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American Nativism and in

Drawing Parallels

By Camille Ford ’18

Tis paper seeks to draw parallels between the phenomenon of Anti-Catholic nativism seen in 19th century America with the current trends of Islamophobic discourse in contemporary Germany. By drawing upon a framework of comparisons established by Jose Casanova in his essay “Te Politics of Nativism: in , Catholicism in the ,” it becomes evident that there are undeniable similarities between the two. Tis paper relies largely on two types of evidence: discursive and political. First the paper outlines the roots and historical context of Catholicism in America and the American response to this new immigrant group throughout the 19th century. Tis background is then followed by an analysis of , and an analysis of how the German people and government since the late 20th century have received it. Te paper concludes that similar rhetoric and political response can be seen in the case of 19th century America and Germany today. Ultimately, the conclusion serves to fully support Casanova’s framework of analysis and is useful in attempting to predict the future path of Islam in Germany, and perhaps even greater Western Europe, by ac- knowledging the successful integration of Catholicism into America throughout the early 20th century.

COLLOQUIUM Introduction: Framework of Analysis to the liberties of poor America!”6 Tese strong In “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Eu- sentiments were quickly quelled by the im- rope, Catholicism in the United States,” Jose pending revolution, yet remained an integral Casanova proposes that “the politics of nativism part of American discourse up until the Civil directed at Catholic immigrants in 19th centu- War. Ironically, during the revolutionary years, ry America ofer a fruitful comparative perspec- anti-Catholicism was dampened by the fnan- tive through which to analyze the discourse and cial and military assistance provided by Catho- the politics of Islam in contemporary Europe.”1 lic and Catholic .7 Moreover, the Casanova posits that both ideological attacks Catholic minority was so negligible at the time, are steeped in the “fusion of anti-immigrant that there existed little cause for uproar. Instead, xenophobic attitudes, perennial inter-religious the colonists faced a far more important chal- , and an ideological construct setting lenge at hand: their impending independence. a particular religious-civilizational complex in In the revolutionary years, and the few years essential opposition to Western modernity.”2 directly following, the issues faced by Catholics In order to assess Casanova’s argument, this pa- remained largely internal. Te Catholic hierar- per applies this comparative framework to the chy faced a variety of obstacles as it tried to root Catholic immigrant experience in 19th century itself in the colonies. Te frst challenge was that America, and draws parallels to the Muslim im- of blending the diverse nationalities of Catholics migrant experience in contemporary Germany. into a unifed American Catholic , and the second was the attempt to establish the Catholicism in America: Te Early Years institutions necessary for the practice of Cathol- It can be argued that the American people icism in light of a defciency of priests and issues have held against the Catholic faith of lay trusteeship.8 Te shortage of clergy found since the inception of the colonies. English Pu- the Catholic Church in an unprecedented dilem- ritans brought Anti-Catholicism from the Old ma, as lay trustees do not typically have power World to the New World, carrying with them within the formal Catholic Church. Te short- the negative experiences associated with the Irish age of clergy, however, necessitated moderniza- Catholic church and the association of Cathol- tion of the pastoral selection process, bringing icism with the French and Spanish--rivals of about an attempt by the laity to control clerical the British Empire.3 As such, it was no surprise assignments--an attempt that proved, and still that Puritan Massachusetts legally forbade the proves, entirely incompatible with the hierar- practice of Catholicism, barring the entrance chical structure of the Church. As confict arose of any Catholic priests to the colony as early as among Catholics, the American government the 17th century. By the time Jamestown was remained uninvolved, leaving the clergy to deal founded in 1608, a general sentiment of an- with both the heavenly and temporal matters of ti-Catholicism and anti-popery reigned in the the newly cemented Catholic community. Sud- colonies.4 Tis Catholic repudiation frst rever- denly, at the turn of the 19th century, anti-Cath- berated in the colonies after the passing of the olic nativism emerged stronger than ever from Quebec Act in 1774, which granted religious the newly formed American political landscape. freedom to the Catholics living in territories re- cently conquered by the French.5 For example, Te Nativist Era: the Puritans held that “if Gallic papists have a In his book Strangers in the Land, John right to worship their own way, then farewell Higham defnes the core of nativism as a “be-

