Managing Cross-Strait Relations in Light of Intensifying US- Rivalry Zhiqun Zhu Bucknell University (***Draft prepared for the 2019 Conference, Western Michigan University. No citation please.)

Abstract The (TRA) has provided the legal framework for the to conduct “unofficial” relations with Taiwan since its enactment in 1979. Under this unique law, Taiwan has prospered and democratized and US-Taiwan relations have steadily grown. While celebrating the 40th anniversary of the TRA, one should not forget that for Taiwan’s future, cross-Strait relations are as important as, if not more important than, the US-Taiwan relationship. With growing Chinese power and intensifying US-China rivalry, is the DPP government’s “pro-US, anti-China” approach sustainable? How can peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait be maintained? In addition to achieving economic and political miracles, Taiwan has developed a separate identity from the PRC. As a result, fewer and fewer people in Taiwan identify themselves as Chinese or support reunification with China. Meanwhile, nationalism continues to grow in China under ’s strong leadership. China seems determined to realize the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation by mid-21st century, which will include reunification with Taiwan. Are the two sides of the Taiwan Strait headed for a catastrophic collision? Will a more assertive China continue to tolerate the TRA, a US domestic law, to dictate America’s China and Taiwan policies? Having passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, will China challenge the TRA politically, legally, diplomatically, and even militarily in the future? This paper will explore such questions and examine how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can manage and perhaps improve relations in the context of growing US-China rivalry. Keywords: Taiwan Relations Act, cross-strait relations, US-China rivalry, domestic law vs. international agreement, Chinese dream.

Introduction 2019 is a significant year in Taiwan-US-PRC relations. It marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and witnesses continued upgrading of US-Taiwan relations and continued deterioration in cross-strait relations. It also marks 40th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC. To a large extent, the TRA is a byproduct or a consequence of the US-PRC diplomatic normalization. From day one, the TRA has never been just about relations between Taiwan and the United States. It has been an important document affecting all three parties: the United States, Taiwan and the PRC. The TRA is “the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations,” Senator (R-FL) highlighted the strong sentiment in Congress about the importance of Taiwan to American

1 interests. “We must continue to strengthen our alliance with Taiwan, a fellow democracy, in the face of China’s rising aggression in the region,” and “Taiwan is a critical security partner in achieving our shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”1 It was also in 2019 that the ROC’s two diplomatic allies—the Solomon Islands and Kiribati—switched to the PRC, reducing Taiwan’s formal allies to just 15, despite both carrots and sticks from the United States and Australia, highlighting growing clout of Beijing around the world. As Taiwan and the US celebrate the TRA, some questions emerge: Since the PRC has become more powerful and increasingly assertive, how will it challenge the TRA in the future? What are the prospects of cross-strait relations? Do the US and Taiwan have any constructive plans to handle challenges from China other than countering its rise? The PRC is obviously not happy as the United States and Taiwan celebrate the 40 years of the TRA. Whenever Beijing complains about US moves to upgrade relations with Taiwan or US sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, Washington typically brushes them off by stating that the US policy is consistent with the TRA, which implies that US-Taiwan relations are separate from US-China relations. Can the United States and Taiwan afford to ignore such complaints from Beijing while claiming that the TRA has nothing to do with the PRC? Discussions of the TRA will be incomplete if they are divorced from taking the US-China relationship into account. It is presumed that for Taiwan’s future, cross-strait relations are as important as, if not more important than, the US-Taiwan relations. Based on this assumption, this paper will offer some observations about US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations in light of intensifying US-China rivalry.

Upgrading US-Taiwan Relations There is no naivete in Beijing that the US will support China’s efforts to reunify with Taiwan. From the realist perspective, as US-China rivalry intensifies, Taiwan’s value will increase for the United States. As the US strives to counter China’s rise, it will be foolish not to play the Taiwan card. The U.S. is the only country that doesn’t officially recognize the ROC that is willing to receive its president and foreign minister, giving top officials from Taiwan the rare platforms to make their voices heard in the world. US-Taiwan relations have drastically enhanced since President won the election in 2016. Shortly after the election, he received a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen, which was unprecedented in US-Taiwan relations.

1 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s Status Is a Geopolitical Absurdity,” The Atlantic, July 8. 2019: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical- absurdity/593371/.

