Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

VICTORY IN HADES: THE FORGOTTEN WARS OF THE OMAN 1957-1959 and 1970-1976

PART 2: THE DHOFAR CAMPAIGN 1970-1976 s. Monick*

Section A west), a number of important contrasts emerge in a comparison between the two campaigns. First, the underlying pressures impelling the in- surgent forces were of a different nature. In the Similarities and contrasts first war, the paramount factor underlying the During the years 1970-1976 Oman was once insurrection was traditional tribal seperatism (ad- again a theatre of operations in which the Sul- mittedly with the active support of Saudi Arabia tan's forces, supported by pro-Western powers, and Egypt), compounded by the deep rooted succeeded in defeating the insurgent forces friction between religious authority (vested in the seeking to destroy the established power struc- Imam) and secular power (embodied in the Sul- ture of Oman. In many respects, the political tan). configuration of this second war bore many 1 close resemblances to the first . One had, as in However, in the latter conflict, the paramount the first campaign of 1957 -1959, the active mili- influence in the insurgency was Communist sub- tary participation of Britain; in terms of both lead- version (manifested in the insurgent movement ership and the active involvement of British units designated the Popular Front for the Liberation of (including the Special Air Service Regiment - Oman, or PFLO); functioning as an extension of SAS - who, as in the first Omani campaign, were the power of a neighbouring Marxist state (The to playa major role in the war). One also has the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen - same motivation underlying British participation; PDRY). Thus, covert Communist expansionism viz. the determination to retain Oman's crucial was a real and potent factor in this latter conflict. strategic position (centring upon the Musandam The evolution of historical processes is an im- Peninsula, and its control of the Straits of Hor- portant consideration within this context. In muz). Moreover, as in the first Campaign, one 1957 -1959 the practice of insurgency had de- observes the active participation of neighbour- veloped only to a limited extent. The outstanding ing states of the Middle East in support of the illustr.ation of the success attendant upon insur- Sultan; in the war of 1957-1959 these states gency modelled upon Maoist principles was the comprised the Trucial Oman States, to which Vietminh offensive in French Indo-China Britain was closely related via long standing (1946-1954)2. The Communist insurgency in treaty obligations, and whose active military sup- Malaya (1948-1960) was visibly waning, its de- port was manifested in the presence of the Tru- feat inevitable. Similarly with the Hukbalahap cial Oman Scouts (TOS). In the latter Campaign ('Huk') insurgent offensive in the Philippines. of 1970-1976, the support emanated from Jor- However, the 1960's witnessed the emergence dan and Iran. of insurgency as a developed and highly suc- cessful instrument in the destruction of estab- However, within this broad context of parallel lished powers. The success of insurgency as a political configuration, multiple differences be-' political weapon in the ensuing decade was, of tween the two campaigns become apparent. If course, signalled by the success of the Cypriot one disregards the obvious difference of geo- insurgent movement (EO~A) in expelling the graphical emphasis (i.e. the first war of British from Cyprus in 1958-1959. It had tri- 1957 -1959 centred upon the Jebel Akhdar in umphed in expelling the French from Algeria and the north of Oman, whereas the second focused the British from Aden in 1962 and 1967 respecti- upon the province of Dhofar in the far south vely (although, in both instances, due to political

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capitulation rather than military defeat). In South technology characterizing the two campaigns Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia it was of a different order. Especially noteworthy was developing impetus. Thus, the insurgent within this context was the enhanced role of heli- forces in the Dhofar war gained an enormous copters and the sophistication of anti-aircraft momentum from the global precedents of the weaponry (in the form of SAM-7 missiles). preceding decade.

A further contrast within the military context was Moreover, the role of Britain, in relation to Oman, that, unlike the war of 1957 -1959, civil develop- was of a very different complexion in 1970-1976 ment of the theatre of operations complemented to what it had been in 1957 -1959. In this second the purely military reaction to the insurgency. Omani war Britain had relinquished all power in With regard to this factor, the role of the SAS the Middle East. Its surrender to Marxist insur- crystallizes the profound contrasts concealed gent forces in Aden in 1967, and consequent within ostensible similarities of military approach. evacuation from South Arabia in the same year, Whereas the SAS performed a crucial role in the had finally signalled Britain's' total abdication of decisive action which resolved the first conflict power in the Arabian Peninsula; a decision con- (i.e. the storming of the summit of the Jebel Akh- firmed by its departure from Bahrain in 1971, dar), in the crucial engagements of 1975 the SAS thus completing her total withdrawal from east of played no major role. The purely military climax Suez. This abdication of power was further mani- of their involvement in this second Omani war fested in the cessation of Britain's treaty obliga- was the siege of Mirbat in 1972, which will be tions with the Trucial Oman States, and the re- discussed below. Throughout the second Cam- placement of this political entity with the United paign the Regiment's participation was of a far Arab Emirates (formed in 1971). Hence, in this more subtle and unorthodox nature than the con- second campaign Great Britain was an intruder, ventional military role - that of specialized moun- so to speak, in the affairs of the Persian Gulf to an tain assault troops - which characterized their extent not apparent in the war of 1957-1959, intervention in the war of 1957 -1959. when her intervention could be justified in terms of her military and political presence in neigh- It should be borne in mind that military and politi- bouring South Arabia (i.e. in terms of her interest cal processes are rarely mutually exclusive; they in maintaining stability within a region in which constantly interact and reinforce one another. she had a powerful vested interest). A further Thus, within the political context Britain's capitu- most important dissimilarity between the two lation to the insurgent forces in South Arabia (the campaigns was that a different Sultan (Oaboos), overtly Marxist National Liberation Front - NFL _ possessing quite different attitudes from his pre- and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied decessor, was in power. South Yemen, or FLOSY; the former of whom captured control of the country) was a necessary The above contrasts abviously relate to the politi- prelude to the projection of the power of the NFL cal configuration of the second Omani war. How- in their newly captured state into neighbouring ever, the military aspect of the war also presents Oman (via Dhofar) in the form of both active very real contrasts. It can with justice be as- support for insurgent forces within Dhofar and, serted that the scale of operations in the Dhofar as the war moved west towards PDRY, direct campaign was far more extensive than in the military intervention by South Yemen. In other Campaign of 1957 -1959. In the first war the key words, it was the British evacuation of South to the defeat of the insurgents resided entirely in Arabia which facilitated the NFL's 'export of revo- the capture of the rebel redoubt of the Jebel lution' into Oman. Similarly, the active policy of Akhdar (the 'Green Mountain'). In the Dhofar civil development, the direct consequence of campaign, however, the issue centred upon the Sultan Oaboos's far more liberal attitUdes, mani- creation of 'cordon sanitaires' across the face of fested itself in the close interrelationship be- the province (the principal examples of which tween military response and civil re-construction were the Hornbeam and Damavand Lines), programmes. within which the insurgent forces could be press- ured and isolated, combined with sweeping ver- tical envelopment manoeuvres. In short, where- as the war of 1957 -1959 was tactical in concep- Approach and organization tion and execution, the key to success in that of The approach and organization of this paper 1970-1976 was conceived and executed pri- merits some comment, as it does not follow an marily in strategic terms. Moreover, the military orthodox pattern. In other words, the most ob-

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vious approach - which would be to discuss the facilitates easy movement from one end of the Dhofar campaign in chronological sequence - is jebel to another. In 1970 one could locate barely not pursued. Rather, the salient thematic fea- identifiable airstrips; some from past SAF ope- tures of the Campaign - centring upon the role of rations, and other utilized by civilian oil explora- the SAS in their training and leadership of irregu- tion teams. A prominent feature of the jebel are lar forces and their formulation of a 'hearts and the wadis, which run down to the plain like great minds' campaign - are discussed prior to analy- gashes, and extend for hundreds of yards sis of the actual operations of 1975 which across. They begin in the north as mere indenta- proved, unexpectedly, to be the year of decision. tions but quickly fall away into steep re-entrants These features pre-date and parallel the Cam- and glens filled with thick bush. As they run paign history proper (e.g. the attack on Mirbat in further southwards they become progressively 1972, the firqat operation of January 1975). deeper and wider until, at the entrance to the Hence, it would appear that the ordering of ma- plain, they might be several hundreds of yards terial in this paper is somewhat haphazard, often across, with great precipitous flanks rising being out of sequence. Such an approach, how- sharply to the plateau. The wadi bottoms have ever, has been moulded by the essential objec- formed natural routes for centuries. Generally tive underlying all three parts of this history of the speaking they lend themselves to north-south wars in the Oman. This objective transcends the movement, but the east-west wadis offer easy recounting of a narrative history and is, rather, routes up to the plateau, across it, and down to centred upon the intention to extract certain fea- the next major wadi. The most important feature tures which are of universal and generalized of the wadis is, of course, that they contain the significance for counter-insurgency (COIN) ope- water upon which all life depends; in the form of rations (including those waged in Southern clear sweet pools set under rocks in shady Africa). Thus, the role of the SAS in this second glades, or in natural waterholes often developed Campaign in Oman is so closely interrelated with into tanks with cement and stones by the jebelis the entire issue of 'hearts and minds' - so condu- or, in certain places in flowing streams. As one cive to extensive debate in any discussion of moves towards the border with PDRY the plateau COIN operations - that this theme transcends entirely disappears and the jebel becomes a the actual chronological study of the war of series of escarpments covered with grass and 1970-1976. camel bush, running down to the sea. There is less vegetation in the wadis, which becomes more sheer and stark, with huge precipices. Be- yond the 'gatn' lies the 'negd', a dry, pastureless, The Geographical context featureless moonscape of shingle and small The province of Dhofar is approximately the size rocks, split by boulder-strewn and sand-filled of Wales. Its two major geographical features are wadis. They become shallower, with wide flat the inland coastal plain (the Salalah plain) and its bottoms, as they run north until they finally disap- mountainous range (the Jebel Massif). The jebel pear into a great gravel plain, and eventually is situated inland from the Salalah plain parallel merge into the sand sea of the Empty Quarter. with the coast and extending for some 150 miles down to the border with PDRY. The jebel varies This geographical configuration was to structure widely. At its highest point its height does not the nature of the war in Dhofar. The mountain exceed a modest 3 000 ft, but it rises steeply fastnesses were to provide an ideal sanctuary for from the plain to a plateau comparatively narrow insurgent forces. Blanketed with vegetation, they in the east and west, but some nine miles in are virtually impenetrable to vehicles. This is ex- width in the centre. The fertility of the plateau cellent bandit territory, honeycombed with small appears incongruous within the context of South caves which provided excellent refuge for small Arabia (as does that of the Jebel Akhdar), and is guerrilla bands, whose tactics were those of am- due to the rains caused by the south west mon- bush, intimidation and raids upon the villages of soon (the 'khareef), which blankets the plateau the plains under cover of darkness, when mines with cloud and mist between June and Septem- could be laid along the tracks used by security ber. Grass is luxuriant in the region, and great forces. Accordingly, the success of the COIN rolling downs stretch as far as the watershed to response could only be effectively measured in the north. This watershed (the 'gatn') consists of terms of the extent to which the Sultan's forces uninteresting flat land of small rocks and bushes re-established their authority on the jebel. More- on the edge of the khareef mist and thus still over, a great deal of military activity was directed deriving some moisture from it. Being so flat it towards the wadis, which constituted the insur-

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gents' major source of water supply. The thick Somali stance. The language of Dhofar is termed bush which characterized the wadis determined Jebeli, an unwritten language totally different the tactics of ambush and evasion, in contrast to from Arabic and thought to have originated in the open warfare of the plain. Aramaic.

