Naval War College Review Volume 71 Article 15 Number 3 Summer

2018 The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, vol. 1, From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964, and vol. 2, The Labour Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–1970 Myron A. Greenberg

Matthew onesJ

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation Greenberg, Myron A. and Jones, Matthew (2018) "The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, vol. 1, From the V- Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964, and vol. 2, The Labour Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–1970," Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 3 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Greenberg and Jones: The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, vol. BOOK REVIEWS 155

In telling the fascinating story of to hitherto unavailable materials DesRon 21 and its crew, Wukovits to produce this official history. demonstrates without a doubt that, as At the beginning of both volumes, a scholar and historian, he rivals such Professor Jones graciously pays tribute to naval historians of the Pacific theater the pioneers of British nuclear historiog- as James Hornfischer and Samuel raphy, Professor Margaret Gowing and Eliot Morison. The book might have her associate Lorna Arnold. Gowing, included more maps to ensure correct official historian of the United Kingdom and continued orientation to the (U .K.) Atomic Energy Authority and events, places, movements, and battles professor of the history of science at it describes. Nonetheless, Wukovits has Oxford, authored the studies that set the compiled an excellent study of DesRon scholarly standard: Britain and Atomic 21, one that is demonstrably the product Energy, 1939–1945 and, a decade later, of lengthy research into wartime naval her two-volume Independence and records; academic research; and personal Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, oral interviews with those DesRon 21 1945–1952. Arnold assisted Gowing, crewmembers still living, which bring then in 2001 published her own book, an intimate and personal quality to Britain and the H-bomb. Jones’s two this historical study. In sum, Tin Can new volumes are worthy sequels. Titans unquestionably is a must-have America’s initial monopoly over the addition for any armchair World War II atomic bomb fed the British sense of history buff or student of naval history. technological exclusion. Determined BLAKE I. CAMPBELL then to “go it alone,” Britain asserted an initial nuclear doctrine of sovereign and independent control over its nuclear weapons. It was only after Britain had demonstrated a unilateral mastery of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear thermonuclear weapons development Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 1, From the V- in May 1957 that the United Kingdom Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964. was granted access to specific U.S. London: Routledge, 2017. 547 pages. $155. nuclear weapons technologies. For The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Jones, the ensuing 1958 U.S.-U.K. Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 2, The Labour mutual-defense agreement remains Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964– 1970. London: Routledge, 2017. 559 pages. $155. “one of the most remarkable examples of pooling of sensitive national security No inquiry into British nuclear his- information by two sovereign states, tory can be undertaken in isolation and has rightly been seen as one of the from the presence of an intimate U.S. fundamental pillars of the post-war involvement. It therefore is worth Anglo-American relationship.” taking notice of the publication of the The United Kingdom’s capacity to two-volume Official History of the UK inflict assured nuclear destruction, Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Matthew independent of the United States, Jones, professor of international history allowed it to behave as a “second centre at the London School of Economics, of decision.” In this position, Britain was granted unprecedented access

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018 1

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 155 5/1/18 11:11 AM 156 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 15

secured the ability not only to “leverage” a semblance of qualitative nuclear the United States politically but also parity with the United States. to command a seat at the geostrategic In the wake of the U.S. shift to the “top table.” Jones presents the Skybolt Poseidon’s advanced technology of missile crisis of 1962 as an example of the multiple independently targetable this nuclear-based political leverage over reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under the United States. Aiming at updating Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United exploitation of an intermediate technol- States promised delivery of the Skybolt ogy, Antelope, that the United States had system. A nuclear, standoff, air-to- developed but later abandoned in favor ground missile, Skybolt was designed to of MIRVs. The climax of the U.K. Polaris penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of Improvement Program was reached with an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile Chevaline, a unique configurational (ABM) capability. When President change to alter the front end of the Kennedy abruptly canceled the agree- Polaris missile, thereby rendering it ment in November 1962, he did so all but invulnerable to interception by ostensibly on technical grounds. In truth, deployed Soviet ABMs. But the history the United States opposed, on political of that program will have to await the grounds, any extension to the life of the projected third volume in this series. U .K. nuclear deterrent. Seeing through Meantime, Professor Jones has this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan written an excellent description of was instrumental in resolving the crisis Britain’s quest for a sovereign and at the Nassau conference in December independent strategic nuclear deterrent. 1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy Completely mastering his sources, on its own petard. The United States Jones has produced a compelling work was forced to concede the nature of of lasting significance. He has come its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and full circle, following in the footsteps instead to offer a replacement—which of his larger-than-life role models, paradoxically became Britain’s second- Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold. generation nuclear deterrent: the Polaris missile system. Not only had Britain’s MYRON A. GREENBERG first-generation deterrent not been curbed, but the United States in fact had become father to a second generation. Volume 2 brings with it the advent of a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Wilson and the Labour Party. The Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris necessity for a Polaris Improvement Fussell . New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 290 Program takes center stage in this pages. $29.95. volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile During the years he spent hunting was becoming obsolescent, just as the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling second-generation Polaris system was the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets coming on line. There is a fascinating and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy McChrystal turned the Joint Special at work in the constant race to maintain

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/15 2

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 156 5/1/18 11:11 AM