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US Congress has passed a series of Taiwan-friendly legislations, especially the Taiwan Travel Act and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. The Taiwan Travel Act, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump in March 2018, allows officials “at all levels of the United States Government,” including Cabinet-level secretaries, national security officials, and other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts, and vice versa. If the Act is fully implemented, US-Taiwan relations will be significantly upgraded and become more official. In Beijing’s view, this is provocative at a time when the United States and China are engaged in a trade war and only adds fuel to fire as tensions grow. Recent examples of upgrading and warming US-Taiwan relations also include: ◼ In April 2019, dozens of US officials, led by former House Speaker Paul Ryan, traveled to Taipei to celebrate 40 years of the TRA. ◼ In early October 2019, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the ROC Foreign Ministry jointly held the first Pacific Islands Dialogue in Taipei, which was attended by Sandra Oudkirk, deputy assistant secretary of state for Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands. Oudkirk said she was representing President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo at the Dialogue. The Dialogue was defined as a government-to- government event. ◼ Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) attended the Double 10 ROC national day celebration in Taipei this year—apparently the first US senator to do so in 35 years. ◼ Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO) co-authored an op-ed titled “Strong US-Taiwanese Ties Needed to Counter Rising Chinese Influence in the Pacific” published by The Hill on October 9 calling on the U.S. government to strengthen ties with Taiwan to counter China’s growing influence in the Pacific region. ◼ Both House and Senate have introduced Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act to reinforce ties between the United States and Taiwan after Solomon Islands and Kiribati cut relations with Taiwan in favor of China.

In dealing with the PRC and Taiwan, the U.S. emphasizes both the three US-PRC communiques and the TRA in an attempt to balance U.S. approaches to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The TRA has provided a legal and political framework under which the US- Taiwan relationship has sustained after 1979 and Taiwan has prospered and democratized at the same time. As a result of enforcing the TRA, US-Taiwan relations have become “officially unofficial, but unofficially official.” The AIT was set up to handle “unofficial” relations between Taiwan and the United States in 1979. It has become more active and its public and official role more prominent. Current AIT Chairman Ambassador James F. Moriarty has visited Taiwan 7 times since assuming the duty in October 2016, including the most recent visit in mid-October 2019. In July 2019, the AIT Taipei office--the de facto US embassy in Taiwan--moved into a $250 million new compound built into a lush hill in Taipei with security provided by US Marines. Current AIT Taipei Director William Brent Christensen assumed duties in August

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2018. Since then the AIT has pursued a “four promotes” policy under his leadership: Promote U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, promote U.S.-Taiwan economic and commercial ties, promote Taiwan’s participation in the international community, and promote U.S.-Taiwan people-to- people ties.2 U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation has strengthened, including continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and coordination of the two militaries. It also includes sending Taiwan’s best of the best to the United States for military training. As reported by the AIT, Taiwan Marine Captain Yu Kuei-lin （余奎麟）became the first Taiwan military officer to complete the rigorous U.S. Navy SEAL training course in 2004. Yu is a colonel in the ROC military now. Amid reports that Solomon Islands were about to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing earlier this year, the United States tried to prevent the change. AIT Taipei Director Christensen attended the welcome reception that ROC Foreign Minister Joseph Wu hosted for visiting Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele in early September 2019 to show America’s support for Taiwan. Catherine Ebert-Gray, the U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, also defended Taiwan-Solomon Islands relations and suggested that Taiwan has been an exceptional partner to the Solomon Islands,"3 She met with Prime Minister Sogavare and urged him not to abandon Taiwan. Vice President Mike Pence was scheduled to meet with Sogavare in New York during the UN General Assembly in September for the same reason but cancelled the meeting after the diplomatic switch took place. It was also reported that in June 2019 Australia pledged a $250 million aid program for infrastructure in the Solomon Islands, hoping to balance China’s growing influence in the region.4 Despite the intervening efforts by the United States and Australia, Solomon Islands finally decided to cut relations with Taipei on September 16, 2019. This is significant since it reflects the changing power structure in the South Pacific, i.e. China’s growing influence and America’s relative declining clout. The DPP government may have overestimated the capability and willingness of the United States or Australia to intervene and change the outcome of Solomon Islands’ decision. Some people may suggest that this is a typical case of “dollar diplomacy,” through which Beijing and Taipei have engaged in the diplomatic tussle, and Beijing wooed the Solomon Islands away with a more generous monetary offer. However, the Solomon Islands government’s task force report indicates otherwise. “Normalizing diplomatic relations with (the) PRC will enable Solomon Islands to leverage and enhance its strategic partnership with the world’s second largest economy. As a UN member, (the) PRC occupies a pivotal role in the world stage to enhance Solomon Islands UN agenda. China as a UN Security Council member can also be influential in articulating the interests of developing countries such as Solomon