The ethnic context The contagion of Aden

It should be borne in mind that the rebels of the Sultan Said ibn Taimur's centre of power resided jebel possessed close ethnic sympathies with in Dhofar. He managed the province as though it their neighbours of South Yemen. To the Dhofaris were his own private estate, and took as his wife of the Jebel Massif there was a common bond a Dhofari woman who was the mother of his heir, with the hill peoples of the newly established Oaboos (cf. below). His Headquarters was his Marxist state on their borders, in contrast with palace at Salalah, whence he had moved in their attitude towards the Sultan, who was 1958. The Sultan's writ was inforced within a viewed as ' 'puppet' of the British, a plainsman limited distance from Salalah by the 'Dhofar entrenched behind his palace walls at Salalah, Force', commanded by Maj St John Armitage with an escape route to the sea guarded by and consisting of approximately 200 Baluchi sol- foreign mercenaries. As is characteristic of many diers. As intimated in Part 1, this Dhofar force tribal geographical configurations within Africa, was entirely independent of the Sultan's Armed in which artificially imposed colonial boundaries Forces (SAF); comprising the Sultan's personal disregarded ethnic concentrations, several of bodyguard, so to speak. This force was badly the tribes of Dhofar were distributed over nat- equipped and underpaid (a state of affairs ional boundaries. An example were the Mahra, symptomatic of the Sultan's obsessive fear of who represented a nation rather than a tribe. bankruptcy) and did not enlist Dhofaris. (This They controlled much of the interior of South was in accordance with the Sultan's antagonism Yemen in addition to large tracts of Western to any concept of 'Arabization' in his armed Dhofar. Mahra was virtually unadministered dur- forces at all levels' a feature which has been ing British rule, its Sultan living hundreds of miles discussed in Part 1). After 1961 the Dhofar force away on the island of Socotra, but the Hadhrami was trained and led by seconded officers and Bedouin Legion had manned a fort at Habarut on NCO's from Pakistan. Dhofar was no exception the Dhofar border. Habarut was linked with Hauf to the appalling dearth of civil development that on the coast by a crude truck; and Hauf was charctarized all Oman and which was a testi- where weapons and mines were landed by mony to the Sultan's reactionary attitudes. An dhows from Aden. In short, the entire area pro- organization calling itself the 'Dhofar Liberation vided an excellent base for insurgent incursions Front' (DLF), led by Masallim bin Nuffl initiated a into neighbouring Dhofar, and the prominent limited insurgency programme, exploiting the tribe of the region could rely upon many sympa- inhabitants' (admittedly very real) grievances. thisers among their kinsmen over the border. Between 1962 and 1965 the Sultan endeavoured This ethnic affiliation with PDRY was accen- to combat this with the Dhofar force, but met with tuated by the Dhofaris' alienation from the other little success. The SAF were consequently drawn inhabitants of Oman. Being seperated from into the conflict. Northern Oman by a desert approximately 400 miles in extent, there are inevitably major differ- Until 1967, across the border in South Yemen, ences in culture and social background between left wing Arab nationalists had been engaged in the two. Indeed, the Dhofaris are not true Arabs a campaign against the British controlled South at all. They are believed by some to have origi- Arabian Federation (comprising the port of Aden nated in Ethiopia, and their facial features cer- and the Western and Eastern Protectorates). It tainly resemble Ethiopians or Somalis more than was inevitable that the contagious example of the true Arabs of the north. As is the case with the insurrection within the South Arabian Federa- Somalis also, Dhofaris exhibit a fierce pride in tion would lend considerable impetus to the Dho- their herds of cattle; they build round houses of far insurgency. Dhofari tribesmen, trained in stone and straw which strongly resemble Somali Iraq, intensified their campaign of armed am- manyattas and one frequently encounters old bush, mine-laying and assassination. The insur- men leaning on a staff and resting on one leg gency assumed several new complexions after with the sole of the other foot placed against the the evacuation by the British from South Arabia inside of the knee, reminiscent of the typical in November 1967, and the consequent emer-

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gence of the newly independent state of South young men were sent to China and Russia for Yemen (formally designated the People's Demo- training in guerrilla warfare. The Communist atro- cratic Republic of Yemen - PDRY), controlled by cities escalated as their control intensified; the Marxist National Liberation Front (NFL). The fathers were forced to offer their daughters to the first major change of aspect was that of degree. young fighters as their duty to the PFLOAG, and The insurgency within Dhofar gained tremen- old men had their noses cut off and were blinded dous impetus. It was apparent that the Sultan's with red hot knives for refusing to deny Islam. opponents in the mountains now had far greater (However, these actions ultimately reacted fa- room for manoeuvre. It is, of course, axiomatic to vourably upon the Sultan's forces, in so far as it guerrilla warfare that sanctuary for insurgents provoked a counter-revolution by Islamic tradi- and a secure base for war materials - preferably tionalists within the DLF. Although this counter- contiguous to the war zone - must be estab- revolution was suppressed, it did result in an lished if success was to be guaranteed. After the influx of defectors to the Government forces, as success of the NFL in South Arabia in 1967 the will be discussed below). Dhofari insurgents possessed precisely this ad- vantage. By 1970 the unsurgents - now firmly under the control and leadership of the PFLOAG - con- The second major change of aspect induced by trolled the entire jebel, the Sultan;s forces hold- the Marxist seizure of power in Aden and South ing authority only in Salalah and, to a lesser Arabia was that the leadership of the insurgency degree, in the coastal towns of Taqa and Mirbat, in Dhofar underwent a transfer of power; from the which the adoo (insurgents) tolerated as sources factious tribal leaders to deeply indoctrinated of re-supply of food and ammunition and even as Marxist political movements, sponsored by and rest centres for their fighters. based in the South Yemen; namely, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). After the British had completely The decline and fall of Sultan Said ibn withdrawn from the Persian Gulf the movement Taimur changed its name to the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). PFLOAG - as it then Inevitably, as the rebellion against Sultan Said's was - made overtures to the DLF and suggested rule gained momentum, internal opposition to his that the two should join forces in the face of the regime (not necessarily dependent or intercon- common enemy. The DLF were, initially, most nected with the external forces of subversion but reluctant to be allied with the atheistic Marxist nevertheless emboldened by them) gained au- forces of the PFLOAG. However, finally seduced dacity. There was a dramatic illustration of this in by the money and superior weapons that the 1966, when there was an assassination attempt PFLOAG could provide, they agreed. Inevitably, on Sultan Said's life. Whilst the Sultan was in- as is characteristic of all movements infiltrated specting his own bodyguard they fired at him by Communist political groups (cf. Section B, from the range of a few foot; they missed. It is which follows this paper), the traditional lead- characteristic of Sultan Said's heroic fatalism in ership of the DLF was completely supplanted by the face of such traumatic events (earlier re- their new Marxist allies; the former could not vealed by his attitude towards the annihilation of possibly counter the well organized, energetic his forces in 19573) that, immediately following and highly motivated Communists. Within a short this attempt upon his life, he then drove down to time cells were established throughout the jebel, the principal Army garrison (leaving behind a whilst discussion groups and propaganda wounded Pakistani palace guard commander) to eroded the traditional tribal loyalties of the jebe- inform its British commander, 'We seem to be lis. The succeeding phase was the destruction of having trouble down at the palace. I wonder if the traditional tribal structure by means of per- you would be so good as to come down?' suasion, fear and corrosion. Tribal elders and Sheikhs were killed, often with extreme cruelty. Underlying the intensifying opposition to the Sul- For example, in Western Dhofar five elderly Shei- tan's rule was the knowledge that a trained and khs were pushed over a cliff 450 ft in height; able successor was ready to assume control. whilst at Dalqut the Sheikh and his sons were Oaboos was the son of Sultan ibn Taimur by stood against the walls of their house and ma- Mizoon, the daughter of Sheikh Ahmed Ali of the chine-gunned. Children were forcibly removed powerful Bait Ma'asheni tribe of Eastern Dhofar. from their parents to be sent to school in PDRY Oaboos's principal crime in his father's eyes was (especially to the Lenin School of Hauf), whilst that, after receiving a traditional Islamic educa-

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tion, he had been extensively educated in the 1957 -1959, the response of the beleagured West; having attended the Royal Military Aca- Government forces was simply an extension of demy, Sandhurst, and been commissioned in the COIN operations of 15 years earlier. To reite- the Cameronians. He had, moreover, undertaken rate, this new response manifested itself in mul- a detailed study of British institutions with regard tiple facets; the two most significant being the far to industry, local government, etc. In view of his more extensive scope of manoeuvre and the father's xenophobic attitude towards western very different approach of Sultan Oaboos to- ideas (and, no doubt, remembering that he had wards the question of civil development which, himself deposed his own father), it is hardly sur- as intimated above, became an integral aspect prising that Sultan Said placed his own son of the military counter-offensive. Integral to this under virtual house arrest in Salalah upon the new approach was the extremely active role as- latter's return in 1963. sumed by 22 Special Air Service Regiment from 1970 onwards. Although this facet of the second The end for Sultan Said came in 1970. On the COl N assault of 1970-1976 may ostensibly ap- afternoon of 23 July 1970, less than a month after pear to be but the continuation of the British the election of Edward Heath's Conservative response of 1958-1959, in actual fact it lent a Government in Britain, Sheikh Braik bin Hamud markedly different aspect to the Campaign of bin Hamid al-Ghafari, an Omani aristocrat and 1970-1976. The role of the SAS, therefore, me- the Wali (Governor) of Dhofar, entered the Sala- rits detailed attention. lah palace with a group of armed supporters to demand the abdication of Sultan Said. It was an undeniable act of courage, buttressed by the 'Operation storm': The SAS intervenes Sheikh Braik's knowledge that Oaboos - his once again close friend - as well as key British officers were The new emphasis on 'hearts and minds': part of the plot. The Sultan responded to this Three senior officers of the SAS had spent the unprecedented demand by seizing a pistol from Easter of 1970 examining the Dhofar problem his desk and opening fire. One round wounded and seeking to devise a winning strategy. Such a the Sheikh, another killed a palace servant, and strategy had been moulded by observation of several more wounded the Sultan in the foot and the military developments of the 1960's. To re- stomach. That night Sultan Said agreed to sur- iterate, this decade had been especially charac- render himself to a British colonel seconded to terized by the increasing momentum of the con- his armed forces, and to abdicate. Both Sheikh cept of guerrilla war and 'low intensity opera- Braik and the Sultan were then flown to a Gulf tions'. The continuing conflict in Vietnam at that hospital aboard the same aircraft, seperated point in time, as well as confrontation with Indo- only by a curtain; the RAF subsequently spiriting nesian forces in Borneo during the years Sultan Said away to London, where he spent the 1962-1966, had led the senior SAS officers to final two years of his life in seclusion. Sultan believe that a winning strategy, in an age of Oaboos ascended the throne on the day that revolutionary fish swimming in a proletarian sea, Sultan Said's abdication was demanded and obtained (23 July 1970). was a matter of shaping the perceptions and loyalty of the population at large. By Easter Mon- day one of these three officers (Lt Col John Watts, Commanding the SAS Regiment), had New directions produced a plan of operations for what was to become 'Operation Storm' in Dhofar. The plan In this study 1970 is regarded as the year in demanded a vigorous but intelligent and cohe- which the second major conflict in the Oman rent military campaign conducted by soldiers in began. It may be argued that the impetus to this which indiscriminate reprisals against the civilian second insurrection had been developing in the population (which had tended to be a consistent preceding decade within Dhofar (and especially theme in Sultan Said's response) was to be in the Jebel Massif), particularly after the British avoided. The other basic elements in the stra- evacuation from South Arabia in 1967. Such an tegy were: argument is completely valid. However, in 1970 the response of the established Government in (i) A veterinary campaign to improve farm Oman adopted a form not apparent in the pre- stock, including the provision of that most ceding decade. Thus, whilst the insurgency was scarce commodity, fresh water, as well as assuming a very different complexion form that skilled advice regarding husbandry. which had characterized the rebellion of (ii) A medical campaign to provide aid for the

