North Korea: a Phased Negotiation Strategy
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NORTH KOREA: A PHASED NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 1 August 2003 ICG Asia Report N°61 Washington/Brussels 1 August 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1 I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2 II. THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME.............................................................................. 2 A. THE “DEAR LEADER” ...........................................................................................................2 B. MILITARY POSTURE ..............................................................................................................2 C. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE....................................................................................................3 D. HUMAN RIGHTS ....................................................................................................................3 III. KOREA’S NUCLEAR ROGRAM: EARLY HISTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK............................................................. 4 A. SOVIET ASSISTANCE .............................................................................................................4 B. THE NPT AND IAEA ............................................................................................................5 C. THE 1991 DENUCLEARISATION DECLARATION .....................................................................6 IV. THE FIRST BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1989-1993)............................................... 6 V. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1993-2001).................................................... 7 A. THE 1993-94 CRISIS .............................................................................................................7 B. THE AGREED FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................................8 C. THE PERRY REPORT AND AFTERMATH..................................................................................9 D. AGREED FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION: A REPORT CARD .................................................9 1. The United States and KEDO....................................................................................9 2. The DPRK ...............................................................................................................10 VI. THE CURRENT BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2001-)............................................. 12 A. THE NORTH KOREA POLICY REVIEW ..................................................................................12 B. THE OCTOBER 2002 MEETING AND ITS AFTERMATH...........................................................12 C. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS.............................................................................................13 VII. REGIONAL POSITIONS............................................................................................ 14 A. SOUTH KOREA ....................................................................................................................15 B. JAPAN .................................................................................................................................16 C. CHINA.................................................................................................................................17 D. RUSSIA ...............................................................................................................................18 VIII. KEY UNCERTAINTIES ............................................................................................. 19 A. DPRK CAPABILITIES ..........................................................................................................19 1. How Much Existing Fissile Material? .....................................................................19 2. How Much Potential Fissile Material? ....................................................................20 B. DPRK INTENTIONS.............................................................................................................21 IX. POLICY OPTIONS...................................................................................................... 21 OPTION 1: ACQUIESCENCE AND WITHDRAWAL.............................................................................22 OPTION 2: RECIPROCAL INDEPENDENT RESTRAINT.......................................................................22 OPTION 3: NEGOTIATION ..............................................................................................................23 1. What Does the United States Want?........................................................................23 2. What Does the DPRK Want?...................................................................................23 3. Negotiation Challenges............................................................................................23 OPTION 4: COERCION SHORT OF MILITARY FORCE .......................................................................25 OPTION 5: MILITARY FORCE.........................................................................................................28 1. Limited Pre-emption................................................................................................28 2. Regime Change........................................................................................................28 X. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 29 SEVEN WORKING ASSUMPTIONS...................................................................................................29 A PHASED APPROACH...................................................................................................................30 Phase I: Conditional Security Assurance...........................................................................30 Phase II: Time-Limited Negotiations ................................................................................31 Phase III: Sanctions ...........................................................................................................31 Phase IV: Use of Military Force........................................................................................32 THE CASE FOR DIPLOMACY ..........................................................................................................32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA .......................................................................................34 B. TEXT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................35 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................38 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................39 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................45 ICG Asia Report N°61 1 August 2003 NORTH KOREA: A PHASED NEGOTIATION STRATEGY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Time is slipping away for a peaceful resolution of may have constructed. U.S. intelligence believed it the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. may have had two by the early 1990s; North Korea now says it has material to make six and intends to North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non- move quickly to do so. It is unclear whether such Proliferation Treaty and pulled out of the 1994 weapons are or would be small enough to be Agreed Framework, a plan to provide it with delivered on missiles or planes. It is uncertain how energy in exchange for abandoning its nuclear much more fissile material it could obtain from weapons ambitions. It has restarted its plutonium Yongbyon, or some other possible reprocessing generating nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and now plant, or how much it has or can obtain from claims to have such weapons. Even if this claim is enriching uranium. And nobody knows whether not true and is being made to push the United North Korea is truly willing to negotiate away its States into negotiations, the situation is extremely weapons or has decided that it must have a nuclear dangerous. North Korea has the materials and the deterrent to ensure its survival. capability to develop nuclear weapons – more than 200 of them by 2010. A nuclear-armed North These uncertainties make it extremely difficult for Korea could threaten its neighbours and could the United States – and the key regional countries export weapons, nuclear material or technology to with which it needs to act in concert – to come up other countries or terrorist groups. Even if it with a policy response to North Korea’s program. refrained from actively proliferating weapons, its The full range of available options is discussed in possession of them could spark a nuclear arms race this paper: some are more realistic than others but in Northeast Asia. all have major disadvantages: Pyongyang says it needs a nuclear deterrent because it North Korea could just be accepted as a feels threatened by the United States. North Korean nuclear power, as others have been, but the officials also say they will negotiate them away in dangers of this appear unacceptably high. exchange for security guarantees and economic aid. The administration of President George W. Bush has The current situation could be