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the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #80 | september 2019 securing the belt and road initiative China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads Edited by Nadège Rolland cover 2 NBR Board of Directors John V. Rindlaub Kurt Glaubitz Matt Salmon (Chairman) Global Media Relations Manager Vice President of Government Affairs Senior Managing Director and Chevron Corporation Arizona State University Head of Pacific Northwest Market East West Bank Mark Jones Scott Stoll Co-head of Macro, Corporate & (Treasurer) Thomas W. Albrecht Investment Bank, Wells Fargo Securities Partner (Ret.) Partner (Ret.) Wells Fargo & Company Ernst & Young LLP Sidley Austin LLP Ryo Kubota Mitchell B. Waldman Dennis Blair Chairman, President, and CEO Executive Vice President, Government Chairman Acucela Inc. and Customer Relations Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. U.S. Navy (Ret.) Quentin W. Kuhrau Chief Executive Officer Charles W. 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Herbold Sheldon Simon The Herbold Group, LLC Mary Minnick Arizona State University Lion Capital nbr special report #80 | september 2019 securing the belt and road initiative China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads Edited by Nadège Rolland With contributions by Alessandro Arduino, Michael S. Chase, Mathieu Duchâtel, Kristen Gunness, Raffaello Pantucci, Dirk van der Kley, and Guifang (Julia) Xue This report was produced by the National Bureau of Asian Research with support from the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security. the national bureau of asian research The NBR Special Report provides access to current research on special topics conducted by the world’s leading experts in Asian affairs. The views expressed in these reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other NBR research associates or institutions that support NBR. The National Bureau of Asian Research is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution dedicated to informing and strengthening policy. NBR conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Drawing upon an extensive network of the world’s leading specialists and leveraging the latest technology, NBR bridges the academic, business, and policy arenas. The institution disseminates its research through briefings, publications, conferences, Congressional testimony, and email forums, and by collaborating with leading institutions worldwide. NBR also provides exceptional internship opportunities to graduate and undergraduate students for the purpose of attracting and training the next generation of Asia specialists. NBR was started in 1989 with a major grant from the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. Funding for NBR’s research and publications comes from foundations, corporations, individuals, the U.S. government, and from NBR itself. NBR does not conduct proprietary or classified research. The organization undertakes contract work for government and private-sector organizations only when NBR can maintain the right to publish findings from such work. To download issues of the NBR Special Report, please visit the NBR website http://www.nbr.org. This report may be reproduced for personal use. Otherwise, the NBR Special Report may not be reproduced in full without the written permission of NBR. When information from NBR publications is cited or quoted, please cite the author and The National Bureau of Asian Research. This is the eightieth NBR Special Report. NBR is a tax-exempt, nonprofit corporation under I.R.C. Sec. 501(c)(3), qualified to receive tax-exempt contributions. © 2019 by The National Bureau of Asian Research. Cover image © Pan Siwei/Xinhua/Alamy Live News. For further information about NBR, contact: The National Bureau of Asian Research 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98105 206-632-7370 Phone 206-632-7487 Fax [email protected] E-mail http://www.nbr.org nbr special report #80 | september 2019 securing the belt and road initiative China’s Evolving Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads TABLE OF CONTENTS Securing the Belt and Road: Prospects for Chinese Military Engagement 1 Along the Silk Roads Nadège Rolland Overseas Military Operations in Belt and Road Countries: 7 The Normative Constraints and Legal Framework Mathieu Duchâtel The Space and Cyberspace Components of the Belt and Road Initiative 19 Michael S. Chase The Dawn of a PLA Expeditionary Force? 33 Kristen Gunness The Potential Dual Use of Support Facilities in the Belt and Road Initiative 47 Guifang (Julia) Xue The Dragon’s Cuddle: China’s Security Power Projection into Central Asia 59 and Lessons for the Belt and Road Initiative Raffaello Pantucci China’s Security Activities in Tajikistan and Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor 71 Dirk van der Kley China’s Private Security Companies: The Evolution of a New Security Actor 91 Alessandro Arduino the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #80 | september 2019 Securing the Belt and Road: Prospects for Chinese Military Engagement Along the Silk Roads Nadège Rolland NADÈGE ROLLAND is Senior Fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research. She is the author of China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (2017). She can be reached at <[email protected]>. 1 n August 1, 2017, the day of its 90th anniversary, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officially inaugurated its first permanent overseas support facility under the blazing Djiboutian sun. The event indicated a dramatic departure from the previously prevailing claim that China “does not station any troops or set up any military bases Oin any foreign country” as a matter of policy.1 It also highlighted the long-term role assigned to the PLA in protecting China’s expanding national interests, a role that Hu Jintao had granted the Chinese military back in 2004 as part of its “new historic missions.”2 For the past fifteen years, recognizing that “security risks to China’s overseas interests are on the increase,”3 the PLA has taken on the new challenges created by globally expanding national interests and entanglements, pushing farther away from China’s shores, broadening its strategic horizons, and enhancing its power-projection capabilities. The 2015 defense white paper put an unprecedented emphasis on maritime interests and on the PLA’s responsibility to protect them as one of its core missions.4 Chinese strategic planners generally agree that the “boundaries of China’s national security” are defined by the expansion of its overseas interests and that “where national interests expand, the support of the military force has to follow.”5 Since its introduction in late 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been pushing the boundaries of China’s national interests well beyond the traditional focus on the country’s immediate neighborhood. China’s Ministry of
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