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50 000 or so inhabitants of the Dhofar moun- rebel territory. Despite the very real objection tains, who were indiscriminately blanketed that only a small minority of the tribesmen were with the designation of 'enemy' by the ad- literate, the exercise produced a dramatic and ministration at Salalah. unexpected prize, in the form of the defection of (iii) A coherent and co-ordinated intelligence a leading insurgent. This was Mohammed Su- gathering operation that would encompass hail, a former soldier in the Trucial Oman Scouts. every detail concerning the rebels; with the Suhail had attended the Mons Officer Training object of isolating the insurgents and break- Scool at Aldershot, sponsored by the Foreign ing their morale, as well as underpinning and Commonwealth Office. He was a good sol- military operations. dier (being the best rifle and machine-gun shot (iv) A psychological operation intended to per- on his course, and had been placed first on the suade the rebels to change sides; the fun- FCO sponsorship list). Upon his return to Oman, damental components of which were com- however, he was disillusioned with Said's regime munication by air-dropped leaflets, offer of and joined the rebels in the mountains. The first amnesty to tribesmen wishing to surrender leaflet, containing an offer of amnesty from the and a comprehensive information service. new Sultan, induced Suhail to defect form the insurgents and work with the SAS and the Sul- Sultan Sai(j's regime, by its very nature, could tan's Intelligence Staff, headed by an SAS offi- not be expected to be responsive to such a cer. The amnesty campaign undoubtedly yiel- daring and imaginative application of the 'hearts ded fruitful results. As intimated above, reaction and minds' approach; predictably, it was re- by the traditional members of the DLF to the garded with great suspicion in 'informed circles'. Communist seizure of control considerably Moreover, it required a far greater degree of co- accelerated the rate of defections from the ordination and discipline that was at that point in PFLOAG camp. The counter-revolution occured time manifested by the military leadership in Sa- on 12 September 1970. The PFLOAG ordered lalah. To take a major example, the existing use the disarming of the DLF but, although sur- of air power - then consisting of six Strikemas- rounded, the hard core members of the latter in ters - was, in the view of one SAS officer, remark- the Eastern area of Dhofar refused to comply ably informal. 'At that time', he commented, 'the and chose, instead, to defect to the Government Sultan's Air Force operated in an ad hoc way. forces. Between September 1970 and March The pilots seemed to sit around the mess in 1971, encouraged by promises of money as well Salalah, then someone would suggest, off the as amnesty, a total of 201 rebels surrendered. top of his head, 'Let's go and hit such-and-such Some surrendered their Kalashnikov AK-4Ts a place."4 Systematic air support for infantry and were paid an additional bounty of £50. How- operations did not exist. ever, the serious dangers attached to such a programme should not be overlooked. The The advent of the new regime, however, granted scheme was seriously criticized by some British the new approach a degree of political accept- soldiers on the completely valid ground that it ance on the part of the Sultanate that it could supplied much war material to the rebels; in so never have realized under the old regime. The far as the price paid by the security forces was removal of Sultan Said, therefore, provided the that rebel camel trains conveying arms and am- SAS with its first opportunity. Within hours of the munition and other supplies had unrestricted palace coup a small SAS group (officially desig- access to, and egress from, the mountains, dur- nated an 'information team') was journeying to ing the period in which free movement of men Salalah, led by the principal architect of the new and animals was permitted so that the insurgents 'hearts and minds' win strategy.' They provided could take full advantage of the amnesty offer. an instant bodyguard for the new Sultan about whom there is a story (possibly apocryphal) that it (i.e. the bodyguard) stood behind a two-way The Firqats: Strengths and Weaknesses of mirror whilst Qaboos received petitions; instinc- Irregular Counter-Guerrilla Units: tively moving towards its weapons in response to The defection of former insurgents resulting form every (characteristically Arab) florid gesture on the amnesty campaign was an integral aspect of the part of the petitioners. the SAS's role in the combat sphere of opera- tions; viz. the training of irregular units of Dhofa- The amnesty campaign: a double-edged weapon: ris (firqats), many of whose leaders - as well as One of the first SAS operations, in accordance the rank and file - were former insurgents. The with the new strategy, was a leaflet drop over defectors - officially designated surrendered

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enemy personnel (SEP) were encouraged to join the BAn and SAF assistance withdrew, freeing (and in some cases to lead) the firqats in order them to assist other firqats in their early stages of that their example would generate further defec- development. tions from the enemy (the 'adoo'). Such a policy was shrewdly based on the extremely tight-knit The firqat technique was very far from being an tribal structure which characterized the social unqualified success. There were furious debates system of Dhofar. In those cases where firqat within the SAS concerning the resentment gener- leaders were very closely related to their count- ated in the SAF as a result of paying some of the erparts in the adoo, the former would exert con- firqats better wages than the Sultan's regular siderable pressure upon the latter to defect to soldiers, as well as supplying the firqats too gen- the Sultan's cause (as, in fact, commonly oc- erously with automatic rifles, ammunition and cured). The first of the firqats to be founded was blankets. This school of thought (proponents of designated Salahadin (after the renowned Sara- what might be termed the 'Iean-and-mean' style cen leader of the 12th Century who was so suc- of managment) would point to the fact that at cessful against the Crusaders) and its first leader Mirbat, during the first end-of-fast festival after was an adoo defector, Salim Murabak, who, Ramadan, the local firqat celebrated by firing whilst serving with the adoo, had been second- 5 000 rounds - almost the entire garrison stock in-command of the entire Eastern Area of Dhofar. of ammunition - and hundreds of FN rifles disap- (He died early in the Campaign, presumably of peared. natural causes). Other firqats included the 'A'asi- fat', 'AI Nasr', 'Khalid Bin Waalid' and the 'Tariq Moreover, there were chronic problems of com- Bin Zeed'. Few features of the second Omani mand, which was critically dependent upon the Campaign were to generate such fierce contro- SAS team leader and his tribal second-in-com- versy as the concept of the firqat. mand. According to one British veteran, every firqat experienced a mutiny, of varying degrees The training, management and leadership of of intensity, at some time and several units had to these firqats was one of the most important tasks be disbanded. These problems were minimized undertaken by the SAS in its role as a British when the SAS leader completely identified him- Army Training Team (BAn). BAn centres were self with his soldiers. Generally speaking, how- established at Um al Gwarif (BAn Headquar- ever, SAS teams served with the firqat but were ters), Taqa and Mirbat. (The term 'Bat' was the not one of them. They lived and ate apart, pre- almost universal term applied to SAS personnel. serving their identity even if the space between Indeed, members of this elite unit were very the two groups was only a matter of yards. -(This rarely referred to by their proper regimental des- was, in fact, the only practicable course to ignation. Even at the end of the war, when two adopt. Very few Westerners can identify with the Dhofaris dined in the SAS mess at their Head- mores and patterns of thought of Arab culture. quarters in Hereford, they were amazed to dis- Even Europeans who spoke the language cover that there was no 'Bat' regiment.) As the fluently and served with Arab forces for many Campaign gathered momentum, SAS soldiers years could never secure the total loyalty of their were sent for intensive 10 week courses in collo- soldiers. An outstanding example is the fate that quial Arabic at the Royal Army Education Corps befell Maj Pat Gray, commander of the Hadhrami School of Language at Beaconsfield. By mid- Bedouin Legion which policed the Eastern Aden 1974 there were approximately 16 firqats, con- Protectorates of the former British ruled South sisting of some 1 000 men. This figure had in- Arabian Federation, who was assassinated by creased to 21 firqats (1 600 men) in January 5 his own troops in 1966 . In his book, Imperial 1975. When the war finally ended in 1976 the fir- Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Centu(lj qat numbers had increased to 2 500. One could Maj Gen Lunt makes the trenchant point that identify three phases in the firqat's development; there could never be the same close identifica- the first phase, one of recruitment and training; tion of British officers with their Arab troops as the second, main operational, phase, estab- existed in African regiments such as the King's lishing the firqat in their tribal area (i.e. elimi- African Rifles and the Royal West African Fronteir nating the insurgents from this area, with the as- Force. Maj Gen Lunt quotes an incisive comment sistance of a company or battalion of SAF and as on this state of affairs from a letter written to him many BAn personnel as possible); and, thirdly, by Maj FE White?, who served with both the orientating the firqat towards civil action projects King's African Rifles and Aden Protectorate Le- (e.g. a well drilled, a clinic, school and shop vies, and compares the contrasting attitudes of built, etc.) At the completion of this third phase the troops in both units:

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'My experience with Arab troops left me understood it. A disciplined tribal unit is a with the very firm impression that they contradiction in terms. Discipline, in the largely managed thier own affairs and were military sense that it is understood by a dependent on British officers only in the regular army, cannot possibly be achieved spheres of training and administration. I when everyone in the army thinks he has as frequently found that I was little more than much right to decide what is to be done as an onlooker, hesitant to change things his leaders, and if he dislikes their decision which might perhaps have benefited from feels free to take no part in the outcome.' change, ready to accept that standards were not necessarily better or worse, but in There were several notable instances of insubor- many respects very different to those to dination upon a scale that it would be difficult to which one had grown accustomed else- credit in European armies. One outstanding ex- where, and ruefully aware that there were ample occurred in March 1971, during which the spheres of life and influence in an Arab unit firqats, under the guidance of their BAn men- from which British officers were totally ex- tors, were seeking to establish a foothold on the cluded ... Arabs, too, had through their jebel. One of the firqats had located an adoo devout faith the firmest possible belief in a piquet in the Wadi Arzat, in the eastern sector of devine guidance in all things, even to their the jebel, in the vicinity of the towns of Um al destiny. This was far more influential than Gwarif and Mamurah, and asked for permission any advice or example from a British offi- to attack it. Their BAn commander had has- cer, or from any other mortal for, that mat- tened to BAn Headquarters and had arranged ter.' for all the support necessary; viz. artillery, air- craft, procedures for casualty evacuation, radio It should be noted that Maj White is writing of a frequencies and codes, etc. The BAn com- disciplined regular unit, with a long tradition of mander had then raced back to Mamurah in his seconded service by British officers. In the light Landrover, to organize the departure of the firqat of his comments, the difficulties experienced patrol that evening. Incredibly, the firqat com- with ill-disciplined tribesmen serving as irregu- mander calmly announced that his men had lars, in whom was ingrained a hereditary tradition changed their minds and did not want to go. of tribal seperatism (and, moreover, in which many - including the leaders - had been newly Even more serious manifestations of this en- weaned from the insurgent cause) can be ana- demic problem occured during Operation 'Jag- lyzed in their correct perspective. In actual fact, uar', mounted in October 1971 with the objective the formal command relationship between the of seizing a permanent and secure base on the BAn leader and his firqat charges tacitly recog- jebel. The first major action in this operation was nised this problem; in so far as the BAn com- designed to seize an old SAF airstrip known as mander was only an adviser. He could advise, Lympne, four miles east of Jibjat and located on but had no executive authority.) the gatn between the two great wadis of Arzat and Darbat. A squadron of the SAS, the Baluchi members of the SAF and the firqats A'asifat and The endemic problems of command ultimately Salahadin marched all night to reach the strip on derived from the social fabric of Dhofar, which the morning of 2 October. Finally, no more than centred upon an extremely democratic tribal half of the numbers of the original force stumbled structure. The essence of this structure is conci- 8 onto the airstrip at 0435 hours and set about sely described by Col Jeapes : making it secure. Fortunately, the adoo were 'The Dhofari tribal system, for all its faults, is conspicuous by their absence and remained so possibly one of the finest examples of true for the rest of the day and, by the time that they democracy known to man ... Tribal leaders awoke to the fact that a force was establishing are elected on merit because of their per- itself at Lympne, it was too late. The SOAF were sonal virtues. Heredity and class are mean- active by then in airlifting reinforcements, which ingless; and even when elected the leader consisted of two companies of the SAF, two 75 is by no means paramount; he must consult mm guns and the hundred strong firqat Khalid on almost everything he does and all major Bin Waalid. However, the airstrip began to break decisions are arrived at collectively after up under the impact of the number of Skyvan every man who wishes to do so has had his aircraft and helicopters utilizing it. Lt Col Watts, say ... It took the SAS some time to under- therefore decided on the afternoon of the second stand this and many SAS officers never day to transfer the base 7 000 yards west to

