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Managing Cross-Strait Relations in Light of Intensifying US-China Rivalry Zhiqun Zhu Bucknell University (***Draft Prepared

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Managing Cross-Strait Relations in Light of Intensifying US-China Rivalry Zhiqun Zhu Bucknell University (***Draft Prepared Managing Cross-Strait Relations in Light of Intensifying US-China Rivalry Zhiqun Zhu Bucknell University (***Draft prepared for the 2019 Taiwan Conference, Western Michigan University. No citation please.) Abstract The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has provided the legal framework for the United States to conduct “unofficial” relations with Taiwan since its enactment in 1979. Under this unique law, Taiwan has prospered and democratized and US-Taiwan relations have steadily grown. While celebrating the 40th anniversary of the TRA, one should not forget that for Taiwan’s future, cross-Strait relations are as important as, if not more important than, the US-Taiwan relationship. With growing Chinese power and intensifying US-China rivalry, is the DPP government’s “pro-US, anti-China” approach sustainable? How can peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait be maintained? In addition to achieving economic and political miracles, Taiwan has developed a separate identity from the PRC. As a result, fewer and fewer people in Taiwan identify themselves as Chinese or support reunification with China. Meanwhile, nationalism continues to grow in China under Xi Jinping’s strong leadership. China seems determined to realize the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation by mid-21st century, which will include reunification with Taiwan. Are the two sides of the Taiwan Strait headed for a catastrophic collision? Will a more assertive China continue to tolerate the TRA, a US domestic law, to dictate America’s China and Taiwan policies? Having passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, will China challenge the TRA politically, legally, diplomatically, and even militarily in the future? This paper will explore such questions and examine how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can manage and perhaps improve relations in the context of growing US-China rivalry. Keywords: Taiwan Relations Act, cross-strait relations, US-China rivalry, domestic law vs. international agreement, Chinese dream. Introduction 2019 is a significant year in Taiwan-US-PRC relations. It marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and witnesses continued upgrading of US-Taiwan relations and continued deterioration in cross-strait relations. It also marks 40th anniversary of the diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC. To a large extent, the TRA is a byproduct or a consequence of the US-PRC diplomatic normalization. From day one, the TRA has never been just about relations between Taiwan and the United States. It has been an important document affecting all three parties: the United States, Taiwan and the PRC. The TRA is “the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations,” Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) highlighted the strong sentiment in Congress about the importance of Taiwan to American 1 interests. “We must continue to strengthen our alliance with Taiwan, a fellow democracy, in the face of China’s rising aggression in the region,” and “Taiwan is a critical security partner in achieving our shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”1 It was also in 2019 that the ROC’s two diplomatic allies—the Solomon Islands and Kiribati—switched to the PRC, reducing Taiwan’s formal allies to just 15, despite both carrots and sticks from the United States and Australia, highlighting growing clout of Beijing around the world. As Taiwan and the US celebrate the TRA, some questions emerge: Since the PRC has become more powerful and increasingly assertive, how will it challenge the TRA in the future? What are the prospects of cross-strait relations? Do the US and Taiwan have any constructive plans to handle challenges from China other than countering its rise? The PRC is obviously not happy as the United States and Taiwan celebrate the 40 years of the TRA. Whenever Beijing complains about US moves to upgrade relations with Taiwan or US sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, Washington typically brushes them off by stating that the US policy is consistent with the TRA, which implies that US-Taiwan relations are separate from US-China relations. Can the United States and Taiwan afford to ignore such complaints from Beijing while claiming that the TRA has nothing to do with the PRC? Discussions of the TRA will be incomplete if they are divorced from taking the US-China relationship into account. It is presumed that for Taiwan’s future, cross-strait relations are as important as, if not more important than, the US-Taiwan relations. Based on this assumption, this paper will offer some observations about US-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations in light of intensifying US-China rivalry. Upgrading US-Taiwan Relations There is no naivete in Beijing that the US will support China’s efforts to reunify with Taiwan. From the realist perspective, as US-China rivalry intensifies, Taiwan’s value will increase for the United States. As the US strives to counter China’s rise, it will be foolish not to play the Taiwan card. The U.S. is the only country that doesn’t officially recognize the ROC that is willing to receive its president and foreign minister, giving top officials from Taiwan the rare platforms to make their voices heard in the world. US-Taiwan relations have drastically enhanced since President Donald Trump won the election in 2016. Shortly after the election, he received a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen, which was unprecedented in US-Taiwan relations. 