territory of Iraq. In 1934, the Iraqi High Command in Palestine, not King Petroleum Company’s -Haifa pipeline ‘Abdullah. However, the TJFF struggled to was opened. It ran through Transjordan to the subdue tribal disturbances and in 1931, John British Mandate of Palestine, and thus Bagot Glubb created the Arab Legion’s accorded Transjordan greater importance. Desert Patrol. The Desert Mechanized Force Nonetheless, Jordan was viewed by British was created soon after. politicians more as a buffer-zone to Palestine The TJFF and the Arab Legion were both than a valuable territory in its own right used externally during World War Two – but [Wilson 1987: 71]. In this respect, Britain was the Arab Legion in particular distinguished

6 itself under Glubb Pasha’s leadership in Iraq the Middle East in 1970 and in 1977 returned and Syria in 1941. The TJFF was its airbases at and Masirah to the predominantly used to guard the Iraqi Omani government, ending the period of Petroleum pipeline in the desert, thus ‘informal empire.’ safeguarding oil supplies required by British b. British Interests in Oman: As elsewhere, forces. When the TJFF was eventually British interests in Oman have evolved disbanded in 1948 many of its members significantly. Until the early twentieth joined the Arab Legion. century, alliances with Oman served to preserve Britain’s maritime supremacy along 4. Oman the Arabian coastline and provided a stopping a. Background: Oman differs historically and point en route to India. During World War culturally from the other countries discussed One, securing oil transportation routes was a in that it was never part of the Ottoman central interest, and after the war Oman Empire, and nor was it ever officially a became important as a telecommunications British protectorate. From the late nineteenth centre and as part of the south Arabian air century however, British commercial and route across the empire. New British air bases military treaties with the Omani sultanate were built there, which were to become vital gave Britain increasing control over Omani during World War Two. The potential for defence. Britain militarily buttressed the winning oil concessions became an additional coastal areas ruled by the Al Bu Sayyid incentive. family against threats from the interior, where c. Britain’s Role in the Security Services: As a a series of imams vied for tribal support and great maritime nation in the eighteenth and periodically threatened the coastal regime. nineteenth centuries, the Sultanate had a The British- Treaty of 1891 elicited a strong naval tradition, yet had no permanent pledge from the never to cede any armed forces in the nineteenth century. territory to a third power, and over the Instead, the Sultan relied on ‘askaris (armed twentieth century Britain strengthened the retainers) and on tribal levies drawn from Sultanate’s military capacities. In the 1950s supportive tribes. When these proved Britain backed the Sultanate against the unsatisfactory, the Sultan attempted to create interior tribes and the Saudis in the contest for garrison forces to protect the capital, though oil concessions, and in the 60s and 70s British these were shown to be inadequate in 1895 forces fought in the Dhoffar rebellion on the when the British Government of India felt Sultan’s side. Britain withdrew the vast obliged to protect the Muscat-Matrah area. majority of its military troops and bases from Consequently Indian Army troops were sent

7 to defend Muscat in 1913. In 1921, on the written in English not [Eickelman & recommendation of the British government in Dennison 1994: 1/25]. India, the Muscat Levy Corps (MLC), a small garrison force, was established to protect key SECTION TWO: STRATEGIES buildings and the Muscat-Matrah road. The creation of a more robust standing Omani As a colonial power, Britain became known army came only in the 1950s, and was for its pursuit of certain strategies for directly tied to British oil interests in the maintaining overall control of its territories, peninsula. The oil company British Petroleum where possible at minimal cost. Some of these Development Oman funded the creation of strategies were first developed in India and the Field Force (MOFF) to Northern Ireland, and can be summarized as counter Imamate and Saudi forces in Buraimi. follows: Around the same time the Batinah force, also British led, was established. Between 1953 1. Maintaining a ‘light British footprint’ and 1956 the total strength of the Sultanate’s on the ground. forces increased from 300 to 1100 men 2. Minimizing challenges posed by local [Peterson 2007: 64]. In the late 1950s a actors to British authority by: British army officer, Colonel David Smiley, a. Limiting the capabilities and remit reorganized the armed forces to establish the of the military. Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF were b. Fostering the dependency of the deployed to counter insurgencies in Jebel security services. Akhdar in 1958 and in Dhofar in the 1960s. c. Pursuing a ‘Divide and Rule’ British officers personally oversaw the policy. operational aspects of war. [Cheney 1984: 19] d. Nurturing a network of informants Oman’s first European-style intelligence to keep an ‘ear to the ground’. agency was established in 1959. 3. Reforming and/or professionalizing Even as Britain’s direct military involvement security services to enable eventual self-rule. in Oman was vastly reduced, evidence of its influence at all levels in the security services As should be immediately apparent, not all of remained. In 1970, Sultan Sa’di was deposed these strategies were complementary, and by his Sandhurst educated son, Qabus bin frequently there were competing agendas, Sa’id. Until 1992 it was directed and manned personalities and bureaucratic mechanisms. In at the senior levels by British agents and each case study, some or all of these former army officers. Top level reports were approaches are evident with regard to the

