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Hand in Glove by Rebecca Grant In Gulf War II, the Air Force and Army discovered a new “sweet spot” in combat cooperation. Hand in Glove By Rebecca Grant Desert Destruction. Tank carcasses (here, hulk of an Iraqi T-55) were a common sight. The goal was to move beyond “deconfliction” and harmonize the combat power of air and land forces. N RECENT years, the Air going to see is a new air-land dy- said airpower had been effective ini- tain Victory: The US Army in the Force and Army periodi- namic,” he said recently. “It is as if tially but had been less so in the Gulf War, written by Army Brig. cally have pushed to im- we will have discovered a new sweet war’s latter stages. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., docu- prove their cooperation spot in the relationship between land Schwarzkopf’s statement angered mented profound bitterness caused in joint warfare. The warfare and air warfare.” airmen who had executed a high- by misunderstanding of the air com- IAirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s Finding that sweet spot was no intensity, 38-day-long air campaign ponent’s target selection process. coordinated some service strengths. sure thing. The 1991 Gulf War coa- that had shredded Iraq’s ground Two corps commanders, Army Lt. The so-called “31 Initiatives” of that lition won a major victory, but coop- forces and made possible a 100-hour Gens. Gary E. Luck and Frederick era helped to shape USAF’s E-8 Joint eration of air and land components Army walkover against a devastated M. Franks Jr., were unconvinced that STARS aircraft. There were other, fell short in several key areas. enemy. “The truth was, his remarks airpower was striking hard enough lesser steps. Sparks flew over placement of the hurt,” said Gen. Buster C. Glosson, at enemy forces they would face in Gulf War II, however, took inte- fire support coordination line, al- who was the chief air campaign plan- battle. In his book, Scales wrote, gration to new highs, and now some leged inflexibility of the air com- ner, in his recent book War With “The number of corps-nominated view it as the distinguishing feature ponent’s air tasking order, and even Iraq. targets actually flown quickly be- of warfare, US style. the tally of Iraqi tanks, armored ve- came the litmus test for air support.” That’s the view of Richard H. hicles, and artillery pieces destroyed McPeak’s Words In fact, wartime analysis showed Sinnreich, a former director of the USAF photos by TSgt. Richard Freeland and (above) SrA. Tammy L. Grider by airpower. Most important was the The game of ego wounding turned that a large number of corps-nomi- Army School of Advanced Military difficulty the two services had in into an equal opportunity sport. Gen. nated targets were based on out- Studies. “If there is a single thing adapting to an unexpected event: the Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force dated intelligence and thus weren’t that jumps out at you about Iraq,” he rapid, organized retreat of Republi- Chief of Staff, made a quiet but bold worth striking. However, corps com- Higher and Higher. told the Los Angeles Times, “it is Most combat aircraft were capable of precision attack. can Guard divisions one day after statement at a March 15, 1991, Pen- manders were not back-briefed on that combined arms works like gang- Even B-52s (such as this one from the 40th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron) could the ground war started. tagon news briefing. “My private why some targets were hit and oth- busters.” provide CAS from higher-than-ever altitudes. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the conviction,” McPeak declared, “is ers not. This was largely an organi- Retired Navy Vice Adm. Arthur commander of US Central Command that this is the first time in history zational failure. Because Schwarz- K. Cebrowski, director of the Pen- in Gulf War I, relied heavily on air- that a field army has been defeated by kopf had made himself the commander tagon’s Office of Force Transforma- power throughout, but he began down- airpower.” Though McPeak swaddled of coalition ground forces, there was tion, reached much the same conclu- playing its impact as soon as victory his words in effusive praise for coa- no three-star land component com- sion about Operation Iraqi Freedom. was in sight. In his famous televised lition ground forces, the damage was mander to work out problems with “When the lessons learned come out, briefing of Feb. 27, 1991, the night done. the three-star air component com- one of the things we are probably before the cease-fire took effect, he Gulf War histories such as Cer- mander, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner. In Gulf War II, the Air Force and Army discovered a new “sweet spot” in combat cooperation. Hand in Glove By Rebecca Grant Desert Destruction. Tank carcasses (here, hulk of an Iraqi T-55) were a common sight. The goal was to move beyond “deconfliction” and harmonize the combat power of air and land forces. N RECENT years, the Air going to see is a new air-land dy- said airpower had been effective ini- tain Victory: The US Army in the Force and Army periodi- namic,” he said recently. “It is as if tially but had been less so in the Gulf War, written by Army Brig. cally have pushed to im- we will have discovered a new sweet war’s latter stages. