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7 European institutions and identity change What have we learned? (2004) Thomas Risse This book has both theoretical and empirical purposes. Theoretically, we strive to understand how new (international) institutions affect people’s social identities. How do political institutions shape people’s beliefs about who they are and to which communities they belong? What are the causal pathways by which institu- tions affect social identities and by which identities and institutions coevolve? Empirically, we focus on the European experience, in particular the ways in which more than forty years of European integration have affected people’s sense of belonging. Is there an emerging European identity, and if so, does it replace, coexist with, or otherwise interact with individuals’ multiple identities? And what is the substantive content of this European identity? Is there a difference between elite-level identification processes with Europe and the Europeanness of “ordi- nary” people? To answer these questions, we have embarked on a multidisciplinary and multimethodological approach. The authors in this book are political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists using such diverse research tools as quantitative survey data, laboratory experiments, in- depth interviews, discourse analysis, and historical interpretation. Our hope is that a multidimensional approach gives us additional analytical leverage in tackling such an elusive concept as “European identity.” In the following, I try to summarize some of our findings, to highlight agree- ments as well as differences among the authors, and to suggest avenues for future research. I concentrate on a discussion of the empirical findings of the book. While the introduction by Herrmann and Brewer focuses primarily on theoretical questions involved in studying collective identities, I emphasize what the book tells us about the empirical subject of European identity. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the insights, from a multidisciplinary approach, into European identity as the “dependent variable.” How do European and other identities of individuals and social groups go together? What do we know about the substance and content of European identity? How can we explain the large gap between elite identifica- tion with Europe and the feelings of ordinary citizens, who seem to be more alienated from Europe? While the chapters in this book provide excellent descriptions of what we seem to know about the extent to which people identify with Europe, they are DOI: 10.4324/9781315623665-9 European institutions and identity change 173 less concerned with explaining the evolution of European identity. Nevertheless, this book yields some insights into the reasons why we can see changes over time in identification with Europe. I will also highlight methodological problems in studying the subject matter of European identity that seem to be apparent in this volume. I conclude with the implications of our findings for the policy debates about the future of the European Union. Why bother with studying identities? Do we need European identity to build a European polity? European and other identities: How do they go together? It is no longer controversial among scholars and – increasingly – policy makers that individuals hold multiple social identities. People can feel a sense of belonging to Europe, their nation-state, their gender, and so on. It is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily would decrease one’s loyalty to national or other communi- ties. Europe and the nation are both “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991), and people can feel as part of both communities without having to choose some primary identification. Analyses from survey data suggest, and social psychological experiments confirm, that many people who strongly identify with their nation-state also feel a sense of belonging to Europe (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Martinotti and Steffanizzi 1995; see Citrin and Sides 2004; Castano 2004). However, there are social contexts in which European and national identities might conflict. Two of Siapera’s narratives concern situations in which journalists feel that they have to take sides in a confrontation between “Europe” and the nation-state. According to one account, Europe has to be built against the nation- state, and a European public opinion is supposed to overcome old-fashioned nationalism. The other account takes the opposite perspective and assumes that national identities cannot be superseded by the construction of a European identity (Siapera 2004). Laffan’s account (2004) of “double hatting” in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) at the Council also suggests a some- times conflictual relationship between European and national identities among officials working in Brussels. This conflict results from the somewhat contradic- tory role identities of these officials. On the one hand, they are supposed to work toward a common European goal and negotiate consensual outcomes with their fellow Europeans (see also Lewis 1998a, 1998b, 2000). On the other hand, they are still national representatives and, therefore, supposed to defend their respec- tive national interests. Interestingly enough, zero-sum relationships and potential conflicts between European and national identities are represented in this book only in cases focus- ing on professionals working in Brussels. Journalists reporting from Brussels to their national media markets and COREPER officials have in common that Europe and their respective nation-states are highly salient and “real” entities for them. Both are very “entitative,” to use the term from social psychology (Castano 2004). Journalists and national permanent representatives have 174 From the outside in to constantly negotiate between their commitment to Europe and their commit- ment to their nation-state. No wonder that these two groups perceive Europe and the nation as often in conflict with each other. It seems to be the social context of their professional environment that leads them to sometimes conceptualize the two identities in conflictual terms. However, the other chapters of this book show little evidence of a zero-sum relationship between European and other identities. This finding is trivial for scholars studying collective identities, but it nevertheless has important implica- tions for the political debates about Europe and the nation-state. Take the con- temporary debate about the future of the European Union and about a European constitution. Many people still hold that Europe lacks a demos, one indicator being the lack of strong identification with Europe in mass public opinion (e.g., Kielmansegg 1996). Yet, as Citrin and Sides demonstrate, “country first, but Europe, too” is the dominant outlook in most EU countries, and people do not perceive this as contradictory (Citrin and Sides 2004, for similar findings see Marks and Hooghe 2003). Moreover and more important, the real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who only identify with their nation, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe, on the other hand. Citrin and Sides show that the individual willingness to sup- port further European integration increases quite dramatically from the former to the latter group. Marks and Hooghe add that exclusive identification with the nation-state is more powerful in explaining opposition to European integration than calculations about economic costs and benefits (Marks and Hooghe 2003). They also show that the effect of exclusive identification with one nation-state varies widely across countries. “Nationalist” Portuguese are far less inclined to oppose European integration than, say, “nationalist” British. Generally speaking, therefore, willingness to grant the EU authority requires some identification with Europe, but not an identification that actually prioritizes Europe over the nation. In other words, the European polity does not require a demos that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist and complement each other. This is a significant empirical finding that speaks directly to the current debate on the future of the union. Our findings show much more than the rather simple insight that European and national identities can go together. The chapters suggest quite a bit about how multiple identities go together and how they relate to each other. The introduction of this book suggests three ways in which we can think of multiple identities. First, identities can be nested, conceived of as concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the next. My identity as a Rhinelander is nested in my German identity, which is again nested in my Europeanness. Second, identities can be cross-cutting. In this configuration, some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group. I can feel a strong gender identity and a sense of belonging to Europe, but not all members of my gender group also identify with Europe. Third, identities can be separate. For example, I could be the only professor in a sports club, European institutions and identity change 175 as a result of which my identification with my professional colleagues would be kept separate from my loyalty to the soccer club associates. There would be no overlap in group memberships. There is a good deal of evidence presented