8 development of the army, police and Egyptian force. In Alexandria, hundreds of intelligence services, but British interests and Albanian and Turkish police were the internal dynamics in each case varied immediately dismissed. [Tollefson 1951: 3-4] widely, and thus the employment of such However, some of the broader proposals strategies played out in very different ways. made by British administrators such as Clifford Lloyd (Inspector- of Reforms 1. The ‘Light British Footprint’ in the Egyptian Ministry of Interior from The British colonial approach, particularly in 1883-1884) had the opposite effect and the 1920s, of running its territories with a increased the British presence in the security mere skeletal administrative staff, has been forces. At the same time, Evelyn Baring, the contrasted with the more hands-on approach British Consul General in Egypt between of the French. [Crowdor: 1964] This strategy, 1883 and 1907, pursued a line of reforms which promoted indirect forms of control, which often ran contrary to the ambitions of was designed to cut costs and preserve a low the British Cabinet. Roger Owen writes: profile so as not to encourage resistance. It is “Baring’s actions and arguments … had helped to place Egypt on a exemplified in Britain’s treatment of the path along which the only logical Sudan where, for the duration of destination was not self- government but annexation. In British/Egyptian control, a scant handful of other words, the country would men – almost exclusively Oxbridge graduates now be subject to the familiar colonial process by which the – were left in charge. [McGregor 2006: 199] more reforms were implemented, In Egypt, the light touch principle was the more further reform was seen as absolutely necessary; and that certainly the preferred approach of the more extensive these reforms Gladstone’s cabinet. [Mowat 1973: 116]. became, the more Baring and the British believed they could only From the outset, the British ambassador to the be executed by European Ottoman Empire, Lord Dufferin, personnel.” [Owen 2004: 233] recommended that British administrators In Iraq, direct British rule was immediately should officially take on only advisory roles shown to be disastrous and exorbitantly in the key ministries, in what has been termed expensive, with over 100,000 soldiers a ‘veiled protectorate’. Dufferin, while required to suppress a widespread Kurdish supporting the use of European policemen in and Shi’a rebellion that broke out in 1920. predominantly European neighbourhoods, [Terry 5: 2008]. At the it wanted the majority of European officers to was decided that four Iraqi army battalions withdraw after assisting with reorganization would be raised to permit the withdrawal of and training, leaving a predominantly

9 large numbers of British troops. [Terry 2008: stressful environment in which to assert an imperial claim – as every 35]. The Iraqi army did not assume full world-conqueror since Alexander military responsibility in 1928 as projected had discovered.” [Darwin 1999: 160] but its strength grew progressively. Britain also dedicated a detachment of the Royal Air Force to Iraq’s defence [Slugglet 2007: 182], 2. Minimizing Challenges by Local and throughout the 1920s, Britain pursued the Actors to British Authority infamous practice of ‘air policing’, whereby The ‘light touch’ principle required reliance centres of resistance were bombed into on a predominantly local staff, but since submission. This was a ‘light footprint’ British power in its Middle Eastern territories approach in the sense that it vastly reduced ultimately relied on coercion rather than on military manpower and costs, but it was a consensus, British administrators could not crude policy that reinforced the gulf between afford for local agencies to grow too powerful occupiers and occupied. lest they reject veiled British rule. As a In both Jordan and Oman, the British consequence they employed various strategies presence in the armed forces was initially to check this threat. small, limited to the most senior officers and a. Limiting the Capabilities of the Military: training positions. Post-independence, with On the one hand security forces needed to be the large-scale expansion of the Arab Legion, strong enough to control internal dissent; on the British government refused to second the other hand, as heavily armed bodies, large numbers of British officers. In contrast, military forces represented the most a large number of British officers and ex- prominent threat to British rule. This was officers were deployed to assist the Omani particularly the case in Iraq and in Egypt, army in the 1950s, and the British Army where expressions of anti- gained played a major part in quashing the Dhofar a strong presence within the military. rebellion. Britain checked the powers of Overall, it appears that although Britain’s mandate/protectorate militaries in various intention was to minimize its own physical ways. Where possible, they were constrained involvement, this was not always possible, to internal roles, thus limiting their combat and, as John Darwin remarks: effectiveness. In fact, both the Egyptian and “…the Middle East was no remote Jordanian armies were employed in regional protectorate to be governed on a conflicts: Egypt over a prolonged period in shoestring and garrisoned with a corporal’s guard of local levies. It Sudan and then during the First World War, was instead an exceptionally and Jordan in the Second World War and

10 during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. But when ruler and thus promoted the growth of the the Iraqi government repeatedly offered its armed forces. In Oman, between 1921 and army’s services to the British for external 1953, the Muscat Levy Corps consisted of operations during World War II, it was turned only a few hundred men, their purpose down. restricted to maintaining the security of the Britain often strove to limit armies’ size. This apparatus of government and the Sultan’s was especially the case when it had reason to residence. This initially served British distrust the army, as in Egypt and Iraq. interests by securing uninterrupted maritime However, the tactic was not always possible. access. However, the discovery of oil in In Egypt, Britain’s first move in 1882 was to Oman changed the nature of British interests cut the size of the Egyptian Army, which had and necessitated the creation of a more robust been involved in the ‘Urabi uprising, to 6,000 force that could quell insurrection in the [Mansfield 1971: 123]. Despite Britain’s interior. In Jordan, Britain shared Amir intention to retain only an internal function ‘Abdullah’s ambition to bring the tribes under for the Egyptian army, the need to suppress state control, and used the Arab Legion as the the Mahdist revolt in Sudan led to its principal tool for doing so. retraining and expansion almost threefold. Another controlling mechanism was to restrict [McGregor 2006: 193]. the quality and quantity of weaponry supplied At the army’s formation in Iraq, the monarchy to the army, which was also often tied to wanted a 6,000 man force but Britain set an Britain’s own financial capabilities. It can be upper limit of 4500 [Batatu 1979: 90]. At seen most clearly with the Iraqi army in the independence the army was immediately late 1940s when the War Office, fearing expanded and the Iraqi government another military takeover, refused to release introduced national conscription in 1934. modern tanks and aircraft to Iraq, thus Britain reduced the size of the Iraqi armed restricting the army’s capabilities in the 1948 forces again in 1941 after stepping in to Arab-Israeli war. [Silverfarb 1994: 101] topple the ‘Golden Square’ army generals Finally, even while constraining militaries as during World War Two, and from 1940 to much as possible to the quelling of internal 1944 numbers shrank from 43,400 to 28,000, dissent, Britain sometimes tried to use the although this seems largely connected to lax police instead of the military, even if this application of the conscription law. meant converting soldiers into policemen. [Silverfarb 1994: 93] There were various benefits in such a policy. The Omani and Jordanian armies differed, First, the police were less heavily armed than however. In both cases Britain supported the the army, and thus less expensive, and less