PAGE 55 lief that some infuence originating abroad threat- Major Controversies: Maria Monk and F.B. ened the very life of the from within,” and Morse should thus be understood as “an intense opposi- Two major scandals shook the Catholic com- tion to an internal minority on the ground of its munity in the mid-19th century: the publication of foreign connections.”9 In line with this concep- Maria Monk’s Awful Disclosures, and F.B. Morse’s tualization, Catholic immigrants were understood Foreign Conspiracy. Te full title of Maria Monk’s by some as a distinct threat to the American way Awful Disclosures was in fact the self-explanatory, of life. Catholic traditions were seen as entirely “Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, As Exhibited in un-American due to their attachment to the au- a Narrative of Her Suferings, During a Residency of thoritarian organizational structure of the Church Five Years as a Novice, and During Two Years as a and their association with the monarchical and Black Nun, in the Hotel Dieu Nunnery at Montre- feudal governments in Europe.10 “European pop- al.” In this publication, Maria Monk told the tale ery” was thus incompatible with American no- of her tenure in the Hotel Dieu nunnery, mak- tions of individual freedom and democracy. For ing an infammatory accusation that the priests this reason, Catholics were seen as unft Ameri- in this Catholic nunnery forced themselves upon can citizens. Tese anti-Catholic sentiments were the nuns. Upon impregnating these young wom- frst directed at Irish Catholics, who were not only en, the priests killed the illegitimate children soon viewed critically for their allegiance to Rome as a after their birth--only after baptizing them frst.14 result of their faith, but also represented a “rowdy Maria Monk’s account appealed in every manner ne’er-do-wells, impulsive, quarrelsome, drunken to the dominant contemporary American values-- and threadbare” community.11 Not only were they these Catholic priests were a prime example of the Catholic, but they were also poor and uneducated. Church’s hierarchical obsession, and, by forcing themselves on young nuns in the name of obedi- “an intense opposition ence to God, presented an afront to egalitarian- Natavism: ism. Moreover, the description of events ridiculed to an internal minority on the ground the strict codes of sexual propriety which partially of its foreign connections.” defned the Catholic Church, by making the nun- nery sound more like a brothel than a house of Tree major factors made the 1820s onward women of God.15 While the story was ultimately a particularly difcult time for Catholics: frst, found to be a fabrication, the damage it caused was the religious revival among Protestants was large- near indelible. Te suspicions against the Church ly translated as anti-Catholicism; second, the in- now seemed tangible to anti-Catholics. Adding creased and territorial expansion oc- onto Maria Monk’s narrative was F.B. Morse’s For- curring in America led to greater social dislocation; eign Conspiracy Against the Liberties of the United and third, the growing numbers of immigrants, States. In his book, he held that it was the duty who were often destitute Catholics, occupied the of all to unite in anti-Popery to save logical role of scapegoats.12 Te situation was of America, as he strongly believed that the Catholic such magnitude that the few Catholic Bishops agenda was centered on overthrowing the Ameri- present in the U.S. held the First Provincial Synod can government and undermining its democratic of Baltimore in 1829 in order to decry the poor foundations. He proposed barring Catholics from treatment of their faith’s practitioners by their political participation, closing down all Catholic fellow Americans. Te bishops sought to fght schools, and restricting .16 Morse ef- back against vilifcation and misrepresentation.13 fectively caused the Catholic threat in America

