Confronting Soviet Power Confronting Soviet Paul C

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Confronting Soviet Power Confronting Soviet Paul C. Avey Power U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War

For many, the behavior of the United States in the early Cold War highlights the inºuence of ideas in foreign policy. According to this view, American liberalism directly faced off against Soviet Communism after World War II. This caused the United States to abandon collaboration, deªne the Soviet Union as an enemy, and implement a series of combative policies. In other words, Soviet power became a threat because the Soviet Union was a Communist dictatorship.1 To be sure, works in the realist tradition contend that balance of power concerns motivated U.S. policy. Yet these explanations often sidestep the role of ideas,2 blur the role of power and ideas,3 or incorporate ideas into their analysis.4 In short, many scholars accept that ideas were critical in pushing the United States to confront the Soviet Union and Communism. A close look at early Cold War history, however, suggests that U.S. policy was often inconsistent with the most prominent ideational explanations for U.S. behavior toward the Soviets. For instance, the United States genuinely attempted to engage the Soviet Union in the early postwar period despite awareness of the totalitarian nature of Soviet Communism. In addition, U.S. policy initially tolerated Communist groups beyond the Soviet Union and later targeted them to prevent Soviet expansion. Finally, the United States did not seri-

Paul C. Avey is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Notre Dame.

The author is grateful to Michael Desch, Sebastian Rosato, and the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and advice. He would also like to thank Robert Brathwaite, Peter Campbell, Charles Fagan, Kirstin Hasler, Keir Lieber, Dan Lindley, and Richard Maass for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. He thanks the Nanovic Institute for European Studies and the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, both at Notre Dame, for their generous ªnancial support.

1. See, for example, Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Commu- nity: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357–399. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 256– 261, 322–329; and Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 146–208. 3. Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, America and the Cold War, 1941–1991: A Realist Interpretation, 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010). 4. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006 [1948]), pp. 357–376.

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ously pursue regime change in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and sought to engage Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and China. In this article, I argue that U.S. policy was principally directed toward challenging Soviet state power.5 The rise of Soviet power and the collapse of Eurasia beyond initial postwar assessments generated broad concerns in the United States. U.S. policy subsequently moved to block Soviet expansion and restore a balance of power in Europe and Asia. As the relative power situation worsened, the United States increased the scope of its economic and military commitments. My argument builds on existing power-based accounts, but goes beyond them to explicitly engage ideological arguments and demonstrate that speciªc U.S. policy initiatives followed balance of power logic. I do not claim that ideology played no role in the U.S. decision to confront the Soviets: for instance, U.S. ofªcials feared that Communism offered the Soviet Union a novel means to expand its power and used ideology to justify various initiatives shaped by power concerns. Examining the origins of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the Cold War is important for two reasons. First, there is widespread acceptance across the major international relations paradigms—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—that U.S. policy during the early Cold War went beyond traditional power politics. These arguments turn to ideas to explain U.S. behavior. Historians writing across different historiographic traditions, while generally advancing eclectic explanations for U.S. behavior, provide supporting evidence for the ideational explanations. My argument challenges these accounts. Second, U.S. behavior in the early Cold War is an important case for the growing body of literature premised on the inºuence of ideas in foreign policy. Indeed, ideas should play a critical role in this case. The United States has a strong liberal tradition, and Soviet Communism differed substantially. By showing that ideas did not drive U.S. policy, my argument challenges the broader claims built on this case.6 The rest of the article proceeds in ªve sections. First, it deªnes ideology and power, outlines the ideological and power-based logic for the origins of the

5. I do not address Soviet foreign policy. For recent works on this topic, see Vladislav M. Zubok, Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Interna- tional Politics during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 90– 109; and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1997). 6. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1: Political Science: Scope and Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975); and Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory De- velopment in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 120–123.

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United States’ confrontation with the Soviet Union, and speciªes predictions for each. It also demonstrates the widespread agreement among self-identiªed realists, liberals, and constructivists that ideology played a critical role (if not the most critical role) in spurring U.S. behavior. Second, it discusses the key changes in power and ideology, including ideological perceptions, which should cause changes in U.S. policy. Third, it examines the content and tim- ing of major U.S. initiatives to demonstrate that power, rather than ideology, primarily drove U.S. policy. Fourth, it shows that U.S. policy toward Communist groups and regimes outside the Soviet orbit primarily reºected concerns about Soviet power. The ªnal section brieºy reviews the key ªndings and concludes with historical and theoretical implications.

Ideology, Power, and Confrontation

In this section, I outline the ideological and power-based explanations for international conºict. I show that scholars frequently employ ideology to explain the origins of U.S. Cold War policy. I then use this discussion to generate predictions for U.S. behavior.

ideology Ideas provide a useful tool for analyzing international politics and foreign policy, particularly U.S. policy in the Cold War. Given the breadth of concepts implied by the term, however, assessing the impact of ideas is difªcult. Indi- vidual psychology, common beliefs, norms, ideology, identity, and culture are a few examples.7 I employ the concept of “ideology,” which I deªne as a set of shared beliefs within a society through which that society identiªes and interprets events and selects appropriate policy responses. Ideology provides the basis for the proper construction of state institutions, the economy, conceptions of individ- ual and group, the use of force, and identiªcation of “in” and “out” groups.8 Ideology is distinct from internationally constructed culture, but is informed by and at times synonymous with national culture. It generally subsumes, or is

7. For a discussion, see Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 150–158. 8. This deªnition draws on Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the 20th Century,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 619–626; Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 2005), pp. 1–6; Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Poli- tics during the Cold War,” pp. 95–109; and Alexander L. George, “Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1987), pp. 1–21.

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at least consistent with, strategic culture, collective ideas, or national identity.9 I cannot specify the origins of an ideology or why a particular ideology becomes dominant, but ideologies tend to become entrenched, to repli- cate through socialization, and to constrain or even constitute foreign policy thinking. Two sets of arguments claim that ideology signiªcantly motivated and shaped U.S. foreign policy during the early Cold War. The ªrst, which I label “liberal expansionism,” explores the consequences arising from the content of American ideology. This ideology, widely shared by American elites, has pushed the United States to remake the world in its image in the belief that peace will follow. In essence, this has meant the promotion of liberal democratic regimes and a liberal economic order.10 Liberalism does not automati- cally lead to activism, however. Policies tend to ºuctuate from a crusader spirit (we will make you like us) to disengagement (we are an example to be emu- lated). Scholars disagree on the exact impetus for these changes; realists generally highlight changes in power or threat, whereas constructivists and liberals tend to highlight changes in interpretation and content.11 All agree that power is important, yet they argue that the United States rarely pursues straightfor- ward balance of power policies. Liberal expansionists also agree that the United States entered a crusading phase following World War II. This impulse largely preceded a material threat from the Soviet Union and decisively shaped U.S. policy. As Christopher Layne argues, the liberal “foundations of postwar U.S. grand strategy were in place well before the cold war commenced or even was anticipated by ofªcials in Washington.”12 Because the Soviet system posed the greatest obstacle to

9. See, for example, Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 14–16; Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 4–11; and Nau, At Home Abroad, chaps. 1–2. 10. Stewart Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (New York: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2009); John Kane, Between Virtue and Power: The Per- sistent Moral Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008); Mi- chael C. Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 10–11, 17–25; Wesley Widmaier, “Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretative Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 779–784; Layne, The Peace of Illusions, pp. 7–10, 28–35; Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 1–8, 21–26; Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112–156; and Tony Smith, Amer- ica’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 11. See Layne, The Peace of Illusions, pp. 7–11, 28–36; Desch, “America’s Liberal Illiberalism,” pp. 8– 9, 17–19; Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 18–20, 33–36; Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine,” pp. 115–116, 129–156; Nau, At Home Abroad, chap. 3; and Widmaier, “Constructing Foreign Policy Crises,” pp. 779–794. 12. Layne, The Peace of Illusions, p. 3 (emphasis in original). For more on liberal roots, see ibid., pp. 8–10, 70.

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this liberalizing impulse, U.S. policy quickly became a crusade against Communism. For example, Colin Dueck notes that because liberal “goals came into direct conºict with the declared interests of the Soviet Union....by1945 the great question for American policymakers was how to handle the USSR.” The United States subsequently adopted an anti-Communist policy that “sought to check communist expansion worldwide; to promote a liberal international order outside of the Soviet bloc; to pressure the USSR out of Eastern Europe; and, ultimately, to encourage the collapse of communism within the Soviet Union.”13 Stewart Patrick essentially agrees, arguing that the United States developed an expansive liberal internationalism during World War II, which it later modiªed in the face of Soviet Communism. Subsequently, “anti- Communism [was] at the heart of U.S. containment policy.”14 In Cold War historiography, the revisionist tradition maintains that U.S. policy was aggressively anti-Communist from the start. Some revisionists focus on economics exclusively, yet others recognize a key role for ideology. Indeed, ideology is “at the heart” of Open Door accounts of U.S. foreign policy, standing “on two pillars: the economic Open Door (maintaining an open international economic system) and the political Open Door (spreading democracy and liberalism abroad).”15 Others go beyond ideology to focus on discursive cultural traditions but arrive at similar conclusions. Thus, Walter Hixson argues that the American “myth” convinced Americans that the United States had “an obligation to assume world leadership and spread its way of life across the globe.” This precluded a spheres-of-inºuence accommodation and led to a “quest to ‘roll back’ and defeat the communist movement.”16 There is support for the liberal expansionist position in historical works outside the revisionist tradition as well. Melvyn Lefºer, at times mischaracterized as a neorealist, argues in his seminal Preponderance of Power that the United States extended its power after World War II in part because of a belief that like-minded states were necessary for security. “Preponderance...meant creating a world environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values,” he notes. Wartime experience taught policymakers that “the traditional principles of self-determination and the open door...nowhadprofound implications for the national security, physical safety, and political economy of the United

13. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 84, 83, and p. 192 n. 32; and Layne, The Peace of Illusions, chap. 3. 14. Patrick, The Best Laid Plans, p. 215 and chap. 7. 15. Layne, The Peace of Illusions, pp. 32, 30. See also Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 8–11. 16. Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), chaps. 1, 6–7, quotes at pp. 171, 163. See also Da- vid Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

