A “Responsible Great Power” Not Hiding Light Anymore?— China’s Foreign Policy after the Xi-Li Administration’s Inauguration 79
A “Responsible Great Power” Not Hiding Light Anymore? — China’s Foreign Policy after the Xi-Li Administration’s Inauguration
Simon Teng-chi Chang
(Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University)
Abstract “Hide our light and bide our time” has been upheld as China’s foreign policy guideline for more than twenty years since it was outlined by Deng Xiaoping shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Given the dramatically increased economic and military clout supported by double-digit annual growth, it is no doubt that China is qualified as a major power with global influence. During the reign of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, whether China should amend Deng’s teaching and stress more on “to accomplish something,” or to maintain a low profile has been a fiercely debated issue. Nevertheless, Jiang’s willingness to assume “responsibilities” in his “great power diplomacy” and Hu’s “harmonious world” policy formula generally led China on a “status quo” track.
This paper argues that policy disorder caused by territorial disputes in South and East China Seas and China’s unrefined “core interests” policy discourse, accompanied by the “rebalancing” and “pivot to Asia” strategies of America, gradually have led to China’s foreign 80 Prospect Journal No.9 policy change. To counterbalance Washington and its allies’ economic and military balancing and to redirect domestic discontent against inequality and corruption, the Xi-Li Administration will choose to actively assume the “responsibility” of being a great power, as pre- scribedbythe18th Party Congress Report. This time, however, the “responsibility” does not mean adherence to the established rules and order. Xi’s choice of his maiden foreign visit to Russia and South Africa (to attend the BRICS 5th Summit) and his speech are the best signs. Based on the hardcore idea of a “balance of power” and “The Third World,” Xi will be a candid and tough rival to the West, especially Japan and the United States.
Keywords: U.S.-China Relations, Xi Jinping, Chinese Foreign Policy, Four-Frontier Strategy, New Model Great Power Relations
Keep cool-headed to observe, stand firmly, be composed to re- act, hide our capabilities and bide our time, never try to take the lead, and be able to accomplish something.
— Deng Xiaoping, 1989 (translated by the FY04 DoD Report on China)1
Qu Xing（曲星）, the then Vice-Dean of the University of Diplomacy (Beijing) indicated that the 28-character strategy was first raised by Deng several months after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The then Deputy Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Gen. Xiong Guangkai（熊光楷）con- tended that the translation of “hide our capabilities” was too “narrow” to dem- onstrate Deng’s teaching. His suggestions instead was “hide our light” which echoed the usage of Fareed Zakaria’s book on the “Post-American World.” This paper adopts Zakaria and Xiong’s translation. Please refer to Zhai Hua,〈怎樣 善意地告訴外國人我們在“韜光養晦”？〉,《中國日報網》(China Daily), June 25, 2010,
More than 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville famously pre- dicted that the relationship between Russia and America would shape the destiny of the world. I suspect, if he had returned to earth as the new millennium dawned, he wouldn’t ignore Russia, but he would write first about China.
Madeleine Albright, 2003 2
I. Introduction The debates on the “rise of China” have caught the attention of both Chinese and Western foreign policy watchers. Nevertheless, except for domestic consumption serving the legitimacy of the com- munist party, Chinese researchers were once highly cautious about the discourse of “China rising” and its policy implications.3
For example, in my interviews conducted in 2000 with 31 acade- mics and think-tank researchers affiliated with the Chinese foreign and security branches, six interviewees consistently renounced any notion of China as a great power. This attitude was confirmed by reputed Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi in 2004, who argued that outsiders more often than not exaggerated China’s power.4 As Secretary of State Albright foretold after leaving office, it will be America and China taking the driving seats of international politics in the new
Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan & Co., 2003), p. 436. For example, please refer to Niu Jun（牛軍）,〈“中國崛起”夢想與現實之間 的思考〉(China Rising: A Reflection between the Dream and the Reality),《國 際經濟評論》(International Economic Review) (Beijing), No. 6, November/ December 2003, pp. 45-47. Wang Jisi（王緝思）was among the interviewees in 2000 and is now the Dean of the College of International Relations at Beijing University. 82 Prospect Journal No.9 century. It was hard to imagine and claim that the PRC was not qualified as a “great power” with global influence when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao started their second term in 2008, merely four years after Wang’s comments.