COLLOQUIUM to take on universal proportions, establishing However, the rapid rise of the Know-Noth- the foundation for the future Know-Nothing ing Party represents the pinnacle of nativism era. Tese two narratives served as popular ref- in America. As nativism was slowly starting to erences throughout the anti-Catholic, nativist shift from anti-Catholicism towards issues of era, encapsulating the fears and judgements that race, anti-immigration discourse embedded American Protestants held against Catholicism. within prevalent anti-Catholic sentiments gath- ered tremendous support. Above all, the rise of Te Know-Nothing Party: such strong, anti-Catholic political powers drew Te legitimation of anti-Catholic rhetoric a reaction from the Catholic community, which was established by the birth of the Know-Noth- began to show signs of becoming a more uni- ing Party. While anti-Catholicism had always had fed community in the 1840s--the beginning social implications and educational consequenc- of the Know-Nothing era. A prime example of es for Catholics, the discourse shifted towards this growing union was Bishop John Hughes’ being an integral piece of the broader political campaign to alter the Protestant-oriented school spectrum. In 1854, the Know-Nothings were system.20 When it came to public education, catapulted to the forefront of American politics. Catholics had few choices: they could either pay In one election, they elected 43 members to the for the maintenance of separate Catholic schools House of Representatives, 5 additional Senate (which was unlikely and burdensome due to seats, and 27 new congressmen who were known the majority working-class composition of the members of Know-Nothing lodges. Tis triumph Catholic immigrant community), jeopardize aforded them a 75-member congressional dele- the faith-based education of their children by gation.17 However, their greatest electoral success sending them to traditional, Protestant-oriented was in the of Massachusetts, where after the public schools, or forego educating their chil- 1854 election, the governor, every state ofcer, dren entirely, which would simply perpetuate every member of the senate and 376 of the 378 the poverty of the immigrant generation.21 Bish- members of the Assembly were Know-Noth- op Hughes set out on a mission to rectify this ings.18 Te Know-Nothings also swept Rhode Is- issue in City, where the Public School land, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, Society, a Protestant organization, controlled Kentucky, , New York and Califor- 100 major public schools by 1840. As American nia the following year.19 Shockingly, and perhaps citizens, Bishop Hughes argued that Catholics ironically, no major legislation was passed under had the same rights as other Americans to have the Know-Nothing government. Its sole plat- their tax money be spent on an education com- form was anti-Catholicism, and it held little wa- patible with their beliefs. He rallied the Catholic ter in terms of actual legislation. Moreover, it is community in New York in order to swing the largely agreed upon that the widespread election upcoming election. Bishop Hughes instructed of Know-Nothings was a distraction from the Catholics, who made up a signifcant portion of growing dissent over the issue of . Hav- the Democratic vote, to only support candidates ing little policy goals other than dismantling the who would support a bill which would bypass Catholic Church, the party provided a moderate organizations such as the Public School Society position between abolitionists and secessionists. and give government money directly to local The Public School Society, a Protestant organization, controlled 100 major public schools by 1840.

PAGE 57 schools. In that election, only the 10 of the 15 The Catholic immigrant Democratic candidates running for the city coun- experience in 19th century cil supported the bill were elected to the coun- America can be understood as the cil.22 Tis was the frst instance of major Cath- olic political mobilization in the United States. framework of opposition for the creation of a distinctly Protestant American Nativism: Conclusion American identity. Te Catholic immigrant experience in 19th century America can thus be understood as the Islam and Germany: Background framework of opposition for the creation of a dis- While there have been , specifcal- tinctly Protestant American identity. American ly Turkish Muslims, in Germany since the 17th nativism as a socio-political movement served to century, the Muslim population in the region re- solidify identitary claims made in the post-Amer- mained fairly negligible until the 1960s.24 Guest ican revolution years. Over this period certain es- workers began arriving in 1955, when a foreign la- sential changes must be underlined. First, the ini- bor treaty was signed with . Ger- tial arrival of Catholics, followed by the growth many subsequently signed similar bilateral agree- of anti-Catholic sentiments should be highlight- ments with Spain and Greece, , Morocco, ed. Anti-Catholicism, while carried from the Old , Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. By 1964, prior World, did not become essential to American to even signing an agreement with Tunisia or Yu- identity until the post-revolution years, when the goslavia, Germany had welcomed its millionth formation of a distinct American identity was guest worker.25 In 1973, German foreign labor essential to the birth of the new nation. Te sec- recruitment came to a halt. Up until this point, ond notable development was the emergence of guest workers were largely single males who were an association between Catholicism and authori- perceived as disposable labor hands. By the mid- tarianism due to the Church’s hierarchical struc- 1970s, however, these workers began to have their ture, which was seen as the antithesis of Ameri- families join them in Germany, and others started can democracy. Tird, the American fxation on new families. At this time, the frst public aware- played a central role in the success ness of particular city districts becoming Turkish of Maria Monk’s Awful Disclosures. Fourth, at- “ghettos” rose, and pressure on German health, tempts to bar Catholics from the public sphere, social and educational services due to the popula- whether through restriction of their voting rights tion infux began to be felt.26 Te permanent set- or limiting their reach in education proved in- tlement of Muslim immigrants was also marked fuential. As noted by Casanova, “quasi-perenni- by the emergence of religious organizations in al religious-theological Protestant anti-Catholic the 1980s, such as the Islamic Community Mil- prejudices became fused with a modern liberal li Gorus (IGMG) in 1985. Te infux of Turkish reconstruction of Catholicism as an anti-mod- migrants was so important that the Turkish gov- ern, anti-democratic, uncivilized fundamentalist ernment went as far as establishing the Turkish-Is- religion.”23 Tese changes are essential to un- lamic Union of the Ofce for Religious Afairs in derstanding the parallels between the Catho- 1984 in order to maintain a hold on its diaspora lic experience in 19th century America and the community.27 Tese organizations were, and are Muslim experience in contemporary Germany. still today, classifed as associations or foundations, unlike Christian Churches and the Jewish com- munities which hold the status of publicly recog-

