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The Fallacy of Nuclear Deterrence

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THE FALLACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE LCol J.P.P. Ouellet JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT THE FALLACY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE LCol J.P.P. Ouellet “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 5410 Compte de mots : 5410 1 Introduction Conflicts have been a common occurrence throughout human history and it seems as if they are more present now than ever. They are nonetheless a simple yet cruel expression of human behavior and the clash between ideas and convictions. If one accepts as a basic premise that conflicts are the result of unreconciled wills, then it is worth analyzing when conflicts occur, or do not. As a matter of fact, the absence of an open conflict is not, in itself, representative of the absence of a conflict. It may simply be the symptom of something intangible and lying under the apparent serene surface. The twentieth century has seen the apparition of modern weaponry, most of which was not even though of only a few years before they were invented. The ones that stand above all are certainly nuclear weapons. With them came a new modern day theory called nuclear deterrence. It is not because they haven’t been used since the end of World War II (WWII) that they are a testament to peace and prosperity. Nuclear deterrence, some claim, is responsible for the absence of a major state on state conflict with the possible outcome being the end of humanity altogether. There is however another way to look at nuclear deterrence and argue that it isn’t the only reason why no major conflict has occurred.1 It could even be argued that nuclear deterrence as a concept is an empty shell since no state would rationally use them in a quest for world dominance when there will simply be no world left to dominate. Hence, the thesis of this paper is that nuclear deterrence is a fallacy that provides a false sense of security. A fallacy being defined by the use of invalid and poor logic to prove an argument (even though the argument may appear to be correct when in fact it isn’t). 1 For the purpose of this paper, a major conflict will be defined as one between nuclear armed states. 2 [2][3][4] This paper will begin by setting the stage on some key concepts before illustrating this fallacy by demonstrating that the concept of deterrence refers to a psychological behavior which can only be disproven. It will contend that states that possess nuclear weapons simply do not have the willingness to use them in the face of the massive amount of damage they create and the absence of a guaranteed favorable outcome. Lastly, it will argue that the use of nuclear weapons is simply illegal and highly immoral when looked at from a modern day standpoint. These three elements will then illustrate why the accepted sense of security is in fact simply an illusion, or a James Stegenga would say: “Nuclear deterrence as the ideological foundation for United States (and Western) security policy must, thus, be regarded as doubly unacceptable. Unacceptably unreliable, almost certain to fail eventually, with catastrophic consequences; unacceptably improper, morally bankrupt.”5 2 Harry J. Gensler, The A to Z of Logic (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010)., p. 74. 3 John Woods, The Death of Argument : Fallacies in Agent Based Reasoning (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 2004)., p. 3-23. 4 Eemeren, F. H. van,Grootendorst, R., "Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions a Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed Towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion," Foris Publications, p. 177. 5 James A. Stegenga, "Nuclear Deterrence: Bankrupt Ideology," Policy Sciences 16, no. 2 (11, 1983), 127- 145., p. 143. 3 Setting the stage In order to discuss nuclear deterrence, it is appropriate to anchor the discussion around those actors who possess (openly or not officially) nuclear weapons. The select group of nations currently in possession of these weapons is composed of: the USA, Russia, China, France, the UK, India and Pakistan. Israel is also suspected of possessing nuclear weapons but never officially admitted it possibly out of a desire to not exacerbate an arms race in the Middle East. Two countries are known to be actively developing nuclear weapons and they are Iran and North Korea. In the first case, there is ample evidence going back before the 1979 revolution to demonstrate an enduring desire to acquire these weapons while in the case of North Korea, the ambitions of the regime are less clear and open for speculation ranging from preventing a US sponsored invasion to establishing a regional hegemony (and possibly a combination of both). First and foremost, as stated by Michael MccGwire “Nuclear deterrence theory was a purely western construct.”6 This is an important distinction because deterrence works better if looked at from a western point of view. This is not to say that nations on the other side of the world would not recognize its validity however its basic tenets were born and rest with the western world. There are therefore two main schools of thought when it comes to nuclear deterrence. The first one refers to direct deterrence while the other one refers to extended deterrence. Although direct nuclear deterrence is easier to understand as it refers to the use in case of a direct threat or attack, extended deterrence, as defined by the Brookings Institute, is: […] the ability of U.S. military forces, 6 Michael MccGwire, "Nuclear Deterrence," International Affairs 82, no. 4 (07, 2006), 771-784., p. 771. 4 particularly nuclear forces, to deter attack on U.S. allies and thereby reassure them […]”.7 Understanding some of the basic premise of the concept of nuclear deterrence, the discussion will now focus on the behavioral aspect of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence as a theory of human behavior Not everyone accepts the idea that nuclear deterrence is a theory of human behavior which can only be disproven. It is in fact counter-intuitive that, after so many crises averted, that they may not be the result of sound nuclear deterrence strategy. There are however a vast pool of supporters of the behavioral argument, one of which being the Nuclear Peace Foundation, a non for profit organization regrouping many Nobel Prize recipients and whose purpose is “To educate and advocate for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons […]”. They advertise the behavioral hubris of nuclear deterrence in a video posted on the foundation’s website.8 Before engaging in the heart of the science behind psychology and behavior, it is important to define the concept of deterrence itself, let alone when tied to nuclear weapons. The US Joint Operating Concept (JOC) on deterrence operations defines deterrence as the ability to influence the enemy’s decision calculus through actions designed to deny him the benefits of said action, impose costs and encourage restraints.9 It contends that “Deterrence is ultimately in the eye of the beholder: the adversary decision-maker.”10 As argued by Colin Gray, deterrence is achieved only when the adversary decides or accepts to be deterred. He states that: “To deter is to persuade 7 Steven Pifer et al., "U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges," Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 3 (May 2010)., p. 1 8 Nuclear age peace foundation, "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence," http://www.wagingpeace.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-deterrence/ (accessed 04/15, 2015). 9 United States of America, Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations, Joint Operating Concept , Version 2.0, 2006)., p. 5. 10 Ibid., 56. 5 someone not to do something that they might well have done otherwise. Unless the intended deterree elects to cooperate and be dissuaded, deterrence does not work.”11 This is a key tenet as it entails a reaction from another party which compels it to not undertake an action he would have chosen to do if left to him, hence the direct link to human psychology and behavior.
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