2 From the AIT Facebook post, August 23, 2019. 3 “Taiwan an exceptional partner to Solomon Islands: U.S. ambassador,” Focus Taiwan, September 11, 2019. 4 Charles I-hsin Chen and Ingrid Tang, “America vs. China: A Proxy War through Taiwan?” The National Interest, September 28, 2019.

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Islands. Such interests include: climate change, trade and development issues. (The) PRC is also a promoter of multilateralism. It is important that developing countries such as Solomon Islands work alongside China to enhance and promote multilateralism in the global environment.” According to the task force report, establishing relations with the PRC will open “new frontiers” in the island nation’s foreign relations. “Normalizing diplomatic ties with (the) PRC will open up many frontiers for Solomon Islands never seen in the forty years of Solomon Islands independence. When we normalize, Solomon Islands will have a major donor power that it can engage locally with to support its development initiatives and aspirations. This will add value to our existing diplomatic relations. China will provide us with an opportunity to leverage, engage and maximize fully and constructively with our diplomatic partners.” “Normalizing diplomatic relations with (the) PRC as a key development partner will ensure support for Solomon Islands long-term strategic interest and development. With (the) PRC’s potential support for our development needs in various technical areas, it will also enhance our national interests, security, and stability. For the five countries visited, (the) PRC has supported them in many areas. (The) PRC has contributed to their socio-economic development, peace, stability, and progress in their respective countries.” So in the future, Solomon Islands can use its bilateral relations with (the) PRC, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to push through its UN agenda and seek support from the international community.5 While the DPP government and some people outside Taiwan may continue to accuse Beijing of enticing the Solomon Islands away with money,6 it’s clear from the task force report that the Solomon Islands made the decision based on its long-term national interests. Five days after the Solomon Islands switched to Beijing, Kiribati followed suit and cut relations with Taipei, highlighting serious challenges for Taiwan in keeping its remaining diplomatic allies, almost all of which are small and poor nations that are vulnerable to Beijing’s charm offensive. Indeed, according to President Ma Ying-jeou, many of these small nations wanted to switch to Beijing when he was in office, but Beijing turned them down because it did not want to harm cross-strait relations.7

Will the United States Defend Taiwan?

5 I cannot find the full text of the task force report online. The above quotes are based on the text released by scholars in Taiwan: https://www.facebook.com/kweibo.huang/posts/2434229939997346. 6 For example, US Vice President Mike Pence stated that “through checkbook diplomacy, over the past year China has induced two more nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing” in his second major speech on China on October 24, 2019. 7 This was confirmed by President Ma during a meeting with Asia scholars, which the author attended, on June 5, 2019 in Singapore.

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The current DPP government has followed a “pro-US, anti-China” policy and indicated no interest in breaking the stalemate in cross-strait relations. The rationale is that with strong US support, Taiwan will be safe no matter how cross-strait relations deteriorate. This represents a very risky line of thinking since it is built upon the assumption that the United States will automatically come to Taiwan’s defense if there is a cross-strait military conflict. The DPP government and pro-DPP media in Taiwan selectively focus on progress that has been made in US-Taiwan relations in recent years while downplaying or even ignoring the severe security challenges from across the strait. There is no serious debate within the DPP either regarding how to deal with a rising China. Taiwan plays an indispensable role in curbing Chinese aggression and maintaining regional peace and stability, and the U.S. will continue to provide weapons of a self defense nature for Taiwan to defend itself, said David Helvey, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, at a forum held by the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) in Washington DC on September 11, 2019.8 Are Americans willing to fight a war with China over Taiwan? The TRA obligates the US to sell weapons of defensive nature to Taiwan, but it is not a defense treaty. To put it bluntly, the US is not obligated to fight for Taiwan, and the United States does not have a blank check for Taiwan. According to a survey released in September 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, despite growing trade tensions, 2/3 Americans support friendly cooperation and engagement with China , and only about 1/3 (34%) support selling arms to Taiwan.9 Among all the exchanges between Taiwan and the United States, perhaps the PRC is most frustrated about continued US arms sales to Taiwan and US-Taiwan military cooperation. Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Defense, used “seriously” five times to highlight China’s displeasure in the aftermath of the US announcement of a new $8 billion worth of arms sale to Taiwan in August 2019: it seriously violates the “one China” principle and the three US- China joint communiques, seriously interferes in China’s internal affairs, seriously damages China’s sovereignty and security interests, seriously threatens bilateral military relations and seriously harms peace and stability cross the Taiwan Strait. It is completely wrong and very dangerous.10

