Paper Prepared for JIIA-IFRI Annual Conference

November 28-29, 2002

Crisis Revisited? ――North Korean Nuclear Challenge and Security in Northeast Asia Ken Jimbo The Japan Institute of International Affairs

New Challenge on Nuclear Issue All of sudden, North Korea has acknowledged its nuclear development program by uranium enrichment in negotiation with the US in early October. It was the first time that North Korea officially acknowledged that they have continued the nuclear program after signing of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994. It constitutes not only the violation of the Agreed Framework, but also the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement, North-South Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula effectuated in 1992. North Korea’s uranium enrichment program also challenges the “Pyongyang Declaration” that Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-il signed at the Japan-North Korea Summit on September 17, on which both sides confirmed that they would “comply with all related international agreements.” With the bulk of the stability in Korean Peninsula has rested with its implementation of the Agreed Framework for almost a decade, the DPRK’s sudden recognition of its nuclear development has fallen into a stage where the prospect for peaceful negotiation with the US, South Korea, and Japan become in deep perplexity. North Korea’s nuclear program, aside from their self-revelation, has long been suspected to be continuing after signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. The US intelligence has estimated that North Korea acquires at least one or two nuclear weapons using plutonium produced before 1992. The latest CIA analysis, however, also added that the DPRK is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational, which could be as soon as mid-decade1. If the DPRK continues the production of plutonium, under their recognition

1 “CIA says North Korea could Produce More Nuclear Arms,” Reuters, November 22, 17:22 ET. that the Agreed Framework is now “nullified,” the reprocessing spent reactor fuel in storage at Yongbyon could recover enough plutonium for several more weapons.

Three Different Views on North Korea’s Intentions North Korea’s intention behind their self-confession of nuclear weapons development program is still an open question. The core of the question that puzzles the analysts is, why North Korea has virtually abandoned (or may have not from its point of view) their policy line of broader cooperation and “reform” that it had pursued since early 2000. Pyongyang carried out several diplomatic initiatives that began with the normalization of relation with European Union member-states in 2000-2001, followed by a summit with the South Korea in June 2000, North Korean special envoy Gen. Myongnok Jo’s visit to Washington in August 2000, Secretary Albright’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2000, and a summit with Japan in September 2002. North Korea also pursued their domestic economic reforms, although limited in its scale, by introducing “economic trade zone” for foreign investment in Rajing-Sonbong since 1992, and more drastic reform including the abandonment of rationing system and rising of the fixed price and income level since July 2002. Diplomatic relations with China and Russia have also intensified since 2000, with having Kim Jong-il’s two visits to China and Russia. The important premise to note is that, these cooperative diplomatic/economic lines could have only developed through the international community’s recognition that North Korea abides by the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Normalizations with key western states have been possible with the premise of North Korea’s subordination to the rule of law. Thus the question deepens with the clear consequence that the North Korea’s nuclear program spoils all the effort that it had taken since 2000. The confession proved that the international community has to deal with re-defined North Korea, the actor that did not keep pledges. What North Korea has lost here, is the proponent of ‘engagement’ in the US, South Korea and Japan who have tried to believe that North Korea’s cooperative attitude. Now, the foreign policies toward North might be more influenced by the people who have little faith in the ultimate success of engagement. Further, the back to the future