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States.”17 Others note that the “quest for universal freedom was translated into the pursuit of ‘liberation’” of Communist states.18 Elizabeth Spalding places President Harry Truman ªrmly in the liberal camp, arguing that he “fashioned a unique postwar liberal internationalism that applied broadly held domestic principles to the nation’s foreign policy.”19 A second set of ideological arguments, which I label the “clash of ideologies,” focuses on the interaction of different ideologies. The central claim is that states regard each other as more threatening as the differences, or dis- tance, between their ideologies increase. Scholars making this argument highlight the importance of power but regard its implications as indeterminate. “Conºict or convergence of national identities,” Henry Nau notes, “is therefore a powerful regulator of military competition among independent nations.”20 Andrew Moravcsik makes a similar claim, writing that where “social identities are incompatible and create signiªcant negative externalities, tension and zero-sum conºict is more likely.”21 The clash of ideologies argument has direct implications for foreign policy behavior. Most important, policymakers adopt confrontational policies toward states and groups that are, or are perceived to be, ideologically distant.22 This happens for several reasons. First, policymakers come to identify with others sharing similar ideologies and distrust those who do not. This distrust encour- ages the belief that conºict is inevitable. Second, a state with a different ideol-

17. Melvyn P. Lefºer, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 19, 24. Lefºer rejects the neorealist characterization in Melvyn P. Lefºer, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconªgurations,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 87. I do not claim that Lefºer’s account is primarily liberal expansionist, but merely that important portions of his argument offer support for that position. Scholars identify Lefºer as a neorealist, corporatist, revisionist, and post-revisionist. See, respectively, Lefºer, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconªgurations”; Elizabeth Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Contain- ment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2006), pp. 5, 234–235 n. 9; Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 325–326; and Michael Hogan, “State of the Art: An Introduction,” in Hogan, America in the World, p. 14. 18. Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 3. 19. Spalding, The First Cold Warrior, p. 9. 20. Nau, At Home Abroad, p. 6. Nau links American and Soviet identity with ideology. See ibid., pp. 5–6, 21. See also Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, chap. 1; and David L. Rous- seau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception,” Journal of Conºict Reso- lution, Vol. 51, No. 5 (October 2007), pp. 765–766. 21. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 525–528, at p. 525. 22. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, pp. 16–19; and John M. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

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ogy can threaten the legitimacy of rule at home. This threat can be direct—one state incites revolt in another—or indirect—where the mere example of an alternative ideology strengthens disaffected domestic groups. Finally, disparate ideologies legitimize the use of force differently. States with different ideologies misunderstand force used by the other, and they fear aggression.23 Various scholars provide support for a clash of ideology explanation for the U.S. decision to confront the Soviet Union. Most agree that the U.S. and Soviet ideologies were drastically different. Nau argues that this incompatibility drove U.S. (and Soviet) policy and “was probably decisive in motivating the power competition.”24 Others point to U.S. fears that conºict was likely so long as Soviet ideology remained unchanged.25 Odd Arne Westad writes that U.S. (and Soviet) leaders “believed that friends or enemies on the international stage were deªned by proximity or nonproximity to the speciªc ideological premises on which each of these Powers had been founded.”26

power Power, like ideas, is an amorphous concept. I focus on material capabilities, which consist of the population, wealth, military forces, control of strategic geographic positions, and commodity and industrial resources of a given state or region.27 Although capabilities are absolute, power is a relative concept. The reason is simple: any actor with signiªcant capabilities is less powerful than an actor with even greater capabilities. Because power is relative, one state’s increase in power causes another’s power to decline. Balance of power theories claim that states tend to block others from sig- niªcantly increasing their power.28 States balance power because they under- stand that more powerful states may one day threaten their security and that there is no guarantee that help will come in a crisis. States accumulate and balance power in a variety of ways. They can extract more from internal resources, construct institutions (including alliances) that favor their interests, and expand their territory. In general, states prefer to let others pay the costs of balancing powerful states. States will take up the balancing role if other coun-

23. See Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, pp. 6–18; John M. Owen IV, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman Empire 1517–55,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 73–99; and Nau, At Home Abroad, pp. 6, 21–24, 39–41. 24. Nau, At Home Abroad, p. 6; see also pp. 5–6, 76–79. 25. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” pp. 546–547; and Risse-Kappen, “Collective Iden- tity in a Democratic Community,” pp. 374–375, 378. 26. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 39. 27. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 3. 28. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979); and Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

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tries lack the capabilities to check a powerful rival. The allure to avoid the costs of balancing does not disappear, however, especially if a state must bear signiªcant costs or the overwhelming share of the costs for balancing. In these situations, states work to disperse the balancing costs.

assessing ideology and power accounts Ideological arguments expect shifts in U.S. policy in response to ideological changes, policies motivated by ideological concerns, and peripheral threats evaluated in terms of the overall ideological threat. Speciªcally, liberal expansionists predict U.S. intolerance of illiberal ideologies in the post–World War II world. Here U.S. ideological content made accommodation with different ideologies difªcult and generated confrontational policies toward the Soviet Union. Proponents of the clash of ideologies expect U.S. leaders to adopt aggressive policies toward ideologically distant regimes. In this case, the col- lision of two distinct ideologies pushed the United States to adopt a confrontational approach. Applied to the origins of U.S. Cold War policy, the central causal story for both is essentially the same: liberalism confronted Communism in the postwar period, dictating confrontational U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union and Communist groups. Balance of power arguments make alternative predictions. According to them, policy will change along with shifts in the balance of power; decisionmaking should highlight the importance of power factors; and peripheral matters will be dealt with in light of their connection to the central power concerns. The key U.S. concern would be preventing any one state or bloc from gaining preponderant power. The arguments anticipate that the United States would pursue a spheres-of-inºuence policy with the Soviets if there were multiple powers capable of balancing one another. These arguments expect confrontational policies once the Soviets began expanding into vital strategic regions and other potential balancers weakened. As Soviet relative power grew, balance of power arguments predict expanding efforts to block Soviet expansion and restore a balance of power. These arguments also expect the United States to seek to disperse the costs of balancing. I assess the balance of power and ideological explanations using two within- case methods: congruence procedures and process tracing.29 I ªrst establish baseline measures for policy and ideology, and then outline changes for both during this period. Next, I use congruence procedures to compare changes in

29. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni- versity Press, 1997), pp. 61–67; and George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chaps. 9–10.

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ideology and power to changes in policy. If an explanation is correct, changes in particular measures should correspond with new policies. I then use process tracing to identify the extent to which ideology and power motivated U.S. decisions and policy designs in the early Cold War period.

Shifts in Power and Ideology

It is ªrst necessary to establish how power and ideology changed during the early Cold War. I examine objective changes and changes in U.S. leaders’ perceptions for both power and ideology in turn.

power changes Soviet relative power grew following World War II with a sharp increase from 1946 to 1948. U.S. strength was greater than the Soviet Union’s throughout the period. The United States and the Soviet Union were not the only two potential centers of power in the world, though. Analysts recognized the power potential of Western Europe and Japan, as well as the importance of resources and strategic locations in the Middle East.30 Initially, Soviet power did not dwarf that of Britain or Western Europe. Figure 1 shows modiªed composite indicator of national capability scores—a rough measure for material power— for Britain, Western Europe (France, Italy, and West Germany), Japan, and the Soviet Union. The data show that British capabilities alone approached Soviet capabilities immediately after the war before falling off sharply during 1946 and 1947. The Soviet Union maintained a roughly 2 to 1 advantage over the combined capabilities of France, Italy, and West Germany throughout 1945–53. The Soviet advantage was not merely the result of superior military forces, as important as those forces are to a nation’s power. Figure 2 shows potential power, which excludes military capabilities, for the same countries. Again, Soviet power increases and British power declines. Soviet potential in the period is much larger than that of its neighbors, and remains superior even if France, Italy, and West Germany combined their nonmilitary capabilities quickly and seamlessly.31 U.S. perceptions of these trends were generally accurate. Indeed, policymakers often anticipated actual capabilities. For example, in May 1944 Adm. William Leahy commented on the “recent phenomenal development of hereto-

30. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 [1982]), chaps. 1–3. 31. For the claim that it is more difªcult to aggregate economic capabilities than it is military capabilities, see Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Com- munity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 151–153.

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Figure 1. Eurasian Relative Capabilities

SOURCES: “Correlates of War, National Material Capabilities, 1816–2007,” ver. 4.0, http:// www.correlatesofwar.org; Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750–1993, 4th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa. Asia, and Oceania, 1750–1993, 3d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); Satoshi Niioka, “Japan’s Defence Spending,” in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, eds., The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 253–275; and The United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960). NOTES: Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) scores report each state’s fraction of total world capabilities in a given year. Six categories make up the score: total population, urban population, steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. I modified the CINC scores to include data for West Germany (1945–53) and Japan (1946–51). I calculated the data for each category and revised world totals for those years using the guidelines in the National Material Capabilities Codebook, ver. 4.0. I estimated Japanese military expenditures in 1950–51 by calculating spending per soldier in 1952 and multiplying that rate by the number of military personnel in 1950–51. “Western Europe” includes France, Italy, and West Germany.

fore latent Russian military and economic strength...which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources.”32 Less than a year later, in April 1945, the Ofªce of Strategic Services concluded that “Russia’s natural resources and manpower are so great that within relatively few years she can be much more powerful than either Germany or Japan has ever been.”33 In the United States, there was some concern in mid-1945 that any combination of West European powers—Germany was absent—would leave “Russia prepon-

32. “Excerpts from Leahy to Hull,” May 16, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce, 1960), p. 265. 33. Quoted in Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 151.

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Figure 2. Eurasian Potential Power

SOURCES: Correlates of War, National Material Capabilities, 1816–2007, ver. 4.0, http:// www.correlatesofwar.org; Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750–1993, 4th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); Brian R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa. Asia, and Oceania, 1750–1993, 3d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); and The United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1960 (New York: United Nations, 1960). NOTES: The potential power score reports each state’s fraction of total world potential power in a given year. Potential power includes total population, energy consumption, and steel production. I calculated data for each category and world totals for those years using the guidelines in the National Material Capabilities Codebook, ver. 4.0, http://www .correlatesofwar.org.

derantly strong.”34 The Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) estimated in July 1946 that the Soviets would develop “their economic capabilities and latent military potential more rapidly than any other great power.”35 By 1947, ofªcials simply took it for granted that the Soviets were the dominant power in Europe. “There are only two powers left,” Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson remarked in February.36 These trends were particularly worrisome given the vul- nerability of the U.S. homeland to inevitable advances in air and atomic power.37 Indeed, sooner than many expected, the Soviets ended the U.S. atomic monopoly in 1949. Alongside Soviet conventional military improve-

34. “British Plan for a Western European Bloc,” undated [probably July 1945], FRUS, 1945: Confer- ence of Berlin, Vol. 1, p. 259. 35. JIS 85/26, “Capabilities and Intentions of the USSR in the Postwar Period,” July 9, 1946, Re- cords of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RJCS), pt. 2: 1946–53, reel 1. 36. Quoted in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 393. 37. See, for example, “Memorandum by the JCS,” March 27, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 1, p. 1161.