8 “U.S. concerned at Taiwan's falling number of diplomatic allies,” Focus Taiwan, September 11, 2019. 9 “Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 9, 2019: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/report_ccs19_rejecting- retreat_20190909.pdf. 10 Wu Qian’s press briefing in Beijing on August 23, 2019. “美方向台出售武器严重违反一个 中国原则和中美三个联合公报规定，严重干涉中国内政，严重损害中国主权和安全利益， 严重危害中美两国两军关系发展，严重损害台海地区和平稳定，是完全错误的，也是非常 危险的。” 多维新闻网， August 23, 2019. http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-08- 23/60146517.html.

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It was reported that before his departure as President Trump’s National Security Advisor in early September 2019, John Bolton declassified a 1982 memorandum that President Ronald Reagan sent to Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger regarding US arms sales to Taiwan. The memo, which was written on the same day as the third joint US-PRC communique was issued, stated that “the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences” and “it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided [to] Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.”11 While publicly promising Beijing to gradually decrease arms sales to Taiwan in both quantity and quality, privately Reagan was trying to maintain a military balance across the Taiwan Strait. From Beijing’s perspective, the US government and President Reagan were contradicting themselves. The August 17 1982 Communique between the US and China states that the U.S. government does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, and the arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, in qualitative and quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years. Since George H. W. Bush sold 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan in 1992, his successors Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama were largely deferential in the face of China’s economic and political rise. They were reluctant to approve large or regular arms deals to Taiwan, out of fear of angering Beijing, preferring to bundle medium-size deals that were only approved when they wanted to send a message that they were displeased with China. Donald Trump is clearly the most Taiwan-friendly President since the TRA went into effect. The State Department and Pentagon in the Trump administration are stacked with China hawks and friends of Taiwan, and there is an obvious push for normalization of arms packages.12 At a Department of State news conference on August 21, 2019, shortly after President Trump announced the $8 billion sale of 66 F-16s to Taiwan, a reporter from Xinhua challenged Department of State spokesperson Morgan Ortagus about the sale, pointing out that the sale apparently violates the August 17 Communique of 1982 between the United States and China. Ms. Ortagus’s response was a little incoherent and she parried away a follow-up question: “We don’t see it that way. 1982 was the year I was born. I don’t think it was that long ago, so I think that we’re still in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act that we have here and the three joint

11 See report by Focus Taiwan, September 18, 2019; http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201909180020.aspx. 12 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s Status Is a Geopolitical Absurdity,” The Atlantic, July 8. 2019: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical- absurdity/593371/.

7 communiques.”13 The US government continues to insist that there is no contradiction between the TRA and the three communiques.

US arms sales to Taiwan will not only harm US-China military-to-military exchanges—the weakest link in the bilateral relationship—but also harden the PRC’s resolve to prepare for

13 Department of State press briefing, August 21, 2019. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-21-2019/

8 reunification by force. As the PLA continues to modernize, US arms sales will do little to alter the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, says the defense editor of the National Interest.14 Despite growing tensions between the United States and China, the US government does not intend to contain China and will not take a confrontational approach to China. Instead it will continue to engage with China and seek cooperation in various venues. This pragmatic approach was reaffirmed by Vice President Mike Pence during his major China speech on October 24, 2019. A Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey in June 2019 also indicates that the majority of Americans (74%) support engaging in trade with China while only 24% oppose. Taiwan is only one of the issues in US-China relations; it is far from being a “core issue” for Washington. But for Beijing, this has constantly been the top priority in China’s relations with the United States. It is probably not wise to test Beijing’s resolve or rely on the US protection for Taiwan’s future.

14 David Axe, “Taiwan Is Getting Sixty F-16s but They Won't Really Matter Against China,” The National Interest, September 11, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/taiwan-getting- sixty-f-16s-they-wont-really-matter-against-china-79511.

