Copyright by Paul Harold Rubinson 2008 The Dissertation Committee for Paul Harold Rubinson certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War Committee: —————————————————— Mark A. Lawrence, Supervisor —————————————————— Francis J. Gavin —————————————————— Bruce J. Hunt —————————————————— David M. Oshinsky —————————————————— Michael B. Stoff Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War by Paul Harold Rubinson, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2008 Acknowledgements Thanks first and foremost to Mark Lawrence for his guidance, support, and enthusiasm throughout this project. It would be impossible to overstate how essential his insight and mentoring have been to this dissertation and my career in general. Just as important has been his camaraderie, which made the researching and writing of this dissertation infinitely more rewarding. Thanks as well to Bruce Hunt for his support. Especially helpful was his incisive feedback, which both encouraged me to think through my ideas more thoroughly, and reined me in when my writing overshot my argument. I offer my sincerest gratitude to the Smith Richardson Foundation and Yale University International Security Studies for the Predoctoral Fellowship that allowed me to do the bulk of the writing of this dissertation. Thanks also to the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University, and John Gaddis and the incomparable Ann Carter-Drier at ISS. In addition, a Grant-in-Aid from the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics allowed me access to their oral history collection. Thanks as well for the support and encouragement of faculty at UT, including Michael Stoff, Frank Gavin, David Oshinsky, Jim Sidbury, Howard Miller, George Forgie, and Neil Kamil. Marilyn Lehman made graduate school infinitely easier. D’Arcy Randall has been an excellent teaching mentor and role model. During my college years, Michael Bess and Darren Sherkat were inspirational. This project benefited tremendously from the help of many archivists. Charlaine McCauley provided assistance at the LBJ Library. Cliff Mead at the Ava Helen and Linus Pauling Papers at Oregon State runs an archive worthy of its subjects. Nora Murphy at iv MIT’s Institute Archives, David Hays at UC-Boulder, and Brad Bauer at the Hoover Institution were incredibly helpful. Thanks to Vera Kistiakowsky for granting access to the papers of George B. Kistiakowsky. Thanks are also due to George Rathjens and Carl Kaysen for discussing Pugwash and the test ban; Manny Ness for his encouragement and enthusiasm; Susan Ferber for empathy, advice, and invaluable restaurant recommendations; Coco Peterson for German translations; and the purveyors of Thai Jasmine cart on Church St. in New Haven for providing the ultimate sustenance when it was needed most. Wonderful friends and peers influenced this work in ways both direct and indirect. Audrey Russek, Jessica Luther, Laresh Jayasanker, and Kerry Webb helped me through my grad school years. Sarah Snyder is an ideal colleague whose knowledge and insight proved invaluable for my understanding of foreign relations, and human rights. Thanks also to Joy Rohde for gracing several chapters with her extensive knowledge and imposing intellect, as well as for explaining the real cost of sneakers. Cole Hutchison’s magical re-emergence was a welcome boon to my spirit. Sujay Pathak’s friendship has been nothing less than essential. The completion of this dissertation would have been unimaginable without three friends in particular. Bryant Etheridge generously housed me for research trips and conferences, all with only a minor threat of hypothermia. Ben Hinerfeld was as diligent in discussing my research as he was in barbecue consumption and reckless virtual driving. And Dan Whelan housed me for a research trip to Oregon, helping me out like a quarterback setting a pick for a goalie slam-dunking a home run in the bottom of the fourth quarter. Knowing these three men have made my life immeasurably greater. I owe a great deal to my parents: Karen Pekala, Richard Rubinson, and Deborah Holtzman—nothing could ever replace their wisdom, friendship, support, and love. Many v thanks to my brother Claude, who always keeps an eye on me. My sister Emily has been a source of inspiration, comfort, joy, and pride. My brother Max makes life immensely more enjoyable when he’s around. And thanks most of all to Kristin Hay, who is simply the kindest, warmest, and best person I know. Her unfailing confidence in me is returned by my deepest respect, admiration, and love. vi Containing Science: The U.S. National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War Paul Harold Rubinson, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2008 Supervisor: Mark A. Lawrence Throughout the Cold War, many publicly influential and socially committed scientists participated in a wide array of efforts to push U.S. foreign policy toward nuclear disarmament. Some of these scientists, such as Linus Pauling and Carl Sagan, relied on their credibility as respected public authorities to sway public opinion against nuclear weapons. Other scientists, such as Eugene Rabinowitch, quietly pursued informal, quasi-diplomatic methods. Still others, such as Hans Bethe, George Kistiakowsky, and Jerome Wiesner, worked within the government to restrain the arms race. Though rarely working in concert, all these scientists operated under the notion that their scientific expertise enabled them to articulate convincing and objective reasons for nuclear disarmament. But the U.S. government went to great lengths to neutralize these scientific arguments against nuclear weapons with a wide array of tactics all aimed at undermining their scientific credibility. Some scientists who offered moral reasons to end the arms race found their loyalty questioned by the state. When prodisarmament scientists offered strictly technical reasons to vii oppose to nuclear weapons, the government responded by promoting the equally technical objections to disarmament held by pronuclear scientists. At still other times, the government attempted to co-opt the arguments of its scientific challengers. In addition, scientists’ professional identity as objective and apolitical experts hampered scientific antinuclear activism. From the beginning of the Cold War to the 1980s, scientists continuously challenged nuclear weapons in a variety of ways; the government likewise continuously reshaped its responses to meet this challenge, and in so doing crafted a method of scientific containment. Thus the result of this incessant struggle was the consistent defeat of scientists’ dissent. By the time the Cold War ended, it did so on terms unrelated to scientists and nuclear weapons. viii Table of Contents Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One: From “Highly Unreliable” to “Patriotic and Prompt”: Scientists Confront the National Security State, 1945–1957................................................................................................. 31 Chapter Two: Linus Pauling’s “Morality of Science”................................................................... 66 Chapter Three: Edward Teller’s Flexible Response ................................................................... 110 Chapter Four: “Crucified on a Cross of Atoms”: Scientists, Politics, and the Test Ban Treaty, 1957–1963......................................................................................................................................... 177 Chapter Five: To “Sail Before the Wind of Time”: Scientists and Disarmament after the Test Ban Treaty......................................................................................................................................... 223 Chapter Six: “An Elaborate Way of Committing National Suicide”: Carl Sagan, Popularization, and Nuclear Winter.............................................................................................. 279 Chapter Seven: “An Emotional Grassroots Offensive”: Scientists, SDI, and the Moral Challenge to Nuclear Weapons, 1980–1989................................................................................ 371 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................ 418 Bibliography...................................................................................................................................... 428 Vita..................................................................................................................................................... 445 ix Introduction More Questions than Answers At 9 a.m. on October 25, 1956, a reporter for the Tonopah Times of Tonopah, Nevada, placed a call to Linus Pauling to inform the Nobel Prize-winning chemist of the death of seven- year-old Martin Bordoli. Although Pauling had no connection to the boy, the reporter felt that the circumstances surrounding his death were “interesting,” and sought Pauling’s opinion. According