11 dangerous to British authority. Secondly, and Tollefson notes that: as a consequence, the police represented a “...as the fear of a coordinated army and police revolt faded, the less conspicuous show of force. Thirdly, the British came to view police tended to have a closer rapport with the militarization of the police forces as economical and useful in the local community and thus were better sources suppression of real or imagined of intelligence than the army. This could work political opposition.” [Tollefson 1951: 11] two ways, however, since the loyalties of the police were generally to their own kith and This blurring of military and civil roles kin. Jill Crystal notes that Britain, like France, increased when further reforms of the tended to sponsor three types of police forces: Egyptian police in the 1890s meant that the “…a military with significant urban police came to be composed domestic policing responsibilities, predominantly of ex-soldiers. an urban police concerned with crime and civil unrest, and a rural Elsewhere, the division between the military gendarmerie occasionally tasked and civil apparatus of state coercion was even with civil unrest, assisted at times by a deputized, quasi-privatized less apparent: in Jordan, for instance, the Arab rural force.” [Crystal 2001: 472]. Legion served as an internal policing body for

Broadly, this was the model adopted in Egypt, the latter part of the 1920s when its role was where the army, the urban police and the supplanted by the Trans-Jordanian Frontier gendarmerie were all used to control dissent, Force. The police and the gendarmerie were as well as to investigate criminal offences. In attached to the army until the 1950s, coming addition, the British relied heavily on the pre- under the jurisdiction of the Defence existing ghaffir system to monitor and patrol Ministry, not the Interior Ministry, and in fact urban communities. By the end of World War Glubb Pasha’s refusal to relinquish overall One, Egypt had an estimated 50,000 ghaffirs command over the police was one of the [Thomas 2008: 39]. The ghaffirs were drawn causes of his eventual dismissal. from their local villages and were cheap to b. Fostering the Dependency of the Security maintain but were also prone to corruption Services: Colonial administrators used both and nepotism. For the first few years of formal and informal means to maintain their occupation, British administrators attempted influence over the security services. Formal to imbue the police forces with a civilian-style bilateral defence treaties stipulated that ethic in contrast to the military, but eventually nations were obliged to purchase British arms, it was the militarized Royal Irish appoint British advisors, and to send their Constabulary model which took hold, for the officers to British institutions for further gendarmerie and the urban police. Harold training, while at an informal level, Britain

12 relied heavily on education to instil cultural ethnic or sectarian group.” [al- Marashi & Salama: 26] values into security service recruits. In

Jordan, as commander of the Arab Legion, In the 1930s, his successor, Sami Shawkat, John Bagot Glubb set up an Army Education continued the trend of promoting anti-British, Branch that ran schools from which Arab pan-Arab sentiment. Legion officer cadets were recruited. Glubb Britain experienced even greater problems in notes that: imparting British values to the police, “The need of the production of particularly those operating in rural areas, Arab officer cadets, apprentice such as the Egyptian ghaffirs. The police are tradesmen and future NCOs from Arab Legion schools was to by nature more subject to societal norms than become more pressing as time the military, and British officials struggled to went on. The government schools were saturated with politics, and manipulate the Ministries of Justice and many school-teachers were Interior due to an insufficient understanding Communists. In Arab Legion schools, every effort was made to of their finer mechanisms. In 1890, the teach the boys a straightforward advisor to the Egyptian Minister of Justice, open creed – service to king and country, duty, sacrifice and Sir John Scott, attempted an ambitious religion.” [Glubb 1957: 263] overhaul of the Ministry of Justice to move

In Iraq, ‘Britishization’ was more the legal system away from the French model problematic. A military academy opened in and toward the English one but was forced to 1921 and employed twenty instructors, fifteen abandon his plans due to Egyptian opposition. of whom were British and taught British c. Pursuing a Divide and Rule Policy: Both military doctrine. [al-Marashi & Salama British and French colonial powers commonly 2008: 27] At the same time, however, their pursued ‘Divide and Rule’ policies, favouring efforts were countered by Arab instructors one ethnic or religious group – usually a who instilled anti-British views. Sati al-Husri, minority – above another and preserving it in a Syrian-born product of the Ottoman the ruling class and upper echelons of the education system, followed King Faysal to security services. This type of favouritism Iraq and as the Director General of Education served (for a limited time) to prevent the from 1923 until 1927 promoted a sense of consolidation of anti-Colonial nationalist militarism in the public education system, blocs. To a greater or lesser extent, this policy believing that: was used in all of the case studies. However, “…the army served as a crucial it was not a case of simply choosing and socializing agent to imbue in a backing one group as British officials were new soldier-citizen a cause greater than advancing the interest of his often obliged to practice complex juggling