On the eve of Obama’s overhaul of foreign strategy, as the U.S. was trapped both by the costly Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the global financial crisis, Beijing’s Hu-Wen Administration enjoyed a period of more than six years of “opportunities for development.”5 Their “four-frontier strategy” ([relations with] great powers are critical, neighbors surrounding us are primary, developing countries are foundational, multilateral bodies are serviceable) revealed in 2004 was generally deemed successful. Confronted by several major do- mestic and external challenges, such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), the unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the global financial tsunami, the communist regime in Beijing stood steady and outdid the economies of Germany and Japan. The concept of the so-called “G2” was then forged, and unprecedented expectations were attributed to China, as were “responsibilities.”6 As a consequence, the debate about whether to insist on Deng’s doctrine of “hiding light” re- flamed, as nationalist critics from the Internet and Chinese colleges appeared so confident that Hu-Wen’s successful foreign line looked too submissive to defend China’s national interests.
For the financial burden and damage of national image caused by the war, please refer to John Simpson, “Assessing America’s ‘Imperial Adventure’ in Iraq,” BBC, August 31, 2010,
Words like “assertive,” “arrogant,” and even “aggressive” are common in describing China’s foreign policy changes since mid-2010. From then, the wind turned against China. As public grievances over inequality and bureaucratic corruption have kept growing, endangering the legitimacy of the rule of the party, the Hu-Wen team had much less space for sophistication in foreign issues. More investment in the PLA and tougher measures towards neighbors in territorial disputes seemed the only remaining options. Two superpowers seemed no longer able to inhabit the spacious Pacific Ocean. This challenging picture was what Hu Jintao left for Xi Jinping.
Based on the perceptions offered, this article will try to elaborate on how the Xi-Li administration will continue/reformulate Deng’s teaching and Hu-Wen’s four-frontier strategy, accordingly. It will briefly examine the challenges Beijing is facing, mainly introduced by Washington’s “rebalancing” and “pivot to Asia,” and the resulting Chinese policy stiffness in disputes over the South China Sea and East China Sea. This paper next contemplates the possible ingredients of Xi’s “new model of great power relations,” mainly addressing the U.S., but drawing support from its overall foreign policy towards neighboring countries, developing countries, as well as multilateral platforms, such as the BRICS. It concludes with a forecast of China’s foreign policy trend in the near future.
II. America’s Strategy of “Rebalancing” and Its Impact on China 1. U.S. Rebalancing: hold the growing Chinese influence in check Washington’s “rebalancing” strategy is widely believed to exist to check China’s growing power and influence in Asia. This strategy is an ongoing event, so its full composition is still in the making. Nevertheless, given several clarifications offered by senior U.S. policy 84 Prospect Journal No.9 makers on the object of how to be “rebalanced,” I maintain that the rising China is squarely at the center. It was not a coincidence for Washington to rapidly reduce its military presence in the Afghan- Iraq theater and start to “pivot to Asia.” Like Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes elaborated, the “pivot” was made possible by the winding-down of the “two wars,” allowing more focus on “the fastest-growing economic region in the world.”7 As a commentary by the New York Times put it, “As [the] U.S. looks to Asia, it sees China everywhere.”8
The Obama administration, from the moment of assuming office, has taken Asia seriously. After Obama briefly unveiled the idea of “back to Asia” in the 2009 Bali Summit of APEC, identifying himself as the first “Asia-Pacific President,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated and reinforced the idea in Hawaii less than two months later. Her remark sounded firm and solemn: “So I don’t think there is any doubt, if there were when this administration began, that the United States is back in Asia. But I want to underscore that we are back to stay.”9 Most observers were skeptical of this policy change then, and some even pessimistically concluded that the U.S. had lost Asia for- ever.10 The decision makers at the White House were resolute, never-
George E. Condon Jr., “Obama Ends Remarkable Summit Run With ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” NationalJournal, November 11, 2011,
There are several salient military and diplomatic measures that exemplify the vigorous nature of America’s “rebalancing” China strategy, which this paper will address next.
