QUNO Briefing Paper

Quaker United Nations Office 777 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017 www.quno.org

QUNO Briefing Paper

March 2004 No. 2/04

Bridging the Gap: Proposals and Precedents for Third Party Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Introduction obligations on both sides, but there were no mechanisms for verifying if these obligations had been carried out, nor Over thirty-five years ago the United Nations Security processes for helping the parties meet their commitments. Council adopted resolution 242, which stipulated the As part of the Roadmap a ceasefire was brokered in June principle of ‘land for peace’ as a basis for a final settlement 2003, but it quickly fell apart in the absence of external between Israel and the Arab states. This began a process support. Mechanisms could have been established to help that gradually led to international acceptance of a two- resolve disputes peacefully, to pressurize the sides to state solution to the conflict, where Israeli forces would meet their commitments, to improve the capacities and withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and make capabilities of the parties, and to monitor the condition of way for Palestinian political independence. The 1988 civilians. Jordanian relinquishment of its claims over the West Bank was an important step on this road, as was the mutual This briefing paper will discuss past examples of these recognition contained within the 1993 Declaration of mechanisms in the Middle East, demonstrating how Principles (Oslo I). The United States’ public commitment accumulated experiences in the region already provide to a Palestinian state two years ago and subsequent useful tools for the international community in helping adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1397 resolve this conflict. Five different roles for a third party in completed this journey. Today, for the first time, we have a situations of conflict will be examined and examples of situation where both sides are wedded to a two-state their application in the region will be provided. The settlement, with broad international consensus behind this relevance of these roles for use in the present context will goal. Most of the territorial details were worked out at Taba then be discussed, and the political obstacles to their in 2001, and even thorny final status issues like the future implementation considered. of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem came close to resolution.1

Despite this growing international acceptance, rapidly changing facts on the ground are making the two-state solution more and more difficult to implement. The continuing intensification of settlement programmes in the West Bank, the building of exclusive bypass roads to link settlements to Israel, the construction of a separation wall West Bank deep into Palestinian territory; these immovable changes to the character of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) are threatening the creation of a viable Palestinian Gaza Strip state and jeopardizing a peaceful partition of the land. This paper will begin from the notion that the time for securing a viable two-state solution is limited. Recent developments mean that failure to achieve a political settlement may result in more than just an end to the present round of negotiations. They could also lead to the end of the two- state vision itself. 2

Now is the time for the international community to act and prevent such an outcome. The concerted effort of a third party can do a great deal to bolster existing peace initiatives and help guide the two sides to a lasting settlement. The recent fate of the Roadmap3, for example, could have been averted with the more active engagement Israel and the Occupied Territories of a third party. The Roadmap placed reciprocal Source: United Nations/DPA Regional Precedents of Third Party Intervention was granted by both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities, 5 and an agreement was signed in 1997. The mission’s 1. A Protection/Observation Force for Civilians mandate was to observe and report on the human rights situation in the city of Hebron, and it was given guarantees One possible role for the international community in of freedom of movement to pursue this task. situations of conflict is to monitor the treatment of civilians and take measures to protect them. This can either take the form of a militarily empowered force intervening Regional Precedents of Third Party Intervention directly in the conflict to protect civilian victims (a Protection Force), or a less interventionist mission that - UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) 1948- monitors human rights abuses, observes changing facts on the ground, and reports on its findings (an Observation - First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) Sinai 1956-1967 Force). The first type of force has no precedent in the - Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) Sinai 1973-79 region, whereas the second type has been proposed and implemented with varying degrees of success. - UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Golan Heights 1974-