13 acts in order to maintain the upper hand. political terms, this was the group that In Egypt, the British inherited a long-standing represented the greatest direct challenge to system of rule by the Turco-Circassian elite. British control. As with the French The Arab-Egyptian ‘Urabi revolt sparked colonialists in North Africa, British Britain’s military intervention, but once they administrators hedged their bets by arrived, rather than staging a high-profile circumventing the official Iraqi governance takeover of the key ministries, they continued structures to make bargains with rural tribal to prop up the existing regime structure. In the leaders – mostly Sunni, but also some Shi’a Interior and Justice Ministries however, and Kurdish. This deprived central British administrators waged a long battle to government of ultimate control, and provided reduce the powers of the mudirs (provincial an economic way of stabilizing rural areas governors) – traditionally Turco-Circassians – which the British could not control directly. with respect to the Egyptian police. In 1884, In the 1920s, when the Iraqi Minister of for instance, Clifford Lloyd, the under- Defence attempted to introduce national secretary of state, attempted to bring in a conscription as a tool to incorporate Iraq’s range of reforms which included making the disparate communities into a nation and police directly answerable to police inspectors enforce a sense of citizenship, Britain rejected rather than to the mudirs, and placing prisons the proposal, fearing that conscription would under the control of prison directors instead of put the tribes under the control of the Sunni the mudirs. He also wanted to introduce non- urban elite. [al-Marashi & Salama: 24]. Turco-Circassians into mudir posts. The Interestingly, this attitude was at odds with Minister, Nubar Pasha, himself a Turco- the British stance in Oman in the 1960s: the Circassian, objected and Lloyd was Sultan himself favoured placating tribal dismissed, [Tollefson 1951: 16], but the battle leaders in areas beyond the direct reach of the between the mudirs and British administrators state, and told his British advisors that ‘if promoting greater centralized control Oman’s little rulers [i.e. the tribal leaders] are continued into the 1890s. all right then so is Oman’ [Owtram 121]. But In Iraq, the British accepted overall King here, Britain could not accept such indirect Faysal’s sharifian and Ottoman entourage – forms of rule since greater access to the who were overwhelmingly Sunni - as the Omani interior was needed, and therefore the ruling elite; continuing the exclusion of the Sultan’s Armed Forces were developed. Shi’a from political power. Senior Arab army The most conspicuous example of divide and officers were also mostly drawn from the rule within the security services in Iraq did urban Sunni classes, but this meant that in not involve Sunni, Shi’a or , but the

14 small Christian Assyrian minority. Until Iraqi colonel, Bakr Sidqi, orchestrated the Britain’s total withdrawal from Iraq in 1955, massacre of 300 Assyrians in Simele. This the British supplemented their own and met with popular approval, as it was seen as Indian-British soldiers and gendarmerie with evidence that the Iraqi military was ‘emerging the Iraq Levies, a predominantly Assyrian from the shadow of British domination’ [al- Iraqi force, created before the army in August Marashi & Salama 2008: 32] 1919. Its origins dated back to the First World The Levies, unlike the Iraqi Army, played an War when Kurds, Arabs and Turcomen had active part in World War Two. In Iraq, where been employed as local scouts. By the close the government was briefly an Axis ally, their of the war they numbered nearly 4500. At the most notable victory against Axis Forces was Cairo Conference in 1921, it was announced at the Habbaniya air base in 1941. Following that: this victory parts of the force were sent to “The function of the Iraq fight across and to guard air bases and Levies… is to relieve the British oil installations in the Middle East. [Solomon and Indian Troops in Iraq, take over out-posts in Mosul Vilayat 1997]. Although their numbers were cut (province) and in , significantly after the war, they continued to previously held by the Imperial Garrison, and generally to fill the work for the RAF until they were disbanded gap until such time as the Iraq in 1955. National Army is trained to undertake these duties.” [Browne In Oman, the geographical base of support for 1932] the Sultan before the 1950s was so minimal

Following the creation of the Iraqi Army, that the divide and rule principle was hardly many Arabs serving in the Levies were an option. It was more a case of importing transferred, and Assyrians appointed in their mercenaries or co-opting outsiders who would place. In the 1920s the Assyrian Levies rely entirely on British patronage. The early provoked resentment amongst the Iraqi Army Muscat Levy Corps was formed almost and much of the Arab populace, who believed exclusively of foreign Baluchi and black – not unjustifiably - that the British favoured African mercenaries. In the 1950s, the tiny the Levies and used them for suppressing ‘Dhofar Force’ composed of jebali tribesmen revolts and policing to avoid strengthening was replaced by the creation of the Baluchi the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi government Southern Regiment, led by Brits and manned officially decommissioned the force after by Pakistanis. [Cheney] Even in the 1960s, independence in 1933, but most members the early British-led Omani intelligence continued to work directly for Royal Air organisation was supported by ‘headmen’ Force bases in Iraq. In this context, a popular who were marginalized from mainstream

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Omani society. These included Omanis who single model for the early structures of had fled after its 1964 leftist and intelligence gathering in the Middle East, anti-Arab revolution and members of minority which were influenced by a combination of groups such as the Baluch. [Eickelman & the pre-existing political situation, geographic Dennison 1998: 8] factors and material capabilities. Nonetheless, In Jordan, Britain backed Amir ‘Abdullah, the one common denominator amongst these whose early administration was composed of various agencies and networks was that their the Sharifian elite who had accompanied him principle purpose was to reinforce the from the Hijaz, and of Syrians, Palestinians, authority of the state and/or British rule rather Circassians and Lebanese whom he enlisted than to detect dangers to public welfare. from outside. The first officers of the Arab Frequently the prosecution of criminal Legion were consequently drawn from these behaviour was conflated with the suppression groups, rather than from amongst the majority of political dissent deemed to threaten British Transjordanian population, much of which authority. eschewed the new authority, demanding a In Egypt, pre-World War One, operatives ‘Transjordan for the Transjordanians’ within the intelligence chain typically [Vatikiosis 1967: 62-63]. ‘Abdullah also drew included the urban police, who filed reports his special guard from the minority Circassian relating to dangerous political activity, the population in Transjordan, but with British gendarmerie and ghaffirs in the provinces, assistance, worked to incorporate the broader and military intelligence officers in rural Transjordanian population gradually into the areas. In 1886, the Special Division, the first armed forces. Initially this did not include the secret police, was established in Cairo. Bedouin tribes, who were the main targets of [Tollefson 1951: 38] Nonetheless, in the the Arab Legion’s operations, but in 1931, 1890s, it was to the Egyptian Military with Glubb’s creation of the Desert Patrol, the Intelligence Director, Reginald Wingate, that Legion began to recruit large numbers of the British Cabinet turned for information Bedouins as a mechanism for incorporating regarding the new Khedive Abbas Hilmi. them into the apparatus of the state. [Daly 1993: 224] d. Keeping an Ear to the Ground: In view of During World War One, the focus of Britain’s tenuous authority over its intelligence gathering was switched to the war protectorates and mandates, the requirement effort. The Arab Bureau, used to collect to maintain networks of informants across the intelligence from across the Middle East, was territory in order to pre-empt emerging based in Cairo, and after the war, Britain sources of threat was vital. There is no one experienced difficulties in re-orientating

