THE DHOFAR CAMPAIGN 1970-1976 S
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Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za VICTORY IN HADES: THE FORGOTTEN WARS OF THE OMAN 1957-1959 and 1970-1976 PART 2: THE DHOFAR CAMPAIGN 1970-1976 s. Monick* Section A west), a number of important contrasts emerge in a comparison between the two campaigns. First, the underlying pressures impelling the in- surgent forces were of a different nature. In the Similarities and contrasts first war, the paramount factor underlying the During the years 1970-1976 Oman was once insurrection was traditional tribal seperatism (ad- again a theatre of operations in which the Sul- mittedly with the active support of Saudi Arabia tan's forces, supported by pro-Western powers, and Egypt), compounded by the deep rooted succeeded in defeating the insurgent forces friction between religious authority (vested in the seeking to destroy the established power struc- Imam) and secular power (embodied in the Sul- ture of Oman. In many respects, the political tan). configuration of this second war bore many 1 close resemblances to the first . One had, as in However, in the latter conflict, the paramount the first campaign of 1957 -1959, the active mili- influence in the insurgency was Communist sub- tary participation of Britain; in terms of both lead- version (manifested in the insurgent movement ership and the active involvement of British units designated the Popular Front for the Liberation of (including the Special Air Service Regiment - Oman, or PFLO); functioning as an extension of SAS - who, as in the first Omani campaign, were the power of a neighbouring Marxist state (The to playa major role in the war). One also has the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen - same motivation underlying British participation; PDRY). Thus, covert Communist expansionism viz. the determination to retain Oman's crucial was a real and potent factor in this latter conflict. strategic position (centring upon the Musandam The evolution of historical processes is an im- Peninsula, and its control of the Straits of Hor- portant consideration within this context. In muz). Moreover, as in the first Campaign, one 1957 -1959 the practice of insurgency had de- observes the active participation of neighbour- veloped only to a limited extent. The outstanding ing states of the Middle East in support of the illustr.ation of the success attendant upon insur- Sultan; in the war of 1957-1959 these states gency modelled upon Maoist principles was the comprised the Trucial Oman States, to which Vietminh offensive in French Indo-China Britain was closely related via long standing (1946-1954)2. The Communist insurgency in treaty obligations, and whose active military sup- Malaya (1948-1960) was visibly waning, its de- port was manifested in the presence of the Tru- feat inevitable. Similarly with the Hukbalahap cial Oman Scouts (TOS). In the latter Campaign ('Huk') insurgent offensive in the Philippines. of 1970-1976, the support emanated from Jor- However, the 1960's witnessed the emergence dan and Iran. of insurgency as a developed and highly suc- cessful instrument in the destruction of estab- However, within this broad context of parallel lished powers. The success of insurgency as a political configuration, multiple differences be-' political weapon in the ensuing decade was, of tween the two campaigns become apparent. If course, signalled by the success of the Cypriot one disregards the obvious difference of geo- insurgent movement (EO~A) in expelling the graphical emphasis (i.e. the first war of British from Cyprus in 1958-1959. It had tri- 1957 -1959 centred upon the Jebel Akhdar in umphed in expelling the French from Algeria and the north of Oman, whereas the second focused the British from Aden in 1962 and 1967 respecti- upon the province of Dhofar in the far south vely (although, in both instances, due to political 1 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za capitulation rather than military defeat). In South technology characterizing the two campaigns Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia it was of a different order. Especially noteworthy was developing impetus. Thus, the insurgent within this context was the enhanced role of heli- forces in the Dhofar war gained an enormous copters and the sophistication of anti-aircraft momentum from the global precedents of the weaponry (in the form of SAM-7 missiles). preceding decade. A further contrast within the military context was Moreover, the role of Britain, in relation to Oman, that, unlike the war of 1957 -1959, civil develop- was of a very different complexion in 1970-1976 ment of the theatre of operations complemented to what it had been in 1957 -1959. In this second the purely military reaction to the insurgency. Omani war Britain had relinquished all power in With regard to this factor, the role of the SAS the Middle