The first substantive effort at establishing an observation - UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Lebanon 1978- mission for civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories - Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai 1982- (OPT) occurred during the first Intifada. After 17 Palestinians were killed on al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple - UN Observer Group Beirut (OGB) in accordance with Mount in 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 516, Beirut 1982 Resolution 681, which provided the Secretary-General - Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF) Beirut 1982-84 with a mandate to “monitor and observe the situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation” - United Nations monitoring mechanism in accordance and to “keep the Security Council regularly informed”. The with Security Council Resolution 681 OPT 1990-91 Secretary-General called upon existing UN personnel in - Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) the region to carry out monitoring tasks, and their Hebron, West Bank 1994, 1996- observations were compiled in a report to the Security - Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) 1996 – Council submitted in April 1991.4 Although resolution 681 requested progress reports every four months, the April report was the first and only document presented to the Council. The beginning of the Madrid peace talks eclipsed the UN initiative, and the United States argued that further TIPH had several advantages over the mission reports would interfere with the start of the political established by Resolution 681. By securing consent from process. the Israeli and Palestinian authorities it was able to maintain an official status and improve its access, gaining The ‘681’ observation mission had several difficulties. greater provisions for independence and allowances for First, it consisted of personnel drawn from the United the self-defence of its members. However, TIPH was Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian rendered ineffectual due to several constraints placed Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and was not a upon it. First, its personnel were forbidden to intervene in separate mission in its own right, with its own clear order to protect civilians, and they were restricted to mandate and capabilities. Second, Israel never supported observing and reporting the human rights violations taking or consented to the observation mission, and it objected to place in front of them. Second, the reports that TIPH UNRWA being used for a purpose not explicitly stated in compiled could not be made public, and their distribution its original mandate. Finally, no follow-up mechanism was was limited to the six European governments that established or even recommended, so the reports could contributed to TIPH, plus the Israeli and Palestinian not lead to any concrete action to protect the human rights authorities. This meant that the findings of TIPH could not of civilians in the OPT. be used to exert public pressure on the authorities to improve conditions for Palestinian civilians. The next observation force established for civilians in the Occupied Territories was the Temporary International The value of a clearly identifiable international observation Presence in Hebron (TIPH). This was set up following force like TIPH resides in giving confidence to populations another atrocity, the killing of Palestinians at the Hebron and acting as a deterrent against greater human rights Ibrahimi mosque in 1994 by Israeli settler Baruch violations. This is also very important in building up trust. Goldstein. After the massacre the UN Security Council Although TIPH cannot directly intervene to prevent human adopted Resolution 904, which called for “a temporary rights violations, interviews with their staff revealed a belief international or foreign presence” to “guarantee the safety that a TIPH presence in Hebron may have reduced the and protection of Palestinian civilians”. A non-UN scale of the 2002 Israeli military incursion into the city international force of observers was then established, during Operation Defensive Shield. In order to maximize staffed by personnel from six European nations. Consent this deterrent effect, however, the reports of any 2 observation force need to be made public so that greater (Lebanon and Syria). Nevertheless, the ILMG experience pressure can be bought to bear on the relevant authorities. demonstrates how the creative engagement of a third To be truly effective, the scope of such a force cannot be party could support a ceasefire between Israel and the limited to one city but should be extended to monitoring all Palestinians, creating the conditions under which urban areas with large civilian populations. negotiations could commence and continue.