16 intelligence to internal affairs. This was Arab Legion took on the task of intelligence particularly the case because both rural and gathering. The establishment of a criminal urban police were considered untrustworthy investigation branch in 1926, a passport office sources of information. [Thomas 2008: 110]. in 1927, and a fingerprint bureau in 1928 The Mandates of Jordan and Iraq posed promoted surveillance of the population, as similar challenges in terms of intelligence. did the introduction of new laws such as the Britain assumed control over territories with Trailing of Persons Law. [Massad 2001: 152] large desert-expanses populated by nomadic Again, Oman proved an exception. Since and semi-nomadic Bedouins who were, for Britain did not seriously attempt to extend the the most part, unknown quantities. Mandate Sultan’s authority into the interior until the authorities were under pressure to gain a 1950s, its intelligence requirements were detailed understanding of the land and the smaller than elsewhere. Prior to 1958, the tribes in order to secure their acquiescence. In Sultan relied on updates from his allies. Iraq, the RAF, who were ultimately Prompted by the Jabal al-Akhdar war in 1958, responsible for imperial policing there, the British insisted on the creation of a appointed Special Service Officers and military intelligence unit with posts co- Political Officers who supervised tribal levies located with SAF bases throughout northern in the desert and sourced intelligence reports Oman. All of its officers were British. In 1971 for the High Commission in Baghdad, the Oman Intelligence Service (OIS) was although due to the scope of their remit, these established [Eickelman & Dennison 1998: 8]. were not always accurate [Thomas 2008: 548]. Significantly the British in Iraq relied 3. Reforming and/or Professionalizing heavily on their own military officers and State Agencies to Enable Eventual Self-rule agents rather than on Iraqi officers, who were Alongside these strategies designed to bolster often distrusted. During World War Two, the British control, there was also a need to Iraqi Prime Minister authorized the British to professionalize the security services so that strengthen their position in the Iraqi provinces they would be capable of standing alone after and assume greater control over the Iraqi the British withdrew. Britain stood to gain police. A number of British officials with enormously from strengthening the army, long-standing experience of Iraq were police, and intelligence services to the point appointed to live and travel in the where they could withstand internal and countryside, filing reports on local conditions external threats, under regimes which would to the embassy. [Silverfarb1994: 81]. continue, after independence, to be supportive In Jordan, British officers attached to the of British interests in the region. The reality,

17 however, was that strategies employed to most historical commentators have viewed achieve short-term objectives generally British liberal reform principles at that time hindered the fulfilment of longer-term goals. with cynicism. Indeed, in a climate of World In some cases, however, Britain was obliged Wars and domestic insurgencies, civil to carry out professionalization in order to liberties took a distinct back-seat to achieve short-term operational requirements. maintaining order. Even so, the case of Egypt In Egypt, for instance, a genuine priority of prior to World War One demonstrates that police professionalization in the 1880s and British administrators did intermittently try to 90s was to cut crime and promote security, or push through liberal reforms, specifically in as Lord Dufferin, the Ambassador to the the police and prison systems. As Egyptian Ottoman Porte, expressed it, to ‘rescue the society became increasingly hostile to British people from anarchy’ [Tollefson 1951: 1]. In rule, many liberal reform objectives fell by Iraq, even whilst denying the Iraqi army large the wayside as the British administrators quantities of modern armaments during World resorted to harsher forms of oppression, but it War Two, in 1944 the need to repel the is important to recognize that in the earlier Kurdish rebellion induced Britain to improve years of the occupation they actually the organization and training of the army considered liberal reform as a possible means [Silverfarb 97-98]. The British had opposed of gaining greater legitimacy within the wider the introduction of a conscripted army in the population. 1920s believing that a volunteer army would be of a higher quality, but in fact they were SECTION THREE: LEGACIES disappointed that the volunteer force attracted In the years since independence, security what they classed as ‘undesirable elements’ forces have undergone a series of [al-Marashi & Salama, 2008: 22]. reorganizations, and, in the case of Egypt and Similarly, in Egypt, one of Clifford Lloyd’s Iraq, their governments have seen some failed attempted police reforms was to make dramatic regime changes. Equally, in the the whole institution voluntary. A subsequent course of the , the USSR and the US Commander of the Cairo Police (Charles took over Britain’s position as the main Coles Pasha) noted police salaries were suppliers of arms and training. In recent inadequate to attract men of quality, and only decades, amidst a climate of international procured ‘wasters from the cities’. pressure for democratization within Arab ‘Professionalization’ in the security services, countries, security services have been subject in addition to improving capabilities, can refer to further restructuring. It is therefore to ethical norms. In the post-colonial period, important to consider the extent to which the

18 legacy of British Colonial policies within the under the influence of post-colonial foreign army, police and intelligence services has interventions. remained, and where it has been supplanted, Table No. 2: Factors Affecting the Security either as a result of domestic developments or Sectors Principal non-British Country Regime Changes Post-Independence Formative Events External Influences on Security Sector 1948 Arab-Israeli War

1950s/60s Government suppresses Muslim Brotherhood

1956 Suez Canal Crisis 1952 – Egyptian Free

Officers Movement 1958-61 Union with Syria stages

coup. Nasser takes USSR Egypt 1962-67 – War in Yemen over US

in in 1954, establishes 1967 Six Day War Republic.