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Jibjat, where there was a better landing strip. that he was considering withdrawing BATT per- Accordingly, he ordered a strong BATT de- sonnel entirely and leaving the firqats to their tachment, with the three firqats, to clear the route own devices. it was an extremely powerful argu- to the new position and to secure it for the main ment. The firqat leaders fully realized that without body. At this critical juncture the firqat A'asifat the BATT they would be deprived of all their air, steadfastly refused to move. They claimed that artillery, mortar, machine gun and medical sup- they were tired and had had no food (the lack of port that they now enjoyed. If they were left to food accruing from the fact that they had thrown depend upon the SAF, it was questionable as to their rations away on the march to Lympne in whether the firqats would survive at all for very order to lighten their loads). In addition they long. SAF did not have the manpower to support claimed that they had been promised support by the firqats; the vast majority of SAF has their 1 000 regular troops ('geysh'), were in contrast to resources fully extended in organizing and sup- the 20-30 BATT personnel who were actually plying their own Arab and Baluchi companies accompanying the-m. As a result of this mutinous and had none to spare - in either material or attitude, a reduced force set out. (Jibjat was in psychological terms - to deal with the firqats fact secured, and the base moved from who were characterized by incessant demands Lympne). for more supplies and interminable arguments, both within and between themselves. In any However, this was not the only example during event, even if the SAF had possessed the re- this particular operation of profound command sources to support the firqats, it is extremely problems faced by those who sought to direct doubtful that they would have had the inclination the firqats. By 9 October the Sultan's forces had to do so. The firqata were profoundly mistrusted clearly secured the area. The enemy had been by the SAF for understandable reasons; the for- hunted off the plateau and had withdrawn for mer were charaterized by gross insubordination shelter into the thick bush of the wadis. The firqat and indiscipline, as witnessed by Operation Jag- Khalid Bin Waalid were exultant and established uar, whilst the fact that many of the firqat leaders themselves with an SAF company in the Bait had been former senior officers of the adoo Ma'asheni heartland at a base nicknamed 'White could not have added to their credibility in the City' but later re-named by the firqat Medinat AI eyes of the SAF. Their withdrawel from the Haq ('The Place of Truth'). It was at precisely this theatre of operations at critical junctures must critical point, when the enemy were shaken and have led many to believe that some firqat leaders when the successes of the previous week should had not totally renounced their former loyalties have been exploited by pursuing the enemy and (especially in view of the fact that close tribal driving them from their sanctuaries in the wadis, affiliations existed between many of the firqat that the firqat A'asifat decided not only once and the enemy). As a heavily armed and lavishly again to prove rebellious, but to infect the firqats equipped manifestation of tribal seperatism, with Salahadin and Khalid Bin Waalid. Despite dis- an often ambivalent attitude towards the central pensations from the Sultan, the three firqats Government, it is hardly surprising that they were stated that they wished to observe Ramadan (20 regarded with extreme suspicion in many go- October) and were adamant that as far as they vernment quarters. were concerned the war had ceased whilst Ram- adan was in progress. The Sultan's forces were Not only did the prevailing social structure within therefore left with no option but to abandon their the tribal group seriously impede western con- key position, for which they had fought so hard cepts of military discipline, but tribal seperatism and which threatened the principal supply caves also was frequently a serious problem in this in the Wadi Darbat, and to withdraw them north sphere. This particular aspect of the Dhofaris' back to Jibjat. With total success so close, it was social structure ensured that co-operation within indeed a bitter pill to swallow, and Lt Col Watts a firqat by members of different tribes was fre- seethed with anger. This anger was certainly not quently impossible. An outstanding example of appeased at a meeting that he held with the this was the mutiny which virtually destroyed the firqat leaders at Jibjat on 11 October, when the firqat Salahadin, the very first to be formed. This latter demanded more rations as they had mutiny occurred at Mirbat on 21 April 1971. The burned those that they had in order to avoid origins lay in a dissension between two of the having to carry them on the march. Watts was so firqat's senior officers, Qartoob and Mohammed incensed that he stated flatly that he could see Said, the latter being in command; both - as was no point in British troops losing their lives in order commonly the case - former adoo leaders. Qar- to help people who did not merit their help, and toob, who had defected to the Sultan's forces

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after they had regained Sudh (cf. below), felt 'Boots (no socks), shorts, a belt and his rifle resentment against the authority enjoyed by were all that he carried ... He had an aston- Mohammed Said. Of even greater significance, ishing way with local soldiers. They were however, was the fact that Qartoob was a mem- drawn to him whatever 'the Captain' said, ber of the Bait Umr tribe, based at Mirbat. This they would gladly do; wherever 'the Cap- tribe was extremely powerful and controlled tain' went they would follow.,g most of south-eastern Dhofar; and it profoundly offended Qartoob's pride to serve under a mem- The second major problem associated with or- ber of the Bait Gatun, a minor tribe of the central ganization and control of the firqat - compound- area of Dhofar. Doubtless he had been taunted ing the problem of indiscipline - was a marked by fellow tribesmen within the town itself. Inevi- and increasing tendency among the firqats to tably, factions emerged supporting the rival par- demand supportive fire power from the regular ties in the dispute based upon tribal divisions. army and air force before they would go into The result was that, at 0700 hours on the next action; a process that neutralized their natural morning, only 68 men were on parade; of these advantages of stealth and surprise and the guer- 68, 40 decided to fallout and leave the firqat rilla techniques to which they were so naturally Salahadin; leaving only 28 members of the firqat, acclimatized. A startling manifestation of this se- almost precisely its original number when the rious deficiency occured during a firqat offensive firqat was first formed. in January 1975. In this period the PFLO was being pressed back towards the border with It was these two prominent characteristics of the South Yemen, accompanied with growing inten- Dhofar social structure - a profound democratic sity of conflict and increasing casualties on both instinct which was antipathetic to traditional mili- sides (cf. below). In a catacomb of limestone tary discipline and tribal separatism - which un- caves, almost invincibly protected by a dominat- derlay the PFLOAG's determination to eliminate ing hill, the guerrillas had their main stores of the tribal structure. The determination with which weapons, ammunition and food. This cave com- the Islamic traditionalists resisted these press- plex was situated at Sherishitti, in the vicinity of ures ensured that only terrorist measures by the the coastal town of Rahkyut in the far west of Communists could overcome this resistance; Dhofar. The caves lay in a very strong position at which, in turn, reacted adversely upon the PF- the head of a long wadi extending from south to LOAG in so far as it profoundly alienated many of north and four miles inland. Several sheer es- the adoo. In addition to ruthless coercive meas- carpments protected them. ures, the PFLOAG/PFLO adopted the familiar Metternichean technique of posting adoo to It was a natural fortress, the conquest of which areas far removed from the geagraphical base of demanded speed, stealth and local knowledge. their tribe. The mutiny of the firqat Salahadin On SAS advice a lightly armed firqat unit was spelt the end of the experiment in the multi-tribal nominated for the task of spearheading a bat- firqat. talion assault. SAS climbers were on hand to assist in the final stages after the caves had been captured; the Regiment's demolition ex- Ons should not assume, however, that this pro- perts were to destroy both the caves and their found problem of cultural seperatism between contents. However, before the firqat could cross the SAS leadership and training cadre and their the start line to begin the assault, they insisted firqat troops impeded effective leadership by upon a demonstration of supporting aircraft, artil- SAS officers and NCO's. Indeed, the irregulars lery and armoured cars, and demanded that this learned from experience that their British men- be repeated every few hundred yards during the tors would sacrifice their own lives rather than advance. Inevitably, this orchestrated barrage desert their allies. An outstanding example of widely advertised the commencement of the op- this was provided on 12 April 1974, when Capt eration; not only was the vital element of surprise Simon Garthwaite was killed whilst trying to res- lost, but the subsequent ponderous advance cue a wounded firqat sodier pinned down by provided the rebels with ample time to prepare enemy fire. Garthwaite's magnetism both within an excellent defence. the SAS and among his firqat followers, was considerable. This fact is attested to by a friend, During the ensuing two days, under increasingly who stated that at formal mess dinners Garth- accurate enemy machine-gun, rocket and mor- waite was uneasy, but felt completely at home in tar fire, the assault ground to a halt. In a lecture the primitive and hostile terrain of the jebel: appertaining to this operation Brig (later Maj

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Gen) John Akehurst states how the situation de- hurst (Commander, Dhofar Brigade) describes teriorated: the 'modus operandi' of the firqats in such cir- 'In an attempt to capture the caves the cumstances 11: advance was ambushed by the enemy as it 'First, the firqat would select a base of their crossed open ground and the leading com- choice. Provided it offered good prospects pany lost 13 killed and 22 wounded in less for land access and drilled water we would than an hour. '10 mount a largely military operation, perhaps a whole battalion, to capture it. Military en- The first to die, in a carefully prepared ambush, gineers would then bulldoze an access was 8. British officer who was moving down an track and down the track would come a drill exposed forward slope with his company before rig. attempting to gross a gulley. This group was now hit by the full force of well-sited machine guns Troops would then thin out to the minimum and mortars located almost immediately above necessary to defend the base with firqat it. Attempts by supporting forces to save the now assistance. While the drill turned away, the isolated vanguard attracted more withering fire, Civil Aid team set up a clinic, a shop (with and spectacular bravery was displayed by indi- Government rations, which would be free at vidual officers and SAS troopers to recover the first but later sold, though at subsidised wounded. At dusk on the third day of the opera- prices), a school and a mosque. Engineers tion the SAS squadron moved forward to facili- would be building a distribution scheme for tate the withdrawel of the beleaguered company. the water with water-points for humans and Striking back at the rebel positions with accurate troughs for cattle and camels. machine-gun and rocket fire, they seriously in- hibited the enemy's response whilst the rem- nants of the advance guard fell back. An opera- All this probably took four weeks. Water is tion originally conceived to be of 24 hours dura- at a premium ... and people throughout the tion consumed three weeks and, in actual fact, tribal area would bring in their cattle ... The civilians, of course, were in regular touch the caves were never occupied by government with the enemy, many of whom were their forces. (This does not imply, however, that the relations. When they came in for water and operation was a total failure. Indeed, it was an other Government munificence the firqat outstanding success in some respects, but due talked to them, first to gain intelligence, but to other, quite unintended factors. The ap- second, to tell them to let the enemy know proaches to the caves were denied to the insur- that they should not interfere with the pro- gents by artillery fire. The ridge on which the vision of these good things. The enemy caves were situated extended southwards to a themselves were totally dependent on civi- hillock of huge broken boulders, nicknamed lian goodwill and therefore were forced not 'Stonehenge'. From this point the SAF could to interfere.' dominate the 'Freedom Road', and the range between 'Stonehenge' and the cave complex was approximately 3 500 yards, well within the It will be apparent from Maj Gen Akehurst's com- capability of heavy artillery. Accordingly, two 106 ments that the entire concept of the firqat was an mm recoilless guns were placed on 'Stone- integral aspect of the SAS's 'modus operandi' in henge', and spent the ensuing five days firing Dhofar; whereby civil aid programmes were an directly into the caves day and night. During this integral aspect of intelligence gathering as the time a bulldozer was trundled down off the 'gatn' basis for more specifically military operations. It and a track driven through the bush to allow a will also be apparent that the firqats were most Saladin armoured car to fire shells directly into effectively utilized in the non-military 'politiciza- the caves' entrances. The 76 mm shells fired by tion' process which features so heavily in insur- the armoured cars thenceforward permanently gency wars. An example of their effectiveness in denied access to the caves by the adoo.) this context is the occupation of Sudh, a small coastal town 20 miles east of Mirbat that had been abandoned by the SAF in 1969 and was However, it would be wrong to assume that the subsequently controlled by an adoo band 50 results of employment of firqats had a totally strong led by famous adoo leader named Qar- negative effect. At its best a firqat worked with a toob (see above, with regard to the mutiny within speed and efficiency in recovering lost territory the firqat Salahadin). The town was successfully unique in Dhofar. Brig (later Maj Gen) John Ake- occupied by a force transported by sea on 23