COLLOQUIUM nized corporations. Tis special status, known manner as other religious bodies), they become as Körperschaft des öfentlichen Rechts, grants part of a cycle of Muslim alienation in Germany. them additional privileges, including tax bene- One of the most egregious instances of Mus- fts, the ability to form confessional schools with lim immigrant alienation is the fact that Germa- public funding, and the right to employ under ny does not consider itself a country of immigra- belief-oriented labor laws.28 Muslim associations tion, and thus often still employs the term “guest and foundations have been unable to attain this worker” in reference to those labor immigrants. status due to the among Muslims in Additionally, at various times, the German gov- Germany. German law only grants recognition ernment has undertaken measures to repatriate to institutions or organizations that are broadly foreign workers, specifcally Turks, by either of- representative (both in membership and internal fering lump sums of money, or going as far as re- structure) of the greater faith-community which stricting welfare benefts.31 Restrictions have also it aims to represent. Moreover, the organization been witnessed in the political sphere, as foreign- must have a permanent character, and accept the ers have struggled to gain the right to vote on provisions of German Basic Law, which guaran- the local level.32 In order to compare the current tees freedom of religious worship, organization, Muslim immigrant experience in Germany to and teaching.29 Te state is considered religion that of the Catholic immigrant in 19th century neutral, and thus does not take a position on re- America, a closer look at the rhetoric and pub- ligious afairs. While the Islamic German com- lic outcry against Islam in Germany is necessary. munity lacks these ofcial rights, it still has the right to construct places of worship based on the Islamophobia and Germany: constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion Casanova’s framework holds that the nativist inscribed in German law. Te result of these lim- rhetoric of 19th century America is comparable ited rights is the emergence of mosque unions as to the Islamophobia that has emerged in con- organizing bodies for German Muslims. temporary Europe.33 Islamophobia is a modern Te Muslim community’s outsider status noun used to defne a relatively new concept: compared to and is part of the manifestations of anti-Muslim or anti-Islam sen- greater discourse surrounding the Muslim im- Germany often employs the term migrant experience in Germany. Casanova notes that one of the pillars of European nativism to- “guest worker” day is the anxiety that originates from Muslim in reference to labor immigrants. organized collective identities and their public representations. Tis anxiety is fueled both by timents.34 While it is often associated with being the foreign character of these organizations, but a post 9/11 phenomenon, research has proven also due to their non-Christian character, and that such feelings precede the 2001 attacks. As their inherent religiousness.30 Tus, as the Ger- such, “Islamophobia existed as much on 10 Sep- man state continues to exclude Islam from the tember 2001 as indeed it did on 12 September corporatist structure, whether motivated by valid 2001.”35 In Germany, the emergence of Islam- legal reason or not, the fears of Muslim organiza- ophobic discourse has been largely framed by tional bodies become self-fulflling. As mosque the context of multiculturalism. Multiculturality unions become the primary representative en- is an inherently terrifying threat to the German tities for German Muslims (and do so without nation, a nation that holds a largely biological being state-approved or sanctioned in the same and ethnic vision of itself.36 Tus, a change in the

