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The Chinese Dream – a Dream Or Reality!?

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The Chinese Dream – a Dream Or Reality!? Land Forces Academy Review Vol.XXV, No 3(99), 2020 THE CHINESE DREAM – A DREAM OR REALITY!? Gabriel GABOR “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania [email protected] Mihai-Marcel NEAG “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania [email protected] ABSTRACT This article is written to highlight the ways in which China engages in the competition to conquer world supremacy. China is regularly hailed as a potential new superpower. There are views on rapid economic progress, increasing military power, a very large population and increasing its international influence, as signs that it will play an important role in the world in the 21st century. However, other opinions warn that economic chimeras and demographic imbalances could slow or even stop China’s economic growth. The Chinese dream is a concept that has been promoted by the Chinese president Xi Jinping since late 2012 within the Chinese society to describe a set of personal and national paragons for the future of China. It is currently widely used by journalists, governmental officials, and activists to describe the individual’s role in the Chinese society, as well as the Chinese nation’s goals for the future. KEYWORDS: China, communists, globalization, military challenges, cultural, political opportunities, drawbacks 1. Introduction become what he wants. The Chinese dream is The Chinese dream is a concept that associated with a moderately prosperous has been promoted by the Chinese president society, with the achievement of a new Xi Jinping since late 2012 within the Chinese national youth, with the collective effort to society to describe a set of personal and raise the country, in which the honest, national paragons for the future of China. hardworking and respectful individual can Why did the Chinese president launch find the chance to assert himself. the Chinese Dream formula? Because he Xi Jinping has been president of China realized his percussion force. Economic since 2012. Since then, the main features of calculations, figures of all kinds become pale the period have been increased assertiveness in relation to the force of a simple formula and authoritarianism. The Chinese president's that accompanies the ordinary man, which stated goal has been and continues to be to convinces him that it is in his power to cement China’s position as a superpower, DOI: 10.2478/raft-2020-0022 © 2017. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License. 181 while launching crackdowns on corruption and turned into a consumer economy. It is the dissent. The cultivated image is that of a strong second largest economy in the world in leader at the head of the Chinese Communist terms of nominal GDP, after the USA, and Party, with his ideas mentioned by name in the the first in the world if GDP is related to constitution – an honor that has only been purchasing power” (Cojocaru, 2018). reserved for Mao Zedong so far. The main stated objectives of China’s China’s reputation is growing and the journey are to focus all resources on pandemic and the ensuing crisis could be a improving people’s living standards and catalyst for cooperation with European gradually achieving common prosperity, by countries, especially the European Union. increasing the GDP and per capita income Analysts have long been talking about the of the Chinese. China’s long-term strategy end of the American-led system and the is also to complete the construction of a arrival of an Asian century. prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally In most situations where the Chinese advanced and modern society by the middle president addresses the people, especially of this century. the youth, he urges them to be steadfast in Moreover, the president Xi Jinping their faith, to improve their professional emphasized that the reason why China has skills, to embrace innovation in everything undergone historic changes is because it has they do, to work hard and to build chosen the right path in line with China’s characters noble. “Young people should be national conditions, and that such changes optimistic and tenacious when facing are the personal involvement of the adversities” (Xi, 2013). current generation of the Chinese people. According to the theoretical Xi Jinping that by personal experience and newspaper of the Qiushi party, the Chinese personal construction, the Chinese people dream is about the Chinese people’s has never been as confident as it is today. welfare, collective struggle, socialism, and But we didn’t feel that there was anything national glory. extraordinary, or that we could look at everything and show our might. We just 2. Global China work hard to do our own thing and we have The President Xi Jinping stated on always maintained this attitude. October 22, 2019, when he met the foreign The coronavirus epidemic is wreaking representatives in China during the havoc on financial markets, with imported “Chinese Economic Innovation Forum” that effects expected on the world