The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions Stephen Watts, Caroline Baxter, Molly Dunigan, Christopher Rizzi Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ARROYO CENTER The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The uses and limits of small-scale military interventions / Stephen Watts ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-7653-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Limited war—Case studies. 2. Intervention (International law) 3. Counterinsurgency—Case studies. 4. Military assistance—Case studies. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Stability operations—Evaluation. I. Watts, Stephen, Ph. D. UA11.5.U73 2012 355.02'15—dc23 2012036806 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo courtesy of MC1, Troy Latham, U.S. Navy. © Copyright 2012 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This monograph documents the results of a project entitled “Minimal- ist Stabilization.” The project aimed to assess the utility and limita- tions of small-scale interventions in ongoing conflicts and to propose policy recommendations concerning the circumstances under which minimalist stabilization missions may be appropriate and the strate- gies most likely to make such interventions successful, as well as the implications for U.S. Army force structure debates and partnership strategies. The monograph is written for a general audience, although it is likely to be of particular interest to those in the defense analytical com- munity, both civilian and military, concerned with stability operations, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance. This study is a product of the RAND Corporation’s continu- ing program of self-initiated independent research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and develop- ment centers. This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. For comments or further information, please contact the project leader, Stephen Watts (telephone 703-413-1100, extension 5174, email [email protected]). iii iv The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; fax 310-451-6952; email [email protected]) or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard/. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHaptER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Background: Weak and Failed States and the Problem of Intervention ..... 3 Weariness with Large-Scale Nation-Building ................................ 3 The Growing Consensus in Favor of Minimalist Stabilization ............. 7 Moving Beyond the Current Debate ............................................ 9 The Concept of Minimalist Stabilization ......................................10 Approach ...........................................................................13 CHaptER TWO Arguments For and Against Minimalist Stabilization....................15 Costs and Sustainability ..........................................................15 Nationalist Backlashes and Golden Hours .....................................17 Dependency, Adaptability, and Transformation ..............................19 Control and Escalation .......................................................... 23 Conclusion ........................................................................ 24 v vi The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions CHaptER THREE Overview of the Results of Minimalist Stabilization .................... 27 Analytic Framework ............................................................. 28 Empirical Scope of the Research ..............................................29 Military Outcomes: Defining Success .........................................29 Stabilizing Interventions .......................................................31 Operational Environments ....................................................32 Empirical Results ..................................................................33 Outcomes in the Absence of Intervention .................................. 34 Where Do States Intervene? .................................................. 34 Consequences of Minimalist Stabilization ...................................37 Understanding the Role of Operational Environments ....................41 Large Interventions ............................................................ 43 Conclusions ........................................................................45 CHaptER FOUR Case Studies.......................................................................47 El Salvador and the FMLN, 1979–1991 .......................................51 Conflict Narrative ..............................................................53 Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment ..............55 Results of the U.S. Intervention .............................................. 56 Conclusions ......................................................................57 Colombia and the FARC, 1978 to the Present ................................58 Conflict Narrative ..............................................................61 Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment ..............62 Conclusions ..................................................................... 68 Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines, 2002 to the Present ..........69 Conflict Narrative ..............................................................70 Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment ..............74 Results of the U.S. Intervention ...............................................75 Conclusions ......................................................................76 Central African Republic, 1996–1997 ........................................ 77 Conflict Narrative ..............................................................78 Significant