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., docu- prove their cooperation spot in the relationship between land Schwarzkopf’s statement angered mented profound bitterness caused in joint warfare. The warfare and air warfare.” airmen who had executed a high- by misunderstanding of the air com- IAirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s Finding that sweet spot was no intensity, 38-day-long air campaign ponent’s target selection process. coordinated some service strengths. sure thing. The 1991 Gulf War coa- that had shredded Iraq’s ground Two corps commanders, Army Lt. The so-called “31 Initiatives” of that lition won a major victory, but coop- forces and made possible a 100-hour Gens. Gary E. Luck and Frederick era helped to shape USAF’s E-8 Joint eration of air and land components Army walkover against a devastated M. Franks Jr., were unconvinced that STARS aircraft. There were other, fell short in several key areas. enemy. “The truth was, his remarks airpower was striking hard enough lesser steps. Sparks flew over placement of the hurt,” said Gen. Buster C. Glosson, at enemy forces they would face in Gulf War II, however, took inte- fire support coordination line, al- who was the chief air campaign plan- battle. In his book, Scales wrote, gration to new highs, and now some leged inflexibility of the air com- ner, in his recent book War With “The number of corps-nominated view it as the distinguishing feature ponent’s air tasking order, and even Iraq. targets actually flown quickly be- of warfare, US style. the tally of Iraqi tanks, armored ve- came the litmus test for air support.” That’s the view of Richard H. hicles, and artillery pieces destroyed McPeak’s Words In fact, wartime analysis showed Sinnreich, a former director of the USAF photos by TSgt. Richard Freeland and (above) SrA. Tammy L. Grider by airpower. Most important was the The game of ego wounding turned that a large number of corps-nomi- Army School of Advanced Military difficulty the two services had in into an equal opportunity sport. Gen. nated targets were based on out- Studies. “If there is a single thing adapting to an unexpected event: the Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force dated intelligence and thus weren’t that jumps out at you about Iraq,” he rapid, organized retreat of Republi- Chief of Staff, made a quiet but bold worth striking. However, corps com- Higher and Higher. told the Los Angeles Times, “it is Most combat aircraft were capable of precision attack. can Guard divisions one day after statement at a March 15, 1991, Pen- manders were not back-briefed on that combined arms works like gang- Even B-52s (such as this one from the 40th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron) could the ground war started. tagon news briefing. “My private why some targets were hit and oth- busters.” provide CAS from higher-than-ever altitudes. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the conviction,” McPeak declared, “is ers not. This was largely an organi- Retired Navy Vice Adm. Arthur commander of US Central Command that this is the first time in history zational failure. Because Schwarz- K. Cebrowski, director of the Pen- in Gulf War I, relied heavily on air- that a field army has been defeated by kopf had made himself the commander tagon’s Office of Force Transforma- power throughout, but he began down- airpower.” Though McPeak swaddled of coalition ground forces, there was tion, reached much the same conclu- playing its impact as soon as victory his words in effusive praise for coa- no three-star land component com- sion about Operation Iraqi Freedom. was in sight. In his famous televised lition ground forces, the damage was mander to work out problems with “When the lessons learned come out, briefing of Feb. 27, 1991, the night done. the three-star air component com- one of the things we are probably before the cease-fire took effect, he Gulf War histories such as Cer- mander, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner. In short, “jointness” did not reign ponents was not tested in conven- Maj. Gen. Franklin L. “Buster” Hagen- supreme. tional combat until operations in beck, coalition force land compo- Misunderstanding festered into a Afghanistan entered a new phase in nent commander forward, launched mistrust that infected professional early 2002.
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