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20021122/wl_nm/korea_usa_nuclea r_dc_1 scenario, with the reminiscence of the nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 will possibly become the roadmap to follow. What, then, is the rationale, if there is, for North Korea to take this sudden admission? The central argument of engagement proponent is that Kim Jong-il’s recent policy initiatives －from the economic “reforms” to the diplomatic confessions－are all an indication of North Korea’s desire to change. Pyongyang’s admission of its abduction of Japanese citizens as well as its nuclear program, according to this line of analysis, indicated that North Korea is finally ready to break with its rogue past and to come to be a credible actor in the international community. Even under the situation that the North Korea has admitted the nuclear program, engagement is the only path for the breakthrough. Engagement in the form of normalized relations, economic carrots, and mutual threat reduction will ease Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity, allowing it to move away from proliferation and toward reform. The government of South Korea tends to take this approach. While Seoul has called for immediate North Korean compliance with its nuclear agreements, the Kim administration has a tendency to want to continually lower the bar for the North. There has been a no sign from North Korea, however, taking “confess, apologize, and negotiate” approach which paralleled with the abduction issue against Japan. North Korea repeatedly argues that it is the US aggressive foreign policy that forced North Korea to ‘nullify’ the Agreed Framework. In their view, the Agreed Framework has not been fulfilled by the US, given that the delay of light water reactor construction process. Judging from the North Korea’s behavior of past one month, North Korea clearly not become apologetic and try to give up its nuclear program unilaterally, and to resume the status where the 1994 Agreed Framework had ensured. Another camp of analysis argues that North Korea has re-started to play a “nuclear card” against the US. North Korea has reportedly made a counteroffer in exchange for the abandonment of the uranium enrichment program. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of North Korea specified three condition while seeking a ‘negotiated settlement’ of the nuclear issue: “First, the US recognizes the DPRK’s sovereignty, second, it assures t of non-aggression, and third, the US does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK.” According to James Kelly, an assistant Secretary of State Department, envoy to North Korea, in press conference on October 19, he confirmed during the meeting with North Koreans that it has suggested the three conditions for giving up its nuclear program; the United States guarantees not to make a preemptive attack; agrees to recognize North Korean government; and sign the peace treaty with North Korea. At the core of these North Korean deals is to ensure the political/economic survivability of the regime by signing of non-aggression/peace treaty with the US. Although the US emphasized that it would pursue peaceful resolution of this situation, there have been no signs of entering the negotiation by receiving the deal that North Korea is offering. Instead, Washington has demanded, “complete and visible dismantling” of its efforts to process uranium into nuclear weapons fuel in a verifiable manner. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Council has decided, on November 18, that to freeze supplying heavy fuel oils from December, while allowing the current November shipment. Meanwhile, Pyongyang also signaled to take counter-measures to the US, however in a low-profile manner. Pyongyang has barred international inspectors from checking aid deliveries as a response to the KEDO decisions as well as banning of using the US currency. In the worst case scenario, the “Nuclear card” approach could suddenly turn into crisis, if 1) North Korea expels the IAEA, evict inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear site, 2) declare its withdrawal from the NPT, 3) resume construction of two nuclear reactors that it gave up under the Agreed Framework, 4) fire missiles, and 5) extract fuel rods from sealed containers in Yongbyon to demonstrate its stance of manufacturing plutonium. There seems that both sides are trying to take a firm position to avoid themselves unilaterally concealed. The third school thinks that North Korea ultimately try to establish firmer deterrence with its nuclear capability against the US military intervention, especially when the ‘nuclear card’ deal with the US seem to be unsuccessful. North Korea needed to show the potentiality of their military might, especially where the US military operation against Iraq has been a very credible option to be taken. In North Korea’s spokesman’s statement, he exhibits grave concern that North Korea might be the next target after the US attack on Iraq. He says, “the Bush administration listed the DPRK as part of ‘axis of evil’ and a target of the US preemptive nuclear strikes. This was a clear declaration of a war against the DPRK… the Bush administration has adopted it as its policy to make a preemptive nuclear strike at the DPRK.” This recognition of fear, led them offer series of blackmail sent to the US. The spokesman of the North Korea implicitly recognized that Pyongyang had a new nuclear program and the one beyond, saying, “the DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy (James Kelly) of the US President that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful that that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the US.”