2. A Disputes Settlement Mechanism 3. A Verification and Implementation Mission

A second possible role for international involvement in A third role for the international community in conflict conflict situations is the provision of a mechanism to settle situations is to give the parties support in fulfilling their disputes between the two parties. A disputes settlement signed agreements and to verify that specific mechanism is particularly relevant in maintaining ceasefire commitments have been carried out. Any peace process agreements, because it can allow grievances to be solved depends on the successful implementation of agreements peacefully and prevent an escalation of violence. External reached, but frequently the two sides need help and support is necessary in order to facilitate such a pressure in order to fulfill their obligations. mechanism, and it remains an important tool for the international community in maintaining the cessation of The most substantive precedent of a verification and violence and building up trust. implementation mission in the Middle East is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which began The main precedent for this type of involvement in the its mission at the start of 1982. Positioned in the Sinai region is the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG). Peninsula after a peace treaty was signed between Egypt This was established after Israel’s Operation Grapes of and Israel, the MFO is a militarily empowered observation Wrath, which killed over 100 Lebanese force with a mandate to verify and civilians in 1996. With US support the supervise the implementation of the two main protagonists, Israel and The key to the ILMG’s success peace treaty provisions. Originally Hizballah, reached an understanding in was that its aims were not envisioned as a United Nations force, which they agreed to a ceasefire and ambitious. It was never the MFO was eventually established the establishment of a mechanism to intended to be a permanent as a US-led multinational force due to monitor this ceasefire.6 The ILMG solution to the problem, nor a lack of Security Council consensus. operated by allowing any of the involved substitute for a comprehensive The particular duties the MFO carries parties to submit a complaint in the peace agreement. out are: supervising and verifying event of a ceasefire violation. This Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, complaint was then disseminated to the guaranteeing the limitation of forces in whole group, and if necessary an investigative team was the area, and ensuring freedom of navigation for Israeli dispatched to verify responsibility for the ceasefire shipping from Egyptian interference in the straights of violation. There was no mechanism to punish the party Tiran.8 These tasks are stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, responsible for the violation. Rather, the ILMG publicly and the force was established with the consent of all blamed the relevant party, calling attention to violations parties. and holding the parties accountable for their actions. The mission of the MFO has been remarkably successful, The main role of the ILMG was to diffuse tensions. By in a large part due to the commitment of both sides to allowing the sides involved to air their grievances and making the peace treaty work. The importance of score political points without using violence, the ILMG international presence in the Sinai has been in verifying to prevented escalations along the Israel-Lebanon border. both Israel and Egypt that the terms of their peace are The key to the ILMG’s success was that its aims were not being observed and in investigating and reporting on any ambitious. It was never intended to be a permanent violations. The MFO differs from traditional peacekeeping solution to the problem, nor be a substitute for a missions in that it is not designed to act as a buffer comprehensive peace agreement. It was simply designed between belligerents, but rather to work closely with the to support a ceasefire, and in this it was largely two sides and support a permanent peace that they successful.7 worked at and agreed upon.