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What Does Beijing Think? There is a tendency in the United States to claim that everything the US government does regarding Taiwan or cross-strait relations is consistent with the TRA and the three communiques. Some US officials and scholars suggest that the TRA supersedes the three communiques because it is “the law of the land,” passed by Congress and signed into law by the President. This view has been rejected by Beijing. Beijing would simply argue that the TRA is after all a domestic law and should not be used to regulate international relations especially when the external party concerned (China) does not agree with the law. Obviously, China looks at the TRA and cross-strait relations very differently. From the PRC’s perspective, the three communiques were reached between China and three different US administrations and are therefore international agreements. Furthermore, the 1979 and 1982 communiques reaffirmed the “One China” principle enshrined in the 1972 communique, so the three form a coherent series of agreements between Beijing and Washington. If every country uses its domestic law to contradict the content and spirit of the agreements reached between its own government and a foreign government, then where are the integrity and authority of international law and international accord? Some US officials and scholars also play the word games, saying the US “One China Policy” is different from the PRC’s “One China Principle.” They do not clearly explain what America’s “One China Policy” is and what the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan is. The US “One China Policy” smacks of a “One China, One Taiwan” policy. Indeed, some members of US congress publicly support Taiwan as an independent and separate country from China, although the White House has not gone that far. Given the inherent contradictions of the three communiques and the TRA and different interpretations of the TRA, this US law that has helped promote US-Taiwan relations is likely to become an acute problem between the United States and China as their rivalry intensifies. As far as cross-strait relations are concerned, increasingly people in Taiwan believe that the PRC has never ruled the island for a single day, and Taiwan is already a democracy, so its future has to be determined by the 23 million people on the island. But the Chinese government continues to view cross-strait relations from the lens of unfinished . They argue that no matter how Taiwanese politics evolves, there is no way Taiwan can unilaterally cut its historical, political, cultural, and economic ties to China. You can dislike the CCP, but you cannot deny that Taiwan and the Mainland belong to one country. In other words, Taiwan independence is not an option unless the majority of the people on the Mainland agree. This may sound outlandish to many in Taiwan, but it’s just reality on the Mainland. Beijing watches growing Taiwanese identity with great concerns. The fact that two sides conducted official exchanges based on the “92 consensus” and that Xi Jinping met with Ma Ying-jeou on equal footing suggests that Beijing is willing to negotiate with Taipei about the future arrangement of cross-strait relations. Western media’s portrayal of Chinese view of Taiwan as a “renegade province” does not capture Beijing’s pragmatic policy.

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Knowing that “one country, two systems” is not popular in Taiwan, Beijing is apparently trying to come up with a new, perhaps more generous model for Taipei, but it is not creative enough. Xi Jinping raised the “Taiwan proposal” based on “one country, two systems” at the beginning of 2019, but it has been flatly rejected by both KMT and DPP. Nevertheless, the KMT is willing to resume exchanges with the Mainland based on the “92 Consensus,” whereby both sides agree there is one China while leaving “one China” undefined. Tsai Ing-wen’s misleading interpretation of the “92 Consensus” as equivalent to “one country, two systems” shows that she is not interested in or serious about talking to Beijing. “One China” is not something that Beijing imposes on Taiwan; it is based on the constitutions of both sides and was the foundation for exchanges in the past. It is not a precondition for talks, as claimed by the DPP. Taiwan’s own definition of its relations with China under the DPP government is confusing and inconsistent. Initially, Tsai used “Chinese mainland” to refer to the other side of the Taiwan Strait and pledged to follow the ROC Constitution and the Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in conducting cross-strait relations. After about a year in office, Tsai and all DPP officials began to use “China” in their speeches and official documents. Meanwhile, they seldom use Taiwan’s official name, the Republic of China. Increasingly, “China” and “Taiwan” have become widely used and accepted references to the two entities across the Strait. Hawks in China may like the DPP to stay in power. If the DPP government continues to depart from “one China” and cross the red line, hawks in China believe it will be the great opportunity for speedy reunification by force.