2. U.S. Military and diplomatic rebalancing First of all, the future reconfiguration of U.S. Naval assets from a 50-50 split between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific to a 40-60 formula (60 to the Asia-Pacificregion)isaclearsignal.
Ostensibly, this is because the total military budget of all Asian nations has surpassed that of Europe. Therefore, “the United States military is rebalancing and bringing enhanced capability development to this vital region,”11 as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said last June in Singapore. Nevertheless, the fastest growing defense spending in the region over the last decade has been by China. Following the speech given to the annual meeting of Asian defense ministers, Panetta started a tour of another three key nations surrounding China: Vietnam, India, and Afghanistan. Two months after the tour came the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC 2012), a multinational sea-control and power-projection drill in which 22 countries’ navies, including Russia, Burma, and Vietnam, were invited, with only two East Asian excep- tions: China and North Korea. The drill, initiated in 1971 and targeting
Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Why America No Longer Gets Asia?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, Spring 2011, pp. 25-43. Leon E. Panetta, “Shangri-La Security Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 2, 2012,
Second, America’s “forward deployed diplomacy” is another strike back after years of China’s fruitful “good neighbor policy” and “charm offensive” in the region.13 Empowered by its fast and steady economic growth, China was not only becoming the top trading partner of its neighboring countries, but also its investments on raw material mining and infrastructure construction were outdoing Western democracies. With newly winning economic clout, China was able to persuade some of its neighbors, as well as nations in the developing world, not to side with the West on issues like human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Beijing prudently sealed its antagonistic revolutionary mode and switched to a new theory of the “peaceful rise,” seeking to project itself as a friendly, non-intervening power.14 As result, the U.S. seemed not the only one with the advantage of championing “values” and “norms” locally and globally.
Zang Jingya, “2012 Rim of the Pacific Exercise Joint Military Drill Held,” cctv.com, June 29, 2012,
The best demonstration of “forward deployed diplomacy” came shortly after Panetta’s Asian Tour. Secretary Clinton’s sweeping nine- nation trip in July of 2012 is a classic example. Clinton made three stops in the Middle East and Europe, with the remaining six being China’s key neighbors: Afghanistan, Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the course of her travels, Secretary Clinton pro- claimed that “support for democracy and human rights” was at the heart of American strategy. She also told reporters in Mongolia the essence of the trip beyond democracy and rights: “My trip reflects a strategic priority of American foreign policy today.” “After ten years in which we focused a great deal of attention on the conflicts in Af- ghanistan and Iraq, the United States is making substantially increased investments — diplomatic, economic, strategic and otherwise — in this part of the world. It’s what we call our pivot toward Asia.”15
There was not a single word about China in all open remarks. Nevertheless, Washington successfully encouraged Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor Diplomacy” (distancing from Russia and China’s over- whelming influences), reassuring the shaky Yoshihiko Noda cabinet in Japan as the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands dispute was escalating, and reopened high-level exchanges with the communist-ruled inland Laos, the first after John Foster Dulles’s 1955 visit.
The most prominent part in Clinton’s itinerary was her tour to Hanoi, where iron-fisted communist rule was not an obstacle to specific U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation. The Chinese clearly remembered the USS George Washington made a historical visit to Vietnam’s waters in August of 2011.16 This time, as Clinton voiced concerns over Hanoi’s “peaceful expression of ideas” and detention of bloggers,
“US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Historic Laos Visit,” BBC, July 11, 2012,
3. Origins of China’s foreign policy disorder: shedding light over “core interests” No matter to what extent the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” is aimed at containing Chinese economic, political, and military influence through a comprehensive military and trading encirclement, its success so far cannot solely be attributed to Washington’s well- organized strategy. I argue that one major policy problem for Beijing developed in late 2009 and early 2010 that played into America’s hands. Accidental events further worsened Beijing’s geopolitical standing thereafter.