In the Israeli-Palestinian context the maintenance of The use of verification and implementation missions in ceasefire arrangements is essential because the cessation other contexts, however, is not restricted to the period of violence is stipulated by Israel as a prerequisite for after a full peace treaty has been signed. An international resuming negotiations. However, the disputes settlement presence can also be used in order to build confidence as mechanism as practiced in the ILMG is not entirely part of a phased process towards a final settlement. This relevant, since it was not designed to maintain a ceasefire was largely the purpose of John Wolf’s mission to Israel or resolve disputes per se, but merely prevent escalations. and the Palestinian Territories in 2003, which was It was also negotiated with a single clearly identifiable designed to guide and monitor the implementation of the militia (Hizballah) through governmental channels Roadmap initiative and work with the two sides to help 3 them meet their obligations. This mission was short-lived, however, because the Roadmap rapidly unraveled and the 5. A Traditional Peacekeeping Model number of observers in Wolf’s mission was too small in order to adequately monitor who was responsible for the A fifth type of international involvement in conflict deterioration. situations is the introduction of a traditional peacekeeping force. This is the most common and the most established 4. A Transition State Model form of international involvement, which is designed to serve as a buffer between two hostile sovereign states by A fourth role for the international community in situations patrolling borders and maintaining demilitarized zones. It is of conflict is a far more substantial one. Rather than usually a UN blue-helmeted force, sent in after a ceasefire placing obligations on the two sides to carry out, a has been brokered in order to preserve that ceasefire and transition state model involves a far more interventionist create the conditions for a lasting peace settlement. policy of coming in and Traditionally, UN doing all the substantive peacekeeping forces are groundwork for peace. based on the three Relevant examples would operational principles of be the United Nations consent, impartiality, and missions in East Timor or the non-use of force. Kosovo, which took over Firstly, the force is only administrative and security to be sent in with the control from the existing agreement of both sides, sovereign powers and it can only remain in (Indonesia and Yugoslavia place whilst this consent respectively). Trusteeship continues. Second, the responsibilities also force should be made up include building up state of contributing countries institutions and holding that are impartial with elections. respect to the belligerents. Finally, it This type of operation has should have a mandate never been attempted in to use force only in self- Finnish members of UNEF II installing a checkpoint in Sinai (1973) the Middle East Source: United Nations/DPI defence, and may not environment, although intervene directly in any there have been recent dispute. proposals to do so.9 The process would work through a third party, who would provide transitional administrative Traditional peacekeeping has a long precedent in the and security control over the OPT and lead the Territories Middle East region, where UN forces have frequently been to sovereign independence. International forces would deployed along Israel’s borders with its neighbouring Arab guarantee Israel’s security concerns: preventing suicide states. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in bombings and training Palestinian security forces. Sinai was the first ever peacekeeping mission, set up in Simultaneously, these forces would guarantee Palestinian 1956 after the Suez War. This mission demonstrated the self-determination: overseeing the Israeli withdrawal and constraints of UN peacekeeping because the forces had to helping establish Palestinian institutions. be withdrawn in 1967 following Egypt’s termination of its consent to their presence. A more successful mission was Some commentators have proposed that international established on Israel’s border with Syria after the 1973 forces be used to take over from the Israeli army whilst war. Known as the United Nations Disengagement negotiations are continuing, as a way of building up trust. Observer Force (UNDOF), this still exists in the Golan Such an approach is dangerous, however, because if Heights because the political will remains on both sides to negotiations falter the transition from Israeli rule could end keep it there. up being long and drawn out: Palestinians would continue living under occupation, and the goal of political The value of such peacekeeping forces lies in preserving independence would remain distant. Far better would be the status quo and keeping the opposing militaries of two for Israel and the Palestinians to sign a final status states separated. So long as both sides desire for a freeze agreement before the introduction of an international in military activity a peacekeeping force helps them transitional authority, so a clear mandate and timeline achieve it, but as soon as it serves the interests of a party could be drawn up for the international ‘trusteeship’. The to initiate military action a peacekeeping force can simply lessons of Oslo must be heeded. If a final agreement is be bypassed and ignored. For this reason the relevance of reached comprehensively first, implementation can be traditional peacekeeping for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict secured in a way that is not dependent on the actions of resides in its role in patrolling borders after a final either side. settlement has been implemented. 4 objections and deadlock has prevented anything The Temporal Dimension of a Third Party Presence substantive being passed for over a year and a half now. On the part of the Palestinians there is broad support for This brings us to the temporal dimension of international the idea of an international presence in the OPT, but some involvement. Each one of these five roles for the are concerned that such a force would effectively freeze international community is relevant at a different stage in the situation on the ground, replacing Israeli forces with the conflict. A protection or observation force is most international ones and further delaying real political relevant whilst the conflict is continuing, to protect civilians independence. and help build up trust. A disputes settlement mechanism is most relevant once a ceasefire has been brokered, in It is generally agreed that implementing an international order to maintain the cessation of violence and allow force requires securing consent from both parties to the negotiations to commence and continue. A traditional conflict. In order to get this support any kind of peacekeeping force, on the other hand, plays its role after international involvement would need to respond to the the final peace settlement and Israeli withdrawal has been fears of both sides: Palestinian fears of a third party completed. presence effectively freezing the situation on the ground, and Israeli fears that a third party presence would do When used together, these tools provide an important way nothing to curb Palestinian attacks. in which a third party can guide the process towards a final settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In addition, the success of a third party presence would The following chart illustrates this temporal dimension of require the active engagement of the United States. It is an international presence: extremely unlikely that Israel would consent to an international presence unless it was led by the US, and the US is likely to veto any diplomatic effort to establish a presence under any other auspices. To illustrate this, Stage of Conflict Role for a Third Party Presence several recent initiatives brought before the UN Security