1 Chris Horton, “Taiwan’s Status Is a Geopolitical Absurdity,” The Atlantic, July 8. 2019: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical- absurdity/593371/. 2 US Congress has passed a series of Taiwan-friendly legislations, especially the Taiwan Travel Act and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. The Taiwan Travel Act, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Trump in March 2018, allows officials “at all levels of the United States Government,” including Cabinet-level secretaries, national security officials, and other executive branch officials, to travel to Taiwan to meet their Taiwanese counterparts, and vice versa. If the Act is fully implemented, US-Taiwan relations will be significantly upgraded and become more official. In Beijing’s view, this is provocative at a time when the United States and China are engaged in a trade war and only adds fuel to fire as tensions grow. Recent examples of upgrading and warming US-Taiwan relations also include: ◼ In April 2019, dozens of US officials, led by former House Speaker Paul Ryan, traveled to Taipei to celebrate 40 years of the TRA. ◼ In early October 2019, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the ROC Foreign Ministry jointly held the first Pacific Islands Dialogue in Taipei, which was attended by Sandra Oudkirk, deputy assistant secretary of state for Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands. Oudkirk said she was representing President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo at the Dialogue. The Dialogue was defined as a government-to- government event. ◼ Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) attended the Double 10 ROC national day celebration in Taipei this year—apparently the first US senator to do so in 35 years. ◼ Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and Senator Cory Gardner (R-CO) co-authored an op-ed titled “Strong US-Taiwanese Ties Needed to Counter Rising Chinese Influence in the Pacific” published by The Hill on October 9 calling on the U.S. government to strengthen ties with Taiwan to counter China’s growing influence in the Pacific region. ◼ Both House and Senate have introduced Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act to reinforce ties between the United States and Taiwan after Solomon Islands and Kiribati cut relations with Taiwan in favor of China. In dealing with the PRC and Taiwan, the U.S. emphasizes both the three US-PRC communiques and the TRA in an attempt to balance U.S. approaches to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The TRA has provided a legal and political framework under which the US- Taiwan relationship has sustained after 1979 and Taiwan has prospered and democratized at the same time. As a result of enforcing the TRA, US-Taiwan relations have become “officially unofficial, but unofficially official.” The AIT was set up to handle “unofficial” relations between Taiwan and the United States in 1979. It has become more active and its public and official role more prominent. Current AIT Chairman Ambassador James F. Moriarty has visited Taiwan 7 times since assuming the duty in October 2016, including the most recent visit in mid-October 2019. In July 2019, the AIT Taipei office--the de facto US embassy in Taiwan--moved into a $250 million new compound built into a lush hill in Taipei with security provided by US Marines. Current AIT Taipei Director William Brent Christensen assumed duties in August 3 2018. Since then the AIT has pursued a “four promotes” policy under his leadership: Promote U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, promote U.S.-Taiwan economic and commercial ties, promote Taiwan’s participation in the international community, and promote U.S.-Taiwan people-to- people ties.2 U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation has strengthened, including continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and coordination of the two militaries. It also includes sending Taiwan’s best of the best to the United States for military training. As reported by the AIT, Taiwan Marine Captain Yu Kuei-lin （余奎麟）became the first Taiwan military officer to complete the rigorous U.S. Navy SEAL training course in 2004. Yu is a colonel in the ROC military now. Amid reports that Solomon Islands were about to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing earlier this year, the United States tried to prevent the change. AIT Taipei Director Christensen attended the welcome reception that ROC Foreign Minister Joseph Wu hosted for visiting Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele in early September 2019 to show America’s support for Taiwan.
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