Managing Cross-Strait Relations in Light of Growing US-China Rivalry “Anyone attempting to split China in any part of the country will end in crushed bodies and shattered bones （粉身碎骨）. Any external forces supporting the split of China can only be regarded as a delusion by the Chinese people!” warned Xi Jinping during a visit to Nepal in early October 2019. The message is likely not just sent to Tibetans in exile, but also to people in and Taiwan. The words may sound threatening, but Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan has been consistent since the 1979 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (告台湾同胞 书). Beijing changed the policy from “liberation of Taiwan” to “peaceful reunification”. It has proposed the “one country, two systems” model for reunification, albeit few people in Taiwan would support it. In the dynamic Washington-Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is the United States and Taiwan that have changed their policies over the years. The DPP government changed the status quo that it inherited from the Ma administration. President Ma improved relations with the Mainland based on the “92 consensus.” If the DPP government insists that “one China” should not be the basis for talks between Taiwan and the Mainland, then what is to be talked about? Why will they even need to talk to each other? By saying that “one China” should not be a precondition, the DPP is actually setting its own

11 precondition for cross-strait talks. The DPP government shows no interest in talking to Beijing and has not made a counter-offer while flatly rejecting “one country, two systems.” The DPP government has also been playing the democracy and freedom card in dealing with Beijing. But the DPP government’s interpretation of “freedom” can be highly selective. Basically, you have the freedom to support Taiwan’s separation from China, but you do not have much freedom to defend the idea of reunification with China or support the PRC’s policies. So when a PRC official (Chen Yunling) was egged while visiting Taiwan, he deserved it, and the attackers were exercising their rights in a free society. When a Hong Kong political activist (Denise Ho) was egged in Taiwan, the DPP government vowed to punish the perpetrator. And when a young couple from the Mainland tore down posters that supported Hong Kong protests, they were expelled from Taiwan. Chinese liberals used to consider Taiwan a shining model of democracy for the Mainland, but now they look at the DPP government with disappointment and even contempt. There is a joke on the Mainland: I thought the is over, but after I have visited Taiwan, I realize that it is not. The US government used to say that the cross-strait dispute has to be resolved peacefully, with the consent of people on both sides. Nowadays, few US officials still hold such a view. In fact, one can argue that the United States is changing the status quo: it is changing Taiwan from a political entity whose future will be determined by people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to a strategic asset in US-China rivalry that must be denied to China. China passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 to check Taiwan’s independence tendency. Will Beijing enact a specific legislation aiming at the TRA and arms sales in particular? The PRC can perhaps borrow a page from the US playbook by saying that this is the law of the land, and we are conducting business based on the law. It is unlikely that the United States will annul the TRA no matter how much pressure China exerts. Rather, the TRA’s status as a major source of contention between the two countries will become more prominent. Indeed, since the US government emphasizes the TRA so much and so often, many Americans mistakenly think it is a treaty between the US and Taiwan. Many also think Taiwan is an independent country from China (table next page). According to a study conducted over three different periods, the percentage of Americans who think Taiwan is an independent state has increased since 2010. In 2010 towards the end of Obama’s first term, close to 75% Americans surveyed believed Taiwan was an independent state, not part of China. In 2012 at the beginning of Obama’s second term, it dropped slightly to 70%. By 2017 after Trump entered the White House, about 89% of Americans surveyed consider Taiwan an independent country. This is perhaps influenced by Trump’s phone call with Tsai Ing-wen as well as passage of Taiwan-friendly bills by Congress, especially Taiwan Travel

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Act. The same survey finds that close to 60% Americans do not support continued sales of weapons to Taiwan.15

Looking ahead On October 1, 2019, Beijing flexed its muscles while celebrating 70th anniversary of the PRC. The country's biggest-ever military parade with an array of new weaponry showcased reflects China's "war plan," which is aimed at realizing the military annexation of Taiwan by 2049 -- the centennial of Communist Party rule -- while preventing intervention by the U.S., commented Nikkei Asian Review.16 The DF-17 and DF-26 ballistic missiles pose credible threat to Taiwan and US forces in Asia.

15 Lv Jie, “American Public’s Views of Taiwan and America’s Taiwan Policy,” 美国民众对台 湾和美对台政策的认识， 海外看世界, August 25, 2019. 16 TETSURO KOSAKA, “China's military parade heralds 'war plan' for US and Taiwan,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 5, 2019.