Council to provide monitoring forces for Palestinian

Conflict stage A Protection/Observation Force: civilians have been vetoed. In 2001, for example, the non- Monitoring human rights violations and aligned states sponsored a resolution that would lead to protecting civilians to help build up trust. “an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including… a United Nations observer force”. This 10 resolution was vetoed by the United States. Ceasefire stage A Disputes Settlement Mechanism: Resolving disputes and diffusing Because of such political constraints it is generally tensions to maintain a ceasefire. assumed that any international presence in the Middle East will be a US-led effort. When proposing a third party mechanism for the conflict in April 2002 Secretary-General Partial agreement A Verification and Implementation Mission: verifying Israeli withdrawal and Kofi Annan clarified: “I must stress that I do not contemplate a United Nations force, but rather a the dismantling of settlements. 11 multinational force formed by a coalition of the willing”. Although the UN clearly has the institutional capabilities to Full Settlement The Transition State Model: Overseeing implement any of the models outlined above, it is very the establishment of Palestinian unlikely that it will be mandated to do so by the Security institutions and training security forces. Council.

Finally, it is necessary to emphasise that some types of Post-conflict stage Traditional Peacekeeping: Patrolling and international involvement are more politically possible than monitoring the borders of the Palestinian state others. The idea of an implementation and verification mission is most likely to be implemented, especially after the Roadmap’s call for the “establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism” as part of its phased peace plan. Obstacles to Implementation: Political Will and the Of the models outlined above perhaps the least easy to Third Party Presence implement is a protection or monitoring force. The legal case certainly exists for such a force in the OPT12, but the Israeli government is extremely unlikely to consent to it, The issue of applicability to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the US remains opposed. Whilst such political is one thing in theory, but quite another in practice. The constraints continue, the task of monitoring and protecting main obstacle to implementing the policies outlined above civilian welfare will continue to fall on civil society initiatives is the lack of political will at the governmental level. On the like the World Council of Churches’ Ecumenical part of the Israeli authorities there is almost complete Accompaniment Programme.13 resistance to any kind of ‘internationalisation’ of the conflict. At the United Nations Security Council, US 5

A Negotiated Model: The Geneva Accord Conclusion

Due to the political constraints just discussed, it is often This briefing paper has provided an overview of the suggested that implementing any kind of third party methods that a third party can employ in helping bring presence is close to impossible. In particular, there seems about peace between Israel and the Palestinians. It has to be little chance of securing consent from both parties, or concentrated on five possible roles for the international achieving agreement on a blueprint for international community, from a protection or observation force to a involvement. This perception is challenged by the recent traditional peacekeeping mission. Each of these roles, it drafting of the Geneva Accord.14 Although not a was clarified, are relevant at a different stage in the government agreement or an official document, the progression from conflict to peace. When used together, Geneva Accord demonstrates that prominent Israeli and these tools provide an important way in which a third party Palestinian opposition figures can agree to a blueprint for can guide the political process towards a final peace peace, and approve substantial international involvement settlement in the Middle East. in order to bring this peace about. Although a number of political constraints are preventing The international presence envisioned in the Geneva such policies from being implemented at the moment, the Accord encompasses four of the five possible roles Geneva Accord can be seen as an example of a outlined above. First, the Accord involves the comprehensive third party mechanism that was agreed by establishment of an Implementation and Verification both sides. The Accord demonstrates how Israelis and Group (IVG), which is meant to oversee and verify the Palestinians are both willing and able to endorse progress of the whole peace settlement. Second, a international involvement as a way of achieving a two-state disputes settlement mechanism would be set up as a settlement, but in the absence of official support the subsidiary body of the IVG, to fulfill the important role of Accord can do little to stop the rapidly changing maintaining a ceasefire and preventing an escalation of developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. As violence. Finally, a Multinational Force (MF) would fulfill settlements expand, bypass roads continue to be built, and two more roles: that of a transition state mission and a the construction of the separation wall accelerates, the traditional peace keeping operation. During the viability of a Palestinian state based in the West Bank and implementation of the Accord the MF would help build up Gaza is seriously under threat. Palestinian institutions and security forces, and after the Israeli withdrawal it would revert to more traditional roles of At this time it is important to reaffirm the consensus that patrolling borders and monitoring international border has emerged over the past thirty years in favour of a two- crossings (see chart on opposite page). state solution. It is important to emphasise that a two-state vision can fulfill the goals and concerns of both sides. The only international role that is lacking from the Accord Palestinian concerns for political independence will only be is a monitoring or protection force for civilians. As achieved when reasonable Israeli concerns for security are explained in the previous section, this is politically the most met. Moreover, Israel will only really achieve its security problematic of the five roles (which could explain its once it ends its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza omission), but as previously emphasized, such a role Strip and allows the Palestinian inhabitants of the could be fulfilled by civil society on the ground. Territories their independence. There is a limited window of opportunity in which these two desires can be In addition to the main roles already discussed, the simultaneously implemented. Given such a timeframe, Geneva Accord also provides interesting details as to how successful implementation will increasingly require the certain aspects of an international presence can operate. active engagement of a third party. A ‘senior political-level contact group’ is proposed, which will be charged with overseeing the performance of the Prepared by Tom Smith third party presence, providing international guidance and legitimacy to the process. At the head of the contact group will be a ‘special representative’, who will be the public The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), located in face of the international presence and will explain its Geneva and New York, represents Quakers through Friends changing role clearly and visibly, liaising with all interested World Committee for Consultation (FWCC), an international parties. non-governmental organisation with consultative status at the UN. QUNO works to promote the peace and justice Leaving aside the territorial details contained in the concerns of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) from Accord, the third party intervention envisaged in this around the world at the United Nations and other global institutions. It is supported by the American Friends Service document is detailed and achievable, demonstrating how Committee, Britain Yearly Meeting, and the worldwide international forces can be used creatively to solve many community of Friends. of the outstanding problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

6 A Negotiated Model for International Involvement: The Geneva Accord

Special Representative

3 Contact Group MF Commander

Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) Multinational Force (MF)