PAGE 59 ethnic composition of the country would be un- deemed unconstitutional, but during the fve-year derstood as a “dissolution of a previously homo- span during which they occurred, 31,988 person- genic structure into ethnically heterogeneous seg- al data sets were sent for analysis. Tis decision ments.”37 As famously on behalf of the German government highlights remarked in 2010, “the approach [to build] a two of the main ideas put forth by Casanova as he multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and draws parallels between American and European to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed.”38 nativism: frst, the “undiferentiated confation of the categories of “immigrant” ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ “Islamophobia existed as much on in European discourses,” and second, the constant 10 September 2001 as indeed it did on suspicion cast upon Muslim people in Germany.42 12 September 2001.” In the case of Catholics in the U.S., accusations were those of popery and Romanism, while those Post-9/11, a discourse of foreign “sleepers” against Muslims are of and Islamization. and “dewy-eyed” emerged, in which In 2014 and 2015, Germany witnessed a Muslim foreign workers were viewed suspiciously major public outcry against Muslim integration in the wake of the terrorist attack. In an ofcial in the wake of the numerousf terror attacks that statement by the German Lutheran Church, the swept over Europe. In October 2014, Patriot ofcials held that, “Our [Lutheran] representa- Europeans Against the Islamization of the West tives who maintain dialogue with Muslims cannot (PEGIDA) formed in reaction to the prevailing persist with their dewy-eyed innocence any more. view “that the religion of Islam was gaining in- Tey should make better use of the Protection of fuence in various quarters, including the govern- the .”39 “Sleepers” were undercover ment.”43 Te group organized mass protests in terrorists and criminals hiding among foreign the streets of Germany, and in April 2015, over workers, and protected by innocent, “dewy-eyed” 10,000 protesters gathered to express their out- Germans who had failed to acknowledge their rage over the immigration crisis. Unsurprisingly, existence. In response, the German government these events came after the rise of Alternative für passed a law legalizing dragnet searches.40 Drag- Deutschland (AfD), a new, far-right party that has net searches are systematic government searches gained tremendous traction in Germany. While that match certain criteria against existing data- the party’s original platform was largely focused sets to fnd “terrorists.” German authorities used on opposing debt bailouts for countries such as a “terrorist-profle” provided by the FBI which Greece, AfD has now become the anti-immigra- cross-searched for anyone who ft the following tion party in Germany. AfD has been enormously description: male, afliation with Islam, between successful in light of the European refugee crisis. the ages of 18 and 41, student or former student, Te party calls for EU border closures, rigorous living in Germany and hailing from one of 27 identity checks along national borders, and an specifc countries.41 In 2006, these searches were overall rejection of Angela Merkel’s refugee policy.

German “terrorist profle”:

between the from one of affliation with student or living in male ages of 27 specifc Islam former student Germany 18 and 41 countries

COLLOQUIUM Tis political group has espoused parts of PEGI- to egalitarianism. During the American nativist DA’s rhetoric, particularly in regards to chal- era, Maria Monk’s Awful Disclosures epitomized lenging the “Islamization” of Germany. In 2017, this view of Catholicism, while politics of the veil AfD entered the German parliament as the and the rights of women in Islam often shape a third largest party, drawing the strongest sup- similar conversation in Germany. As such, many port from Eastern and Southern federal states- liberal arguments that call for scrutiny and reg- -areas with high immigrant concentrations. ulation of Islam in the public sphere are vaguely grounded in feminist rhetoric. However, these Drawing Parallels: arguments make a great contribution to Islam- American Nativism and German Islamophobia ophobic discourse and fail to make a genuine fem- In assessing the Catholic immigrant experi- inist case. Casanova also refers to a blatant con- ence in 19th century America and the current fation of Catholics, Muslims, and immigrants Muslim immigrant experience in Germany under in both cases.46 Tus, the negative associations Cassanova’s comparative framework, a variety of held against immigrant , which in- common rhetorical threads arise between Amer- cludeabuses of welfare benefts, violent inclina- ican nativism and contemporary Islamophobia. tions and lack of education, become intertwined Just as Catholics were accused of Popery and with the religious identity of the immigrant. Romanism by news outlets and famous publica- Tis is exemplifed by a Midwestern carpenter’s tions like F.B. Morse’s Foreign Conspiracy, Mus- complaint in 1886: “we poor, native-born citi- lim immigrants today are consistently targeted zens are just pulled around same as dogs by for- as potential terrorist threats. Catholics were and eign people. We do not stand any show, and it Muslims are accused of wanting to overthrow seems as though everything is coming to the very the government system of the receiving coun- worst in the near future unless free immigration try: the Catholics by way of their allegiance to is stopped.”47 Similar discourse on immigration Rome, and the Muslims by way of allegiance to is echoed throughout Germany today, particu- the global ummah. AfD’s ofcial platform man- larly by AfD. Tis fusion of negative ifesto states: “Islamic countries aim to spread strengthens pre-existing anti-Muslim rhetoric Islam in Germany and extend their power base Another strong parallel that can be drawn by building and running mosques.”44 Moreover, between the Catholic immigrant experience both faiths are consistently painted as distinctly in the U.S. and the Muslim immigrant experi- opposed to democratic institutions. In the case ence in Germany is the political response. Te of Catholicism, the authoritarian and hierarchi- Know-Nothing party which rose in the 1840s in cal structure of the Church theoretically opposes America was entirely premised on anti-Catholi- the democratic ideal of individual freedom in cism. In the 1854 elections, the Know-Nothings America. Islam is often painted as an anti-dem- were omnipresent in American politics. Teir rai- ocratic religion, as once again highlighted by son d’être, however, was ultimately their down- AfD’s campaign manifesto, in which the party fall, as their myopic desire to thwart Catholic blatantly outlines frm opposition to “Islam- infuence resulted in little signifcant legislation ic practice which is directed against our liber- being passed. Te emergence of the Know-Noth- al-democratic constitutional order, our laws, and ings is comparable to that of the AfD party in the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations Germany. AfD is one of many prominent far- of our .”45 In the same breath, both Ca- right political parties that have risen to power tholicism and Islam are characterized as afronts in the past few years in Europe. Ideologically,

