The Development of Military Nuclear Strategy and Anglo-American Relations, 1939 – 1958 Submitted by: Geoffrey Charles Mallett Skinner to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, July 2018 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (Signature) ……………………………………………………………………………… 1 Abstract There was no special governmental partnership between Britain and America during the Second World War in atomic affairs. A recalibration is required that updates and amends the existing historiography in this respect. The wartime atomic relations of those countries were cooperative at the level of science and resources, but rarely that of the state. As soon as it became apparent that fission weaponry would be the main basis of future military power, America decided to gain exclusive control over the weapon. Britain could not replicate American resources and no assistance was offered to it by its conventional ally. America then created its own, closed, nuclear system and well before the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the event which is typically seen by historians as the explanation of the fracturing of wartime atomic relations. Immediately after 1945 there was insufficient systemic force to create change in the consistent American policy of atomic monopoly. As fusion bombs introduced a new magnitude of risk, and as the nuclear world expanded and deepened, the systemic pressures grew. It was these pressures which forced America to review its security alignment. Science can hold a mirror to changing strategic relationships during the militarisation of nuclear affairs. From leadership during the inception phase, through to becoming one part of a multi-dimensional defence environment as technical progress accelerated, science reflected wider atomic developments in both Britain and America during the 1950s. It was the benefits resulting from its increasingly linked internal science-military structures, combined with the changing worldwide geopolitical forces of the late 2 1950’s, which encouraged and constrained America to consider previously unthinkable external nuclear relationships. In 1958, America moved away from separatism in atomic affairs. It chose to create a nuclear state partnership with the nation that best reflected its new security orientation, and which had also reached a significant level of maturity in fusion weaponry. That country was Britain. 3 Acknowledgements The wish to undertake a PhD has been a long held one. However it was kicked into life by my son, Guy, who told me to simply ‘get on with it’ and to contact a suitable university and person. Following some initial research, that person was Professor Andrew Thompson of Exeter University. Professor Thompson’s initial advice and very warm welcome confirmed to me that this journey was feasible. At the start of my studies my good fortune continued as my supervisors were confirmed as Professor Richard Toye and Professor Martin Thomas. Professor Toye has been ideal to work with – a distinguished academic who is both efficient and supportive. Without his advice and wisdom this work would certainly not have been completed. Professor Thomas has also always provided very valuable observations across my three year undertaking. The help and input of many other people has been essential during my work. The librarians at the archives of Churchill College, Cambridge and of the Royal Society Library, London were always ready to answer questions and point me in the correct direction. Similar kind assistance was obtained from the staff at the Cadbury Archive, Birmingham and the library of Nuffield College, Oxford. Continuing support has been forthcoming from Philip Oakes whose attention to detail and constructive remarks have been extremely helpful. In addition to consistent encouragement from Guy, my younger son Jamie has also always been very positive towards me in this and earlier endeavours. Finally without the highly significant and much valued support, understanding and forbearance of my wife, Judy, this would never have been possible. My deep felt thanks are extended to all. 4 Contents Abbreviations 8 Introduction 10 Part One: The Birth of Militarised Fission and the Formation of Anglo-American Nuclear Relations, February 1939 – August 1942 39 Fission and the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum 48 Emerging Knowledge and Anglo-American Differences 63 MAUD, America’s Reaction and the Point of Transition 80 Germany’s Fission Failure and America’s Move to Manhattan 103 Part Two: The Illusion of Anglo-American State Cooperation, July 1942 to Hiroshima and McMahon 122 The Technical Committee of Tube Alloys and Dualism in Anglo-American Atomic Relations: 9 July 1942 – August 1943 132 Anglo-American Scientific Cooperation and Political Stasis – Quebec to the Death of FDR 155 Truman and the Bomb Decision 176 The McMahon Act of 1946: The Myth and the Reality 187 5 Part Three: Developing Nuclear Systems and the Logic of Stalemate, Anglo-American Nuclear Relations, Hiroshima to November 1952 206 Britain’s Nuclear Decision 215 American Nuclear Weakness and the Modus Vivendi 226 The Berlin Airlift to RDS-1 239 Fusion Decision and Fission Failure 249 Anglo-American Relations from RDS-1 to January 1952 258 British Fission, American Fusion and the GSP 276 Part Four: Nuclear Pressure, Geopolitical Change and the Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement, November 1952 to August 1958 290 Eisenhower, Massive Retaliation and the Failure of Nuclear Diplomacy 297 The 1954 Atomic Energy Act, Suez and the Changing Geopolitical World 315 The 1957 British Defence White Paper, Sputnik and the Growth of Big Science in America 331 American Policy, Systemic Pressures and the 1958 MDA 354 6 Conclusion 373 Appendices 381 Bibliography 409 7 List of Abbreviations ACAE British Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy AEC American Atomic Energy Commission AENPSC British Atomic Energy Nuclear Policy Steering Committee AFOAT-1 American Office of Atomic Testing CDT Combined Development Trust COS British Chiefs of Staff CPC Combined Policy Committee (Quebec Agreement). DOD American Department of Defense FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (records of) GAC American General Advisory Committee GSP British Global Strategy Paper (1952) ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile JCAE Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy JCS American Joint Chiefs of Staff JIC British Joint Intelligence Committee JPS British Military Joint Planning Staff 8 JSSC American Joint Strategic Survey Committee KWI Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Chemistry MAUD Unknown - British nuclear committee, 1940 / 1941 MDA Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958 MLC American Military Liaison Committee MPC American Military Policy Committee NDRC American National Defence Research Council NSC American National Security Council OSRD American Office of Scientific Research and Development OSS American Office of Strategic Services SAC American strategic Air Command SACEUR NATO Supreme Commander Europe SSAW British Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare TATSC Tube Alloys Technical Sub Committee UKAEA U.K. Atomic Energy Authority USAEC United States Atomic Energy Commission 9 Introduction “Steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” George Washington’s farewell address, 1796.1 The works of the British Official Historian Margaret Gowing suggest that, despite various difficulties along the way, America and Britain cooperated together in atomic affairs during the Second World War.2 Her use of sweeping phrases such as “full atomic collaboration”, when describing the wartime nuclear relationship, gives an impression of one-dimensional, positive interactions between the nations.3 It is then often argued that such a partnership was only separated by the terms of the American Atomic Energy (‘McMahon’) Act of 1946.4 Indeed, these wartime transatlantic atomic relations have sometimes attracted the term ‘special’.5 This interpretative line goes on to suggest that there followed a ‘long wait’ from 1946 until the state partnership were restored under the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) of 1958.6 Once a more holistic view of American actions and policy is added to the inconsistencies that will be shown to exist in the historiography, this broad brush assessment requires re-calibration. There would be multiple levels to transatlantic wartime atomic relations – scientific, economic (particularly resource 1 Quoted in Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography (Elliott and Thompson, 2015), p. 74. 2 For instance see Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1935 – 1945 (Macmillan, 1964) and Margaret Gowing, ‘Britain, America and the Bomb’, in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from power, Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol.2 (Macmillan, 1981). 3 Margaret Gowing, ‘Britain and the Bomb’, Contemporary Record, 2:2, (1988), 36 - 40. 4 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is often named after its eventual sponsor, Senator Brien McMahon. See Part Two, p. 186 for more details. See Edward Spiers, ‘The British Nuclear Deterrent: Problems and Possibilities’, in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power, Studies in Britain’s Foreign