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ments, Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), remarked in 1950 that increasing Soviet capabilities meant that in a global war “we might be in danger of losing.”38 Yet there were initially reasons to believe that Britain or some combination of West European states might emerge as a counterweight to Russia. For one thing, Soviet devastation from the war led U.S. ofªcials to believe that the Soviet Union was unlikely to “embark on adventurist foreign policies which . . . might involve the USSR in a conºict or a critical armament race with the great western powers” anytime soon.39 Beyond this, U.S. views of British recovery were cautiously optimistic. In March 1945 Lauchlin Currie, an assistant to President Franklin Roosevelt, visited Britain and reported in April that the postwar economic situation looked relatively positive.40 U.S. pressure during British-U.S. loan negotiations in late 1945 stemmed in part from the belief that Britain was strong enough ªnancially to accede to U.S. requests. Britain was still considered one of the great powers, albeit the weakest, into 1946. Many U.S. ofªcials thought that Britain had a rough road ahead but one it could travel.41 Various British ofªcials shared this view. In 1945 and 1946, as Anthony Adamthwaite notes, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Ofªce believed that “recovery as a great power would be a long uphill task but none the less a practical goal.”42 There were also reasons for optimism elsewhere in Europe, although it is important not to overstate the case; U.S. ofªcials understood that the damage was signiªcant.43 Yet throughout 1945 and 1946, reports continually surfaced that

38. Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945– 1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 98. On Soviet conventional capabilities, see Philip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, “The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945–1963,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 399–429. 39. JIS 85/26, “Capabilities and Intentions of the USSR in the Postwar Period.” 40. “Report by Lauchlin Currie on Conversations with British Ofªcials, March 1945,” April 24, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, pp. 36–40. 41. On ªnancial recovery, see “Phase II Commitments to the British,” undated [probably June or July 1945], FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, p. 808. On discussions with the British on postwar ªnances, see ibid., pp. 812–814; “Truman to Churchill,” July 17, 1945, ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 1179– 1180; and “Acheson to Winant,” September 14, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, pp. 126–127. On great power, see “Excerpts from Leahy to Hull,” May 16, 1944, FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, pp. 264–266; “Memorandum by Matthews,” April 1, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 1, especially p. 1170; and John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 55. For general statements, see Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 61– 63; and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino- American Conºict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 32–36. 42. Anthony Adamthwaite, “Britain and the World, 1945–1949: The View from the Foreign Ofªce,” International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 231. 43. Melvyn P. Lefºer, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), pp. 57–58.

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production would return and even exceed prewar levels. Early U.S. surveys noted with surprise how much industry, even in Germany, had survived the war. Various locations seemed, at ªrst, to recover relatively quickly.44 In June 1945 Robert Murphy, the U.S. political adviser in Germany, reported that coal production goals in the Western zones could be met and that the “situation is far better than many had anticipated.”45 That same month ofªcials reported that northern Italy, where the bulk of industry was located, “was not badly devastated and that with only moderate support from abroad...theItalians can themselves undertake the major effort in restoring industry and agricul- ture to production and reactivating the transportation system.”46 The illusion of recovery began evaporating in the spring of 1946 and, following an extremely harsh winter, was gone by the beginning of 1947. In April 1946 Murphy explained that German coal production was one-third of previous targets; ofªcials watched as the situation did not improve over the course of the year.47 In March Acheson explained to Congress that the “commercial and ªnancial situation is worse than any of us thought a year ago it would be.”48 In September the U.S. ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffery, reported that the “widespread feeling [during the summer] that while difªcult days still lay ahead, the corner had been turned and [the] French economy was on the upgrade” had given way. The “rose tinted lenses through which the French public viewed developments,” he added, “had turned to gray.”49 Britain’s ªnancial difªculties continued to grow worse. By 1947, as Adamthwaite notes, British ofªcials accepted that “weaknesses seemingly provisional in 1945 were now judged permanent.”50 In February 1947 Acheson put the point more bluntly: “The British are ªnished. They are through.”51 Af- ter returning from Europe in May, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton argued that it was “now obvious that we grossly un- derestimated the destruction to the European economy by the war.”52 In July the Policy Planning Staff conceded that there had been “an underestimation, for which we ourselves share responsibility, of the extent of war-time damage

44. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), pp. 83–86. 45. “Murphy to Clayton,” June 29, 1945, FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, pp. 621–622. See also “Murphy to the Secretary of State ad Interim,” June 28, 1945, ibid., pp. 614–621. 46. “Grew to Truman,” June 18, 1945, ibid., p. 686. 47. “Murphy to Byrnes,” April 28, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, pp. 776–777; and “Murphy to Byrnes,” September 10, 1946, ibid., pp. 791–792. 48. Quoted in Lefºer, For the Soul of Mankind, p. 60. 49. “Caffery to Byrnes,” October 29, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, pp. 468–470. 50. Adamthwaite, “Britain and the World, 1945–1949,” p. 231. 51. Quoted in Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 393. See also “Acheson to Patterson,” March 5, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 197–198. 52. “Clayton to Acheson,” May 27, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, p. 230.

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and of the cost of reconstruction.”53 Thereafter, there was a general sense throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s that the balance, particularly the military balance, in Europe would continue to shift in the Soviets’ favor.54

ideological changes Strictly speaking, there were no shifts in underlying ideology: the United States was a liberal state and the Soviet Union a Communist state. Indeed, the main ideological argument is simply that U.S. liberalism encountered Soviet Communism and thereafter the United States settled on a policy of confrontation. There were, however, possible ideological shifts during this period. The makeup of the U.S. government—the key individuals and dominant parties— could have precipitated policy shifts. Although all U.S. leaders tended to embrace a broad version of liberalism, they did so to different degrees. For instance, many scholars consider Truman, for better or worse, less subtle than Roosevelt and especially committed to U.S. liberalism.55 Another potential breakpoint was the change in congressional leadership in 1947 to Republican and then back to Democratic in 1949. Although the Republican Party maintained a strong isolationist element, its location on the political right in the United States made it more “distant” to Communism and more committed to certain liberal tenets than the Democratic Party.56 Increases in Communist popularity abroad represented a ªnal possible ideological change. Communism surged in popularity during the war and reached a peak immediately thereafter.57 From there, as ªgure 3 demonstrates, its electoral support ºattened out, and in many countries was not large. In addition to these factors, there were important possible changes in the perceptions of Soviet ideology. Cooperation during World War II improved the image of the Soviet Union in the United States among policymakers and the public at large.58 Growing awareness of the “true” nature of the Soviet system should have driven changes in policy. Several Soviet actions were im-

53. PPS/4, “Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Program from the United States Stand- point,” July 23, 1947, in Anna Nelson, ed., State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, Vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1983), p. 33. 54. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 3. 55. See Spalding, The First Cold Warrior; and Arnold Offner, “‘Another Such Victory’: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 127–155. 56. For a discussion, see Kane, Between Virtue and Power, chap. 13. 57. Lefºer, For the Soul of Mankind, p. 59; and Judt, Postwar, pp. 79–80. 58. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), chap. 2.

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Figure 3. Communist Electoral Strength

SOURCE: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History (New York: Free Press, 1974). ELECTIONS: Britain: July 1945, February 1950, October 1951—House of Commons France: October 1945 and June 1946—Constituent Assembly. November 1946 and June 1951—National Assembly West Germany: August 1949, September 1953—Bundestag Italy: June 1946, April 1948, June 1953—Camera Dei Deputati Japan: April 1946, April 1947, January 1949, October 1952, April 1953—House of Representatives *The 1948 results reflect combined vote total for Italian Communist Party and Italian Social- ist Party in electoral alliance.

portant in this respect; the most obvious was Soviet repression beyond the Soviet Union’s borders, which highlighted the different conceptions of moral- ity and legitimacy of force between the ideologies. It also signaled resistance to the U.S. liberalizing project. In addition, broad statements by the Soviets about irreconcilable differences or capitalist encirclement could have caused a reassessment of the nature of Soviet ideology and U.S. policy.

From Ally to Adversary: U.S. Policy and the Soviet Union

This section sketches U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Broadly speaking, the United States pursued a spheres-of-inºuence policy through early 1946. Thereafter, U.S. policymakers responded to Soviet expansionist attempts and steadily increased the scope of its confrontational policies in response to increases in Soviet capabilities. Throughout this period, the United States en- couraged European integration to restore the balance of power and create a

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force capable of checking the Soviets.59 By the end of 1950, though, the United States had created a U.S.-led industrial and military bloc opposed to the Soviet Union. As Secretary of State Acheson remarked, there had been “a complete revolution in American foreign policy.”60 Changes in the balance of power were primarily responsible for the varia- tions in U.S. behavior. The pattern of U.S. activity roughly matches the changes in relative capabilities highlighted above. Beyond this congruence, U.S. leaders generally pursued policies based on balance of power logic. Ideological concerns, while certainly present, played a secondary role.

spheres of inºuence The United States did not initially confront the Soviet Union. Nowhere was this restraint more apparent than in Eastern Europe. There the United States pursued a spheres-of-inºuence peace with the Soviets. During the war, President Roosevelt conceived a postwar order dominated by “four police- men”—Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States—responsible for maintaining peace and stability in their respective regions. Roosevelt occa- sionally prodded the Soviets on issues in Eastern Europe but was unwilling to press forcefully. After Roosevelt’s death, various ofªcials attempted to push Truman to adopt a more confrontational position toward the Soviet Union. The ªrst opportunity came during two meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in April 1945. In his memoirs, Truman recounted that he dictated a hard-line policy to a shocked Molotov during the second meeting on April 23. Evidence from Soviet and U.S. records, however, indicates that Truman spoke ªrmly, but there was no break in relations.61 Following the cor- dial ªrst meeting, Truman met with his advisers and explained that he had “no intention of delivering an ultimatum to Mr. Molotov.”62 Indeed, the main mes- sage Molotov took from the talks, as Geoffrey Roberts notes, was that “the new American president was going to continue Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union.”63 Throughout 1945 and into 1946, U.S. policy toward speciªc East European countries reºected this position. In May 1945 Truman dispatched the ailing

59. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 115–119, 146–149; and James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), especially pp. 135–150. 60. “Acheson to Truman,” September 15, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 3, p. 1229. Acheson was discuss- ing U.S. military commitments, but the statement is broadly applicable. 61. Geoffrey Roberts, “Sexing up the Cold War: New Evidence on the Molotov-Truman Talks of April 1945,” Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (April 2004), pp. 105–125. 62. “Memorandum by Bohlen,” April 22, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, pp. 253–254. 63. Roberts, “Sexing up the Cold War,” pp. 112–113.

