THE IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC ORIGINS

OF THE BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Peter Bennett-Koufie

1

As the Second World War drew to a close in 1945, the British economy lay in ruin.1

Exhausted by almost six years of worldwide conflict and with an empire growing ever more restless by the day,2 Britain’s place in the world was tenuous to say the least. In spite of all its challenges, however, Britain successfully tested a nuclear bomb, a massive undertaking, just seven short years later. This essay seeks to answer the question of what drove the British to attain the nuclear bomb. A thorough review of the available literature reveals that the quest for a British nuclear bomb was driven by two parallel goals. Firstly, Britain sought to re- attain its former role as a global superpower. As the pre-eminent weapon of the day, nuclear warheads were the ultimate symbol of power and so were pursued as a matter of course.

Secondly, Britain was driven by the more pressing need to defend itself against anticipated

Soviet aggression. The huge size of Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of the war coupled with the perceived unreliability of Joseph Stalin gave currency to British concerns.3

This paper will begin by examining the post war desire in Britain for a return to superpower status with special focus on how this was seen as a way to exert greater influence on

American nuclear policy. The paper will also examine how peculiarly, the desire for glory was at times supported by the goal of economic expediency. In the second half of this essay, we will assess Britain’s need to arm itself with a deterrent against anticipated Soviet aggression and the Middle East’s crucial role in this regard. Overall, this paper will put

1 “American deaths attributable to the war numbered 324,000, whereas the UK suffered war losses of 358,950, including 63,635 civilians … Given that the UK had a high pre-war level of national income per head, however, its aggregate human capital loss, at least in monetary terms, was higher. The war-time destruction of physical capital in the form of land, structures, inventories and shipping (including cargoes) amounted to £1,240 million at 1938 prices. Taking into account also internal and external disinvestment … the net loss of national wealth due to the war was £4,595 million at 1938 prices, equivalent to 18.6 per cent of pre-war wealth.” Quoted from Peter Howlett, “The war-time economy, 1939–1945,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain Volume III: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, eds. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 24. 2 William David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869-1971, (St. Paul MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 341-342. 3 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 249-251, 253. 2 forward the proposition that deterring the Soviets played a greater role in the attainment of the British nuclear bomb than the desire to be a superpower once more.

I. Nuclear Weapons as a panacea to decreasing power

Within the British establishment, it was understood that Britain needed to be a nuclear armed nation if it was to re-obtain the rank of superpower.4 The atom bomb’s significance had been recognized as early as 1941. The Military Application of Uranium Detonation

(MAUD) Committee, formed in wartime to consider British action regarding the bomb, had observed that:

“Even if the war should end before the bombs are ready the effort would not be wasted, except in the unlikely event of complete disarmament, since no nation would care to risk being caught without a weapon of such decisive possibilities.”5

The lack of the atom bomb deprived Britain of the most powerful weapon of the day.

In high politics, less military power relative to others, did and indeed still means less influence in global affairs.6 Thus, it should be no surprise that the American decision in 1946 to end nuclear cooperation with Britain was met with anguish in Whitehall.7 The McMahon

Act signalled a sudden end to all nuclear collaboration between the two countries and was seen by London as an American recognition of the bomb’s power and consequently, a desire to keep it in American hands.8 The post war British government was not keen to accept a diminished role in the world. Speaking before the House of Commons in 1947, Foreign

4 William T. R. Fox, “The Super-Powers Then and Now.” International Journal 35, no. 3 (1980): 416-419. William Fox was one of the first to use the term “superpower” in 1944 when he employed it to describe nations that could wage war on a global scale. 5 "The MAUD Report, 1941: Report by MAUD Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb." Atomic Archive. Accessed April 26, 2015. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/MAUD.shtml 6 Lawrence Freedman, “Military Power and Political Influence.” International Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 764. 7 Whitehall is a metonym for the British government. 8 Rod Hague, “The Anglo-American special relationship in retrospect,” in European defence co-operation: America, Britain and NATO, eds. Michael Clarke and Rod Hague (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 11. 3

