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South Korea's Candlelight Revolution and the Future of the Korean

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South Korea's Candlelight Revolution and the Future of the Korean The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 16 | Issue 23 | Number 3 | Dec 01, 2018 South Korea’s Candlelight Revolution and the Future of the Korean Peninsula Nak-chung Paik Opening remarks The year 2018 has witnessed extraordinary changes in the Korean peninsula.1 So many, in fact, that the initial amazement may have worn off a little, and discontent with the pace of change may have set in. But even a brief recapitulation of major occurrences will remind us what an amazing year it has been. The year began with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s New Year Address in which he Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump at the promised DPRK participation in the Singapore summit PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and proposed a new beginning in inter-Korean relations. North Korean athletes and artists did The US-DPRK summit in Singapore on June 12, come to the Games, along with a high-level the first ever between the two countries, was official delegation that met with President another historic breakthrough. In their Joint Statement the two leaders promised to work for Moon Jae-in and other important South Korean a new relationship between the hitherto hostile officials. But a truly historic breakthrough countries, while Chairman Kim reaffirmed his occurred at the April 27 meeting of the two commitment to full denuclearization. I shall leaders in Panmunjom, producing the come back later to the meaning of the Panmunjom Declaration, which promised a Singapore agreement, but I should note that drastic improvement in North-South relations between the first Moon-Kim meeting and the and full denuclearization of the Korean Singapore summit a second inter-Korean peninsula. The meeting, though filled with summit occurred in Panmunjom in May, after dramatic moments, was more business-like Trump suddenly canceled the scheduled than the two previous inter-Korean summits (of Singapore meeting. The two Korean leaders 2000 and 2007), yet the informal and business- met, quite business-like and unannounced, for like atmosphere, with live television coverage an emergency consultation to get the of much of the event, had an even greater negotiation process moving again. impact on popular consciousness in South Korea and abroad. This was presumably the While progress in US-DPRK relations has been case in North Korea too, though without live limited—though stopping joint US-ROK military coverage there, viewers received only an ample exercises must mean a lot more to the DPRK broadcast of taped scenes. than they publicly 1 APJ | JF 16 | 23 | 3 acknowledge—unprecedented events have continued to transpire between two Koreas. The opening of the Joint Liaison Office in Kaesung in September must be counted a landmark: not only do the two Koreas now have a venue for daily official contact, but the very notion of a ‘joint’ office (located in the same building), rather than respective liaison offices of North and South, implied a commitment to a partnership evolving toward something more than mere coexistence. Kim Jung Un and Moon Jae-in at Mt Paektu President Moon’s visit to Pyongyang on September 18, 2018 for his third summit with Chairman Kim was another historic occasion. While in North Korea, President Moon broke Particularly noteworthy was the fact that an precedent again when he spoke to some ‘Agreement on the Implementation of the 150,000 Pyongyang citizens, and the two leaders went to the Paektu Mountain (a place Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military charged with symbolic and emotional meaning Domain’ was signed as an annex to the for the Korean people) and enacted dramatic Pyongyang Declaration, which soon led to some scenes of friendship and mutual trust. Whether unprecedented changes in the conflict-prone Mr. Trump or any other foreign leader can peninsula. The return of the Joint Security Area actually reverse, rather than merely slow down, (JSA) in Panmunjom to a genuinely shared zone the momentum produced by the Pyongyang (i.e. without the demarcation line that Moon summit and its aftermaths is a subject of and Kim crossed both ways on April 27, to the reflection that this paper proposes to huge delight of millions of Korean viewers) was undertake. not strictly unprecedented but rather a return to the status quo ante of 1976. On the other While awaiting future developments, including hand, the removal of guard posts and land Chairman Kim’s return visit to Seoul (agreed to mines within the highly militarizedfor this year but with possibility of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) represents apostponement) and the announced but not yet reversal of a process that began soon after the definitely scheduled second meeting between Armistice Agreement in 1953. The joint survey Trump and Kim, I would like to raise a few work in the Han and