The US Policy toward North Korea: “Hawk Engagement” No matter which of these three hypotheses would best describe the North Korea’s intention, the approach that the Bush administration seems to take is very solid. Victor Cha, a professor at George Washington University, calls it as a “Hawk Engagement”, has best characterized this approach. 2 According to Cha, the US policy must be made available presumably based on some assumptions with regard to North Korean intentions, however, there are skeptics that the US and South Korea would be ill-advised at present to posit major change in North Korea’s intentions. However, such skepticism does not preclude engagement as the chosen policy by Washington and Seoul. On the contrary, for reasons having to do with the changing nature of the North Korean threat since the end of the Cold War, “the appropriate policy even for ‘hawks’ on North Korea remains engagement.” Three conceptual points substantiate the Cha’s argument. First, deterrence and robust defense capabilities (i.e., containment) remain

the cornerstone of US-ROK-Japan security on the Korean peninsula, and these will

remain integral to any new policy vis-à-vis North Korea. The policy choice is therefore

not between containment and some other policy, but how this military capability should

be complemented diplomatically.

Second, there is a "hawk" rationale for engagement. In short, hawks should

engage Pyongyang not because the regime is crazy, near-collapse, or misunderstood,

but because engagement avoids the crystallization of conditions under which

Pyongyang could calculate violence as a "rational" course of action even if victory were

impossible. In this sense, engagement is a form of preventive defense -- actions taken

2 Victor Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security, Vol.27, No.1, (Summer 2002). by the United States, Japan and South Korea to prevent the emergence of a status quo

so unbearable to North Korea that Pyongyang calculates hostility as rational in spite of

an objective military balance unfavorable to the regime.

Third, engagement remains the "default" policy on the peninsula. Many

hardliners may view the preventive defense rationale for engagement as

window-dressing for appeasing a morally reprehensible regime for lack of a clear

alternative, and without a responsible "exit" strategy. Cha makes a number of

sub-arguments as to why engagement, while gaining a window on the degree of

change in DPRK intentions, is also simultaneously laying the groundwork for

punishment if necessary. In this sense, engagement is not in lieu of, but comprises the

exit strategy. In other words, the “Hawk Engagement” is the diplomacy, which the US never backs away from the principle by splitting the each agenda for negotiation that let North Korea to play a survival strategy without changing its nature. This reflects the basic line of philosophy led by the ‘Perry Process’ in 1997, but more strict, improved and verifiable manner. This is why Bush administration declared to take `comprehensive approach` in his statement on June 13, 20013. The approach to include: 1) improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea’s nuclear activities; 2) verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and 3) a less threatening conventional military posture, in a comprehensive manner.

North Korea and Iraq: The US approaches to two ‘axis’ compared Even revealing the fact that North Korea continued its nuclear program, the initial response that Washington took was to pursue `peaceful resolution.` Many have argued the contrast of the US approaches toward North Korea with Iraq, where military option to overthrow the regime is a serious agenda. In the viewpoint of military hardware, the situation in North Korea is certainly more serious than that of Iraq. North Korea is estimated to possess one or two nuclear weapon, and now declare that it has continued the nuclear development. North Korea also implied that they possess chemical and biological

3 For June 2001 policy review, see “Statement by the President,” June 13, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html. weapons. North Korea deploys about 100 No-dong missiles that can target most of Japan and the US forward deployed forces. All of these statuses are more serious and urgent than these of Iraq. Then, why is the approach so different? Michael McDevitt, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the CNA Corporation, answers simply that the realities in each case are very different, especially with regard to their geostrategic circumstances4. McDevitt argues that “Iraqi military power is essentially hemmed into the middle of that country, kept away from our allies Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia through constant, armed U.S. and UK combat air patrols that enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.” This air supremacy over much of Iraq creates de facto no offensive military operations zones, since any sign of offensive operations could be immediately attacked from the air. Thus, “Iraq cannot easily lash out and attack its neighbors, whereas military ways and means are very much available to the U.S. and its allies.” In contrast, “the U.S. and allied aircraft don't venture into North Korean airspace. Unlike its Iraqi counterpart, the North Korean army is forward deployed and very close to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) it shares with the Republic of Korea, which means Pyongyang could launch an assault with very little warning. Seoul, the ROK capital, is so close to the DMZ that North Korean artillery can bombard the city, even without launching an all-out attack. While the U.S. and South Korean army have deterred a North Korean attack for 50 years, the ability of North Korea to impose politically unacceptable damage on South Korea has effectively taken military ways off the table, even though the means are available. It is not likely that any government in Seoul would agree to even surgical strikes because they could easily trigger a second Korean War.” McDevitt also argues that the geography also plays a role when considering the utility of economic ways in forcing North Korea to disarm. “North Korea shares a long border with China. Trying to economically isolate North Korea can only be accomplished if China agrees to close this frontier. This is not likely since a cut-off of Chinese economic assistance along with international sanctions could bring about the implosion of the Pyongyang regime, or a desperate North Korean military roll of the dice leading to war.