The responsibilities of the IVG shall include: The MF shall be deployed in the future state of Palestine, and it will perform the following functions: Art. 3.4: Monitoring and resolving disputes between the parties regarding the implementation of the Accord During the implementation of the Accords: Art. 4.3: Verifying and facilitating Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of territory to Palestinian sovereignty Art. 5.6: Training the Palestinian security forces and Art. 4.5: Compiling an inventory of the property, infrastructure and facilities of Israeli ensuring they curb Palestinian terrorism settlements, to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty Art. 5.6: Providing security guarantees to both parties, and Art. 5.5: Monitoring and aiding both sides’ efforts to curb incitement to irredentism, racism and acting as a deterrent against external attacks violence Art. 5.7: Overseeing and monitoring Israeli withdrawal Art. 6.7: Monitoring and verifying the preservation of cultural heritage in the Old City of from the OPT and the dismantling of settlements Jerusalem and devising a restoration and preservation plan for the city Art. 5.6: Deploying observers to adjacent areas during the phases of the Israeli withdrawal

After the establishment of the state of Palestine:

Art. 5.12: Monitoring all international border crossings into Palestine and preventing the entry of any weapons IVG Disputes Settlement International Arrangements for and military equipment Mechanism Jerusalem Art. 5.8: Overseeing a small military presence of the IDF in the Jordan valley (Israeli ‘Early Warning Art. 16: To resolve any disputes related to Art. 6.5: International Group on al-Haram al- Stations’) and verifying that these Early Warning the implementation of the Accord through Sharif/Temple Mount Compound, to oversee Stations are only used for their stated purposes mediation and conciliation. This is separate conservation and security. Art. 5.3: Continuing to monitor and verify the police, from any verification that the two sides security, and border control functions of the have carried out their obligations. It is Art. 6.7: Old City Policing Unit (PU), to Palestinian forces purely to help resolve disputes, diffuse coordinate the two sides’ policing activities and Art. 10: Escorting and inspecting shuttle transportation to problems and friction points, act as a help resolve any disputes sites of Jewish religious significance in Palestine, liaison between the two sides, and register and providing joint security for these sites complaints by each side about the other. Art. 5.6: Protecting the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine, since it is to be a non-militarized state

7 Adam Frey’s article “The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: An Further Reading: Operational Overview” provides more detailed information on the ILMG. Available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note3.htm

1 The Moratinos report of the Taba negotiations is available at 8 www.bitterlemons.org/docs/moratinos.html The Israel-Egypt Treaty of Peace, Annex 1, is available at www.mfo.org/files/Treaty.pdf 2 For more on an alternative to the two-state settlement see 9 Avraham Burg, “The End of Zionism?” Martin Indyk’s article: ‘A Trusteeship for Palestine?’ (Foreign (http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/); Dr. Ghada Karmi, “A Affairs, June 2003) provides a detailed proposal of the Secular Democratic State in Historic Palestine: An Idea Whose trusteeship approach.

Time Has Come?” (http://www.caabu.org/press/articles/secular- 10 state.html); Ari Shavit “Cry, the beloved two state solution” For details of the vetoed draft resolutions on international (www.haaretz.com); and Tony Judt, “Israel: The alternative” monitoring see UN Press Release SC/7040, available at (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16671). For more details on www.un.org/News/Press/. A similar draft resolution was also put physical changes in the OPT, the UN Office for the Coordination to a vote and defeated at the end of 2000 (see Press Release of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/ SC/6976).

11 3 The Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Kofi Annan’s entire statement on an international force in the Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is available in full at OPT can be read at www.un.org/news/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf www.escwa.org.lb/information/press/articles/18apr02.html

12 4 The April 1991 report pursuant to Resolution 681 (S/22472), is For a legal case for international protection for civilians in the available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF?OpenDatabase OPT, see al-Haq’s policy paper: “International Protection: Perceptions and Possibilities” , at www.alhaq.org/publications/ 5 The Agreement on a Temporary International Presence in the 13 City of Hebron is available at For more details on the World Council of Churches’ www.tiph.org/Documents/Agreement.asp Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme see www.eappi.org/

14 6 The text of this Ceasefire Understanding can be found at The full text of the Geneva Accord, can be found at www.accessv.com/~yehuda/israelleb1996.htm http://www.heskem.org.il/Heskem_en.asp