Secretary Ernest Bevin refuted suggestions that “[Britain has] ceased to be a great power, or the contention that [Britain has] ceased to play that role.”9 He saw Britain as “one of the powers most vital to the peace of the world [with a] historic part to play.”10 Britain’s world standing however, was further called into question two years later when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. That the Soviets could build a bomb before the British was taken as a slight against the British nation by Britain’s scientific and political elite.11 Nuclear weaponry was yet another field in which Britain had fallen behind its two major wartime allies. Though the economic and military resources of the US and USSR far exceeded those of Britain, it was hoped that at least in the nuclear realm, Britain could achieve parity. This view was particularly emboldened by the advent of the hydrogen bomb. Julian Amery, then

Conservative MP for Preston North, summed up this mind-set succinctly in 1956 when he stated:

“It will seem that the hydrogen bomb, when we have it, will make us a world power again…

It cancels out the disparity between populations and big areas of territory and smaller ones. It would be just as dangerous for the Soviet Union or the United States to incur thermo-nuclear bombardment as it would be for us.”12 Amery’s statement was based on the understanding that the hydrogen bomb was more powerful than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima by a hundred fold.13

As early as mid-1954, it had been the cabinet’s view that “unless [Britain] possessed thermo-nuclear weapons, [Britain] should lose [its] influence and standing in world affairs.”14

At this stage it is necessary to ascertain what drove the British desire to be a superpower once

9 Quoted in Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 13. 10 Quoted in Ibid., 13-14. 11 Fred Roberts, 60 Years of Nuclear History: Britain’s Hidden Agenda, (Charlbury: Jon Carpenter, 1999), 37. 12 Quoted in Navias, 23. 13 Ibid., 22. 14 Quoted in Ibid. 4 more. A simple answer is that many government officials of the time had grown up in the zenith of British world power and could not imagine an alternate reality. Though there is undoubtedly some credence to this understanding, a question of such significance demands a more multifaceted answer. In this regard, a cabinet memo dated May 12 1954 is particularly useful. According to the memo, “it would be dangerous if the United States were to retain their present [nuclear] monopoly since we would be denied any right to influence her policy in the use of this weapon.”15 The British desire for influence over American decision making pre-dated the nuclear age. The late historian Lorna Arnold described as a “cherished British notion”, the idea that America was a naïve newcomer to the game of great power politics and needed to be guided by a more experienced Britain.16

An interesting fact of the nuclear age is how even the most chauvinistic ideals sometimes achieved tangible relevance. Increasing east-west tensions through 1948, highlighted by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of West Berlin, moved the US to establish air bases in Britain from which nuclear strikes against the USSR could be carried out.17 The British acquiesced on June 27 and approved the US request to send three groups of B-29 bombers to air bases in East Anglia.18 Quite clear to the British

Chiefs of Staff was the fact that by accepting a role as a forward base for US strategic bombers, Britain had made itself a primary Soviet target in the event of nuclear hostilities.19

Nuclear strikes launched from Britain would inevitably lead to Soviet retaliatory action. As former Labour War Minister, John Strachey said in 1954, “It is from British airfields that hydrogen bombers might take off, thus possibly endangering the lives of every man, woman

15 Quoted in Ibid., 21. 16 Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 51. 17 John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 71. 18 Ibid. 19 Arnold, 35. 5 and child in this country.”20 It was therefore of utmost importance to the British government that it be consulted before the US ever decided to launch strikes from its bases in East

Anglia.21 Britain would be an obvious Soviet target if indeed nuclear war were ever to break out. Consequently, it was necessary to restrain American actions as much as possible. This it was thought, could be best achieved through a British nuclear deterrent. With a significant nuclear stockpile, Whitehall’s observations, would hold greater sway in Washington.

Conversely, as a non – nuclear power, Britain would lack the “most important denomination in the currency of military forces” and would therefore wield less influence in Washington.22

What we see here is that at the end of the day, the drive to secure more global influence and power for Britain was not driven just for power’s sake. It was driven by the goal of influencing U.S. nuclear policy in the face of the Soviet threat.