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February 1971, and there was no adoo presence boxes, in each corner of the two-storey stone in Sudh when the occupying firqat Salahadin fort, and to link these with detonator cord to a entered the town. The firqat Salahadin suc- five-minute safety fuse in the courtyard. Having ceeded in securing the defection of many mem- ensured that the engine of his escape vehicle bers of the adoo in the region (including the was safely running, the British firqat leader lit the leaders Qartoob and Dherdhir) to their ranks, as fuse and effected a rapid exit. The resultant well as ensuring the allegiance of the towns- spectacular explosion that occurred just after people to the Sultan's cause. The tribal affilia- dusk not only destroyed the fort but also a Ye- tions between the firqat and townspeople/adoo meni Government shop, garages and a house. had played a major role in the process. No SAF The object of this audacious operation was to unit would have achieved such results. The vital divert the resources of South Yemeni's army from role performed by the firqats with regard to intel- aiding the guerrillas as these infiltrated into Dho- ligence gathering operations was made manifest far farther south, along the coastal plain. (As is after the conclusion of major hostilities in the so often the case in such episodes, the ultimate Western Area at the end of 1975 (d. below). consequences were of the nature of an anti-cli- Adoo groups remained active in the Eastern max. Although the Sultan of Oman was im- Area, despite the fact that this should have been pressed, the British military commanders were impossible in view of the ceaseless pursuit of horrified, as border crossings are a perennially SAF and firqat. The fundamental reason why the sensitive issue for the political authorities in remaining insurgents could thus survive was the Whitehall. The contract officer who led the incur- fact that all incoming intelligence regarding their sion into the South Yemen transferred to other activities deriving from the civil population of the duties in Dhofar soon afterwards, in command of region had ceased. This dearth of intelligence another firqat. The leadership of his former firqat could be attributed to the fact that the SAF now operating in the Empty Quarter was assumed by totally controlled the area (the SAS/BA TT teams an orthodox SAS team, and its cross-border op- had moved out of the area a year previously), erations ceased). and its commander, possessing the innate dis- trust of the firqats shared by many SAF person- Non-military dimensions of the conflict: nel, had refused to utilize the firqats in an active role. It should be borne in mind that the 'hearts and minds' programme formulated by the SAS in- Within this context of the positive aspect of firqat volved this unit in the specifically non-military operations, it is opposite to discuss the activities aspects of the assault upon the PFLO. Thus, of one officer recruited by the Sultan from the point 1 (a veterinary campaign) involved experi- SAS force as a freelance, contract firqat leader mentation in animal husbandry (not always suc- who maximized the effectiveness of the firqat cessful, as the improved strains of livestock in- concept as a COIN weapon. Working under the troduced by the SAS were often infected with direction of another SAS veteran who was now in diseased strains of indigenous livestock); drilling charge of Dhofar's military intelligence, he lived of wells; and the establishment of a model farm for months on the edge of the Empty Quarters, on the outskirts of Salalah. Point 2 (the provision dressed like his Dhofari warriors and indistingui- of previously non-existent medical services) in- shable from them. He dropped and collected volved the SAS medical personnel in supplying agents over the border with South Yemen; and, the medical requirements of the Dhofaris until in 1972 decided to blow up the army fort at Si- trained (or, more often, semi-trained) indigenous nau, 80 miles inside Yemeni territory. The opera- inhabitants could assume their duties. Members tion was completely clandestine; to such an ex- of the BATT team thus established rudimentary tent that had he been taken prisoner he would clinics. These services were gradually taken have been disowned by the Sultan's hierarchy over by the Civil Aid Department (d. below). many of whom, including the British Comman- However, an example of SAS civic action at a der-in-Chief, had absolutely no prior knowledge late point in the campaign occurred in a small of the operation. With two Bedford trucks carry- group of five islands in the Kuria Muria group ing 500lbs of unstable gelignite, and 80 men which are located some 25 miles off the coast (including a party of South Yemeni exiles trained opposite Hasik, the next town east from Sudh. in Saudi Arabia), he arrived unimpeded at the Only one island in the group - AI Hallaniyah - fort, where the small garrison surrendered with- was populated (83) and in June 1975 a myste- out resistance. Little more than half an hour was rious epidemic struck this island, killing 16 of the needed to plant the gelignite, still in its 51b population (except one) and the majority of the

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elderly. CAD requested the SAS to despatch a knowledge of the intelligence personnel with re- BATT team to the island, which was accordingly gard to adoo organization, etc. done on 23 June 1975. As a result of the efforts of this team - a group of four, all Arabic speak- ers, under the command of Cpl Wally Warwick _ Rorke's Drift re-enacted: the Battle of Mirbat the epidemic was extirpated and the health of In July 1972 the SAS experienced its most dra- the villagers was enormously improved by the matic confrontation with the insurgents. This con- ample provision of iron, vitamins, anti-biotics and frontation was singularly remarkable for several anti-tubercular drugs in tablet and syrup form. Of reasons. First, it was curiously anachronistic equal importance, they returned with a full recon- within the context of a dead imperial power, naissance report and recommendations. War- being reminiscent of the desperate sieges of wick stated that only two alternatives were vi- embattled garrisons caught in the midst of native able; either AL Hallaniyah should be the focus of uprisings (as occurred on the North West Front- extensive civil aid development, or the popula- ier of India, for example, or Rorke's Drift in South tion should be rehabilitated and rehoused on the Africa, in the January of 1879). Secondly, a siege mainland. The former course .was adopted (cf. situation was totally alien to the traditions of the below). SAS, whose personnel were never conceived in the role of garrison troops. The scene of the An important aspect of Point 4 (psychological conflict was the town of Mirbat, situated approxi- warfare) was a sophisticated information service. mately 40 miles from the provincial capital of This was largely the fruits of the efforts of Cpl Salalah; a huddle of flat-topped houses and two John Lane, SAS. The dissemination of transistor ancient mud-walled forts flanked on two sides by radios throughout the jebel at low prices, com- the sea. Until the action of July 1972 the town bined with bulletins on notice boards situated at had been characterized for the British who strategic points in the towns (i.e. at every gate served in this base by a deadly monotony; punc- through the perimeter wire which surrounded the tuated by sporadic mortar or anti-tank missiles towns, where packs were inspected for mines fire directed at Mirbat by an unseen enemy. Im- and weapons entering, and food and medical mediately prior to the frontal assault of the Dho- supplies leaving; and where queues of people fari insurgents, six mortar bombs had struck the naturally developed). (Transistor radios have town on 28 May, on 6 June a further six, and on 8 been a most powerful instrument for the dissemi- June three 75 mm shells. At this time Mirbat was nation of Arab nationalist propaganda, a factor occupied by a BATT team drawn from the Regi- fully appreciated by Nasser). The psychological ment's B Squadron, under the command of Capt assault had three principal objectives:- improv- M.JA (Mike) Kealy. The other members of the ing the morale of government forces by empha- team were:- UCpl Pete Wignall; Cpl Roger sizing their successes and minimizing their de- Chapman; Tpr Labalaba; Tpr Savesaki (Tprs La- feats; informing the populace of the new civil balaba and Savesaki were Fijian); Tpr Harris; development projects which were symptomatic Tpr Tobin; Cpl Bob Bradshaw and Cpl Reynolds. of a new and far more enlightened administra- The training team's functions included the train- tion; and the development of an aggressive ideo- ing of the local firqat, the maintenance of vehi- logy to counter that of the Marxist insurgents, this cles and the implementation of the 'hearts and new ideology being founded upon the re-asser- minds' concept through the dispensation of rudi- tion of the Moslem religion. The emphasis mentary medical care for men and animals. In throughout was on 'white' propaganda (i.e. em- addition to the SAS team the town was occupied phasizing the positive aspects of the Sultan's by a group of 30 Askaris from Northern Oman, policies) as opposed to the 'black' variety (i.e. 500 miles distant, armed with accurate but slow- vituperation directed at the enemy.) Radio Aden, firing .303 rifles (i.e. slow firing in comparison predictably, was characterized by 'black' propa- with FN semi-automatic rifles and AK-47s). ganda. Point 3 (intelligence) was the responsibi- These served the Sultan's representative (the lity of an intelligence cell controlled by WO Bir- Wali, or Governor, of the town), as town gate- rell, assisted by several junior NCO's. This as- keepers, searching all who came and went for pect of the COIN offensive naturally gathered messages and supplies (including food) that momentum as the war progressed and the psy- might be destined for the rebels. These Askaris chological counter-offensive - combined with occupied a fort near the water's edge known as the escalating alienation of Dhofaris by the PFLO the Wali's fort and situated some 100 yards leadership - yielding constantly increasing num- north-east of the HQ of the BATT team (known bers of defectors; who, in turn, expanded the acronymously as the 'Batt house'). Living within

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the town itself, armed with FN rifles and light ment that 'war is the province of chance'. Cer- machine guns, was the local firqat. Normally its tainly, the relief of Mirbat can be attributed to a strength was approximately 60, but at least 20 remarkable convergence of coincidental factors. were somewhere in the mountains on a recon- The first link in this chain of coincidence was naissance patrol. (This was the result of a delib- forged by the ironic fact that, on the day of the erately planned PFLO diversion). Finally, there attack, the nine man BATT team were to fly out was a further force of approximately 25 men of and return to England, to be relieved by G the Dhofar Gendarmerie (DG); armed with FN Squadron SAS. Before B Squadron could leave rifles and a single light machine gun, in a second the territory, it had to hand over to its successor fort just within the wire. In front of this fort was the in Dhofar. The relieving force had arrived from dug-out position for a veteran 25 pr artillery England the previous day and were, in actual piece of World War II vintage. The DG fort domi- fact, already entrenched in the hills surrounding nated the town and Mirbat's only airstrip. It was, Mirbat. The majority of officers and senior NCO's therefore, a vital position (cf. fig. (i)). In addition had been in the advance party and were already to the artillery team, the heaviest weapons avail- taking over positions in the jebel from the out- able to the SAS team in their Batt house were two going squadron, leaving only the younger sol- machine guns (a .5 in Browning and GPMG - diers in Salalah. An even more remarkable coin- General Purpose Machine Gun) and an 81 mm cidental factor was that, at 0800 hrs on the morn- mortar. ing of the attack, the squadron commander, his sergeant major and 21 soldiers paraded, having At dawn on 19 July 1972 Mirbat was attacked by originally intended to go to a nearby range to test a column of 250 adoo, armed with the ubiquitous fire their weapons as part of the normal routine of Kalashnikov AK-47s, light, heavy and medium taking over. They were heavily armed for such a machine guns, mortars of various calibres up to small group; nine GPMGs and four M79 grenade 82 mm, two 75 mm recoilless anti-tank rifles and launchers, in addition to their semi-automatic an 84 mm Gustav rocketlauncher. The column rifles. At this point the action at Mirbat had been had marched south towards the town and the in progress for two-and-a-half hours. That the sea, and then dispersed into carefully organized attack was a major one could not be in any combat groups, each of approximately 10 men, doubt. The outgoing squadron commander, Maj which spread out in a wide arc around the town. Richard Pirie, appreciated that the only manner Another group made a circular trek east to the in which help could reach Mirbat in time was by beach and then back again along the coast to air, despite the monsoon, and had already penetrate the town from that sector. Thus, when moved to the SOAF HQ at Salalah airfield in the attack was launched the town was com- order to establish a joint operations centre. Thus, pletely isolated and its defenders had no means the 23 soldiers embarked in three SOAF heli- of escape. Much of the fiercest fighting under- copters at Salalah bound for Mirbat, and landed taken by the SAS team was centred on the 25 pr south-east of the town according to plan. Their gun pit outside the Wali's fort, which was de- arrival at 0915 hrs coincided almost exactly with fended by Capt Kealy and Tprs Tobin, Savesaki a second air strike around the fort. The party of and Labalaba (Tpr Labalaba was shot dead in SAS reinforcements deployed into two 10-man the engagement and Tobin was mortally groups and a command group, and advanced wounded). The ordeal of Mirbat's defenders was inland towards town. It was almost 1030 hrs be- lightened by vigorous air support by the SOAF, fore the most seriously wounded - Tprs Tobin who rapidly responded to Kealy's communica- and Savesaki and the wounded Omani gunner - tion to Provincial HQ at Salalah that Mirbat was were evacuated by helicopter. under attack, and sent in two waves of Strike- masters. These air strikes undoubtedly relieved Aftermath of Mirbat pressure upon the fort. From the radio in the artillery bunker, Kealy relayed positions of By mid-day the adoo had withdrawn. In retro- enemy targets to the Batt house which, in turn, spect, after the war had ended four years later, radioed the information back to the Strikemaster many considered that the battle of Mirbat had pilots. been a decisive turning point. The insurgents had been compelled to launch a spectacular However, nothing less than substantial reinforce- attack to counteract the high propaganda value ments could retrieve the situation and, by a fortu- of the Government's successes during the pre- nate circumstance, these were forthcoming. That vious year, in which Operation Jaguar (ct. this was the case vindicates Clausewitz's state- above) had signalled the successful penetration