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Harry Hopkins to discuss the Polish issue with the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The Hopkins mission resulted in token adjustments but no genuine change.64 On July 5 the United States recognized the Polish Provisional Government. As Marc Trachtenberg points out, at the Potsdam conference later that month, “the key question of whether a communist police state was going to be im- posed on [Poland] was not dealt with in any serious way. The Polish problem . . . had been ‘settled.’”65 The same understanding applied to Bulgaria and Romania. True, the United States issued statements during and after Potsdam supporting free and fair elections. In August 1945, local U.S. ofªcials were given permission to convey the United States’ pro-democracy sentiments to Bulgarian and Romanian ofªcials.66 In both cases, Secretary of State James Byrnes soon worried that U.S. representatives were pushing too vigorously. In Romania he ordered U.S. ofªcials to reduce contacts with anti-Communist groups and convey that the United States hoped that “measures which might further provoke Soviet ofªcials will be avoided.”67 In Bulgaria the U.S. representative, Maynard Barnes, worked to postpone unfair elections scheduled for August 26. Byrnes tried to restrain Barnes on August 24, asserting that the United States “did not contemplate our making speciªc request for postponement of elections.”68 Barnes had succeeded earlier that day, though. Faced with new facts on the ground, Byrnes accepted postponement. No substantive changes resulted, though, and the United States largely let the matter pass. Indeed, pressure on the Soviet Union throughout the fall reºected a tough bargaining position rather than any major new aggressive policy. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow that December, Byrnes agreed to recognize the communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania.69 General U.S. policy was not confrontational either. The United States consistently refused to push Allied troops forward in Europe for postwar bargaining leverage. Indeed, on the very day Truman allegedly dressed down Molotov, he informed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that U.S. troops would not go beyond negotiated lines.70 On May 11, 1945, Truman approved an order

64. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 154–162. 65. Marc Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945: A Reassessment,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 2008), p. 104. 66. “Byrnes to Barnes,” August 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 4, pp. 282–283; and “Byrnes to Mel- bourne,” August 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, pp. 565–566. 67. “Byrnes to Melbourne,” August 25, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 594. 68. “Byrnes to Barnes,” August 24, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 4, p. 309. 69. Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945,” pp. 105–115, 124–132; and Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 269–276. 70. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 111–112, 129–131, 138–139.

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suspending most lend-lease aid to the Soviets. Far from attempting to use aid as leverage, though, the United States quickly softened the order and made considerable effort to allay Soviet suspicions. Furthermore, the order largely reºected congressional constraints limiting lend-lease deliveries for use on active fronts. Indeed, these constraints affected aid to Britain as well. Churchill cabled Truman in July that “the Departments in Washington have recently been insisting that nothing can be delivered save what is needed for direct use against Japan, and interpreting this in the narrowest possible sense; this has reduced munitions supplies almost to [the] vanishing point, and has put us in a very difªcult position.”71 Following the Japanese defeat, the United States again brieºy terminated lend-lease to Russia. Aid resumed on an equal basis with other countries a short time later without attempts to elicit concessions.72 To further underscore the lack of a general confrontational policy, the United States continued to pursue agreements with the Soviets after the war. In the fall of 1945, the United States made special provisions to allow the Soviets to purchase $400 million of lend-lease supplies on favorable terms.73 A frustrated Averell Harriman, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, complained in December that economic policy toward the Soviets was too generous.74 Harriman notwithstanding, the United States continued to pursue equipment sales, and a $1 billion loan remained earmarked for the Soviet Union as late as April 1946.75 Administration ofªcials, including no less a Cold Warrior than Acheson, debated sharing atomic energy details with the Soviets into 1946.76

explaining the spheres of inºuence In general, the U.S. spheres-of-inºuence policy conforms to power-based expectations. Ideological arguments expect that the United States would have opposed a spheres-of-inºuence arrangement after World War II. To the extent

71. “Churchill to Truman,” July 24, 1945, FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 2, p. 1180. See also the documents in FRUS, 1945: Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, pp. 805–820; Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 133–148, 154–155; Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), pp. 124–147; and Rob- ert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 28–30. 72. Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War, pp. 156–167. 73. “Byrnes to Harriman,” October 23, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 1044; and “Clayton to Land,” October 31, 1945, ibid., p. 1046. 74. “Harriman to Byrnes,” December 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 1049–1050. 75. On sales, see “Acheson to Byrnes,” January 17, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 6, p. 819 and p. 819 n. 82; and “McCabe to Orekhov,” February 11, 1946, ibid., p. 825–827. On loans, see “Memorandum by Leddy,” July 9, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, p. 65; National Advisory Council (NAC) Meeting, April 19, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 1427–1428; and ibid., April 25, 1946, pp. 1430–1432. 76. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 254–255, 287–288; and Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 31–35.

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that accommodation occurred, these arguments largely expect such a policy to be the result of successful wartime collaboration clouding the nature of Soviet ideology. In this case, policy should have shifted once the nature of Soviet rule became apparent. Evidence from the early postwar period contradicts these expectations. Rather, given international realities the United States accommo- dated the Soviet Union. U.S. ofªcials did not endorse Soviet behavior, but a spheres-of-inºuence system seemed feasible as long as the Soviets did not expand into strategic areas and recovery elsewhere continued. There would undoubtedly be friction as the two sides worked out boundaries, and they might never be close, but the United States did not need to pursue a hostile policy. President Roosevelt based his postwar policy on the premise that a balance of power would exist between the Soviet Union and Britain in Europe and China and the Soviet Union in Asia, with the United States occupying the priv- ileged position of balancer of last resort. He envisioned a world of several great powers, not a world where each great power shared the same ideology. To be sure, Roosevelt prodded the Soviets to allow representative governments in their sphere, but as he remarked in 1944, he “didn’t care whether the countries bordering Russia became communized.” Although Roosevelt probably did care, he was prepared to grant the Soviets a relatively free hand in Eastern Europe if doing so would extricate the United States from European affairs.77 Roosevelt’s policy attracted support as well as opposition. The majority within the State Department favored recognizing predominant Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, but hoped the Soviets would allow local political and economic autonomy. If not, some were prepared to pressure the Soviets to attain these goals.78 Other ofªcials recognized relatively quickly what Soviet domination of Eastern Europe meant, but cautioned against breaking with the Soviets over the issue. For instance, in January 1945 Secretary of War Henry Stimson anticipated that Soviet security interests would lead them to dominate Eastern Europe on terms “quite different from complete independence on the part of those countries,” and this needed to be accepted prior to broad declara- tions of principle.79 The most forceful opinion came from a U.S. embassy

77. Quoted in John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 89, see also chap. 3; Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 38–43, 61–73; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 9–13. 78. Eduard Mark, “Charles E. Bohlen and the Acceptable Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: A Memorandum of 18 October 1945,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 201–214. 79. “Stimson to Stettinius,” January 23, 1945, FRUS, 1945: Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 80. See also Stimson’s and Marshall’s comments in “Memorandum by Bohlen,” April 23, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, pp. 253–254.

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ofªcial in Moscow, George Kennan. Although the future director of the Policy Planning Staff cautioned against giving moral cover to a Soviet sphere, he argued that “I recognize that Russia’s war effort has been masterful and effective and must, to a certain extent, ªnd its reward at the expense of other peoples in eastern and central Europe.” Russian actions, he added, were “the product of tradition and environment and should be beyond the scope of moral judgment.”80 The restrained view won out. Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, of- ªcials in Washington understood that the Soviet Union was imposing police states in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, but they were unwilling to seriously confront the Soviets on the issue. Indeed, at the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in September, Secretary of State Byrnes repeatedly suggested that the Polish model might be applied to Bulgaria and Romania. In essence, in exchange for Soviet cooperation elsewhere, the United States was willing to give the Soviets a free hand in Eastern Europe.81 Truman did not signiªcantly alter U.S. policy after he became president. He certainly could have forced a more confrontational approach in 1945 and early 1946. His decision to maintain the spheres-of-inºuence approach did not result from misunderstanding the nature of the Soviet regime. Truman was immediately informed by Ambassador Harriman that “Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely inºuence on their foreign relations but the exten- sion of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc.”82 Truman understood the point. In May he noted that “I knew what I wanted—and that I intended to get it—peace for the world for at least 90 years. That Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugo-Slavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, et al[.] made no difference to U.S. interests only so far as World Peace is concerned.” Recounting speciªc instructions to Hopkins on the Polish mission, Truman remarked that “Poland ought to have a ‘free election’ at least as free as [Frank] Hague, Tom Pendergast, Joe Martin, or [Robert] Taft would allow in their respective bailywicks [sic].”83 Truman did not think that conºict with the Soviets was inevitable. “I’m not afraid of Russia,” he wrote in June 1945. “They’ve always been our friends and I can’t see any reason why they shouldn’t always be.” He added that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is no different from the Czar or Hitler....ButIdon’t care what [the Soviets] do. They evidently like their government or they

80. “Kennan to Bohlen,” January 26, 1945, George F. Kennan Papers (GFK), Seeley G. Mudd Li- brary (SGML), box 28. 81. Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945,” pp. 104–115, 121–132. 82. “Memorandum by Bohlen,” April 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 5, p. 232. 83. Truman Notes, May 23, 1945, Harry S. Truman Papers (HSTP), President’s Secretary Files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), box 281.