Imjin River estuary is also points of a somewhat theoretical nature for the something entirely new under the 65-year old sake of greater intellectual clarity. armistice regime. The latest news as I write is First, current changes in the peninsula cannot that on November 29, South Korea sent a train be adequately grasped without taking into for the first time in a decade—actually the first account the crucial role of South Korea’s ever since the Korean War, as this time it will Candlelight Revolution. This in turn assumes travel beyond Kaesong all the way to Sinuiju, that the Candlelight Revolution does indeed the city facing Dandong, China across the Yalu add up to a real revolution—a point that River, and later to a riverside station near the obviously calls for sober analysis and open- Russian border. The purpose is to conduct joint minded reflection. surveys in preparation for reconnecting the rail lines between the two Koreas.2 Secondly, adequate consideration of the 2 APJ | JF 16 | 23 | 3 foregoing proposition would entail anGeun-hye was impeached by the National understanding of what I have called Korea’s Assembly in December 2016 and then removed ‘division system’ and of its role as part of the from office by ruling of the Constitutional Court reigning world-system.3 in March 2017. In the ensuing election the main opposition candidate Moon Jae-in was I shall then return to the current situation and elected and took office in May. Whatever suggest possible ways to further advance the factors have gone into the making of the changes in the peninsula and bring them to extraordinary changes in the Korean peninsula their full world-historical significance. in 2018, the presence of a South Korean government espousing peace and democracy should be counted one of the most important. Candlelight demonstrations of 2016-17 The demonstrations were so extraordinary in and their aftermath size and tenacity and so remarkable in their peaceful, spontaneous and orderly qualities that from early on many participants in and celebrators of the events applied the term ‘revolution’. Those very qualities, however, could be cited as features that diverge from a real revolution. Moreover, the removal of the incumbent president and subsequent coming into office of a new one all took place within the existing constitutional and legal framework. Identification of the demonstrations with candlelight revolution as such would also be inadequate from quite the opposite viewpoint: that is, unless the series of demonstrations Downtown Seoul in Candlelight (also called ch’otpul hangjaeng, ‘candlelight demonstration 2016 resistance movement’) are perceived as only the initial phase of an ongoing revolution, their revolutionary impact would be limited to the The series of candlelight demonstrations in launching of a new government and the South Korea between late October 2016 and ensuing reform measures. Against this view, early March 2017 have received considerable there are also scholars who argue that, since media attention outside Korea as well, and I do the demonstrations themselves did not add up not intend to report on them in detail. Some 17 to a real revolution, it is up to the new million people in all participated, according to government to carry out a revolution.4 That, the People’s Action against President Park however, would be a forlorn hope indeed, for if Geun-hye, a loose coalition of civic groups that the demonstrations did not already possess a managed the logistics of weekly events. At a revolutionary élan, no constitutionally elected peak point in early December more than two government could initiate a revolution so late million people reportedly came out nationwide. in the day. The demonstrations for all their lack of organized leadership were entirely peaceful A more satisfactory approach would thus call and orderly, full of festive humor andfor an examination of the precise nature of the innovative actions. In the upshot President Park revolutionary élan in the candlelight 3 APJ | JF 16 | 23 | 3 demonstrations and of how, if at all, that élan inter-Korean confrontation. I have called this a has been extended into the new regime and ‘hidden constitution’5, which reached a new into North-South relations. Here I must first high of virulence under Lee Myung-bak and note that the interim period between the Park Geun-hye, at last prompting citizens to dismissal of Park Geun-hye and election of rise up to suspend, though not yet fully Moon Jae-in represented a special phase of its abrogate, that hidden constitution and punish own. Moon did win handily (though not the perpetrators. In that sense, the candlelight overwhelmingly) with 41% of the vote in a four- demonstrations accomplished, or at least part race. But the fact that the campaign had to initiated, “a more essential revolution that be conducted within the existing constitutional changed a country where constitutions were and legal framework severely hampered the not observed into one where they were.”6 revolutionary fervor of candlelight citizens.
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