BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY in CYPRUS, ADEN, and NORTHERN IRELAND Brian Drohan a Dissertation Submitted to the Facu
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RIGHTS AT WAR: BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CYPRUS, ADEN, AND NORTHERN IRELAND Brian Drohan A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School. Chapel Hill 2016 Approved by: Susan D. Pennybacker Wayne E. Lee Klaus Larres Cemil Aydin Michael C. Morgan © 2016 Brian Drohan ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Brian Drohan: Rights at War: British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland (Under the direction of Susan D. Pennybacker) This study analyzes the role of human rights activism during three post-1945 British counterinsurgency campaigns in Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden (1963-1967), and the Northern Ireland “Troubles” (emphasizing 1969-1976). Based on material gathered from 15 archives in four countries as well as oral history records and personal papers, this study demonstrates that human rights activism shaped British operational decisions during each of these conflicts. Activists mobilized ideas of human rights to restrain counterinsurgency violence by defining certain British actions as illegal or morally unjustifiable. Although British forces often prevented activists from restraining state violence, activists forced government officials and military commanders to develop new ways of covering up human rights abuses. Focusing the analytical lens on activists and the officials with whom they interacted places rights activists on the counterinsurgency “battlefield” not as traditional arms-bearing combatants, but as actors who nonetheless influenced warfare by shaping military decisions. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………..1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1 Counterinsurgency and the Post-1945 World…………………………………………9 Human Rights in Context…………………………………………………………….15 Rights Activism and “Restraint” in Warfare…………………………………………25 CHAPTER 2: A LAWYERS’ WAR: EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND THE CYPRUS BAR COUNCIL…………………………………………………………….35 Introduction………………………………………………………….……………….35 Enosis and the Cyprus Insurgency…………………………………………………...36 The Emergency Regulations………………………………………………………....41 EOKA’s Lawyers………………………………………………………………….…47 The Bar Council Goes to War………………………………………………………..56 Courting Controversy: The Expanded Emergency Regulations…………………..…63 Harding Under Pressure: “Ill-treatment” and Interrogation…………………….…....74 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..…..82 CHAPTER 3: “THE SHADOW OF STRASBOURG”: INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY AND BRITAIN’S RESPONSE……………………………………...…..…...84 Introduction………………………………………………………………….….…....84 The International Arena………………………………………………….……...…....85 “Human Rights Committees” and the Greek Applications………………….……….89 The “Atrocity Campaign”…………………………………………………….……...94 “Embarrassing Nonsense”: The Sub-Commission Investigation…………….…......101 iv Responding to the “Shadow of Strasbourg”………………………………...….…...105 The Special Investigation Group…………………………………………………....111 The Geunyeli Massacre…………………………………..……………….………...119 “Cold Fury”: The Cutliffe Murder………………………………….……………....128 The Inquest Debate……………………………………………………………….....132 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………......138 CHAPTER 4: “HUNGER WAR”: THE RED CROSS AND THE RADFAN CAMPAIGN……………………………………………………………………………......142 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..…..142 The Middle East Balance of Power and the Threat to Aden……………………......144 Unrest in the Radfan………………………………………………………………...151 Airpower Unleashed…………………………………………………………..….....163 The Refugee Crisis and Britain’s Response .……………………………………….169 Asserting Humanitarian Rights: The ICRC and Amnesty International…………....174 The 1963-64 Aden Detention Controversy…..…………………………………......180 Britain Obstructs the ICRC………………………………………………………....184 Forcing the Issue: The Red Cross Enters Aden……………………………………..190 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..195 CHAPTER 5: “THIS UNHAPPY AFFAIR”: INVESTIGATING TORTURE IN ADEN…………………………………………………………………………………....198 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………198 “An Uncoordinated Mess”: Intelligence in Aden………………………………...…199 Abuse Uncovered…………………………………………………………………...204 Amnesty International’s Intervention……………………………………………….217 The Rastgeldi Mission…………………………………………………………....…222 The Bowen Inquiry…………………………………………………………...……..234 v A Hollow Victory………………………………………………………...…………244 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..…256 CHAPTER 6: “A MORE TALKATIVE PLACE”: NORTHERN IRELAND………...…...259 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..….259 From Civil Rights to Civil War: The Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland………………………………………………………………….…261 Internment and Interrogation……………………………………...………………...270 The Interrogation Inquiries………………………………...……………………..…277 Debating the Troubles………………………………………...…………………….293 Responding to Scrutiny……………………………………………...……………...309 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..318 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………...320 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………320 Human Rights on the Battlefield…………………………………………………....320 Contemporary Conflict and the Moral Challenge of Human Rights………………..329 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………...…………………………………………...338 vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Introduction The United States military expected a quick, “surgical” victory in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but soon encountered what General John Abizaid, much to the chagrin of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, described as a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.” 1 A similar situation emerged in Afghanistan as the Taliban and Al Qaeda regrouped within Pakistani sanctuaries. Military practitioners and policy makers in the United States began to grope for conceptual answers to these unexpected wartime challenges. In their search for solutions, analysts turned to narratives of European counterinsurgency campaigns—especially Britain’s wars of decolonization. Embedded within the legacies of these post-World War II campaigns were a series of assumptions about British counterinsurgency practices and cultural values. These assumptions coalesced around the notion that Britain was more successful in waging counterinsurgency than other imperial powers such as France. During the 1946-54 war in Indochina and the 1954-62 Algerian War, French forces embraced torture to obtain intelligence on insurgent activities and terror to cow civilian populations into submission. But in both conflicts, France suffered ignominious defeats. Likewise, many supporters of the “British approach” to counterinsurgency viewed the American defeat in Vietnam as the result of the United States’ reliance on overwhelming firepower and technological panaceas. 2 These 1 Brian Knowlton. “Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ War,” The New York Times . July 16, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/16/international/worldspecial/16CND-POLI.html. Accessed Feb 27, 2013. 2 For criticism of the “British approach” from within the American defense establishment, see Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York, NY: The New Press, 2013); Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013); “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 2 (2011): 239–57; “Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era—Reflections on Historians and the 1 failures contrasted neatly with supposed British successes. Supporters of this view claimed that British forces’ counterinsurgency prowess derived from the British army’s military culture, including the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and effectively operate in a decentralized manner. Furthermore, proponents of British exceptionalism insisted that Britain succeeded by using methods that aligned with liberal democratic values. According to this view, British forces succeeded because they achieved a kind of moral legitimacy. They won the “hearts and minds” of civilian populations by obeying the “rule of law” and using the minimum amount of force necessary against insurgents. Proponents of this narrative believed that unlike the French, British forces existed to protect, rather than harm, non-combatants. 3 This idealized image of past British victories proved particularly compelling for American policymakers because it appeared to offer a solution that was not only effective, but also aligned with American liberal democratic ideals and contemporary international human rights norms. In December 2006, the United States military released Field Manual 3- 24: Counterinsurgency , which wholeheartedly embraced the idea that Britain’s counterinsurgency approach was both effective and moral. The manual generated instant fanfare and unprecedented attention. Pundits immediately hailed the new manual as “ground- breaking” and “paradigm-shattering.” 4 Initially issued as a government document, the manual was downloaded 1.5 million times in the first month after public release. Within a year the GWOT,” Journal of Military History 70, no. 4 (2006): 1065–79; and James Wirtz, “The ‘Unlessons’ of Vietnam,” Defense Analysis 17, no. 1 (2001): 41–57. 3 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Cassidy asserts that British military culture was particularly well-suited to the demands of counterinsurgency.