economy as a he was fully confident in China’s future, result of measures taken to manage the while emphasizing that the Chinese dream medical crisis. However, if China manages is to perform the great rejuvenation of the to keep the epidemic under control and Chinese nation. This is certainly not a companies resume global operations at “hegemonic dream”, as he puts it himself. normal levels, the impact on the world Are not prepared to replace anybody, just to economy may be limited. restore China to its proper dignity and Fears of the coronavirus epidemic status. The humiliation of the semi-colonial have also shaken global stock markets. and semi-feudal countries in the past will China's stock market, which is directly never be repeated. linked to economic growth and expansion, China’s main priority remains has fallen at a record pace due to the development. “China is the first developing epidemic, increasing the likelihood of a nation to become a great power. From a coordinated policy response from central country where the main attraction for banks to prevent a global recession. investors was cheap labor, China has The recent cuts and abnormal declines in 182 the Chinese stock market have caused rejuvenation, while also stating that the concern for governments to prevent a Chinese youth envies America’s cultural massive panic. influence and hope China can become a The borders of People’s Republic of cultural exporter. China are between power and force. Its If this is the case from a cultural wealth and strength increase every single perspective, the responsibility of China’s year compared to the world’s. But what do rise from a military point of view falls upon its leaders expect to get by their new the members of the Chinese army, who approach? support the military development of China, Jonathan D.T. Ward (2019) wrote in claiming that “the dream of the powerful his book China’s Vision of Victory that the nations” as to a great awakening of the answer to the question “What does China Chinese people cannot but result from a want?” (compared to the world...). It is as dream of a strong army. simple as that: the Chinese want supremacy. In this respect, the former US secretary The author considers that the vision of state John Kerry promoted the idea of a of China is shaped despite the way the “US Pacific dream” to adapt China’s rise by leaders of the Chinese Communist Party regional cooperation on joint stakes such as show it to other nations (as having humble the environment and the economic growth. and peaceful ambitions): as a matter of fact, Along the other points of view, there it is a hegemonic and expansionist vision is, of course, that of the ordinary Chinese focused on acquiring military, economic, people, who interpreted the Chinese dream technological, and, why not?, ideological through the stereotype of chasing individual supremacy, as such leaders plainly and dreams. The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos periodically communicate to the domestic concludes that “Xi Jinping sought to inspire audience. Ward shows how vast the scope his people by raising the flag of the Chinese of such ambitions is, by guiding his readers dream, but the population interpreted it as through a series of official documents China’s Dreams – in the plural” (Osnos, mentioned throughout his book. 2008). Under such circumstances, the Chinese dream is defined depending on the 3. Understanding China’s Wishes individuals’ aspirations and personal It is essential that in the process of wishes, which might lead to “proliferating understanding the “Chinese Dream” 1.3 billion of China dreams”. project, launched during the tenure of In recent times, Chinese society in President Xi Jinping, we expand the area of general has gone through difficult times, interest and understanding of public social, economic turmoil, deprivation or communication mechanisms, one of the political shocks by virtue of local and strategic elements in dream construction domestic dynamics. “Problems of corruption, being the theory of “Four General Themes”. social injustice, public unrest, disparity of As a continuation of the “Three Great income and regional development, energy Achievements” which aimed at “building a and resource shortages, unemployment, socialist road with Chinese specificity, aging population, inadequate social and forming its own socialist theoretical system economic security network, pollution, etc. and establishing a socialist organization they overshadow the moral foundation of with Chinese specificity” (Tomozei, 2017). economic reform. These new problems are a The Chinese dream has been daunting task for the Chinese leadership” considered a call for influencing the rising (Guo & Guo, 2008). international path of China, Xi Jinping One of the main objectives of Chinese meaning a dream as a form of national state propaganda is therefore to build links 183 between individual and national aspirations, a dream of constitutionalism, pleading for which means converging the values of the having the powers separated, but it was market economy with those of state censured by the authorities.
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