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and establishment of a permanent foothold on in their leaders had been shattered. The latter the formerly sacrosanct (i.e. for the enemy) jebel. resorted to a terror campaign in an effort to re- The attack on Mirbat had been well planned and assert their authority, and a number of 'kangaroo' well executed. By using the cover of the mon- courts were established to 'judge' and execute soon, the PFLO had calculated that the SOAF those considered responsible for the failure of would not be able to fly. Moreover, having de- the plan. The reaction to this terror campaign, coyed the firqat out on patrol, they had antici- combined with the impact upon morale created pated that 250 hard core fighters, supported by by such heavy casualties, intensified the divi- all the Eastern Area's recoilless artillery and mor- sions within the ranks of the adoo. It was hardly tars, should be more than sufficient to 'take out' surprising, therefore, that August and Septem- all the defences that remained. From the enemy ber 1972 were characterized by a noticeable prisoners it was learnt that the adoo objective increase in the number of insurgents surrender- was to capture the town, to hold it for a few hours ing to government forces. only - possibly for a day - to denounce and execute the Wali and his advisers, to subject the townsfolk to a propaganda harangue, and to The situation in 1975 return once more to the jebel. Had these objec- tives been fulfilled, the psychological impact It was stated above that 1975 was the decisive upon the Government's COIN offensive would year in the COIN operations within Oman. How- have been disastrous. No other Wali would have ever, in order to assess the importance of the been found (in any event it had been extremely military operations undertaken in this year, it is difficult to find a governor for the town in the first extremely important to provide an appreciation instance). Townspeople throughout the province of the COIN situation immediately prior to 1975, would have been terrified into total non-co- in order that these operations can be viewed in operation with the Government forces and the their correct perspective. This appreciation can PFLO would have gained total control over the be categorized under the headings of military coastal towns. In the event, three major factors and political dimensions. were instrumental in destroying these plans. The first was the skill and tenacity of the SAS BATT team and the impeccable judgement of its com- The Military Dimension: mander throughout the assault. The second was A major development that characterized the the skill and courage of the SOAF pilots. The years 1972-1975 was the creation of 'cordon third was the remarkable coincidental factor that sanitaires'. The object of these barriers was the Capt Kealy's team was to leave Mirbat on the interruption of enemy supplies which were des- very day of the attack and, accordingly, the re- patched regularly from PDRY by animal train and lieving SAS squadron was close by, on hand to routed through the jebel. In 1972 a 35 mile wire provide reinforcements. The retreating adoo left and mine obstacle, termed the 'Hornbeam Line', approximately 30 bodies behind and approxi- was constructed across the enemy supply mately 10 wounded, who were taken prisoner. routes into Central and Eastern Dhofar. The However, their sources later admitted that the toll Hornbeam Line could not, of course, totally repel incurred by them had, in fact, been considerably human infiltration but it undoubtedly became a higher (approximately 100). The SAS casualties most effective barrier to animal trains; and as had been two dead and two seriously wounded; such it soon exercised an important impact upon the Dhofar Gendarmerie lost one man killed and adoo morale and capability in Eastern Dhofar. one wounded, and the Oman Artillery one dead. The adoo also suffered a crippling shortage of The PFLO defeat at Mirbat had three major re- supplies and the restriction on their movements purcussions. First, in view of the heavy casual- seriously hampered the provision of reinforce- ties they suffered, it was considered that the ments and the evacuation of wounded. The PFLO were never able to deploy similar concen- Hornbeam Line had its ancester in the form of trated forces to mount attacks of the same scale the 'Leopard' Line, which was established after and intensity elsewhere. From the psychological the successful incursions by Government forces aspect, the adoo had clearly lost credibility in a into the jebel signalled by Operation Jaguar warrior society through decisive defeat in open (1971) (cf. above). ON 2 November 1971 the first combat, where the odds were heavily in their of three positions was established at a point favour. Thirdly, the PFLO defeat at Mirbat in- where the mountains narrowed between the voked serious political repercussions for the in- western end of the plateau and the beginning of surgent cause. The faith of the younger fighters the great stark jebels and wadis of the Western

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Area. These positions were withdrawn in the enemy mines where, because the monsoon pre- summer of 1972 as they could not be supplied vented enemy evacuation, the wounded were during the monsoon season. However, to reiter- subjected to a 14-hour man carry; not surpris- ate, it was succeeded by the Hornbeam Line, ingly, some of the casualties died. The task of which extended from Musgayl on the coast for patrolling could not be assisted by helicopters. 40 miles inland to a position named 'Oven'. The Although they were extremely valuable in the Hornbeam Line was supported by the Hammer engagement of specific targets, they were of Line (established in 1973), which occupied simi- little value in search and destroy missions when, lar positions to those of the Leopard Line. In in the thickly wooded terrain, enemy presence 1973 the (then) Shah of Iran, mindful of the Com- was first manifested by a burst of machine-gun munist threat to the Gulf, sent a well equipped fire through the floor. Moreover, these roving battalion task force to Oman, which cleared the missions sometimes resulted in hazardous res- track from Salalah to Thumrait, permitting the cue operations for shot-down pilots, perhaps route's development into a tarred road. In 1974 involving further loss. For these reasons they this force was increased to a brigade group were discouraged. There can be little doubt that complete with ample helicopter support, provid- the adoo suffered from the constricting pressure ing the Sultan with sufficient strength to move of the government forces as the latter expanded into a highly geared offensive. It was decided to their operations between the 'cordon sanitaires', establish a second major obstacle, similar in upon which they were securely based in terms of nature and intention to the Hornbeam Line, ex- communications and supplies. The effect upon tending inland from approximately half-way be- insurgent supply routes was particularly delete- tween the Hornbeam Line and the PDRY border. rious. This escalating pressure was manifested In this sector the three line was closer to the in the declining numbers of adoo. At the height of coast and the enemy supply lines were thus the insurgency, in 1970, the enemy could muster constricted into a more confined area. The 2 000 hard core guerrillas and 3 000 militia, the obstacle could, therefore, be shorter and more latter operating part-time and being virtually in- effective. In a period of intensive operations dur- distinguishable from guerrillas. However, at the ing December 1974 - January 1975 the Iranian outset of 1975 it was estimated that there were Brigade, assisted by the SAF, fought its way now some 850 hard core insurgents remaining south to the coastal region of Western Dhofar, in within Dhofar, 250 being east fo the Hornbeam striking distance of PDRY's border. The second Line. In an attempt to throttle enemy supplies major 'cordon sanitaire' - designated the 'Dama- near source, a battalion had been established in vand Line' (after the principal mountain range of 1972 at Sarfait (sometimes referred to as Simba). Iran) - was based upon these newly won posi- However, the nature of the ground - a series of tions. sheer escarpments graduating down some 4 000 ft to the sea - combined with the enemy These lines would have been familiar to Kitch- strength thwarted this intention. The battalion ener, as they corresponded in conception to the remained beleagured and dependent upon air blockhouse system which he initiated during the re-supply, but it absorbed a great deal of enemy Second South African War of 1899-1902. The attention and, as subsequent event unfolded, Hornbeam and Damavand Lines (cf. fig (ii)) con- was essential to the final collapse of the enemy. sisted of heavily entrenched defensive positions placed at several thousand yards distance along It was evident that the war was far from over. The barbed wire defences which were booby trap- Western Area contained numerous and exten- ped and mined. The Damavand Line consisted sive caches fo adoo weapons and stores and of a triple concertina fence windlassed between was regarded by him as his home base, to be angle irons and booby trapped, then a minefield fought for yard by yard. To fully exploit the great and then on the home side a simple fence to advantages of the new base of the Damavand repel cattle and humans. The Hornbeam Line Line would take a great deal of effort in very was less elaborate, but followed the basic pat- difficult country, and the enemy were unlikely to tern of minefields/barbed wire perimeters/defen-' remain passive supine spectators whilst this ef- sive positions. It should be emphasized that fort was being undertaken. Nevertheless, the these barriers were not simply passive lines of contrast with the situation prevailing in 1970 was defence. The effectiveness of these barriers de- remarkable. That the situation had been re- pended upon constant patrolling, to ensure that dressed to such an extent was due in no small the enemy did not create gaps. On one occasion measure to the joint efforts of the SAS/SOAF/SAF (in mid-1975) a patrol was ambushed amidst (particularly in the years preceding 1973, when

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there were no substantial reinforcements avail- had similarly increased. The SOAF was com- able from external sources). These efforts crys- manded by a Wing Commander seconded from tallized in the gradual but relentless penetration the RAF and flown and maintained by seconded of the jebel from the Eastern Area, climaxed in and contract officers and airmen. A modern air- 1971 by Operation Jaguar. The process of pen- port had been built at Sib whilst Muttrah, Oman's etration had been initiated on 13 March 1971, principal airport, was rapidly modernized. prior to Jaguar, when a position known as 'Ea- gle's Nest' was taken. This position was within a night's march from Mirbat, and was located at The Political Dimension: the extreme eastern end of the escarpment. (The During the years 1970-1975 four major factors position was eventually abandoned due to the characterized the political dimension. These inability to provide an adequate supply of water were:- increasing divisions within the ranks of to support a permanent foothold on the jebel; a the PFLO; the extent to which the Front was prospective site at Tawi Atair proving inadequate increasingly alienating the civil population; the for this purpose). Moreover, the SAF had wit- success of the Government's policy of civil de- nessed a considerable expansion and, by 1973, velopment; and the success of the Government's had developed into a well-equipped, well bal- new emphasis upon information services. All four anced force of two large brigades, an air force of factors were dealt with in an enemy document some 80 aircraft (three squadrons of strike, heli- captured in 1971, containing the observations copter and transport aircraft), and a small navy written by the First Political Commissar of the HO capable of controlling territorial waters. Approxi- Chi Minh Unit of the Central Area. He had at- mately half of this force (Dhofar Brigade) was tended the Third National Conference of the involved in Dhofar; the remainder being based in Front held at Rahkyut in the Western Area in the north Oman resting, recruiting and retraining or June of 1971, together with 74 other senior PFLO in supporting roles. Dhofar Brigade, eventually officers. The document was a remarkably honest based on five battalions with supporting arms attempt, uncharacteristically free of political di- and services, was responsible for the conduct of atribe, to assess the malaise within the Front's operations except in a comparatively small area performance, and to rectify it. The document allocated to an Iranian Brigade (cf. above and made clear that, underlying this malaise, were fig. (ii)). the four corrosive developments cited above. First, with regard to internal divisions, a number In 1975 the SAF had a strength of approximately of ex-regular soldiers who had deserted from the 12 000, and possessed artillery batteries Trucial Oman Scouts and the Gulf armies had (trained by a small unit of British advisers from now returned from their courses in China and the the Royal Artillery (RA) and known as 'Cracker Soviet Union and were making their presence Battery') and an armoured car squadron. As in felt; particularly with regard to their criticism of 1958 its overall commander was a seconded lack of professional military standards within the officer in the British Army, Maj Gen K. Perkins adoo ranks. They particularly criticized:- the lack (who held this position 1975-1977). (The Com- of discussion or any form of de-briefing after mander of the SAF had been up-graded from battle, so that lessons were never learnt and the Brigadier to Major General; all the responsibili- same mistakes were repeated; lack of weapons ties formerly split between Force Commander discipline, manifested in the manner in which and Defence Secretary (the latter position occu- ammunition was lavishly and uselessly ex- pied by Col Pat Waterfield between 1958 - when pended, particularly at aircraft flying hopelessly Col David Smiley assumed the rank of Chief out of range; the fact that commanders did not 12 of Staff of the SAF - and 1969, when the for- insist upon sufficient reconnaissance to enable mer retired) being re-united in the Commander them to arrive at accurate estimates of SAF of the SAF Maj Gen Tim Creasey assumed this strengths; liaison between units (although this role in 1972-1975, succeeding Brig (later defect was being remedied by the provision of a Maj Gen) John Graham (who held the position radio set to every adoo unit); lack of technical 1970-1972). The expansion of SAF since 1970 knowledge on the part of many adoo fighters; had been dramatic. Two new regiments (Desert and far better materials for personal equipment and Jebel) had been raised. In 1970 there had (e.g. ammunition pouches, belts, etc.) Indeed, been only 40 regular (i.e. seconded from British an air of suspicion and hostility permeates the units) officers serving with the SAF, but by 1977 entire document with regard to attitudes towards the number had increased to 200. The number of the several different components of the adoo. contract officers employed directly by the Sultan This tension did not apply only to the more pro-