PAGE 61 F.B. Morse’s Foreign Conspiracy called for: (1) (2) (3) removal of Catholics from the limited funding for halting immigration political sphere by confessional schools. completely as to prevent limiting their ability to vote. the arrival of more Catholics. they resemble the French National Front and the profoundly alter the future of German politics. Austrian Freedom Party; these parties advocate anti- stances, resort to often Conclusion: Te Integration of Catholics in populist discourse, and hold strong views against America and the Future of Islam in Europe immigration and the Muslim faith. AfD’s sudden Te beginning of the Civil War in 1869 rise to parliament in 2017 highlights growing marked a turning point for American Catholics. anxieties within Germany. AfD’s casting of Is- Te war provided an opportunity for Catholic lam as the natural scapegoat of the state through immigrants to demonstrate their loyalty to their its identity as “other” indicates the direction of new country by way of serving in the Union German public sentiment towards the faith. armed forces. Additionally, the Catholic popula- In F.B. Morse’s Foreign Conspiracy, he called tion in America swelled in size between 1850 (7% for three major solutions to curbing the Catho- of the population) and 1900 (16% of the pop- lic issue: (1) remove Catholics from the political ulation).49 Troughout the 1900s, Catholics be- sphere by limiting their ability to vote, (2) lim- gan to carve out infuential roles in labor unions it funding for confessional schools, and (3) halt and within the urban political machine, slowly immigration completely as to prevent the arrival assimilating themselves into the greater Ameri- of more Catholics. While the German constitu- can population and strengthening their political tion largely protects Muslims from the frst two sway. Te election of President John F. Kenne- obstacles, up until 2000 it was incredibly dif- dy, a descendant of Irish-Catholic immigrants, in cult for Muslim immigrants to attain citizenship 1960 would mark the culmination of due to stringent naturalization laws. Moreover, of Catholicism in the public and political sphere. as Islamic organizations remain outside the cor- Te stark contrast between the Catholic im- poratist structure of the German state, it is still migrant situation in the U.S. from 1850 to 1950 difcult for Muslims to form and adequately from those that greeted them when they originally fnance confessional schools. In the case of im- arrived provides interesting insights into the po- migration, the rise of AfD represents a genuine tential path for Muslims in Germany. As a leading threat to the ability for Muslim people to im- European nation, Germany’s policy towards the migrate to Germany. AfD does not nuance its Muslim faith and Muslim people will undoubt- stance, declaring that “Islam does not belong to edly serve as an example to smaller European Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing . While France and the United Kingdom number of Muslims in the country are viewed have long taken their own paths, the corporatist by the AfD as a danger to our state, our soci- structure could very well be the future of Europe- ety, and our values.”48 While the Know-Nothing an policy vis-à-vis Muslims. Most importantly, the party had little long-term impact on the Ameri- originally arduous Catholic immigrant experience can political landscape, AfD has the potential to is now considered long in the past of American

