Hard Offensive Counterterrorism
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Wright State University CORE Scholar Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2019 The Use of Force: Hard Offensive Counterterrorism Daniel Thomas Wright State University Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all Part of the International Relations Commons Repository Citation Thomas, Daniel, "The Use of Force: Hard Offensive Counterterrorism" (2019). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 2101. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/2101 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE USE OF FORCE: HARD OFFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By DANIEL THOMAS B.A., The Ohio State University, 2015 2019 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL Defense Date: 8/1/19 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Daniel Thomas ENTITLED The Use of Force: Hard Offensive Counterterrorism BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. _______________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Thesis Director ________________________ Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: ___________________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Liam Anderson, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Pramod Kantha, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ______________________________ Barry Milligan, Ph.D. Interim Dean of the Graduate School ABSTRACT Thomas, Daniel. M.A. International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2019. The Use of Force: Hard Offensive Counterterrorism. In the following research, I investigate whether hard offensive counterterrorism results in the failure or success of a counterterrorism strategy. In the second chapter, the academic literature of counterterrorism strategies is examined. Next, a hypothesis is put forth that if a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy is utilized, indicators such as high troop levels, more civilian casualties, more negative public opinion, and an increased rate of terrorism, will point to a failed counterterrorism strategy. Then, I put forth a methodology to test the hypothesis while introducing troop level databases, various public opinion polling sources, and terrorist attack databases to investigate the given variables. In the third chapter, a case study of the Iraq War is utilized, in which the initial invasion from 2003-2006 and the Surge/Withdrawal eras from 2007-2011 are examined. Both time periods are compared to see if hard offensive counterterrorism used in 2003- 2006 resulted in a less effective counterterrorism campaign than the softer counterinsurgency strategies from 2007-2011. Data from the Brookings Iraq Index, Iraq Body Count, and Global Terrorism Database are then analyzed to investigate the variables of casualties, public opinion, and rate of terrorism during each era in Iraq. In the fourth chapter, the war in Afghanistan is presented as a case study. I then evaluate whether hard offensive counterterrorism used from 2001-2008 resulted in less terrorism than the counterinsurgency strategies of Surge and withdrawal used from 2009-2016. Data from the Congressional Research Service, UNAMA, Physicians for Social iii Responsibility, the BBC, the Asia Foundation, and the Global Terrorism Database are then utilized to assess each variable. Finally, I present my findings and conclude that evaluating a strategy primarily using hard offensive counterterrorism strategies is rather complex and then present ideas for future research in counterterrorism strategy. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction 1 CHAPTER 2 5 Literature Review 5 Methodology 16 CHAPTER 3 20 History and Politics of Iraq 2003-2006 21 Iraq War Data Trends 2003-2006 36 Iraq History and Politics 2007-2011: The Surge and Withdrawal 50 Iraq Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2007-2011 76 CHAPTER 4 90 History and Politics of Afghanistan 2001-2008 91 Afghan Data Trends 2001-2008 119 Afghanistan History and Politics 2009-2016: The Surge and Withdrawal 136 Afghanistan Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2009-2016 154 CHAPTER 5 168 Conclusion 168 WORKS CITED 174 LIST OF ACRONYMS 180 LIST OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS 181 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Counterterrorism Strategies 8 Figure 2. Number of U.S. and Coalition Troops Present in Iraq from 2003-2006 38 Figure 3. Total Number of Iraqi Civilian Casualties Recorded by the Iraq Body Count from 2003-2006 41 Figure 4. Timeline of Iraqi Public Opinion Percentages on Which Direction Iraq is Headed (2004-2005) 45 Figure 5. Timeline of Percentage of Iraqi Respondents on the Direction of Iraq (2004- 2006) 47 Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq from 2003-2006 49 Figure 7. Total Number of U.S. and Coalition Troop in Iraq from 2007-2011 78 Figure 8. Number of Total Iraqi Civilian Casualty in Iraq from 2007-2011 80 Figure 9. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq in the Surge and Withdrawal Eras (2007-2011) 88 Figure 10. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq after the U.S. Withdrawal from 2011-2017 88 Figure 11. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 2002- 2008 121 Figure 12. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2001- 2008 122 Figure 13. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan from 2001-2008 135 Figure 14. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 2009- 2016 156 Figure 15. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2009- 2016 157 Figure 16. Percentage of Afghans Who Felt Afghanistan was Heading in the Right or Wrong Direction 159 Figure 17. Percentage of Afghans Polled on Their Sympathy Towards Armed Opposition Groups 2009-2016 162 Figure 18. Rate of Terrorism in Afghanistan 2009-2016 167 Figure 19. Relationship Between Counterterrorism Strategies and Troop Levels 171 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Responses in Percent to Iraqi Political Opinion Polling Questions in 2003 42 Table 2. Number of Iraqis Answering that Coalition Forces Should Leave Iraq in 2004 CPA Iraqi Public Opinion Poll 43 Table 3. Percent Answering that Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction in 2004 Regional Iraqi Public Opinion Poll 44 Table 4. Percentage of Yes Answers to 2005 Regional Iraqi Public Opinion Poll Questions 46 Table 5. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq 81 Table 6. Percentage of Responses on Who is Most to Blame for Violence in Iraq (February 2007) 81 Table 7. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq 82 Table 8. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction 83 Table 9. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Things in Iraq Are Good Overall 83 Table 10. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Security Has Gotten Better Over the Last Year 84 Table 11. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction 85 Table 12. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (BBC) 127 Table 13. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (Asia Foundation) 128 Table 14. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey Answer (Asia Foundation) 129 Table 15. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction” Survey Answer (The Asia Foundation) 129 Table 16. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey Answer in 2009 (BBC) 130 Table 17. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction” Survey Answer in 2009 (BBC) 131 Table 18. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Strongly Support, Somewhat Support, Somewhat Oppose, or Strongly Oppose U.S. and ISAF Military Forces 132 Table 19. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Believe Attacks against U.S. and ISAF Forces Can or Cannot be Justified 133 Table 20. Reasons by Percent Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed in Right Direction 2009-2015 160 Table 21. Reasons by Percent of Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed in Wrong Direction 2009-2015 161 vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my gratitude for all the support I have received from my family and friends in helping me to achieve this education milestone in achieving a Master’s of Arts degree from Wright State University. I would also like to thank my thesis committee for being incredibly helpful in reviewing my thesis materials, and especially my thesis chair Dr. Vaughn Shannon for guiding me through the entire process. viii CHAPTER 1 Introduction Terrorism has been around for a long time, yet until recently, terrorism was not a major area of policy concern in most countries. Since September 11, 2001, however, terrorism is a threat that many states now take seriously. The United States and other nations have elevated counterterrorism efforts to the highest consideration in policy circles. The main strategy of the United States immediately following 9/11 was to fight a so called “War on Terror”. In this strategy, President George W. Bush utilized rhetoric marked by an “either with us or against us” mantra. The new global counterterrorism effort focused on bringing groups responsible for terrorist attacks to justice and preventing the next attack.1 Since declaring war on terrorism, the United States embarked on serious military campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite all this conflict, it is unclear whether this strategy has succeeded in reducing terrorism against the United States.