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fessional and more 'amateurish' members of the ration that would have killed most Europeans - hard core fighting units. The document pointed he had a good chance of survival; otherwise his to the militia as being particularly unreliable and chances were slight. A cave at Sherishitti con- requiring more indoctrination. It is of interest to tained the main adoo hospital in the Western note that the documents comment upon a fea- Area; where a Lebanese woman doctor cared for ture which has characterized insurgent move- the less seriously wounded; but those whose ments throughout the world; viz. the dedication wounds or sickness were of a more serious of female members to the insurgent cause. The nature had to go to Hauf, where her husband Commissar states that women were more readily was practicing, or were even evacuated from converted than men (which is, perhaps, hardly Hauf by ship to Aden). The new Government surprising, in view of the subjugation which tra- schools in Mirbat and Taqa (also known as ditional Islamic society imposed upon their Tarqa) provided a statement of intent from the womenfolk, in contrast to which the Front's prom- Front to improve the literacy of the jebel, al- ise of complete equality for women in the new though it was not stated how this was to be political dispensation must have appeared par- achieved; again a tacit admission fo the Govern- ticularly appealing). It was recorded that the ment's educational programme. -monthly payments to 'martyrs' widows was to be increased. (Fighters did not at that time receive Finally, the paper included a particularly reveal- any payment - a major reason why the firqats ing statement pointing to the success of the Gov- were so much more attractive to the tribesmen - ernment's information services. It stated that but their widows did receive an allowance). freedom of religion was a necessity. This rep- resented a major change in Front policy, and With regard to alienation of non-combatants, the derived from the success of the information ser- Front clearly realized that it had estranged the vices of the Sultan's Government in driving a civil population, particularly in the Eastern Area, wedge between Islam and Communism. and decided to announce a six-months amnesty for any firqatmen who wished to return. The None of the above factors eroding the effective- 'people's courts', which had acquired a noxious ness of the PFLO diminished in the succeeding reputation for 'judgement' and execution without four years. The numbers of firqatmen seeking trial, were to be disbanded and replaced by a amnesty by a return to the insurgents remained new court to consist of elements of the People's negligible. (Observation posts of the enemy Army, the Militia and civilians. (The People's Lib- were never less than three men strong lest one eration Army - PLA - were the strictly military man should persuade the others to desert with components of the insurgent forces; the PFLO him; thereby testifying to the fact that the PFLO's constituting the political organization and leader- cause never increased its attractiveness and ship). The revised courts would contain between credibility after it had ruthlessly destroyed the seven and 11 members, and new, more 'liberal' former DLF leadership in 1970; cf. above). More- punishments were devised. (In the past, the vast over, the Government's civil development pro- majority of those who appeared before a gramme, which exercised such an adverse ef- people's court were simply shot). The document fect upon the Front's political impetus, gathered further admitted that the Front was unpopular in increasing momentum in the succeeding four the west also. years. Within this context, it is important to bear in mind that the civic and military dimensions of The Government's civil development policy was the COIN assault clearly interacted. It would discussed also, as well as the BAn's civil action have been neither possible nor desirable to at- teams. It was decided that the standard of medi- tempt a re-settlement of the nomadic peoples cal training amongst the adoo units should be accustomed for centuries to constant movement improved in order that they could provide medi- in search of grazing and water; yet for develop- cal assistance to civilians; a tacit admission that ment there needed to be a pattern of govern- the Front was being adversely compared, in the mental activity and centres of contact with the eyes of the civilian population, with the SAS and civil population. With this overriding objective in Government forces in this respect. (In actual mind, military successes - particularly in secur- fact, the standard of adoo medical orderlies was ing permanent bases on the jebel, upon which' abysmally low. If a wounded adoo could manage the establishment of 'cordon sanitaires' were to reach Hauf, just across the border in PDRY - founded - were immediately followed by the and many of them made incredible journeys construction of access tracks and by the provi- across the mountains, often of several days du- sion of well-drilling equipment. The wells be-

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came focus points for the population and were vand Lines. During the final week of February consolidated as government centres by the con- 1975 two battalions routed the enemy and de- struction of clinics, schools and government stroyed the HQ; in the process rebuilding morale shops. By 1974 there was a substantial number which had become somewhat frayed during the of imported teachers, doctors and nurses _ fighting of January 1975. It was necessary to Egyptian, Lebanese and Jordanian - and this secure the important heights above the wadi and had considerably improved medical and educa- the piqueting alone might well have absorbed a tional facilities. Precisely because civil aid was full brigade. However, by appreciation of the not keeping pace with military penetration of the effects of convex and concave slopes and the jebel (largely due to the remoteness and limited skilful use of helicopters, units of the SAF (the resources of Government ministries in the re- Desert Regiment, Jebel Regiment and Southern mote north), a new department, designated the Regiment) cleared both the heights and the Civil Aid Department, was established in 1973, wadi. The former, consisting of limestone rocks commanded by an ex-Gurkha, ex-SAF officer, scoured by centuries of wind into natural Martin Robb, and intended to implement short weapon emplacements, were ideal natural de- term projects until proper civil development pro- fensive positions (they could not have been bet- jects could be established. The Civil Aid Depart- tered by man-made designs) and were only se- ment (CAD) performed miracles of improvisa- cured after several well co-ordinated set piece tion. For example, it undertook the production of attacks involving all arms and fighter ground pre-fabricated buildings which were flown into strikes in support of well led infantry. position on the jebel and then re-constructed to provide a school, clinic and shop. As a result of To release infantry battalions for more aggres- an SAS BAn team's report regarding conditions sive operations, the Oman Gendarmerie had on AI Hallaniyah, within the Kuria Murias island been transfered from Northern Oman to garrison group (cf. below), a new site for water was found the road from Salalah to Thumrait. They were near the village on the island, a proper well con- succeeded by a Jordanian unit (91 Special structed, and a regular Flying Doctor service Forces Battalion) which held the road between established; as a result of this last mentioned February and September 1975. Jordan had pro- development AI Hallaniyah, like 37 other Govern- vided instructors in the north. The Jordanian unit ment centres, received a weekly visit. Moreover, was a well trained, aggressive and experienced a Land Rover was flown in to relieve the sole unit. In addition, Jordan also sent an engineer donkey on the island of the laborious duty of company to Oman, which remained until the end transporting water from the island's only hitherto of the war and undertook a variety of civil and existing well. However, CAD had its genesis in military tasks, as well as pilots (cf. below). the civic action responsibilities of the SAS BAn teams; especially in the provision of hitherto un- By June/July 1975 it was apparent that the known medical facilities. Damavand Line had sharply reduced the amount of supplies reaching Central and Eastern Dhofar; and it was a reasonable assumption that 1975: The Year of Decision the enemy pressured between the Hornbeam and Damavand Lines would 'wither on the vine', Plans and Deceptions: having had their supply routes cut. Thus, final victory depended upon the clearance of the area Dhofar Brigade was deployed with its centre of between the Damavand Line and the PDRY bor- gravity in the central and eastern areas. Ex- der. The first option which presented itself, and tended across the jebel from the Hornbeam Line the most attractive, was to deploy to Sarfait in to Mirbat were three battalions supplemented by strength and establish a further barrier there, a reserve battalion and well supported by arm- thereby repeating the success of the Damavand oured cars and artillery. The Iranian Brigade of Line and denying the enemy the ability to re- two battalions with artillery were centred on supply anywhere in Dhofar. However, there were some dominating features between Rakhyut and serious disadvantages attached to such a plan. the edge of the tree line some eight miles inland Some logistic hazards were involved, in so far as (ct. fig. (iii)). The enemy HQ and elements of their troops would be dependent upon helicopter re- 9th June Regiment (named after the anniversary supply. Of even greater significance, however, of the Dhofar rebellion) had settled in the Wadi were the political risks involved, as the Sultan's Ashoq, a deep winding ravine in the mountain- forces would be inviting retaliation from regular ous country between the Hornbeam and Dama- PDRY forces; the latter, moreover, would be op-

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erating close to their home bases, whilst the pass, began. An operation designated 'Waagin former would be placed at the end of a tenous Badree' commenced at an earlier date as a de- logistical link with its terminal vulnerable to con- ception. ('Badree' is Arabic for 'early', and 'Waa- centrated artillery fire. Further, there would still gin Badree' for 'very early'; this suggestive con- be a guerrilla campaign being waged in the rear notation inbuilt into the operation's code name of the Governement forces. The only viable alter- was a deliberate deception tactic). The lack of native was to establish a third obstacle, just be- immediate reaction to either operation was a yond the range of PDRY artillery, extending north pointer to the fact that, although a guerrilla force from Dhalqut and to clear the country up to this is highly mobile tactically, it is usually slow to line before advancing to the border. On political react at a strategic level. Badree drove parallel grounds this second course, albeit more pedes- to the coast, north of the tree line and monsoon trian, was preferred. D-Day was chosen as 21 area. It ran through areas liberally sprinkled with October 1975, a month after the expected end of unchartered anti-personnel mines from the pre- the monsoon, in order to allow the replenishment vious December and January operations, and an of supplies and the withering of at least some of armoured bulldozer was invariably in the van. the luxuriant vegetation resulting from the mon- The road construction relied heavily upon civilian soon, which would greatly assist the enemy in labourers, who downed tools under fire, but re- defence. A further factor in the choice of date sources were re-grouped and under the direc- was that it would allow the troops to celebrate the tion of the senior adminstrative officer, Lt Col Ian Arab feast of Eid, which ends the month of day- Sprackfield, the work was completed within the light fasting during Ramadan before being com- margin of time prescribed (although narrowly). mitted to battle. (The problems caused by the There were a number of sharp engangements insistence of certain firqats in celebrating Rama- also, in which RPG7 missiles were in evidence. dan during a critical juncture of Operation Jag- Operation Badree tempted the enemy into the uar in 1971 will be racalled; cf. above). The post- premature use of SAM-7 missiles, when a Strike- monsoon plan envisaged the following se- master was shot down and Fit Lt Roger Furlong, a seconded pilot, successfully ejected and was quence of events (cf. fig. (iii)): rescued. Thus, SOAF were allowed time in which (i) Between July and mid-October the driving of to revise their ground strike tactics before the a road westwards as far as Defar, with the crucial D-Day. intention of both a logistic build up and de- ceiving the enemy into thinking that the real objective was the Sherishitti area. Preparations for D-Day: (ii) On D-Day minus six and four, diversions by Dhofar Brigade at Sarfait and the Iranian PFLO was now virtually unable to influence Brigade on the coast south of Sherishitti. events east of the Damavand Line. In the ab- (iii) On D-Day a land approach from Defa, in- sence of extensive supplies of ammunition heavy itially west to Furious and then swinging weapons had been cached and the remaining south to the high ground overlooking the adoo were mainly concerned with survival. In formidable Wadi Sayq. On D-Day plus one a contrast, in the west the tempo of enemy activity helicopter assault across the wadi followed had intensified, with Dhofar Brigade and Iranian within two days by exploitation south to positions coming under increasing fire. Three companies of PDRY regulars were operating be- Dhalqut. tween Sarfait and Sherishitti, and PDRY 85 mm These operations would involve a drastic thin- had, from their sanctuary west of the border near ning of troops in the centre and east, but it was Hauf, joined in the bombardment of Sarfait. To considered that the prize compensated for the reiterate, the plan of operations had been largely risk, It was considered that by Christmas the determined by the intention to avoid contact with Sultan's forces would have cleared the area be- PDRY regular forces; yet this factor was now tween Damavand and the new line and would be being negated by PDRY itself. As a precaution- well placed to advance towards the border, ary measure, Dhofar Brigade was ordered to where it was planned to arrive in strength by mid- deploy 5,5 in guns at Sarfait, in order that the PDRY 85 mm guns could be matched for range. 1976. These 5,5 in guns were transported to Sarfait by Iranian Chinook helicopters. The immense logis- Operation Badree: tic activity clearly pointed to an SAF offensive at On 14 August Operation 'Badree', to secure the the end of the monsoon; all that could be done region through which the new road to Defa would was to conceal the area in which the blow would