To round off the discussion on the influence of superpower aspirations, it is necessary to appreciate the role played by economic considerations. British superpower aspirations were helped by the American loan of 1946. The British desired the loan to keep afloat

Britain’s overseas commitments and so the loan ensured that there would be no significant cuts in these areas.23 By 1951 however, Britain’s economy was beginning to buckle under the strain of unsustainable military expenditure. Upon returning to power in October 1951, the

Conservatives were faced with “a balance of payments crisis brought about by rearmament.”24 Further pressure was added upon the discovery that American defence assistance would be £80.4 million lower than expected.25 Cabinet’s response to the unfolding

20 Quoted in Ibid., 48. 21 Ibid., 45. 22 David Greenwood, “Defence and national priorities since 1945,” in British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. John Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 180. 23 C.J. Bartlett, “The Military Instrument in British Foreign Policy,” in British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. John Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 32. 24 G.C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 253. 25 Ibid. 6 financial conundrum was a swift decision to cut defence expenditure.26 The question was, how could Britain cut defence spending significantly and still be a great power? The Air

Defence Sub Committee arrived at an answer in July 1954. Its report assumed that there was a finite number of nuclear warheads needed to destroy the Soviet Union.27 The report went on to state that in the age of the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear stockpile needed to defeat the

USSR “is comparatively small and can be obtained quickly and reasonably economically.”28

It was therefore believed that nuclear weapons could provide a viable global defence policy with its attendant prestige and influence at a lower cost than could be achieved with conventional forces. With this understanding in mind, it is easy to see how some within the

British establishment could have thought that Britain could still be a superpower.

As we have seen, there is a significant amount of evidence that one could draw on to support the argument that the desire to be a superpower was indeed the main motivating factor in the pursuit of a British deterrent. The reality however, is more complicated. Though this was clearly a factor, it was not the decisive factor. For a number of reasons, the claim that the decision was based on a desire to reclaim a lost status in the world fails to stand up to scrutiny. The idea of Britain as a “Third Force”, a term used by Clement Atlee during his time as prime minister,29 was never supported by military planners. Beginning in 1944 with the Post-hostilities report, the Chiefs of Staff had emphasized the need for cooperation with

America.30 From mid-1947 through 1948, they had argued that America was “our only hope of defence against Russia and it was therefore axiomatic that we must at all costs avoid the risk of antagonizing them.”31 The actions of British politicians help to strengthen the case for

26 G.C. Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906-1959, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 458. 27 Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 216. 28 Quoted in Ibid., 217. 29 Baylis, 68. 30 Ibid. 31 Quoted in Ibid. 7 the centrality of this view in Whitehall’s decision making process. A constant theme between the end of war in 1945 and the creation of NATO in 1949 was the continued search for a defence agreement with the US. Bevin’s calls in 1948 for “some form of union, formal or informal”32 are particularly revealing. Bevin was also quick to acquiesce to US desires for multilateral agreements between Britain and other European countries rather than direct bilateral agreements.33 Additionally, the hope that nuclear weapons would provide Britain with a cheaper means to achieve superpower status proved unfounded. Economic realities forced Britain to settle for a policy of “independence in concert.”34 Under this framework,

Britain’s nuclear deterrent was resolutely implanted in the composition of the much larger

American deterrent.35

II. On Strategic Considerations: Neutralizing the Soviet threat

British concern about the Soviet threat had been expressed as early as 1943.36 By the war’s end, there was a perceptible mood of nuclear hysteria that permeated British society.

Soon after becoming Prime Minister in 1945, Clement Atlee noted that Britain “offers to a continental power such targets as London and other great cities.”37 It wasn’t just in official circles that nuclear fears were promulgated. Statements like “no country in the world is more vulnerable than Britain to the new weapon”38 became all too familiar in academic circles.

This, however, should not be dismissed entirely as hysteria. At the time, 42% of the country’s population lived in urban areas compared to 31% in the USA and 14% in the USSR.39 This led the Chief’s Joint Planning Staff to conclude that “this country is more vulnerable to

32 Quoted in Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, 165. 33 Ibid. 34 Navias, 109. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., 34. 37 Quoted in Ibid., 76. 38 Quoted in Ibid. 39 Ibid., 77. 8 weapons of mass destruction than either of the other great powers.”40 Curiously then, it was only in 1948 that the Soviet Union was identified as the primary threat to British interests.41

The prevailing view in the early post war era was that Britain could not afford to rely entirely on America’s nuclear deterrent. This was based on the supposition that if war were to break out, the US and Britain would have a different order of priority of Soviet targets.42 It was assumed that both nations would initially focus on targets vital to their own security. The aforementioned Air Defence Sub Committee report contended that if “New York is vulnerable to retaliation, the USA will not use her strategic weapon in defence of London.”43

During his second stint as Prime Minister, Winston Churchill was also unsure whether “in an emergency … the targets which threaten us most would be given what we consider the necessary priority.”44 Such views were not without historical precedent. During World War

II, Royal Air Force and US Air Force commanders had clashed over the priority of bombing the V-1 and V-2 launch sites.45 The USAF favoured the bombing of targets which contributed to the German war effort and judged the V weapon launch sites to not be among such targets.46 Such an approach was a complete anathema to the residents of southern England who had been living under daily bombardment from these weapons since 1944.

