The International Sources of Soviet Change Author(S): Daniel Deudney and G
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The International Sources of Soviet Change Author(s): Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 74-118 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539089 . Accessed: 09/01/2012 02:11 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org The InternationalDaniel Deudney and Sources of Soviet G. JohnIkenberry Change The Cold War has ended, shiftingglobal political life on a scale not seen in fiftyyears. At the heart of these changes were domestic and foreignpolicy choices made by the Soviet Union. In domestic affairs,the Communist Party gave up its political monopoly, then collapsed, glasnosthas aired historicalcrimes and failings,and socialist economics is being abandoned. In foreignaffairs, the Soviets have acquiesced in the complete collapse of communistclient regimes in Eastern Europe and the unificationof Germany, accepted far-reaching force reduction and disarmament agreements, sought to strengthenthe United Nations, and embarked upon a broad effortto solve regional con- flicts.'The speed and magnitude of these changes, acceleratingin the wake of the abortive August coup, have exhilarated world public opinion and stunned Western foreignpolicy elites. They have also overturnedmuch of the conventionalwisdom in the West about the permanence of the East-West Daniel Deudneyis AssistantProfessor of PoliticalScience at the Universityof Pennsylvania and author ofthe forthcoming book Pax Atomica: States and Republics in Sustainable Global SecuritySystems. G. JohnIkenberry is AssistantProfessor of Politicsand InternationalAffairs at PrincetonUniversity; during1991-92, he is an InternationalAffairs Fellow on the PolicyPlanning Staff at the U.S. State Department.He is authorof Reasons of State: Oil Politicsand the Capacities of American Govern- ment, and co-authorof The State; he is currentlywriting a bookabout the international spread of policy doctrines. The authors would like to acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by Henry Bienen, Matthew Evangelista, Andrew Farkas, Sam Kim, Rey Koslowski, Charles Kupchan, David Meyer,Henry Nau, Alvin Rubinstein,Stephen Walt,and WilliamWohlforth. Research assistance was provided by GeoffreyHerrera and Naomi Mobed. Research for this paper was supported by the Peter B. Lewis Fund and the Center of InternationalStudies, Princeton. 1. For overviews of Soviet foreignpolicy change, see Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to Security,"World Policy Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 561-599; RobertLegvold, "The Revolutionin Soviet ForeignPolicy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Americaand the World, 1988/89),pp. 82-98; David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military Under Gorbachev," InternationalSecurity, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90),pp. 5-24; JackSnyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" InternationalSecurity, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 1987/88),pp. 93-131; William Hyland, The Cold War Is Over (New York: Knopf, 1990); Michael MccGwire, Perestroikaand SovietNational Security(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991); David Armstrongand Erik Goldstein, eds., The End ofthe Cold War(London: Frank Cass, 1990); Andrei V. Kozyrev, "The New Soviet AttitudeToward the United Nations," The WashingtonQuarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 41-53. InternationalSecurity, Winter 1991/92 (Vol. 16, No. 3) (C 1991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology. 74 The InternationalSources of SovietChange j 75 conflict,the possibilityof change in the communistworld, and the relative strengthsof the competing camps.2 Not only have these changes been sweeping and unexpected, but they have been peaceful as well, at least at the internationallevel. Many students of Great Power politics have long held that sudden and significantchanges in the status of Great Powers, particularlyauthoritarian ones, are likely to be violent.3In the modern state system, it is hard to find a precedent for sudden and peaceful change in the status of a central Great Power and in the patternand intensityof inter-staterivalry. The half centuryof Cold War, markedby unexpected stabilityand peace among the Great Powers, has been labeled the "long peace."4 The postwar period has now also experienced "major peaceful change." Given the centralityof the Cold War over the last forty-fiveyears and the importanceof the Soviet experimentin the twentiethcentury, explanations 2. The consensus of foreignpolicy elites in the West was that the East-Westconflict would be a semi-permanentfeature of world politics. As late as 1986 Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that "the American-Sovietconflict is not some temporaryaberration but a historicalrivalry that will long endure." Brzezinski, Game Plan: A GeostrategicFramework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest(Boston: Atlantic,1986), p. xiii. Colin Gray argued that "the East-Westconflict is (forall relevantpolicy-related purposes) a permanentfeature of internationalrelations." Gray, The Geo- politicsof the Nuclear Era: Heartlands,Rimlands, and theTechnological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), emphasis in original. "Profound differencesand severe competitionwill surely continue to mark U.S.-Soviet relations," wrote Robert S. McNamara and Hans A. Bethe, "Re- ducing the Risk of Nuclear War," Atlantic,July 1985, p. 47. Only fifteenyears ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan worriedthat Western ideas and institutionswere becoming increasinglymarginalized in world history.Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," Commentary,Vol. 59, No. 3 (March 1975). Jeane Kirkpatrickargued that totalitarianregimes such as the Soviet Union were incapable of reform.Jeane Kirkpatrick,"Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary,Vol. 68, No. 5 (November 1979), pp. 34-45. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many in the West saw a Soviet strategicand geopolitical juggernaut. Henry Kissinger argued in 1978 that because of "the vulnerabilityof our strategicforces . [Soviet] willingness to run risks . must expo- nentiallyincrease." The next five years, he said, were going to be "our period of maximum danger." U.S. Senate, Committeeon Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treaty,96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office [U.S. GPO], 1979), pt. 3, pp. 224-225. 3. The problem of peaceful change in Great Power systems is a central proposition of realist internationaltheory. As E.H. Carr put it, "normally,the threatof war, tacit or overt, seems a necessarycondition for important political changes in the internationalsphere." Carr,The Twenty Years Crisis,1919-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1939), p. 216. Similarly,Robert Gilpin argues that "throughouthistory the primarymeans of resolving the disequilibriumbetween the structure of the internationalsystem and the redistributionof power has been war." Gilpin, War and Changein WorldPolitics (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981), p. 197. See also JackS. Levy, "Declining Power and the PreventiveMotivation for War," WorldPolitics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107. 4. JohnLewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiresinto the History of the Cold War(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1987); Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,ed., The Long PostwarPeace: ContendingExplana- tionsand Projections(New York: HarperCollins, 1991). InternationalSecurity 16:3 | 76 of these events are of central concern to social scientistsand historiansas well as makersof foreign policy.5 Thus thelong and contentiousdebate over the originsand strategyof the Cold War is being replaced by a debate about its end.6 Because Western knowledge of internal Soviet deliberations and motives remains incomplete and because events of this magnitude are the product of the conjunction of many forces,the debate over the end of the Cold War,like the debate over its origins,is likelyto be long and inconclusive. At the heart of this debate is a question with far-reachingpractical and theoreticalimplications: what are the sources of the Soviet crisisand how do we account for the directionsof policy change? At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between the question of what caused the Soviet crisisand the question of what caused the responses.Many students of Soviet politicsargue that both the crisis and the responses are the product of essentiallyinternal developments-the failureof socialism and the reformimpulses it generated. In this view, the new Soviet foreignpolicy has been primarilydriven by the requirementsof domestic reform.7 The propositionof this paper is thatrecent changes in Soviet foreignpolicy behavior (and some domestic behavior) can be explained as a product of the changing characterof the Soviet Union's externalenvironment. The Soviet environmenthas evolved slowly but profoundlyover the last half century. The two most importantfeatures of the Soviet Union's new environment, nuclear weapons and the multi-facetedliberal capitalist system of states,