COLLOQUIUM history and serves as a success story for minority these groups as a barrier to the normalization of faith immigrants. Today, the confation of Islam Muslim civil society and to Muslim actors hav- and immigration, or Islam and terrorism, renders ing a voice in the country. Tese groups are cen- the mechanisms of assimilation put forth by Ger- tral to lobbying for political and legal solutions many, and the rest of Western Europe, complex pertaining to Islam, such as halal-slaughtering or and fragile. Yet there is cause for a certain amount issues related to public wearing of the headscarf. of moderate optimism. Tis optimism is best un- Te most fundamental obstacle facing these in- derstood through one fnal parallel that can be termediary bodies is simple: in Germany, Islam drawn between the early Catholic immigrant remains on the outskirts of the corporatist struc- experience in the U.S. and the current Muslim ture, which does not grant Muslims the same immigrant experience in Germany. While the state recognition given to representatives of other Civil War is often noted as the turning point for communities of faith. As much as Muslims seek Catholic immigrants, it is truly their assimilation adequate representation, they are barred by this into the political system, and thus their ability to seemingly minor, yet ultimately enormous hur- impact policy and election outcomes, that signi- dle. Tus, while the Catholic community in the fed genuine integration into American society. If U.S. was able to carve out a place for itself within the greatest charge against Catholic immigrants the political process with the help of unions and was their inherent inability to be democratic tactics, the corporatist structure based on their ties to the Church, becoming key of Germany perpetuates the outsider narrative players in the political system, particularly the surrounding Islam. Te question then becomes Democratic party in the early 20th century, was one of the ethnicization of religion, and how indubitably an ideal means of assimilation. Over this must be surmounted in order for Muslims, the past 20 years, the rise of immigrant mem- whether as one unifed community, or smaller bership in both German and immigrant associa- Members of the German tions has increased, which counters narratives of exclusive “home-country” oriented organizations Bundestag with an Immigrant being the heart of the Muslim community.50 In Background 2010, only 17 of the 622 members of the Ger- 51 622 man Bundestag had an immigrant background. total Today, still, only 58 members are of migrant members background, climbing from 3% to 8% over the past seven years. Tis political shift in orientation of Muslim immigrants towards the German state from their homeland is crucial to securing proper rights and recognition for Muslims in Germany. Immigrant organizations also continue to prove essential in government-initiated dialogues, pro- viding a platform for prominent immigrant blocs, like the Turkish community, to openly critique government policies and promote the immigrant interests.52 Te greatest concern for these organi- 58 zations is the inferior place of Islam in German 17 ofcial and public discourse, which is seen by 2010 2017

PAGE 63 bodies representative of the diversity of Islam in Germany, can become integral pieces of the Ger- man corportarist structure. Ultimately, the most clear path for Muslims in Germany to follow is one of political involvement and representation, where they can begin to overcome and circum- vent the obstacles posed by the corporatist state structure individually, and perhaps eventually, as a diverse community. Tus, moderate and long- term outlooks becomes essential in determining a positive future direction for Muslims in Germany. In conclusion, through numerous parallels binding the Catholic immigrant experience in 19th century America to the Muslim experience in contemporary Germany, it becomes evident that the framework of analysis put forth by Jose Casanova in the “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States,” is not only accurate, but robust as well. Tis com- parison is most striking with regard to external imposed upon Catholics and Muslims, as demonstrated by the common discourse sur- rounding both faiths being anti-democratic, un-egalitarian and invasive to their new “host” country. Tis comparison provides a concrete starting point to a better understanding of the challenges faced by Muslims in Western Europe today, and how their paths have been, and will be, forged by both their own internal issues and the obstacles presented to them by the state.