1973 1986 Egyptian Police Mutiny suppressed by Army

1990s Government suppresses Islamist movements 1958 – Iraqi Free Officers Movement 1948 Arab-Israeli War USSR Iraq stages US coup under ‘Abd 1960s & 70s Kurdish rebellion in al-Karim Qassim Northern

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Iraq 1963 – Ba’athist Coup overthrows 1980-1988 - Qassim but Ba’athists forced to cede 1990-91 power to ‘Abd al- Salam al-Sharif 1991 Shi’a Uprising

1968 - Ba’athists 2003 War against Coalition Forces regain power 1948 war

1950-56 turbulence following annexation of the West Bank

1956 War Jordan N/A US 1967 Six Day War leading to influx of thousands of Palestinian Refugees

1970 –

1989, 1996 Bread Riots 1954 – Buraimi Crisis

1970 – Sultan Sa’id 1957-59 – Jebel al-Akhdar Rebellion Oman overthrown by son US Qabus 1963-76

1990 Gulf War

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This final section briefly analyzes how the significantly from Soviet military development of security services in each organizational models. Between the 1967 and country has been influenced by the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, considerable efforts characteristics of post–independence regimes, were made to professionalize the Egyptian their relations with third powers, and army, which appeared to pay dividends in domestic events. It concludes by highlighting 1973. More competent commanders were some traits common to many Arab security appointed, greater cohesion developed, and sectors that bear resemblances to strategies military education strengthened [Kamrava: used during British rule and assesses the 81]. Reliance on Soviet advice and assistance extent to which they can be linked. was greatly increased, although Egyptian officers mistrusted Soviet motivations and 1. Egypt were thus reluctant to adopt their doctrines In the aftermath of the Free Officers’ coup in wholeheartedly [Eisenstadt and Pollack 2001: 1952, the security services were entirely 552]. Since Egypt’s 1979 peace agreement restructured. Personnel associated with the with Israel, U.S. military aid to Egypt has British authorities and the former Turco- flowed, making Egypt the second largest Circassian elite were swept aside. Military recipient after Israel. In 2009, Egypt received promotions under Nasser’s Presidency were $1.3 billion in military funding [Sharp 2009: awarded on the basis of political affiliations to 35]. the Revolutionary Command Council, but the The Egyptian military exercised enormous Egyptian conscript military reflected a large influence in the political sphere under Nasser, degree of homogeneity in Egyptian society. and over 50% of ministerial portfolios were The glaring exception was the Coptic exercised by officers in 1961 [Picard 1990: Christian minority (10-15% of the population) 198]. Under Sadat and Mubarak, the direct which despite its active role in politics and the influence of the military in politics has military during the 1920s and 30s, was decreased significantly and some attempts marginalized from influential positions under have been made to bolster the status and role Nasser and his successors. At the same time, of the police viz-a-viz the army. In 1966, the Islamist groups including the Muslim Central Security Forces (CSF) were created to Brotherhood and more extreme offshoots such perform some of the more heavy-handed as al-Takfir wa’l-Higra gained footings policing/gendarmerie functions such as riot within the army and the police, much to the control and SWAT. Accountable to the regime’s discomfort [Vatikiotis 1985: 439] Ministry of Interior, the CSF is composed of During the 1960s and 70s, the army borrowed police officers and army conscripts.

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Following the 1979 Egyptian/Israeli peace Mandate fears over the emergence of an agreement the CSF were deployed to the overly-powerful Iraqi military elite were eastern edge of the Sinai bordering Israel in realized in the post-war years. Since British place of the Egyptian army. However, a rule ended, Iraq has witnessed three bloody mutiny by CSF members in 1986 necessitated regime changes: one in 1958 which brought a reinforcement of state control by the army Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim to power, one [Springborg 1987: 7]. At the same time, the in 1963 in which he was overthrown by his army’s defence industry and development of erstwhile ally ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, whose agricultural enterprises has played and death in 1968 gave way to a Ba’athist military continues to play an important part in the and political takeover, and most recently in Egyptian economy. 2003 when the Ba’ath Party and its leader The Egyptian regime has placed a high Saddam Hussain were toppled by Coalition premium on the development of sophisticated Forces. intelligence agencies whose duties overlap but Trained by the British for purely internal whose existence provide a checks-and- security, the Iraqi Army has engaged in a balances mechanism for averting the threat of number of regional conflicts since a military coup. These include the General independence: against Israel, Iran, and, in Intelligence Directorate - (al-Mukhabarat al- 1991, and its allies during the Gulf ’Ama,) and the Military Intelligence (al- War. Internally, under Ba’athist rule, Iraq was Mukhabarat al-Harbiyya) who are engaged in almost uninterrupted fighting answerable to the President, and the General against Kurdish separatists in Northern Iraq in Directorate for State Security Investigation the 1960s and 70s, and in 1991, following the (Mubahath ad-Dawla), controlled by the Gulf War, Saddam’s security forces crushed a Interior Ministry, which performs a Shi’a rebellion in southern and northern Iraq. counterterrorist role [Sullivan & Jones 2008 In addition to the official security agencies, a :33] popular militia – al-Jaysh ash-Sha’abi – was created by the Ba’ath Party in 1970. Hugely 2. Iraq popular, by 1987 its membership, an The post-independence development of the estimated 650,000, rivalled that of the army Iraqi security sphere bears certain itself. While its role was initially purely resemblances to that of Egypt, where a internal, it was employed to fight during the politicized military overthrew the monarchy Iran-Iraq war. [Picard 1990: 202] and assumed control, before witnessing a Iraq’s relations with the USSR steadily “civilianization” of the regime. British strengthened following the declaration of the