4 Michael McDevitt, “Iraq and North Korea: Disarmament vs. Deterrence” PacNet 48, available at the website of the Pacific Forum/CSIS, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0248.htm Beijing considers it more important to avoid either of these scenarios than removing WMD from North Korean hands. In the case of Iraq, the UN itself over the last decade has allowed the economic instrument of sanctions to become so eviscerated that economic tools are no longer a credible way to force disarmament.” What tells us here is that the presumption that North Korea is playing the ‘nuclear card’ because they know that the US administration is now focusing the Iraq operation, is not enough. The more serious distinction between North Korea and Iraq is, to seize the fact that Seoul is a geographically a critical hostage, and much more credible than the location of Israel from Iraq, in the negotiation with the US. It could be said, in theory, that the US need more coercive approach against North Korea than to Iraq, if North Korea military hard-liner tend to think that it has a capability to deter, dissuade the US intervention in the Peninsula.

The Role of Japan in the US-South Korea-Japan Trilateral Relations The Pyongyang Declaration, signed by Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il on September 17, states, while having agreed (“decided”) to resume the Japan DPRK normalization talks, “Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.” The resumed talks in KL, the 12th meeting since 1991, proceeded in a tense mood as Tokyo had toughed its position, caused by two factors, one, the hardening of the Japanese public opinion related to the government’s handling of abduction issues and the revelation of the North Korean nuclear enrichment program. The talks agreed to have a security meeting in November and also discussed a possibility of the second talks towards the end of November. However, as of this writing no dates are announced for either meeting. The government of Japan will now necessarily move only slowly in their talks. And no substantial movement is possible without resolution of these two hard-core issues, abduction and nuclear issues. Now the DPRK’s strategy to achieve a breakthrough in the Japanese avenue in order to counter the Axis of Evil pressures seems to have been dashed. North Korea reacted to this new development by saying the 1994 Agreed Framework was now nullified and by proposing a non-aggression agreement with the US. The US insisted that DPRK must dismantle the program first, before any talks occur. It also hinted that the Framework was no longer valid, meaning it would be no longer obligated to provide heavy oil. In spite of these, the Framework had better be kept alive, because a formal sanction of nullification would set DPRK completely free in their nuclear activities and such a situation would not be one we want. It would be more advantageous to keep it alive at least legally, putting aside whether reactor construction or heavy oil assistance would continue as before. Now one thing is crucial. It is more than ever important for Japan, the US and ROK closely coordinate its positions and policies. In this respect, the Trilateral Coordination Group (TCOG), which most recently met in Tokyo on November 9, will continue to provide a central liaison. The Bush Administration will maintain a very hard position, short of seeking a military option or moving this to the UNSC while giving a priority to Iraq for the time being. And in ROK whoever elected in December, he will likely to take a harder line than President Kim Dae Jung. What is important for the US-Japan-ROK is to clearly spell out jointly the preconditions for resumption of US-DPRK dialogue5: a declared halt to the North’s nuclear weapons programs, followed by an invitation to the IAEA to begin the long awaited verification inspections at Yongbyon and to inspect the new suspected uranium enrichment facilities identified by Washington. The trilateral coordination must be made to get North Korea to understand that there are scarcely the place to play a game and for saber rattling under the “hawk engagement” and the US-Japan-ROK coordination.

5 Ralph Cossa, “Déjà vu All Over Again?” PacNet 45A, available at the website of the Pacific Forum/CSIS, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0245A.htm