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wouldn’t die for it. I like ours so let’s get along.”84 The next month, Truman remarked to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that “we shall have a Slav Europe for a long time to come. I don’t think it is so bad.”85 Truman occasion- ally contemplated a harder line, but he generally remained committed to the nonconfrontational tract into 1946.86 Stalin’s February 1946 election address on renewed capitalist-communist tensions did not markedly inºuence U.S. decisionmaking. Two reports later that month outlined the basic power concerns that would drive future policy. Speciªcally, they highlighted the dangers of an unstable balance of power and Soviet expansion to vital areas. Kennan provided the most widely distributed analysis. In a lengthy dispatch from Moscow, he argued that ideology colored the Kremlin worldview, but at the “bottom of [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive sense of insecurity.” The root of Soviet expansion was “the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism.” Communism was a “ªg leaf” designed to justify policies and, with its “honeyed promises,” it offered a means for Soviet expansion on a “subterranean plane.” While impervious “to the logic of reason,” the Soviet Union remained “sensitive to the logic of force.” It could therefore be confronted without “prestige-engaging show- downs,” and because the Soviets were neither “schematic nor adventuristic,” coexistence was possible and conºict not inevitable. The key was to restore the health and vigor of countries outside the Soviet sphere. Kennan would subsequently make clear that this meant restoring a balance of power and preventing Soviet expansion.87 At the same time, the JCS reached similar conclusions. In a February 1946 report, they argued that “collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian inºuence in Europe and in the Far East.” The authors were undoubtedly aware that, strictly speaking, American principles had been compromised. Indeed, they argued that when U.S. policymakers contemplated efforts to block Soviet expansion, “the realities of nations already deªnitely penetrated by Soviet inºuence should be recognized in order that a position of antagonism may not be unfruitfully [sic] assumed.”88

84. Truman Notes, June 7, 1945, HSTP, PSF, HSTL, box 281. 85. Quoted in Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 28. 86. See Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman. 87. “Kennan to Byrnes,” February 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 6, pp. 696–709. See also “Memoran- dum by Matthews,” April 1, 1946, ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 1167–1171; and Gaddis, Strategies of Contain- ment, chap. 2. 88. “JCS to Byrnes,” March 29, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 1165–1166. The JCS sent the report to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on February 21, 1946.

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confrontation U.S. policy began to break with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1946. The ªrst major instances occurred in the Middle East. In March the United States re- versed its previously restrained policy toward Soviet forces in northern Iran and pushed for Soviet troops to withdraw. The Soviets did, and the crisis ended.89 In the summer of 1946, a more serious crisis arose over Turkey. Throughout the summer, the United States anxiously monitored Soviet force deployments. In August renewed Soviet attempts to place bases on the Turkish Straits led U.S. policymakers to formalize war plans and dispatch the United States’ newest aircraft carrier, the USS Franklin Roosevelt, to the area as a show of strength. Truman acknowledged that U.S. action could precipitate war. Here, too, the Soviets backed down. Yet the event signaled a new willingness by the United States to use force to oppose Soviet expansion.90 In February 1947 Britain informed the United States that it could no longer support Greece and Turkey. The following month, Truman requested $400 million from Congress to aid those countries in an effort to prevent Soviet expansion. The Senate approved the president’s request in April, with the House following in May.91 In mid-1946 U.S. policy began changing in Germany as well. Most U.S. ofªcials tried to cooperate with the Soviets and run Germany as a single unit through early 1946. In May 1946 Gen. Lucius Clay, head of the U.S. military government in Germany, ended reparations payments from the American zone in an effort to force Soviet cooperation in Germany or, failing that, to pull the Western zones away from the Soviets. The United States generally pursued the separation route that summer, culminating in the decision to merge the American and British zones into a single unit. The new “Bizonia” would deªnitively be outside Soviet control. A year later, U.S. and British ofªcials agreed to reject new Russian proposals for establishing a uniªed Germany. By January 1948 the two English-speaking powers were setting up quasi-governing bodies within their zones and in June announced, along with the French, the London Conference program to organize a West German state. The Soviet Union retaliated by blockading Berlin, which the United States circumvented by airlifting supplies into the city. The Soviet Union lifted the blockade in May 1949. As early as 1947, U.S. ofªcials began privately dis- cussing some form of German rearmament.92 In September 1950 Secretary of

89. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1980), pp. 304–342. 90. Eduard Mark, “The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 383–415. 91. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 146. 92. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 41–65, 73, 78; Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and

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State Acheson presented the U.S. intention to rearm West Germany to the North Atlantic Council.93 Initiatives in Germany were part of a series of larger efforts in Western Europe. In June 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall announced what would become the European Recovery Program. The program, or Marshall Plan, ended up delivering approximately $13 billion for European recovery and solidifying Western Europe as part of a bloc opposite the Soviet sphere. True, the United States extended the offer to the Soviet Union and its satellites, but U.S. ofªcials predicted the Soviets would not participate.94 In 1948 the Truman administration began discussions for an alliance with West European countries. The following April, the United States and eleven other states signed the North Atlantic Treaty.95 After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States nearly quadrupled its defense spending and committed U.S. forces to Europe.96 Beginning in 1948, various groups in the Truman administration explored plans to roll back Soviet inºuence. Ofªcials designed several programs to gather intelligence and coordinate resistance movements in the event of war.97 These were more consistent with prudence than rollback, though. More pro- vocatively, U.S. ofªcials considered a number of initiatives to liberate people living under the Soviet and satellite regimes. For instance, the covertly funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcast political messages into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively. Complementing these efforts were programs that sent balloons over the Soviet bloc to drop propaganda leaºets or fake currency. One suggestion included dropping extra-large condoms over Soviet territory in crates labeled “Made in the USA: Medium.” More subtle “Packet” programs developed in 1950–52 sought to overload the centralized Soviet system by introducing small issues at low levels, to sow discord upon Stalin’s death and to encourage defection.98 Available evidence suggests that most of these programs were somewhat ill-

the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 141–143; Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 116–121, 198–199; and Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Conn.: Green- wood, 1981), pp. 185–186. 93. See FRUS, 1950, Vol. 3, especially pp. 309–311, 316–320, and 1229–1231. 94. McAllister, No Exit, pp. 129–131. 95. Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Eu- rope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 10–12. 96. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 110–112. 97. Scattered policies began earlier. For instance, during the 1946 Turkish crisis, U.S. ofªcials es- tablished operatives to disrupt Soviet wartime operations. See Mark, “The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences,” pp. 398–411. 98. Quoted in Lucas, Freedom’s War, p. 65. On liberation operations, see ibid., pp. 64–68, 100–104, 150–151; Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 21–23, 42–45, 72–82; and Peter Grose,

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conceived and not widely implemented by the United States. Many programs were generally delayed or canceled outright by the summer of 1952. For instance, U.S. programs utilized few refugees, and when reviewing plans for action upon Stalin’s, death President Eisenhower remarked, “We have no plan.” Many inside and outside government questioned the U.S. commitment to liberation.99 Gordon Gray, who, as former director of the Psychological Strategy Board, was tasked with coordinating many such operations, wrote in 1952 that “I argued very strongly during the period that I served as Director...that containment was not enough. However, I am not sure that I succeeded in convinc- ing anyone but myself and my associates in the staff of the Board.”100 U.S. policy in Japan began to shift in 1947 as well. After World War II, the United States governed Japan independently.101 Initial policy focused heavily on economic liberalization, notably by breaking up producer cartels, and democratization. Beginning in 1947, U.S. policymakers began rethinking this focus. By 1948 policy shifted toward greater emphasis on economic and industrial recovery, slowing or reversing several reforms. In 1949 the United States started taking serious steps to incorporate Japan into the evolving U.S. military defense against the Soviets. The United States consistently pressured Japan to create some military forces. The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated these efforts. When the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan in September 1951, it also signed a security treaty providing U.S. basing rights in Japan and the surrounding area.102

explaining confrontation Balance of power logic largely explains the U.S. decision to confront the Soviet Union. U.S. efforts to challenge the Soviets grew as the balance of power worsened. Truman administration ofªcials thought that a deliberate Soviet attack was unlikely but worried that war could still occur through miscalculation.103 More threatening was Soviet expansion through control of Communist parties in Europe and Japan, a fear that the deteriorating economic situation exacer-

Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 2000), pp. 123–135, 151–187. 99. Quoted in Mitrovich, “Undermining the Kremlin,” p. 126, see also pp. 114–116; Lucas, Free- dom’s War, pp. 140–154; and Scott Lucas and Kaeten Mistry, “Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy, and Political Warfare in the Early Cold War, 1946–1950,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 56–57, 62–65. 100. Quoted in Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, p. 114. 101. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 8. 102. Schaller, Altered States, pp. 12–46; and Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, chap. 8. 103. See, for example, Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power.

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bated.104 Ideological arguments do predict several of the liberation initiatives that policymakers considered. Yet, these policies were rarely seriously pursued. To the extent that top ofªcials explored these options, they largely rested on desires to reduce Soviet power as the balance of power in Europe worsened. Changes in U.S. leadership or fears of Communism did not cause major changes in U.S. policy. The brief Republican ascendancy in Congress from 1947 to 1949 undoubtedly led to an increase in anti-Communist rhetoric.105 Yet confrontation with the Soviet Union began before this period and did not abate after Democrats regained control. Fears of American Communists endangering American democracy did not drive foreign policy. True, Soviet espionage concerned ofªcials. The “loyalty programs” that emerged in 1947 and the later excesses of McCarthyism arose primarily for domestic political reasons, however. Truman and several top lieutenants offered some resistance with little success.106 “There is only one [Communist] in a million of our population,” Truman noted in 1945. He then added, “I’d like to send them to Russia....But I can’t do that and wouldn’t if I could.”107 The United States’ policies in Iran, Turkey, and Greece centered on strategic concerns. The Soviet refusal to withdraw troops from northern Iran threatened the resource-rich Middle East. The March 1946 confrontation, though serious, was settled by diplomacy as the two sides worked out the boundaries of their spheres.108 Soviet control of Turkey could close off shipping routes and access to resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. “Strategically,” the JCS argued, “Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.”109 In 1946 the Joint Chiefs advocated supporting the British in the area since the “defeat or disintegration of the British

104. Perceptions of Soviet control over Communist parties were often accurate. See Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 73–76; Silvio Pons, “Stalin and the Italian Communists,” in Melvyn P. Lefºer and David Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 205–220; Fernande Sheid Raine, “Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran,” Cold War History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 2001), pp. 1–38; and Douglas J. Macdonald, “Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 163–166. 105. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 49–54. 106. Melvyn P. Lefºer, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp. 78–80, 92–93, 119–121; and Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994), pp. 299–305. 107. Truman Notes, June 7, 1945, HSTP, PSF, HSTL, box 281. 108. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp. 320–340; and Trachtenberg, A Con- structed Peace, p. 54. 109. “JCS to Patterson and Forrestal,” August 23, 1946, enclosed in “Patterson and Kenney to Acheson,” August 28, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 7, p. 857; and “Acheson to Byrnes,” August 15, 1946, ibid., pp. 840–842.