East. Its surrender to Marxist insur- crystallizes the profound contrasts concealed gent forces in Aden in 1967, and consequent within ostensible similarities of military approach. evacuation from South Arabia in the same year, Whereas the SAS performed a crucial role in the had finally signalled Britain's' total abdication of decisive action which resolved the first conflict power in the Arabian Peninsula; a decision con- (i.e. the storming of the summit of the Jebel Akh- firmed by its departure from Bahrain in 1971, dar), in the crucial engagements of 1975 the SAS thus completing her total withdrawal from east of played no major role. The purely military climax Suez. This abdication of power was further mani- of their involvement in this second Omani war fested in the cessation of Britain's treaty obliga- was the siege of Mirbat in 1972, which will be tions with the Trucial Oman States, and the re- discussed below. Throughout the second Cam- placement of this political entity with the United paign the Regiment's participation was of a far Arab Emirates (formed in 1971). Hence, in this more subtle and unorthodox nature than the con- second campaign Great Britain was an intruder, ventional military role - that of specialized moun- so to speak, in the affairs of the Persian Gulf to an tain assault troops - which characterized their extent not apparent in the war of 1957-1959, intervention in the war of 1957 -1959. when her intervention could be justified in terms of her military and political presence in neigh- It should be borne in mind that military and politi- bouring South Arabia (i.e. in terms of her interest cal processes are rarely mutually exclusive; they in maintaining stability within a region in which constantly interact and reinforce one another. she had a powerful vested interest). A further Thus, within the political context Britain's capitu- most important dissimilarity between the two lation to the insurgent forces in South Arabia (the campaigns was that a different Sultan (Oaboos), overtly Marxist National Liberation Front - NFL _ possessing quite different attitudes from his pre- and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied decessor, was in power. South Yemen, or FLOSY; the former of whom captured control of the country) was a necessary The above contrasts abviously relate to the politi- prelude to the projection of the power of the NFL cal configuration of the second Omani war. How- in their newly captured state into neighbouring ever, the military aspect of the war also presents Oman (via Dhofar) in the form of both active very real contrasts. It can with justice be as- support for insurgent forces within Dhofar and, serted that the scale of operations in the Dhofar as the war moved west towards PDRY, direct campaign was far more extensive than in the military intervention by South Yemen. In other Campaign of 1957 -1959. In the first war the key words, it was the British evacuation of South to the defeat of the insurgents resided entirely in Arabia which facilitated the NFL's 'export of revo- the capture of the rebel redoubt of the Jebel lution' into Oman. Similarly, the active policy of Akhdar (the 'Green Mountain'). In the Dhofar civil development, the direct consequence of campaign, however, the issue centred upon the Sultan Oaboos's far more liberal attitUdes, mani- creation of 'cordon sanitaires' across the face of fested itself in the close interrelationship be- the province (the principal examples of which tween military response and civil re-construction were the Hornbeam and Damavand Lines), programmes. within which the insurgent forces could be press- ured and isolated, combined with sweeping ver- tical envelopment manoeuvres. In short, where- as the war of 1957 -1959 was tactical in concep- Approach and organization tion and execution, the key to success in that of The approach and organization of this paper 1970-1976 was conceived and executed pri- merits some comment, as it does not follow an marily in strategic terms. Moreover, the military orthodox pattern. In other words, the most ob- 2 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 12, Nr 4, 1982. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za vious approach - which would be to discuss the facilitates easy movement from one end of the Dhofar campaign in chronological sequence - is jebel to another. In 1970 one could locate barely not pursued. Rather, the salient thematic fea- identifiable airstrips; some from past SAF ope- tures of the Campaign - centring upon the role of rations, and other utilized by civilian oil explora- the SAS in their training and leadership of irregu- tion teams. A prominent feature of the jebel are lar forces and their formulation of a 'hearts and the wadis, which run down to the plain like great minds' campaign - are discussed prior to analy- gashes, and extend for hundreds of yards sis of the actual operations of 1975 which across.