22 republic. This had some effect upon the & Salama 2008: 130-132] . capabilities and doctrine of Iraq’s armed The transformation from monarchy to forces, although probably less than has been socialist military dictatorship changed the described. Keen to replace Britain as its main bases of power patronage, but did not change supplier of arms, Iraq made large arms the predominance of the Iraqi Sunni minority purchases of tanks, helicopters, fighters, within the security services. The Kurds and armoured personnel carriers and rockets from the Shi’a remained largely excluded from the the USSR in the 1960s and 70s, so that higher echelons. Over the course of Ba’ath between 1974 and 1978, 90% of Iraq’s arms Party rule, power over the intelligence imports came from Russia. [Smolansky & apparatus and the military was increasingly Smolansky 1991: 27]. One result of these concentrated in the hands of family members sales was that large numbers of Soviet from al-Tikrit, and promotion throughout the military advisors were deployed in Iraq to security services was dependent on party provide training in weapons systems. At the affiliation. In addition to the professional same time, numerous Iraqi Army officers security services, in 1970 the Ba’ath were sent to Soviet training institutes. established the Popular Army - a militia Nonetheless, the Ba’ath Party’s antipathy to composed of civilian volunteers, which grew communists in Iraq stymied relations with to 600,000 during the Iran –Iraq War. Moscow, and in the period after 1978 bilateral [Kamrava 2000: 82] relations deteriorated significantly. Eisenstadt Faced with the constant threat of a coup, and Pollack note in their article on the impact Saddam created a number of intelligence of Soviet military doctrine on Arab armies agencies within agencies designed to report that although the Iraqi army employed Soviet on the activities of members of the security equipment during the Iran-Iraq War, they services and/or to protect the President incorporated only minor elements of Soviet himself. These included the Republican operational thought and continued to use Guard, Saddam’s Fedayeen, and the Special mostly British based tactics. Indeed, in May Republican Guard, and they reported directly 1980 the Iraqi Chief of Staff was preparing to the president not the Ministry of Defense. for an invasion of Iran based on an exercise [al-Marashi & Salama 2004: 10] conducted under British military supervision at the War College in 1941, although the plan 3. Jordan was altered in line with Soviet doctrine to Since independence Jordan has remained involve heavy bombardments and methodical under the rule of the Hashemite monarchy and progression across enemy ground. [al-Marashi maintained friendly relations with Britain.

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The Jordanian Armed Forces have continued the Palestinian Liberation Front used Jordan to send officers to British military institutions, as a staging post for attacks on Israel and and Britain has continued to supply large assumed de facto control over much of the quantities of arms to Jordan, although the US Palestinian population in Jordan. The army became Jordan’s main arms supplier as early and police were deployed to eject the PLO as 1963 [Levey 2006: 527]. from Jordan in September 1970. Nonetheless, Despite the absence of any dramatic regime the continued influx of thousands of changes, the shape of the security sector has Palestinian refugees has put pressure on the changed significantly since Jordan’s Jordanian economy, causing further independence. As commander of the Arab resentment. Palestinians are now estimated to Legion, John Bagot Glubb oversaw the comprise 60% of Jordan’s total population, Legion’s most extensive external operation in and have entirely altered the demographics of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Entering Palestine the Jordanian state. as soon as the British Mandate expired, Following Glubb Pasha’s departure, King Jordanian forces subsequently annexed the Hussain pursued a vigorous policy of West Bank of Palestine and incorporated it Arabizing the security services to placate into Transjordan in 1950. The Legion Jordanian hadari officers who, under Glubb’s expanded rapidly between 1948 and 1956 into command, had been barred from senior a modern army so as to control its newly positions due to his preference for Bedouin acquired territory. The Armed Forces again soldiers. Conversely, incorporation of the engaged in the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab- Palestinian population into the army and Israeli wars, but otherwise the emphasis of the police still lags behind. Where they are army’s missions has been on maintaining recruited, they tend to occupy rather internal stability. than combat roles [Vatikiotis 1967: 6]. Domestically, the dismissal of Glubb in 1956 The intelligence services also witnessed an heralded the separation of the police from the Arabization process in the post-independence Army with the establishment of the Public period, although minorities such as Security Directorate in 1958, and in 1964 the Circassians and Christians continued to be General Intelligence Directorate was disproportionately represented. During the separated from the police. The greatest 1960s and 70s Jordan was characterized as a challenge to Jordan’s internal stability post- typical Arab ‘mukhabarat’ (intelligence) independence has been posed by tensions state, with the remit of the GID growing between East Bankers and Palestinians. These enormously. The repressive powers of the became most serious in the late 1960s when security forces as a whole have increased in

24 times of political turbulence, most recently in developed bureaucratically into modern, well- response to threats posed by Jordanian organized state agencies. However, in Islamist movements, although moves towards southern Oman, where the Sultan did not gain political liberalization initiated in 1989 have effective control until the mid-1970s, archaic served overall to make the security services modes of policing have remained. During the less conspicuous. Dhofar rebellion SAS trained jebeli fighters who had defected were formed into firqat 4. Oman teams. Their role was decisive in ending the Although, or perhaps because, Oman was rebellion. The Sultan has maintained many of never officially a British protectorate, its these firqat in the post-rebellion years to act relations with Britain in the security sphere as paramilitary policemen for their tribal areas have been little interrupted since the British and to assure their loyalty to the Sultan, withdrawal in 1970, even while US military although the Royal Omani Police now also links have steadily grown. Oman did in fact operate in the mountains [Peterson 2004: undergo a coup, though not a regime change, 265]. Another combat institution created after in 1970 when Qabus deposed his father Sa’id the Dhofar rebellion was the Sultan’s Special bin Taymur, but this was with British Force, a counterpart to the British SAS. It was acquiescence. Britain’s own military, based in Dhofar and initially recruited mainly particularly the Special Air Service (SAS) and jebeli Dhofaris [ibid]. the Intelligence Corps, has played an Nonetheless, Dhofaris remain extensive role in fighting off the insurgencies underrepresented within the security services. in Jebel al-Akhdar and Dhofar. In 1973, the Sultan Qabus undertook an Omanization Shah of Iran also sent a brigade of soldiers programme following Britain’s withdrawal, and some helicopters to assist the Sultan. which, by the 1980s, had even permeated the [Eilts 1980: 93]. upper levels of intelligence agency. By 1995 The Royal Omani Police was established in only 10% of the Oman military were foreign. the 1970s, reporting to a ministry separate [Allen & Rigsbee 2002: 91]. However, the from both the Interior and Defence Ministries, majority of officers come from northern and in 1974 the intelligence agency was Omani tribes that have traditionally supported separated from the military and renamed the the Sultan [ibid]. Omani Research Department. It was transformed in 1887 into the Internal Security 5. Common Strands Service. In all cases barring that of Oman, the security Oman’s security services have, on the whole, services have undergone complete overhauls