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Empire would eliminate from Eurasia the last bulwark of resistance between the United States and Soviet expansion.”110 It was a short leap, then, to the United States’ February 1947 decision to support Turkey directly when the British no longer could.111 Security concerns dominated discussion in Greece as well. Greece was important because it was “the only country of the Balkans which has not yet fallen under Soviet hegemony.” If Greece fell, then the U.S. position in Turkey and the entire Eastern Mediterranean would be in jeopardy.112 Although Soviet action in Greece was somewhat restrained, U.S. policymakers linked the Communist insurgency there to Soviet expansion. In “the opinion of veteran U.S. representatives [the Communist-dominated] EAM [National Liberation Front] is not a ‘friend’ or ally of the USSR; it is an in- strument of Soviet policy.”113 U.S. ofªcials placed special emphasis on Germany’s power potential. Even at Yalta, as Tony Judt notes, the United States and the Soviet Union left postwar German arrangements “off the table precisely because it was so important and intractable.”114 U.S. ofªcials were simply not willing to see Germany’s power potential absorbed into the Soviet sphere.115 In February 1948 Marshall described “such an eventuality as the greatest threat to security of all Western Nations, including US.”116 Yet it was by no means obvious in 1945 and into 1946 that this would result in the Western-controlled German zones aligned against the Soviets. The decision to move away from cooperation with the Soviets in Germany and merge the British- and U.S.-controlled zones to facilitate recovery stemmed from a conºuence of factors. To begin with, the United States could not indeªnitely pay the economic and political costs incurred from running its occupation zone. State Department ofªcials also feared that the Soviets sought to capitalize on continued economic and political paralysis to extend their inºu- ence into the Western zones. “What the Russians want in Germany,” Kennan argued, “is...power both to control internal affairs and to govern Germany’s international behavior.”117 It was also apparent that continued German stagna-

110. Quoted in Mark, “The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences,” p. 392. 111. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 34–36. 112. “Memorandum Regarding Greece,” October 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 7, p. 242; and “Byrnes to Clayton,” September 24, 1946, ibid., p. 224. 113. “Memorandum on Greece,” March 3, 1947, in Dennis Merrill, ed., Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, Vol. 8 (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1996), p. 20. 114. Judt, Postwar, p. 102 (emphasis in original). 115. Creswell, A Question of Balance, p. 34; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 59; and Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 115. 116. “Marshall to U.S. Embassy in London,” February 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. 2, p. 72. 117. “Kennan to Ofªe,” May 10, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5., pp. 555–556. See also the documents in ibid., pp. 505–507, 516–520, 527–528, 535–536, 539–540, 550–555.

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tion was hindering the general European recovery and furthering the Soviet relative power advantage.118 Thereafter U.S. policy continued to evolve to secure German military- industrial resources for the West. In July 1947 the secretaries of state, war, and the navy agreed that the “economic revival of Europe depends in considerable part on a recovery in German production.”119 German recovery and loyalty to the West, though, required not only economic cooperation among the Western zones but also some promise of German political control over those zones. These needs drove Western policy in 1947 and 1948, culminating in the London Conference program and ultimately a West German state.120 State and defense ofªcials gradually came to the conclusion that German military forces were necessary as well. Acheson explained to the British and French foreign ministers in September 1950 that “an attempt to defend Western Europe without German participation was impossible.” Without German forces, “the simple arithmetic would not work out.”121 The United States did not blindly push German recovery after 1946 or trust in German democratization, however. The challenge, as U.S. ofªcials saw it, was twofold. A strong Germany might one day threaten its neighbors. Worse still, Germany might align with the Soviets. This was a serious problem: German recovery was necessary to restore a balance of power in Europe, but German recovery threatened to upset the future balance of power. The solution, gradually recognized and accepted, emerged in a series of U.S. initiatives to revive West Germany free from Soviet inºuence and to tie it to Western Europe through overlapping institutional controls.122 As Charles Bohlen, then counselor for the Department of State, explained to top military ofªcials in August 1947, “[T]he three Western zones of Germany should be regarded not as part of Germany but as part of Western Europe.”123 The ªrst major U.S. initiative toward Western Europe as a bloc, the Marshall Plan, dealt with several problems at once. First, U.S. ofªcials feared that the economic crisis in Western Europe in 1947 would redound to the beneªt of the Soviets. Indeed, as Marshall recalled, “[T]he Soviets were doing everything

118. On Bizonia, see Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 297–298; Trachtenberg, A Con- structed Peace, pp. 41–55; and Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 116–121. 119. Quoted in Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, p. 156. 120. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 55–79; and Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 151– 157, 198–203. 121. “Minutes of a Private Conference,” September 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 3, pp. 299, 294. 122. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, chaps. 2–4; Cresswell, A Question of Balance, pp. 13–21; McAllister, No Exit, chap. 4; Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 151–157, 230–233, 277–285; and Melvyn P. Lefºer, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,” Diplo- matic History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 277–306. 123. “Memorandum by Bohlen,” August 30, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 1, pp. 762–763.

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possible to achieve a complete breakdown in Europe.”124 European recovery thus promised to combat “the economic maladjustment...which Russian communism is now exploiting.”125 Second, U.S. insistence that the Europeans develop a common economic program ensured that German, British, and French recovery was tied together. This would harness German industry, limit German freedom of action, and further European integration. Finally, U.S. ofªcials believed that the Soviets would refuse to participate and would pro- hibit their satellites from doing so. In that event, Western leaders could blame Europe’s division on the Soviets.126 At the same time, U.S. policy toward the military defense of Western Europe evolved. British and French ofªcials consistently sought concrete commitments from the United States to the continent. Soviet opposition to Western initiatives caused the Truman administration to acquiesce and enter negotiations for a military alliance in 1948. These negotiations culminated in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. Even then, the United States continued to encourage the emergence of European forces capable of balancing the Soviets independently and did not permanently commit U.S. troops to the continent.127 Several factors undermined the offshore strategy. American war plans called for U.S. forces to evacuate the continent followed by an American air atomic campaign. In April 1949 General Bradley remarked that this risked creating “nothing better than impotent and disillusioned Allies in the event of war.”128 Arguments for larger ground forces to defend Europe also gained momentum after the Soviets ended the U.S. atomic monopoly in August 1949.129 The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 drove home the inadequacy of existing U.S. forces and further heightened anxiety about European defense capabilities. U.S. forces were able to respond in Korea but, as Acheson noted, the United States “would have a terrible time doing anything” elsewhere, including Europe.130 Moreover, as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee pointed out, U.S.

124. Quoted in Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, p. 311. 125. PPS/1, “Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe,” May 23, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 5. 126. On these points, see McAllister, No Exit, pp. 124–141; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 62–65; Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, chap. 2; and Lefºer, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan,” pp. 277–306. 127. Creswell, A Question of Balance, pp. 10–13; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 83–86, 114– 119; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 70–72; and Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, pp. 66–114, 183–184. 128. Quoted in Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 101. 129. Creswell, A Question of Balance, pp. 22–26; and Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 86–103. 130. Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 108. On concerns over European resolve, see enclosure in “Matthews to Burns,” August 16, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 3, pp. 212–219; and “Pace, Matthews, and Finletter to Johnson,” August 1, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 1, especially p. 356. On military readiness, see Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 376–379; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 99–

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involvement in Korea meant that the “capability to implement [U.S.] war plans for global war has been drastically reduced.”131 All of this suggested that the existing capabilities were inadequate: the United States could no longer rely on an atomic shield, and the Soviets might win a war with superior standing forces. Together these pressures produced increases in U.S. defense spending and a deeper commitment to Europe. U.S. ofªcials concluded that Europe would have to be defended on the ground. This pushed German rearmament, occa- sionally discussed as early as 1947, to the top of the agenda. In July 1950 Acheson noted to Truman that the “question was not whether Germany should be brought into the general defensive plan but how this could be done without disrupting anything else we are doing and without putting Germany into a position to act as the balance of power in Europe.”132 Top British and French ofªcials agreed with the Americans on the necessity of raising some German forces; but they, and especially the French, insisted that U.S. forces de- ploy to the continent. Only a U.S. commitment could safeguard against both Soviet attack and independent German forces. A series of compromises during late 1950 created an integrated military structure under a U.S. commander and with U.S. troops committed to the continent. Intra-alliance politics caused the process, particularly German rearmament, to move forward in ªts and starts. Yet the basic premise undergirding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s development remained the incorporation of German power with adequate U.S. safeguards to balance against the Soviets.133 In Eastern Europe, U.S. liberation initiatives were relatively anemic largely because of the pragmatic nature of their goals. U.S. policy primarily aimed to reduce the Soviet ability to project power into Europe rather than attack Communism. In 1949 the National Security Council (NSC) contended that East European communist regimes were a threat “because they are in varying degrees politico-military adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power into the heart of Europe.”134 Acheson argued in 1950 that “if we could get them [the Soviets] back into Russia...wewould be in a far superior position militarily,

100; Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, pp. 184–185; and Pollard, Economic Security and the Or- igins of the Cold War, p. 241. 131. JCS 1924/20, enclosure A, July 14, 1950, Declassiªed Documents Reference System, http:// gdc.gale.com/products/declassiªed-documents-reference-system/. 132. “Memorandum by Acheson,” July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 3, pp. 167–168. 133. Creswell, A Question of Balance; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, chaps. 3–4; Gaddis, Strat- egies of Containment, p. 112; and Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, chaps. 5–6. 134. NSC 58/2, “United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” De- cember 8, 1949 (December 13, 1949), Presidential Directives, Digital National Security Archives, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do. I list the NSC document date ªrst and, if it was approved as U.S. policy, list the date of Truman’s approval in parentheses.