COLLOQUIUM Endnotes 1. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” and Social Criticism. May/June, 2012. 2. Ibid. 3. Massa, Mark S. Anti-Catholicism in America: Te Last Acceptable Prejudice. , NY: Te Crossroad Pub- lishing Company, 2005 4. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1984. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. 9. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 -1925. New Brunswick, : Rut- gers University Press, 1955. 10. Ibid. 11. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 -1925. 12. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Roy, Jody M. Rhetorical Campaigns of the Nineteenth-Century Anti-Catholics and Catholics in America. Lewiston, New York: Te Edwin Mellen Press, 2000. 16. Ibid. 17. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. 22. Ibid. 23. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” 24. Al-Hamarneh, Ala and Jorn Tielmann. “Islam and Muslims in Germany.” Leiden, : Brill Academic Pub- lishers, 2008. 25. Hackett, Sarah. Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: Te Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013. 26. Nielsen, Joergen S. and Jonas Otterbeck. “Germany.” Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh Univer- sity Press, 2015. 27. Al-Hamarneh, Ala and Jorn Tielmann. “Islam and Muslims in Germany.” 28. Nielsen, Joergen S. and Jonas Otterbeck. “Germany.” 29. Ibid. 30. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” 31. Nielsen, Joergen S. and Jonas Otterbeck. “Germany.” 32. Ibid. 33. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” 34. Allen, Chris. “Islamophobia and the rises of Europe’s Multiculturalism.” New Multicultural Identities in Europe: Reli- gion and Ethnicity in Secular Societies. Edited by Erkan Togusly, Johan Leman, Ismail Mesut Sezgi. Leuven, : Leuven University Press, 2014. 35. Ibid. 36. Heckmann, Friedrich. “Nation, Nation-State and Ethnic Minorities.” Muslims in Europe, ed. Bernard Lewis and Dominique Schnapper. New York City, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 37. Ibid. 38. Allen, Chris. “Islamophobia and the rises of Europe’s Multiculturalism.”

PAGE 65 Endnotes 39. Jonker, Gerdien. “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’: Te Church, the State and Germany’s Discovery of its Muslim Population.” European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. J. Cesari and Sean McLaughlin. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 40. Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin. Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany:New Developments in the 21st Century. Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2012. 41. Ibid. 42. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” 43. Lean, Nathan. ‘Islam as the Enemy of .” Te Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Hatred of Muslims. London, UK: Pluto Press, 2017. 44. Alternative für Deutschland. “Manifesto for Germany: Te Political Programme of the .” April, 2017. 45. Alternative für Deutschland. “Manifesto for Germany: Te Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany.” 46. Casanova, Jose. “Te Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” 47. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 -1925. 48. Alternative für Deutschland. “Manifesto for Germany: Te Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany.” 49. Schwartz, Michael. Te Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1984. 50. Nordbruch, Gotz. “Germany: Migration, Islam and National Identity.” University of Syydansk: Center for Mellemot- studier, 2011. 51. Ibid. 52. Nordbruch, Gotz. “Germany: Migration, Islam and National Identity.”

COLLOQUIUM References Al-Hamarneh, Ala and Jorn Thielmann. “Islam and Muslims in Germany.” Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008. Allen, Chris. “Islamophobia and the rises of Europe’s Multiculturalism.” New Multicultural Identities in Europe: Reli gion and Ethnicity in Secular Societies. Edited by Erkan Togusly, Johan Leman, Ismail Mesut Sezgi. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2014. Alternative für Deutschland. “Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany.” April, 2017. Casanova, Jose. “The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. May/June, 2012. Hackett, Sarah. Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: The Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013. Heckmann, Friedrich. “Nation, Nation-State and Ethnic Minorities.” Muslims in Europe, ed. Bernard Lewis and Dominique Schnapper. New York City, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860 -1925. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rut gers University Press, 1955. Jonker, Gerdien. “From ‘Foreign Workers’ to ‘Sleepers’: The Church, the State and Germany’s Discovery of its Muslim Population.” European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. J. Cesari and Sean McLaughlin. Aldershot: Ash gate, 2005. Lean, Nathan. ‘Islam as the Enemy of Populism.” The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Hatred of Muslims. London, UK: Pluto Press, 2017. Massa, Mark S. Anti-Catholicism in America: The Last Acceptable Prejudice. New York City, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005 Nielsen, Joergen S. and Jonas Otterbeck. “Germany.” Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2015. Nordbruch, Gøtz. “Germany: Migration, Islam and National Identity.” University of Southern : Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2011. Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin. Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany:New Developments in the 21st Century. Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2012. Roy, Jody M. Rhetorical Campaigns of the Nineteenth-Century Anti-Catholics and Catholics in America. Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000. Schwartz, Michael. The Persistent Prejudice: Anti-Catholicism in America. Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1984.

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