25 since the departure of British colonial powers. informants to pre-empt threats to their Indeed, in Egypt and Iraq perhaps the greatest authority, so contemporary Arab regimes legacy of British rule has been the backlash have prioritised intelligence. Since the against it. Therefore it is curious that current colonial period, intelligence agencies have Arab regimes employ some of the same proliferated: the army and the police generally strategies used by the British authorities, have their own intelligence capabilities in resulting in some shared characteristics addition to the official state agency. Due to among their security services. lack of trust within Arab regimes, specific a. The Blurring of Police/Military Roles: agencies are also commonly assigned to British colonial powers tended to use highly report on the rest of the security agencies, and militarized police forces to suppress dissent in they report back directly to the ruler. the Middle East. Today the roles performed c. The Exclusion of Certain Social Groups by the police and the army are similarly from the Higher Echelons of the Security confused. This ambiguity is attributable to a Services: Britain’s divide and rule policy has range of factors. In many cases the police a complex and varied legacy within her force was not officially separated from the former mandates and protectorates. Almost military until relatively recently and the without exception, some sort of backlash military high command has continued to against former elites took place post- dominate over the police, creating a situation independence, even if the new elite is drawn whereby in some countries, for example from the same religious, ethnic or social Jordan, the police act as service providers to group as the old one. Therefore, in Iraq, post- the army. In addition, the military has independence, the Sunni minority continued continued to play an active role in suppressing to rule the majority Shi’a and Kurdish internal dissent, so that both army and riot populations, but under Saddam, the military police are deployed to control the same and intelligence services came to be situation. Conversely, regimes are aware that dominated by a very small Sunni minority this poses the danger that their armies – which drawn from his Takriti kin network. In overall maintain high public approval ratings Jordan, the monarchy immediately pursued a – will become unpopular. As a result they vigorous ‘Arabization’ in the higher ranks of have created new militarized branches of the the army following Glubb’s dismissal, police, or gendarmerie units, whose tasks reversing Glubb’s trend of favouritism for straddle the civil-military policing divide. Bedouin commanders. However, it was then b. The Reliance on Intelligence to Suppress the Palestinians who were excluded from the Dissent: Just as the British relied on their upper levels of the security sector. Where

26

Palestinians did join the military and the every case. So, for instance, whilst in Jordan police, they tended to occupy technical rather the British were immediately required to than combat roles [Vatikiotis: 1967]. In strengthen the armed forces and subdue the Egypt, whilst the old Turco-Circassian elite tribes in order to create a viable state in the were swept aside, the new minority largely 1920s, in Oman they were content to leave the excluded from military command were the Sultan with the bare minimum military force Copts. At the same time, the Egyptian until the 1950s when their own requirements military have developed into a class elite of for oil led them to create more robust armed their own, and young officers are generally forces to combat rebellion. And while in Iraq, drawn from this pool. In Oman, the Sultan’s the British opposed the conscription of rural policy of Omanisation finally ended the tribal populations into the army in the 1920s prevalence of Baluchis at the lower levels of because they feared that this would reduce the security services and Brits in senior British control over these populations, in intelligence and military positions. The armed Jordan Glubb Pasha made concerted efforts to forces are popular, but despite the bring Bedouin into the army in order to instil establishment of specialist Dhofari units, the them with a sense of national identity. vast majority of recruits come from northern, Nonetheless, some general trends do emerge, not southern Oman. specifically relating to areas where the British Invariably, under post-independence regimes, were successful, and where they failed with certain social groups have been excluded from the security services. British army officers assuming powerful positions within the achieved some measure of success in creating security services, although it is not clear elite fighting corps composed predominantly whether these trends are always the result of of one social group: for instance the Assyrian deliberate policies or are the result of a Levies in Iraq; the Baluch regiments in Oman, process of self-selected exclusion by those and to a lesser extent the Bedouin Desert who feel disenfranchised by their regimes. Patrol in Jordan (lesser because the Bedouin were drawn from different tribes). In the CONCLUSION absence of a sense of national identity, these types of formations took on an esprit de corps What these case studies demonstrate is that based on ethnic heritage. Conversely, Britain although Britain certainly resorted to some of experienced far greater difficulties in the same tried and tested strategies throughout penetrating the mechanisms of the police, the their colonies, there was no overarching justice systems and the ministries of defence model, because overall objectives differed in than it did with the army and the Ministry of

27

Defence. Despite the fact that militaries were agencies in her former mandates and trained to act internally, they tended to be protectorates. Nonetheless, in light of the assigned with offensive operations and riot diverse post-independence influences on each control rather than the more complex areas of of the security sectors in question, we should criminal investigation and the micro-level avoid over-estimating the legacy of the day-to-day dispute resolution tasks which are British protectorate policies. But since that is common to the police. British administrators the case, how should we account for those found it difficult to take police forces under traits common to both colonial and their control because they lacked sufficient contemporary Middle Eastern security knowledge of the norms and laws of their agencies? We may find clues by looking at subject populations, and it was hard to control the characteristics of the security agencies of corruption within these forces because they any non-democratic state, in history or today: did not fully grasp the bases of patronage. it cannot come as a surprise that they share Clearly it may be argued that since the many characteristics, when only a finite modern Middle Eastern state system is a number of strategies for rule are available to product of the colonial era, Britain is at least regimes whose control ultimately relies upon partly to ‘blame’ for the failings of security coercion rather than consensus.

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