Band of Brothers Or Dysfunctional Family? a Military Perspective on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations
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Glenn NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Control Number: 2011942596 ISBN: 978-0-8330-4769-4 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Counterinsurgency (COIN) and other stability operations seldom present a nation with trials that threaten its very survival (unless the country in question is the one directly under assault).1 Bonds between coalition members are therefore weaker in such situations than they are when threat of annihilation reinforces mutual dependence. These situations are further complicated by the use of force likely not being the primary implement for attaining ultimate success. Devoid of a preeminent threat and denied primary dependence on armed forces, primary coalition objectives tend to be political rather than military in character. They include the myriad tasks embodied in such wide-ranging language as counterinsurgency, nation building, developing government capacity, and providing humanitarian assistance and that are collectively referred to in doctrine as stability operations. Armed forces are not staffed or trained to meet the long-term demands of many of these tasks. An alliance or coalition must therefore incor- porate participation by other government agencies and—ultimately—that of the indigenous government and its population to an extent not expected during conventional combat opera- tions. (Indeed, the indigenous country is sometimes excluded from membership in a coali- tion longer than appropriately serving the coalition’s objectives would seem to dictate.) Recent contingencies have also seen commercial enterprises, militias, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) become key participants in these under- takings. The result is coalitions of a size seldom seen and with a number of affiliations rarely, if ever approached, before the closing years of the 20th century. This monograph investigates the dramatic expansion of challenges confronting alliances and coalitions today and thereafter considers potential solutions that include questioning our very conception of what constitutes a coalition in today’s world. While military readers may comprise the primary audience for this document, the scope of this study should make it of interest to representatives of any governmental agency likely to participate in a coalition with domestic or multinational partners and those from IGOs, 1 For the purposes of this document, I consider COIN operations to be a subset of stability operations. The latter are defined in U.S. joint military doctrine as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, pro- vide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02, 2001 [2008b], p. 515) To emphasize the application of the analysis herein to COIN in particular as well as stability operations in general and to avoid overuse of stability operations as a term, at times I refer to COIN alone when the point seems particularly appropri- ate to COIN operations. That use should not be taken as meaning that the discussion is exclusive of other types of stability operations. iii iv Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? NGOs, and commercial or research organizations that choose to operate where alliances and coalitions deploy their capabilities. The RAND National Defense Research Institute This research was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand. org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202. More information about RAND is available at www. rand.org. Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Figures ...........................................................................................................vii Table .............................................................................................................. ix Summary ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... xvii Abbreviations .................................................................................................. xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Coalitions (and Alliances) 101: The Basics .................................................................... 2 The Nature of Coalitions ...................................................................................... 3 Reasons for Joining a Coalition .............................................................................. 4 Factors Affecting the Cohesion and Stability of Coalitions............................................... 5 Coalitions 102: More Observations Regarding Coalition Cohesion ....................................... 7 The Pages Ahead ................................................................................................. 8 CHAPTER TWO Supporting Case Studies: East Timor and the Balkans ................................................11 Case Study 1: East Timor ......................................................................................11 Background ....................................................................................................11 Leadership