21 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

fall and persuade the enemy to extend his re- Change of plan: sources. This was attempted by avoidance of any preparatory bombardment of the intended However, in the event the projected plan for the objective; threatening gestures from Defar; capture of the region south of Dhalqut was never building new observation posts at Sarfait; and executed. Instead Sarfait, much further to the diversionary attacks. It was subsequently west and far closer to the PDRY border, became learned from surrendered enemy personnel that the centre of operations. Sarfait had been taken the adoo had considered the objectives of the over by units of the Muscat Regiment in May. The Sultan's forces to be in the Sherishitti area and Commanding Officer of the garrison, Lt Col Ian had not discerned their intentions concerning Christie. Bored and frustrated with merely ob- the Dhalqut line. serving the enemy held stronghold below Sarfait, the garrison successfully ambushed enemy sup- SOAF had meanwhile greatly increased its strik- ply trails in May and June. This involved de- ing power by the formation of a Hunter squadron. scending a precipitous 600 ft scarp, negotiating The aircraft had been acquired from Jordan and enemy minefields by night and remaining con- the pilots were a mixture of seconded RAF, Royal cealed by day. C Cy, Muscat Regiment, had an Jordanian Air Force and contract personnel. The important role to play in the planned operations. squadron base at Thumrait was at this time no This was that of staging a large diversion by more than a concrete strip, a single hangar with intensifying these activities once the monsoon no doors and a number of contractors' buildings. was over. Accordingly, on 14 October, after last The service and arming of the aircraft was, as in light, C Cy, led by Maj Ian Gordon (a former the case of all SOAF operations, the responsibil- Gurkha officer and now a contract officer) de- ity of a civilian firm, Airwork. The air force com- scended from Sarfait. In the van of the advance mander, Air Commodore Erik Bennett, perfor- was an engineer troop led by Capt Ted Wells, med prodigies of improvisation with meagre re- who had spent the previous night hand-clearing sources, ably assisted by a seconded squadron a route through enemy mines. In a brilliant opera- leader, Robin Renton. The development of this tion, repeating on a larger scale the ambushes of squadron into a first class fighting unit involved a four months previously, C Cy seized a prominent return to a less sophisticated environment than is feature called 'Capstan', which had long taunted commonly associated with modern aviation; and the battalion at Sarfait. At Capstan the company it was not unusual in the hectic months that fol- sat in caves and hastily constructed sangers (i.e. lowed to see pilots towing bombs from the circles of rock built for protection when it is not magazines and assiting in the re-arming of their possible to dig trenches) to await the consider- own aircraft between sorties. able enemy reaction which it was expected would follow. Virtually none came, the enemy As D-Day approached, doubts arose in the heli- having apparently ignored this diversion. In the copter squadron with regard to the 'coup de absence of any resistance, Christie decided to main' across the Wadi Sayq. This involved a first reinforce success by deploying more companies lift of two parallel streams, each of six helicop- through Capstan down to the sea. This deploy- ters, which would be overtaken in flight by Hunt- ment had been completed by 15 October. Al- ers tasked to bomb and strafe the landing zone, most before anyone had realized it, Christie had whilst artillery and armoured car fire neutralized created a new line of positions, admittedly not flanking areas. The helicopters, AB 205s, were yet linked by wire and mines, but nevertheless equipped with exhaust shields to repel the heat capable of making it a very bloody affair for the seeking SAM-7s, but these certainly did not adoo to try to move through the line in either guarantee immunity. Low flying was therefore direction. In effect, the operation planned for two necessary to minimize exposure to SAM-7s but days later - D-Day minus 4 (diversions by Dhofar this, in turn, subjected the aircraft to further risk Brigade at Sarfait) - was rendered completely from another direction; they would be flying superflous. Indeed, the unexpected success of within range of AK-4 7 automatic rifles and Sphar- the operation originally planned as a diversio- gin heavy machine guns. The majority of heli- nary movement from Sarfait meant that there was copter pilots were contract personnel and some little point in withdrawing the positions Christie had had as much as six years operational flying; had achieved simply to establish another line pilots suspected that they were living on bor- further east. Accordingly, on the night of 16 Oc- rowed time but under the leadership of W/Cdr tober Maj Gen Perkins and Brig Akehurst de- Alan Hastings, the SOAF station commander at cided to abandon the former plan of operations Salalah, good morale was maintained. and transfer the main theatre of operations to

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Sarfait. It should be borne in mind that at this the following morning - 17 October - he had point in time the position of Sarfait itself was far gained all his objectives and was dug in. Hauf from being secure. Whereas in July and August lay under a pall of smoke and the enemy showed less thatn 30 shells had been fired at Sarfait, in no inclination to inetervene. With this successful October this figure had increased to over 1 000; consolidation of forces south of Sarfait the fate of and on 16 October the artillery bombardment the PFLO in Dhofar was sealed. The enemy were had become even more intense, as the enemy now sealed between the Government forces in no doubt realized that Sarfait was the new base the east - firmly based on the Damavand Line - of a line which had effectively isolated the insur- and those of the west, securely based at Sarfait gents within Dhofar. and its line to the coast. In order to maintain maximum pressure upon the enemy, the Iranian diversion as originally planned was executed. The Climax The Iranians had increased their brigade Important areas of doubt concerning the viability strength by a battalion group and volunteered of this 'modus operandi' remained. The two most naval and logistic support. Preceded by bom- serious problems were the questionable ability of bardment by three Iranian frigates and air attack the helicopter squadron to maintain the force by Strikemasters, half a battalion flew in to seize thus far forwards and the threat fo PDRY artillery a feature on the coast south of Sherishitti. The near Hauf, which might conceivably prevent operation attracted heavy opposition and cas- consolidation of Government forces in this area. ualties were immediately incurred in close-quar- With regard to this latter factor, for some months ter fighting around the objective. With determina- the Government had been exerting political tion they dug in, supported by the courageous pressure upon the SAF to retaliate against the action of an SAF forward observation party under PDRY because of the latter's continued and ac- Capt Gordon Allen who, having been dropped tive support for the PFLO. Maj Gen Perkins, how- by their helicopter as it traversed the position ever, had resisted on both political and military under fire, were responsible for the co-operation grounds; in the former case because he wished of an artillery, air and naval fire plan. The enemy to limit the conflict (although one suspects that recognized that seizure of Sherishitti would he was here following the policy dictates of Her clearly destroy their last major source of re-sup- Majesty's Government, his ultimate authority) ply, and for several days the object of the Irani- and in the latter because he was doubtful of the ans' attack was subject to heavy artillery fire, ability of aircraft, even when flown by highly rendering all movement above ground extremely skilled and experienced pilots, to destroy well- hazardous. One week later the Frontier Force concealed artillery emplacements in the difficult was sent into action, and in the ensuing three terrain. However, PDRY had itself widened the weeks to 18 November, under the determined conflict by increasing the artillery bombardment, leadership of Lt Col Jonathan Salusbury-Trelaw- and the political reasons in favour of retaliation ney ( a seconded officer from the Coldstream now outweighed those opposed to such a Guards) this force cleared the enemy north of the course. Moreover, the interests of morale de- Wadi Sayq and finally captured Sherishitti, with manded a vigorous military response. It was, its enormous stores of arms and ammunition. In therefore, decided that at first light on 17 Oc- the last week of November Muscat Regiment tober the Hunter squadron, which had been pushed eastwards from Sarfait, leaving only the tasked to support the Iranian diversion on D-Day Darra Ridge, a large feature extending along the minus 4, would be re-directed to military targets coast inland from Dhalqut, to be cleared. in the direction of Hauf, and the 5,5, in and 25-pr guns on Sarfait were ordered to harrass these targets between air attacks. To assist in the in- The end: creased logistic task a naval coaster was or- dered to operate off Sarfait as a re-supply point On 17 October Hauf was subjected to extremely for helicopters. (Capt Philip Brook-Popham was heavy air attack. It covered all known military commander of naval operations). targets as well as the PFLO HQ. It had involved six Hunters with bombs and rockets just after first Brig Akehurst placed Lt Col Ian Christie in im- light and a further strike of four aircraft in the mediate command of the thrust to the sea. Under early afternoon. Attacks were continued over the the latter were a hastily assorted collection of succeeding five weeks, but the enemy made companies from his own battalion, the Frontier good their losses and, reinforced by 122 mm Force and the Southern Regiment. By first light and 130 mm guns, continued to fire at Sarfait

23 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

and the positions around Sherishitti. They intro- units that all operations would be accompanied duced fire and movement and became adept at by firqatiSAS. As a result, intelligence began to utilizing mountainous terrain for concealment flow once again. Ironically, the very area in which and protection. To this extent, Maj Gen Perkins's the adoo were most active was the most easterly, misgivings concerning the military aspects of on the rocky terrain between Tawi Atair and Ea- assaults upon Hauf and its defences (cf. above) gle's Nest where BAn and the firqats had exe- appeared justified. The anti-aircraft defences ac- cuted their very first operation on the jebel (cf. counted for two Hunter aircraft and damaged above). It had been by-passed and left virtually several others. Nevertheless, combined with the untouched by SAF and Government civil recon- infantry assaults and eventual capture of Sheri- struction projects as operations extended grad- shitti, these air attacks led PDRY to re-consider ually westwards. In the west the guns of the its unreserved support for the PFLO. The air PDRY ceased their shelling on 5 March 1976 and strikes were discontinued on 21 November, and the PFLO halted its own bombardment on 30 several weeks after this the PDRY artillery fire April. The firqats, now numbering some 2 500 became minimal. By late November it was ap- men, were placed under the control of the gov- parent that those hard core enemy who had ernment of Dhofar. (These firqats sought to be- neither been killed nor surrendered (91 had sur- come separatist power bases founded on tribal rendered in November, five times the previous groupings, but their faction fighting rendered monthly average for 1975) had either fled to them effectively impotent within a few years). The PDRY or simply abandoned the fight. Dhalqut last SAS squadron finally left Dhofar permanently was the last village in Dhofar to be re-captured, in September 1976, after an uninterrupted pres- on 2 December, and this is the official date for ence in the theatre of six years. During this the end of the war; the Darra ridge was con- period, its strength had never exceeded that of a firmed clear of the enemy on 8 December and on squadron (approximately 80 personnel). Its cas- 11 december the Sultan declared war to be offic- ualties - 12 dead - were relatively heavy in pro- iallyover. portion to its overall strength. In so far as adoo activity continued into 1976, necessitating the Conclusion: continued presence of SAS and firqat teams, The second Omani war presented the dual as- 1976 and not the official date of 2 December pects of both a conventional war and a pro- 1975 is ragarded as the terminal point of this tracted COIN operation. Clearly, the operations second Omani war. Precisely because of its dual of 1975 represented the orthodox military pattern COIN-conventional aspect, the lessons derived of clearly defined assaults upon specific targets, from the Dhofar war are peculiar to each indivi- whilst the operations of 1970-1974 embodied dual dimension of warfare, as well as being com- the COIN dimension of the conflict. The two as- mon to both. They are thus both extensive and pects are, to reiterate, closely related; in so far as complex and, to do them justice, detailed dis- the concerted attacks of 1975 would have been cussion is reserved for a succeeding, final paper (Section B). impossible without the COIN approaches of the preceding four years, which had secured the Eastern Area of Dhofar for Government forces, • S. Monick. SA (Hons). PhD, ALA thereby eliminating the problem of a guerrilla offensive in their rear whilst the conventional ad- vance to the west was in progress. As has also Bibliography: sources referred 10 in Ihe lexl been intimated above, the end of conventional (1) Part 1 was published in militaria 12/3, October 1982. (2) Monick, S. The Five-Act Tradegy: the French in Indo-China, operations did not necessarily imply the cessa- 1946-1954. Militaria 11/2, June 1981, pp 1-12. tion of all guerrilla activity in the east, which (3) Ibid. item (1) above. (4) Quoted by Geraghty, Tony Who Dares Wins: The Story of the SAS continued until 1976 (although, pincered be- 1950-1980. London: Fontana, 1981, p 157. (Originally published tween the firmly established Government forces London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980). (5) Ibid. item (1) above. in the east and west, based on their impene- (6) Lunl, James. tmperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century. trable defensive lines, it was inevitable that the London: Macdonald, 1981. insurgent forces would 'wither on the vine', as (7) Ibid. item (6) above, p 144 (8) Jeapes,Tony. SAS Operation Oman.London: William Kimber, 1980 actually occurred in 1976). In February 1976 (9) Ibid. item (4) above, p 172. BAn teams returned to the Eastern Area, and (10) Ibid. item (4) above, p 175. (11) Ibid. item (4) above, p 174. Akehurst issued an unequivocal order to SAF (12) Ibid. item (1) above.

24 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

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Fig (I) C Wali's fort Attacking adoo waves 1-6 Fort 1st attempted landing zone of helicopter trying to D A Gun pit (25 prj effect casualty evacuation; helicopter driven off by E F Ammunition bay enemy fire. Landing strip (not used) 2nd landing zone of helicopter, which evacuates G B H HQ of SAS BATT team. wounded.

25 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

Situation In Dhofar, January 1975 Fig (II)

A Jibjat G Mugsayl B Sudh H Rayzut C Medinat AI Haq 1 Damavand Line D Eagle's Nest 2 Hammer Line E Tawi Atair 3 Midway road (to Northern Oman) F Tarqa

, :;/10 MILES I IS KILOMETRES

Situation In western areas, September 1975, and final operations Fig (III)

A Main supply complex of insurgents B Garrison of Muscat Regt

26