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Flexing muscles will not help win the hearts and minds of the people in Taiwan. Growing military power itself may not be that surprising; what is dangerous is the belief in Beijing that military force will have to be used as hope for peaceful reunification diminishes. A “tipping point” of using force against Taiwan might come in 5 to 10 years if Chinese leaders lose patience: both Bonnie Glaser of CSIS and Oriana Skylar Mastro of predicted during a congressional hearing organized by U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on September 4, 2019.17 Prolonged protests in Hong Kong raised more doubts about Beijing’s “one country, two systems” policy and further pushed the Taiwanese away from the policy while reviving Tsai Ing- wen’s reelection campaign. Meanwhile, Tsai has hardened her anti-China stance ahead of the January 2020 election. Tsai said Hong Kong protests illustrated the failure of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” governance of Hong Kong. “We are witnessing China’s rise and expansion, as they challenge free, democratic values,” said Tsai during the 2019 Double 10 Day speech. “Taiwan has become the first line of defense for democratic values.” If Tsai is re- elected, she will have to revamp her policy towards the mainland, unless she and the DPP believe that the current stalemate and further deterioration is in Taiwan’s interest. With protests in Hong Kong still going on and increasing number of people in both Hong Kong and Taiwan opposing the “one country, two systems” model, Beijing needs to reflect upon its policies and has to be more creative and magnanimous in dealing with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Beijing and Taipei sharply disagree on the island’s status. The PRC asserts that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. Beijing says Taiwan is bound by the “1992 Consensus”. The tacit agreement underlying the “1992 Consensus” is that Taiwan will not seek independence from “one China.” Confident that time is on its side, Beijing has not set a clear timetable for reunification, although many believe that mid-21st century is the soft deadline, by which Xi vows the “Chinese Dream” will be realized. With the DPP in power and Taiwanese identity growing, Beijing’s focus now has shifted from “promoting reunification” （促通）to “opposing independence” （反独）。 KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu remarked that for Taiwan, the United States is too far away and China is too close by,18 which reflects geography and political reality that are not easy to overcome for Taiwan. The key is to make sure that Beijing still feels hopeful that peaceful reunification is possible. If developments in Taiwan suggest that reunification becomes impossible, then Beijing is likely to feel compelled to use force.

17 美專家：大陸對台動武引爆點或在五到十年間, 中國評論通訊社, September 6, 2019. http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1055/3/3/0/105533071.html?coluid=93&kindid=7950&docid=10553307 1&mdate=0906015647 18“韩国瑜受访谈两岸关系 引用越南名言比喻,” 中评社， 2019 年 10 月 15 日。 http://bj.crntt.com/doc/1055/7/0/0/105570087.html?coluid=153&kindid=0&docid=105570087& mdate=1015233040。

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Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s words are stridently insulting for Taiwan: “When it comes to economics and politics, Taiwan is completely useless to us.” 19 Yet, it probably reflects the international reality as China becomes more powerful and influential in global affairs. The January 2020 election in Taiwan could be a new beginning for cross-strait relations no matter who emerges as the winner. The leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must be open-minded, pragmatic, and creative in addressing their differences and forming a path forward. The future of peace and prosperity across the strait lies in their hands.

Takeaway points: 1. The 40 years of TRA are worth celebrating due to its contribution to Taiwan’s security, stability across the strait, and improvement of US-Taiwan relations. 2. 2019 also marks the 40th anniversary of the PRC-US diplomatic ties. How parties concerned address the inherent contradictions between the TRA and the 3 US-China communiques will be a big challenge in the years ahead. 3. No matter who wins the next ROC presidential elections, he/she will have to reset and improve cross-Strait relations. Without a stable cross-strait relationship, Taiwan’s economy and international relations will continue to suffer and its future will remain delicate. 4. The PRC is likely to become less tolerant of the TRA as its power continues to grow. It is likely to challenge the TRA legally and diplomatically. The triangular US-Taipei- Beijing relations will become more conflictual. 5. As the Chinese power and influence continue to grow globally, is it the best strategy for the United States and Taiwan to counter China’s rise? Is it the best policy for Taiwan to willingly stand on the frontline as part of the US pushback again Beijing? What is in Taiwan’s best interest as far as cross-strait relations are concerned? 6. Arresting further deterioration of cross-strait relations should be the priority after the Jan. 20 election. Resolving differences between the two sides will require tremendous wisdom, creativity, and pragmatism that reflect both history and reality of the relationship.

19 Graeme Smith, “The wisdom of Solomons: Taiwan and China’s Pacific power play,” The Interpreter, The Lowy Institute, September 12, 2019.

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