The policy problem was a gradual re-adjustment of the proportion
As the flagship of the GWCSG (George Washington Carrier Striking Group), it offered another on-board tour to “distinguished” Vietnamese guests in mid- October 2012. At receiving, Captain Carlos Sardiello welcomed visitors by saying: “We are partnered with all nations with the intention to work together to provide maritime security for the world.” Please refer to Tatiana Avery, “Viet- namese Distinguished Visitors Tour George Washington,” America’s Navy,Oc- tober 20, 2012,
As China’s size of economy and public complaints on inequality and corruption grew simultaneously, the above re-adjustment went into a different, risky track. Failing to adopt more far-reaching political and economic reform, ruling elites of the communist party became vulnerable and lost room to manipulate diplomacy flexibly. This subtle change, I argue, explains the increasing stubbornness when China was dealing with islands disputes with neighbors, first with nations in the South China Sea and followed by Japan.
At the center of such policy stubbornness was the idea that the South China Sea belongs to China’s “core interests,” an informal comment in private conversations with top American diplomats that
For detailed discussion on such ambivalence, please refer to Simon Teng-chi Chang,《建構中國：不確定世界中的大國定位與大國外交》(Writing China: Identity Formation and Big Power Diplomacy) (Taipei: Yang-Chih Book Co., 2003), pp. 73-81. 90 Prospect Journal No.9 was leaked by a Japanese source in early 2010. It claimed American officials had confirmed one or more Chinese diplomats had labeled the South China Sea a “core interest.”19 Debates about whether Beijing would place the Spratly Islands on par with other sovereignty issues that could justify military intervention, like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, intensified as a result. This created grave concerns in countries having territorial disputes with China. The concerned nations had temporarily settled the issues through the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a milestone of China’s once popular “good neighbor policy.”20 Then, China seemed to show a very different face to its neighbors, fast losing patience in an in- creasingly tense confrontation over rival claims to the resource-rich waters. The result was widespread suspicion that a rising China had been simply biding its time and would face them down when its leverage was formidable.
As Kerry Brown from the Chatham House observed, “China is becoming much more confident in the region and there are signs it is becoming giddy with success. It has become much more influential much more quickly than it expected.”21 One also can find provocative
〈中國視南海為核心利益 美嚴拒〉(China Considered South China Sea ‘Core Interest,’ Rebuffed by the U.S.),《中時電子報》(China Times), November 10, 2010,
III. “New Model” of Great Power Relations: Xi-Li’s Choices and Challenges 1. From Hu’s “peaceful rise” to Xi’s “great renaissance” The 16th CPC Congress in 2002, when Hu Jintao assumed the party leadership, outlined the grand strategy of China: “taking ad- vantage of the 20-year period of strategic opportunity to concentrate on domestic priorities, and then build a moderately prosperous, de- velopment-sustainable society in an all round way.”24 In order to
November 4, 2011,
Few students of diplomacy would buy such Chinese propaganda; but whether to challenge the American hegemon and by which means remained debatable. Hardnosed realists, like John J. Mearsheimer, contend that China will conduct and is implementing a hard-balancing strategy against the U.S. It is a natural and destined logic for “great powers,” like what America had done to the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century.26 Nevertheless, more believe that the Chinese, and perhaps some other great powers during the term of the younger Bush, chose to do “soft balancing” by means like multilateral bargaining and temporary coalitions to constrain the U.S. power.27 My observation echoes the “soft-balancing” argument, not only due to Hu’s awareness of China’s power lag behind the U.S., but also due to his and Wen’s mild style and fragile leadership.
For example, Hu did not take control of the PLA immediately
17, 2002,
The 18th Party Congress report represents to a fair degree the agenda to be achieved by the Xi-Li administration. In the sections covering world politics and foreign policy, the report frankly recognized “increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism.”29 It further condemned the “law of the jungle” and “arbitrary use of force,”30 strong words not found in the previous two party congress reports coordinated by Jiang and Hu. Clearly, America’s pivot back to Asia was blamed without being named.