The view of the US as an unreliable partner was also driven by fears of another

American relapse into isolationism. The most obvious sign of American retrenchment was the McMahon act of 1946. Even before that however, there had been cause for concern. In

August 1945, Lend lease, the vital lifeline that had sustained the British economy during the

40 Quoted in Ibid. 41 Baylis, 67. 42 Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 92. 43 Quoted in Clark and Wheeler, 217. 44 Quoted in Arnold, 65. 45 Pierre 93. 46 Ibid. 9 war, was abruptly scrapped by the Truman administration.47 The Truman administration followed suit in September when it suddenly abolished several Anglo-American combined boards which had been set up during the war to combine resources and personnel.48 All these events caused Whitehall to view America as an increasingly unreliable partner in Britain’s defence. The historian Andrew Pierre also identifies a sense of frustration at American

“immaturity,”49 a fear also noted by Lorna Arnold as we have seen. The British it was believed, would therefore be in good stead by relying on themselves.

The importance of the Middle East in British strategic thought is also worth mention.

As has been observed, there was a clear worry that the US could not be relied upon to defend

Britain. This raised the historically significant Middle East region to even greater importance.

In March 1946, Bevin articulated the view that a continued British presence was necessary to deter Soviet expansion and influence in the region.50 Of vital importance was Iraqi oil which according to Bevin was among “[Britain’s] greatest assets.”51 The Middle East, however, was of more than just economic interest to Britain. The Chiefs of Staff argued for the retention of bases there from which British bombers would be within striking distance of Soviet industrial centres in the Urals and Western Siberia.52 This, it was thought, would amplify the power of

Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

It is however necessary to concede that some unassailable points can be brought up which question the idea of the impetus for the deterrent as rooted entirely in strategic expediency. There was indeed a lot of guesswork in British strategic planning. In 1946 for instance, despite being committed to the idea of a nuclear deterrent, the Chiefs of Staff were

47 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, (London: Longman, 1991), 150. 48 Pierre, 70. 49 Ibid., 76. 50 Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, 261. 51 Quoted in Ibid., 261. 52 Ibid., 262. 10 unable to ascertain just how many nuclear warheads were necessary to provide an effective deterrent.53 John Baylis identifies this ambiguity as symptomatic of “the failure of military planners of the time to sit down and provide a detailed analysis of the impact of atomic weapons on military strategy.”54 However, the lack of a precise plan does not preclude an understanding of the strategic importance of nuclear weapons. It is also necessary to remember that Britain at this point in time was still recovering from a world war; its military planners had a myriad of concerns to deal with.

Those who question the strength of the strategic expediency motive could also cite the

1950 Global Strategy Paper. In it, the Chiefs of Staff could only express “some hope” that nuclear weapons would bring a war with Russia to victory.55 One would therefore not be without complete reason to doubt the primacy of nuclear weapons in British strategy. This position however ignores the fact that there are no winners in a nuclear war. Can a nation really be judged to have won a nuclear war if its people are forced to spend a millennia living in underground bunkers?

III. Conclusion

This paper has argued that Britain’s desire to attain the nuclear bomb was driven predominantly by the desire to deter Soviet aggression. Some may argue that the main motivating factor was the desire to be a superpower again. Though many within the British establishment made such statements, their actions at the end of the day indicate otherwise.

That Britain’s chief concern was deterring the USSR becomes clearer the deeper one delves into the subject matter. Apart from very clear reasons for not wanting a nuclear war, this also implies a respect for the Soviet War Machine. The Soviet Union had successfully dealt with

90% of German forces during World War II and so had earned a grudging respect in Western

53 Baylis, 50. 54 Ibid. 55 Quoted in Baylis, 107. 11 circles.56 Secondly and perhaps more importantly, that deterring the Soviets was more important than preserving prestige highlights an admission in the British establishment that its days as a superpower were no more. That all the talk of being an independent “third force” was belied by conscious efforts to seek the support and assistance of America reveals that

London was cognizant of the fact that the power had shifted decisively to Washington.

56 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, 240. 12

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