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that even if they did not withdraw all the way into Russia but remained in Poland, we would be much better off than with them now near the borders of the Rhine.”135 NSC 10/5 explained that the general purpose for covert operations was to “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Communist China; and when and where appropriate...contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and inºuence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security.”136 Thus, while U.S. ofªcials continued to hope for liberal regimes in the long run, the main goal was the reduction and “elimination of Soviet control” over the satellites even if the regimes remained “communist in nature.”137 It is unsurprising that liberation policies attracted interest from U.S. policymakers but little action. After all, U.S. ofªcials were sincerely concerned over the deteriorating balance of power and desired to avoid permanent military commitments to Europe. If Soviet power and force projection decreased, then the pressure on the United States and Western Europe would lessen.138 Ulti- mately, most ofªcials came to doubt the efªcacy of liberation programs, essentially agreeing with Paul Nitze, director of the Policy Planning Staff, that “we should not over-estimate the effectiveness of the activities we can pursue within the Soviet orbit, and should proceed with caution and a careful weigh- ing of the risks in pressing upon what the Kremlin probably regards as its vital interests.”139 In Asia, U.S. concern centered on Japan’s power potential. In the spring of 1947, Forrestal noted that U.S. thinking on Germany’s recovery “applied with equal force to Japan.”140 This view was widely shared. Kennan considered Japan one of the “ªve centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from the standpoint of national secu-

135. “Memorandum by Acheson,” March 24, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 1, p. 209. 136. NSC 10/5, October 23, 1951 (October 23, 1951). See also NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, p. 1. 137. NSC 58/2, pp. 2, 13; and “NSC Progress Report on Implementation of NSC 58/2,” February 3, 1950, HSTP, PSF, HSTL, box 179. 138. This partially explains Kennan’s interest in liberation projects. For instance, in 1948 Kennan proposed a demilitarized Germany followed by U.S. and Soviet troop withdrawals to remove So- viet military power from central Europe. Covert operations to break up the Soviet bloc pursued the same goal through different means. Many ofªcials were willing to explore options to break up Soviet power, but they opposed Kennan’s plan because they refused to risk losing Germany. For a discussion, see McAllister, No Exit, pp. 156–169; Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 229–237; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 73–75. 139. “Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security,” July 30, 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 71; and NSC 135/3, “Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security,” September 25, 1952 (September 25, 1952), p. 9. 140. Quoted in Schaller, Altered States, p. 12

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rity.”141 Acheson explained in 1949 that if “Japan [was] added to the Commu- nist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of signiªcantly altering the balance of world power.”142 From 1947 onward the United States focused on revitalizing and securing Japan as a strategic ally. Policymakers considered that the primary U.S. “objectives with respect to Japan are its denial to the Soviet Union and the mainte- nance of Japan’s orientation toward the Western powers.”143 As the balance of power worsened and Japanese recovery stalled, many in Washington grew concerned that the “present purge and de-cartelization policies, in particular, run counter to the requirements of future stability and economic vigor in Japan.”144 If Japan remained weak, the Soviets could apply direct pressure or utilize Communist parties to co-opt the country. These concerns caused the United States to slow or reverse various liberalizing reforms and instead focus on building a politically and economically stable state tied to the West.145 U.S. ofªcials, particularly in the military, also focused on Japan’s defense. This included growing pressure for some form of Japanese rearmament and basing rights for U.S. forces. The Korean War solidiªed Japan’s place in the United States’ defense strategy. Japan served as a staging area for U.S. troops, and Japanese industry grew in response to U.S. defense procurement. The Japanese acquiesced to U.S. pressure to create some armed forces, though the numbers remained far below what many in the United States sought.146 These U.S. initiatives in the Near East, Western Europe, and Japan were part of an evolving general strategy to restore the balance of power to prevent Soviet expansion. Importantly, the focus was not on overturning the Soviet regime. The Policy Planning Staff noted in November 1947 that U.S. concern stemmed from the Russians “taking advantage of the power vacuums left by the collapse of Germany and Japan” and postwar “radicalism” to expand Soviet inºuence. Marshall presented the report to the cabinet and argued that U.S. policy should “be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe

141. George F. Kennan, “Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy,” September 17, 1948, GFK, SGML, box 17. 142. “Acheson to Franks,” December 24, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 927. 143. PPS, “Department of State Comments on NSC 49,” September 30, 1949, Vol. 3, p. 183. For similar JCS views, see NSC 49, “Current Strategic Evaluation of the U.S. Security Needs in Japan,” June 15, 1949, p. 2. 144. PPS/10, “Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settle- ment,” October 14, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 113. 145. Schaller, Altered States, pp. 12–18, 37–38; Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of Ameri- can Foreign Policy, pp. 250–270; and Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 255–258. 146. Schaller, Altered States, pp. 24–46; Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American For- eign Policy, pp. 270–273; and Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 333–336, 426–433.

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and Asia.”147 A month later Forrestal agreed: “Without laying blame or responsibility upon anyone, the fact remains that we have destroyed the balance of power in the world....That balance of power has to be restored.”148 In August 1948, NSC 20/4 stated that “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subver- sive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.” U.S. policy “in time of peace as well as in time of war” was to “reduce the power and inºuence of the USSR.”149 Subsequent policy statements in NSC 68 and NSC 135/3 reiterated these claims.150

Communism beyond the Soviet Empire

U.S. policy toward Communist regimes and parties during the Truman administration presents a puzzle for ideological explanations. Contrary to these explanations, the United States engaged Communist regimes to balance Soviet power and did not initially target Communist parties in Western Europe. Con- sistent with power explanations, the United States sought to engage independent Communist regimes to undercut Soviet capabilities and, beginning in mid- 1946, exerted pressure on West European Communists to prevent Soviet expansion.

yugoslavia U.S. concern with Soviet power rather than Communism per se manifested it- self most clearly in policy toward Yugoslavia. On June 28, 1948, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau. State Department of- ªcials worried that an aggressive rapprochement would expose Yugoslavia’s leader, Josip Tito, to charges that he was a tool for American imperialism, while isolation might topple his regime or return Yugoslavia to Moscow’s control.151

147. PPS/13, “Résumé of the World Situation,” November 6, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 1, at p. 771. 148. “Testimony of Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, before the President’s Air Power Commission,” December 3, 1947, James V. Forrestal Papers, SGML, box 44. 149. NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Secu- rity,” November 23, 1948 (November 24, 1948), pp. 9–10. For discussions noting that U.S. policy did not require eliminating the Communist regime, see PPS/38, “United States Objectives with Respect to Russia,” August 18, 1948, Vol. 2, pp. 373–375, 392–394; and PPS draft, “A Strategic Con- cept for a National Psychological Program” June 30, 1952, HSTP, Psychological Strategy Board Files, HSTL, box 14. 150. NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security,” April 14, 1950, pp. 21, 60–65; NSC 135/3, pp. 1–4; and enclosure B in “Memorandum by Lay,” February 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 225–230. 151. PPS/35, “The Attitude of This Government to Events in Yugoslavia,” June 30, 1948, Vol. 2, pp. 317–321.

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The United States adopted a pragmatic course to undermine the Soviet bloc. In February 1949 it relaxed trade restrictions on Yugoslavia, including on goods “of considerable importance to war potential” such as category 1A and 1B items.152 The United States soon agreed to export a steel ªnishing mill, a category 1A item.153 In September the Export-Import Bank approved a $20 million credit while U.S. and British ofªcials worked to channel more funds.154 Overall aid increased from virtually nothing in 1948 to $36 million in 1950 and $120 million in 1951. Military assistance totaled $310 million between 1949 and 1952.155 By 1952, as Henry Brands notes, many believed “that Yugoslavia was heading for at least de facto membership in NATO.”156 U.S. ofªcials clearly understood the nature of Yugoslavia’s regime. Policy- makers expressed hopes for a free Yugoslavia, but set aside such desires in practice. Instead ofªcials worked to moderate Yugoslavian foreign policy and rejected pressuring Tito on domestic reforms.157 NSC 18/2 stated the basic logic: “Much as we may dislike him, Tito is presently performing brilliantly in our interests in leading successfully and effectively the attack from within the communist family on Soviet imperialism. Tito in being is perhaps our most precious asset in the struggle to contain and weaken Russian expansion. He must be allowed to prove on his own communist terms that an Eastern European country can secede from Moscow control and still succeed.”158 In 1949 Bohlen argued that the United States should not give “moral approval to what was essentially a Communist totalitarian dictatorship. With that one important qualiªcation we should go to the limit.”159 Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George Perkins testiªed before the House of Representatives in 1950 that the “American people, unquestionably, believe that the Yugoslav people have a right to liberties which they do not now enjoy.” He then

152. NSC 18/2, “Economic Relations between the United States and Yugoslavia,” February 17, 1949 (February 18, 1949), pp. 7–8. 153. “Memorandum by Thorp,” June 9, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 5, pp. 898–899; and “Memorandum by Acheson,” August 8, 1949, ibid., pp. 920–921. 154. See documents in ibid., Vol. 5, especially pp. 946–947, 955–959. 155. For general aid, see Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1975), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/ documents/CT1970p2-01.pdf. For military assistance, see “Serbia and Montenegro, Former: Historical $U.S.,” Greenbook, U.S. Agency for International Development, http://gbk.eads .usaidallnet.gov/data/. 156. Henry W. Brands Jr., “Redeªning the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1948– 1960,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1987), p. 47. 157. NSC 18/2, pp. 5–7; and Brands “Redeªning the Cold War,” pp. 45–47. 158. NSC 18/2, p. 5. 159. “Meeting of Ambassadors at Paris,” October 21–22, 1949, undated [probably October 1949], FRUS, 1949, Vol. 5, p. 973.

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added that “the issue here is a different one. Yugoslavia is resisting Soviet imperialism.”160

china As the global situation changed, U.S. policy in China evolved from moderate support for the noncommunist Nationalists (Guomindang) to attempts to engage the Communists. Ideology probably delayed U.S. engagement with the Communists. Consistent with balance of power explanations, though, U.S. policy ultimately aimed to maintain Chinese independence from Soviet inºu- ence even if that meant engaging a communist regime. Initial U.S. policy reºected uncertainty and indecision. Ofªcials avoided overt involvement in the “fratricidal war,” but understood that transport- ing U.S. Marines to disarm and repatriate Japanese forces in 1945 indirectly aided the Nationalists.161 Yet the United States also took actions that indirectly aided the Communists. For instance, at Yalta Roosevelt had agreed to give the Soviets a role in occupying Manchuria in exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Initially, then, U.S. ofªcials instructed the Nationalists to consult the Soviets on Manchuria and refused to transport troops into the region.162 Truman grew frustrated with the ongoing civil con- ºict and in November dispatched General Marshall to settle the dispute. Marshall worked to include the Communists in a coalition government and moderate Nationalist behavior. In an effort to elicit concessions, he reduced aid and suspended military supplies for several months to the Nationalist regime.163 Marshall left China in late 1946 convinced that the Guomindang could not win militarily and were unlikely to make the necessary concessions to achieve a political solution.164 Thereafter, the United States’ support for the Nationalists decreased steadily. True, the embargo on military supplies ended in May 1947, but the initial design of the China Aid Act later that year excluded military assistance. Sup- port was primarily to redress balance-of-payment difªculties and satisfy domestic opponents. Congress, however, added $125 million for military support. The Truman administration accepted the revision but beat back several

160. Quoted in Brands, “Redeªning the Cold War,” p. 45. 161. “Wedemeyer to Marshall,” August 19, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, pp. 531–534; and “Minutes of Meeting of Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,” November 20, 1945, ibid., pp. 646–647. 162. On troop movements, see FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, pp. 603–605, 611–613, 644–645, 660–661. On the Yalta agreement, see Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 65–66. 163. See FRUS, 1946, Vol. 10, pp. 753–757, 785–786, 1020–1023; and Woosen Choi, “Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy toward China (1949–50),” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (October/December 2007), p. 560. 164. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 58–60.