Faced with pressing challenges like “increasing hegemonism,” Xi’s public speeches on China’s goal and the party’s mission were also frank, brief, and bold, a sharp contrast to Hu Jintao, who rarely spoke language other than socialist jargon. “Peaceful rise,” at least
Karen Parrish, “Panetta Calls Beijing Meetings ‘Substantive, Productive’,” U.S. DepartmentofDefense, September 20, 2012,
China’s rise, is beyond doubt. The party now pledges to “complete” the building of “a moderately prosperous society” by 2020, which means the per capita Chinese income may reach $12,000 and the Chinese GDP may overtake the U.S.31 On other occasions, Xi outlined the concept of “Chinese Dream” and rallying support for “the great renaissance of the Chinese nation.”32 With America’s “rebalancing” and China’s goal of “great renaissance” in mind, I argue the Xi-Li administration will gradually move beyond the “hiding light” strategy and soft balancing measures. One signal is the 18th Party Congress endorsing the foreign policy concept of “a responsible great power” for the first time.33 TheideaforChinatobea“responsiblepower” was not simply coined by Western neoliberalists, it also echoed Jiang Zemin’s international “partnership building” engineering in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, opponents of the idea in the party claimed it was against Deng’s “hiding light” and “not to take lead” dictums. In this sense, China’s “great renaissance,” for Xi and his followers, is marching from “hiding light” to “accomplishing” the “China’s Dream.”
2. The U.S.-Chinese “Trust Deficit” Xi’s China Dream does not necessarily mean a direct confrontation with America’s rebalancing. The “dream,” for its realization, still re- quires China to nourish well-balanced relations with developed demo-
The timetable of “completing” such a goal has never been directly mentioned in previous party documents. The personal income estimation was made by Lin Yifu, former Vice President of the World Bank. Please refer to〈林毅夫：2020 年中國人均收入超 7 萬元〉,《新華網》(Xinhuanet), March 5, 2013,
This is the backdrop of Xi’s “new model of great power relations,” which allowed little room for compromise in “core interests” issues.
Elizabeth Economy, “Xi’s Tour Won’t Fix the U.S.-Chinese Trust Deficit,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2012,
In the view of this author, Xi’s maiden overseas tour destinations after taking office were picked with the intent of warning Washington. The visited countries, including Russia and South Africa, are in good accordance with geopolitical thinking and traditional Chinese “Third World” ideology. Such moves only further deepen the U.S.-China “trust deficit.”
In addition to the remaining dead-lock issues like the undervalued RMB and vague positions of America over island disputes in the East and South China Sea, another fierce round of mutual accusations on internet hacking and cyber-attacks is getting fiery. Details of a cyber-war against prominent U.S. international businesses and organi- zations by the PLA was revealed by members of the U.S. administration since Obama began his first term, as some Western media have long and regularly depicted China as the villain behind the scenes.35 The latest case of such violations was the so-called “headquarters of P.L.A. Unit 61398” or the “Shanghai Group” of cyber warriors res- ponsible for hacking, alleged by a U.S. based internet security firm but strongly denied by China’s foreign ministry.36
As a response, Beijing said China was also the victim of this kind of espionage. Linking China to internet hacking attacks arbitrarily was “irresponsible.” State-owned Chinese media further argued there was an American conspiracy of demonizing China in order to justify
Nick Hopkins, “US and China engage in cyber war games,” The Guardian, April 16, 2012,
In this author’s view, most of the accusations above are difficult to verify, as internet insurgencies are becoming extremely irregular. For the same reason, unconfirmed cyber disruptions targeting one another will be one of the most destructive accelerators to the falling U.S.-China mutual trust.
3. Old comrade, new leverage: Russia plus the BRICS The countermeasure of the Xi-Li administration to deal with Washington’s “rebalancing” and a downward Sino-U.S. relations prospect was to revive China’s traditional strategies dating back to the Cold War era. Two traditional Chinese counterweights against foreign economic/military containment were the Soviet Union and the Third World. Moscow’s nationalist elites have long been discontent with the reluctant economic support from the West and their active involvement in various “color revolutions,” aiming to further break up Russia. In a word, both China and Russia shared a fear of being marginalized and eliminated by “a unipolar world”. This trend from the end of the Cold War explains consecutive Russo-Chinese joint statements calling for “multipolarization” and “a just political and economic world order.”