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additional attempts over the next eighteen months to provide new aid to the Nationalists.165 The United States later refused to engage in a show of force as the Guomindang retreated to Taiwan (Formosa). After Mao Zedong estab- lished the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the administration rejected military action to protect the island. Ofªcials estimated that, without military support, Taiwan “probably will be under Chinese Communist control by the end of 1950.”166 At the same time, the United States moved to reduce tensions with the Communists. In typical fashion, U.S. policymakers expressed hopes that noncommunists might regain control of mainland China. They generally concluded, though, that such an outcome was unlikely and rejected active political or military support to create new anti-Communist movements on the mainland.167 Ofªcials instead took steps to normalize trade with Mao’s regime, limiting only the highest category of strategic goods.168 Acheson tied recognition to certain diplomatic concessions by Communist China and not a fundamental change in regime character. Ultimately Mao’s intransigence and the confrontation of U.S. and Chinese forces in Korea blocked the policy of accommodation.169 The U.S.-Soviet balance of power drove U.S. policy toward China in the early Cold War period. Chinese Communism was a threat “only as a possible adjunct of Soviet politico-military power.”170 “What we are concerned with in China,” Acheson informed the Senate in 1950, “is that whoever runs China, even if the devil himself runs China, that he is an independent devil. That is inªnitely better than if he is a stooge of Moscow or if China comes under Russia.”171 Ofªcials debated Chinese subservience to Moscow but ultimately decided that conºicts were bound to occur. Mao, like Tito, attained power on his own. The United States stood ready to “exploit through political and economic means any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.”172

165. Choi, “Structure and Perceptions,” pp. 560–567; Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 178–179, 194; and Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 61–76. 166. NSC 37/8, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” October 5, 1949, p. 1; NSC 37/5, “Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa,” March 1, 1949 (March 3, 1949); Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 191, 197–200; and Choi, “Structure and Perceptions,” pp. 571–572. 167. NSC 34/2, “U.S. Policy toward China,” February 28, 1949 (March 3, 1949); and NSC 48/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949 (December 30, 1949), p. 5. 168. NSC 41, “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” February 28, 1949 (March 3, 1949); and NSC 48/2, pp. 5–6. 169. Choi, “Structure and Perceptions,” pp. 569–574; and Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 175–206. 170. PPS/39, United States Policy toward China, September 15, 1948, Vol. 2, p. 432; and NSC 41, pp. 1, 11. 171. Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 100. 172. NSC 34/2, p. 5; and NSC 48/2, p. 5.

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The “wedge” strategy was long term, expected to take “6 to 12 years” rather than “6 to 12 months.”173 Even after the Chinese intervention in Korea, Acheson and Truman continued to note that “current objectives in China” should be “a Titoist China opposed to the Soviet Union.”174 The decision to abandon Taiwan also followed power-based logic. Ofªcials did not consider the island strategically vital, and Acheson desired to remove it as an impedi- ment to pulling China away from Moscow.175

french and italian communists Initially, the United States did not actively undermine West European Communists. Italian ofªcials submitted multiple aid requests in 1946 and in- sinuated that support would undermine the electoral strength of the Italian Communist Party.176 In March, however, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton cautioned against a political loan to Italy from the Export-Import Bank that had little chance of repayment. A month later, U.S. ofªcials postponed consid- ering a loan to Italy in part because $1 billion remained earmarked for the Soviet Union, thus limiting available funds.177 In France, fears arose in May 1946 that the French Communist Party might launch a coup over an upcoming constitutional referendum. In that event, Truman authorized American forces to secure U.S. supply lines, but stated explicitly “that U.S. troops will take no part in French internal conºict.”178 Economic aid generated the most attention on both sides. In late May the United States announced a $650 million loan and forgiveness of large portions of lend-lease debts. The loan generated considerable debate within the U.S. government despite fears that failure to grant support would strengthen the Communists. Clayton assured skeptics that the loan was sound economically and that he “would favor going through with it, no matter how the [June 2] election turned out.”179 After mid-1946, U.S. concerns for domestic interference were swept aside. In the fall of 1946, U.S. ofªcials cleared obstacles to a $50 million grant for Italy that had been under discussion for several months. In January 1947, policy-

173. Quoted in Beisner, Dean Acheson, p. 199, see also pp. 172–205; and Choi, “Structure and Per- ceptions,” pp. 563–574. 174. “Memorandum for the President,” NSC Meeting 91, May 17, 1951, HSTP, PSF, HSTL, box 187; and the subsequent policy text in NSC 48/4, “United States Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia,” May 4, 1951 (May 17, 1951). 175. Beisner, Dean Acheson, pp. 176, 180, 196–200. 176. See, for example, “Memorandum by Fetter,” February 14, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, pp. 891– 892; and “Memorandum by Hamilton,” May 16, 1946, ibid., pp. 914–915. 177. “NAC Meeting,” March 4, 1946 and April 19, 1946, ibid., pp. 894–897, 902–906. 178. “War Department to Joseph McNarney,” May 3, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, pp. 435–436. 179. “NAC Meeting,” May 6, 1946, ibid., Vol. 5, p. 443; “NAC Meeting,” May 28, 1946, ibid., pp. 459–464; and John Young, France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944–49 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), pp. 102–104.

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makers approved a $100 million loan for consideration by the Export-Import Bank.180 In June Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi dismissed the Communists from the government following assurances from Washington that additional support would be forthcoming.181 In late 1947 and early 1948, the United States authorized covert funding for non-Communist parties, anti-Communist propaganda, and, in contrast to the restraint in the French case in May 1946, the use of troops to seize Italian islands and garrison non-communist areas in the event that the Italian Communists seized power.182 In France Caffery worked to prevent the Communists from returning to government following their dismissal in 1947; “I told [French Premier Paul] Ramadier,” he wrote, “no Communists in gov. or else.”183 The United States also began covertly funding anti-Communist labor groups, and political concerns weighed heavily in aid decisions.184 Balance of power considerations were inºuential in U.S. thinking. There was little newfound Communist party strength in late 1946; that strength was evi- dent immediately after the war. Rather, the primary concern was Soviet domination of France and Italy. In September 1947 the Policy Planning Staff asserted that the Italian Communists’ goal was “the complete subjugation of Italy to Soviet control.” Soviet control, in turn, “would jeopardize US interests in Europe and the Mediterranean.”185 U.S. ofªcials in Europe consistently highlighted Soviet links to the French Communists.186 In February 1947 John Hickerson, State Department deputy director for European affairs, asserted that the Soviets could threaten to use force “to inºuence foreign countries or it can try the inside job method, using the local communist party and boring from within as they are now doing in France.”187 U.S. ofªcials considered France vital to the security of the United States.188

180. “Memorandum by Acheson,” November 7, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, pp. 941–942; “NAC Meeting,” January 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 859–860; and Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, pp. 77–79. 181. “Marshall to Dunn,” May 20, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 909–910; and “Dunn to Marshall,” May 28, 1947, ibid., pp. 911–913. 182. NSC 1/1 and NSC 1/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” October 15, 1947 (November 17, 1947) and February 10, 1948 (March 15, 1948), respectively; and NSC 1/3, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means,” March 8, 1948 (March 15, 1948). 183. Quoted in Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, p. 158. 184. Lucas, Freedom’s War, p. 46; “Memorandum by Matthews,” July 11, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 717–723; and “Memorandum,” September 29, 1947, ibid., pp. 472–477. 185. PPS/9, “Possible Action by the U.S. in the Event of Communist Seizure of North Italy,” Sep- tember 24, 1947, Vol. 1, pp. 103, 105. 186. See FRUS, 1946, Vol. 5, especially pp. 424, 459, 465–466, 471–479; and “Caffery to Marshall,” February 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 3, pp. 690–692. 187. “Memorandum by Hickerson,” February 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 715. 188. JCS 1769/1, April 29, 1947, ibid., pp. 739–741.

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Conclusion

The history of the early Cold War supports balance of power arguments. The nature of the Soviet regime did not force hostility. In Eastern Europe, the United States essentially granted the Soviet Union an exclusive sphere of inºuence. Washington abandoned this policy when Soviet relative power grew and the Soviets pushed beyond their sphere. Thereafter the United States worked to reconstruct a balance of power in Europe and the Far East. American policy primarily targeted Communist groups to block the expansion of Soviet power. Accordingly, U.S. ofªcials sought to engage Communist regimes that demonstrated independence from Moscow. The United States did not seriously pursue rollback or regime change. In essence, faced with a potential hegemon, the United States pragmatically committed to containing Soviet expansion. None of this is to suggest that ideology did not matter. U.S. government ofªcials certainly feared that the Soviets might utilize Communism instrumen- tally to expand. In addition, Communism provided a useful rationale for many in the Truman administration to justify the massive efforts undertaken, both to others and to themselves. In peripheral areas, such as China, ideology delayed certain U.S. actions. Finally, ideology created differences in how the superpow- ers managed their spheres. The U.S. bloc was monumentally more open than its Soviet counterpart. This difference matters. Yet ideology did not dictate confrontation with the Soviets or decisively shape the origins of U.S. policy. This article, then, challenges two prominent strands of ideological theoriz- ing in an important case for these theories. It shows instead that balance of power logic sheds a more powerful light on American behavior. The primacy of power in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the early Cold War— given liberalism’s strong tradition in the United States and the drastic differences between the U.S. and Soviet ideologies—suggests that relative power concerns are more important than ideology in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.

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