Ren Haijung,〈美國“網絡擴軍”令人憂〉(U.S. Cyber Militarism is Worrisome), 《新華網》(Xinhuanet), March 19, 2013,
Meanwhile, although the ideology of the “Third World” seems not stylish and appealing today, countries from the “rising markets” do share similar ideas about amending the rules of international trade and finance. The growing diversity of issues of global governance, like international terrorism and climate change, provides new forums for those embracing various “revisionist” ideas. The so-called BRICS is such a platform that is evolving into a tangible organizational force pooling together renewed elements traditionally embedded in “the Third World” conception. Accordingly, the Xi-Li administration will strive to inject new vigor into the Sino-Russian relations and exploit the BRICS forum to break out the emerging net of containment from China’s east.
China’s history of dramatizing its “friendship” with the Russians is not news. Xi’s first stop on his maiden overseas visit further verifies this. To maximize the effect, Xi stressed that the two countries are each other’s “most important strategic cooperative partner,” deter- mining to deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership in their foreign policy. In this way, Beijing and Moscow now find common ground as they each seek to claim a place as a “respected great power.”38
Furthermore, Xi’s joint statement with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, celebrates their relations, which have reached an un- precedented high level, “set a good example for the harmonious co-
“China’s new president wraps up visit to Russia,” Xinhuanet, March 24, 2013,
Last, the BRICS bloc has not yet evolved into the powerful anti- West body that some observers foresaw. This is partially due to worries in India and Russia that China’s economic strength could overwhelm the bloc. For example, there are reports that claim that the currency reserve the BRICS plans to establish would be heavily
“Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the win-win cooperation and deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation,” Comprehensive News, March 23, 2013,
IV. Conclusion For Chinese foreign policy today, Hu Jintao’s “four-frontier strategy” ([relations with] great powers are critical, neighbors sur-
So, Graham Allison argues that it is more appropriate to consider China separately from other BRICS, which, “if an acronym is called for, can be called: ‘RIBS’.” Please refer to Graham Allison, “China Doesn’t Belong in the BRICS,” The Atlantic, March 26, 2013,
In order to compensate for the breaks in two of the four frontiers, the Xi-Li administration strives to draw support from the other two:
Thom Shanker, “U.S. Won’t Become Isolationist, Gates Tells Worried Asian Leaders,” The New York Times, June 3, 2011,
“friends” with shared discontent of the West in the developing world and certain multilateral forums, like the Forum on China-Africa Co- operation (FOCAC) and the BRICS summits, where Beijing enjoys a shaping force. Besides, Beijing has re-oriented its “new model of great power relations” previously addressing U.S.-China relations. The relations with old comrade Russians are invigorated again. As a consequence, Deng’s teaching of “hiding light” is yielding to Xi’s newly interpreted “responsible great power” diplomacy confirmed in the 18th Congress of the Communist Party. Differing from the concept of “responsibility” proposed by Jiang Zemin in the late 1990s, Xi’s version is based on “Sino-Russian partnership” and the BRICS bloc, responsible for pursuing “democratic international relations” and a “just international political and economic new order.” This is indeed a candid and frank response to an emerging economic and military network of “rebalancing” China designed by America.
Indeed, for the Chinese, relations with the U.S. remain the most crucial for supporting its continuing economic growth and the ful- fillment of Xi-Li’s “Chinese Dream.” To trigger a showdown with the U.S. in any “asymmetric way” makes no sense. It serves no one’s interests in the all-mighty elites of the Communist Party. Xi Jinping had described the unprecedented U.S.-China great-power stalemate as “a surging river that could not be stopped.”46 The way out of this trap is a practical consensus: “When confronted by mountains, one finds a way through. When blocked by a river, one finds a way to bridge to the other side.” His comments echoed Biden’s words, “we are not going to see eye to eye.”47 Nevertheless, given the growing
“China’s Xi Jinping calls for ‘deep’ US-China ties,” BBC, February 15, 2012,
“trust deficit,” Xi is only on a long march to China’s own “rebalancing.” For the rising and the established superpowers, it is a competition of strategic patience. 104 Prospect Journal No.9
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