China's Glo.Bal Influence
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Netzroller Das Eventmagazin Der Saar.Lor.Lux Badminton Open Fr
DIE WELT ZU GAST IM SAARLAND Präsentiert von NETZROLLER DAS EVENTMAGAZIN DER SAAR.LOR.LUX BADMINTON OPEN FR. 02.11.2018 Vereinigte Volksbank eG Europa Allee 32 · 54343 Föhren · www.triacs.de | 03. November 2018 | Netzroller | 1 | Präsentiert von DIE WELT ZU GAST IM SAARLAND INHALTSVERZEICHNIS Grußwort Seite 3-6: Tagesbericht Donnerstag Seite 8-9: Hintergrund: Zählweise Liebe Badmintonfreundinnen Seite 10: Spiele im Fokus und Badmintonfreunde, zum diesjährigen internationa- len Badmintonturnier SaarLorLux DAS NETZROLLER-TEAM Open 2018 heiße ich alle Sportle- rinnen und Sportler mit ihren Be- Berichte, Interviews: treuern in der Landeshauptstadt Thomas Fuchs, Julian Schwarzhoff, Jil Heinz-Schwitzgebel Saarbrücken herzlich willkommen. Fotos: Sven Heise Vom 30.10. bis 04.11.2018 steht Titelfoto: Bernd Bauer das Saarland im Fokus des Badmin- Layout: www.designfreundin.de tons, zu dem wieder viele Spiele- Satz: mw sportkommunikation Michael Weber rinnen und Spieler aus aller Welt Druck: repa-Druck, Ensheim anreisen werden. Subhankar Dey, Foto von Bernd Bauer Saarbrücken ist für mich und viele andere die Badmintonhaupt- stadt Deutschlands und auch in diesem Jahr ist es wieder dieses sportliche Highlight, auf das ich mich mit Besucherinnen und Alle Informationen für Fans, Spieler und Helfer Besuchern des Turniers sehr freue. auf der offiziellen Turnier-Homepage: https://www.saarlorlux-open.de Das vom Badminton Weltverband (BWF) neu eingeteilte BWF Tour Super 100 Turnier, das mit 75.000 US Dollar dotiert ist, Die SaarLorLux Badminton Open auf Facebook: wird wieder Schauplatz für viele zur Weltspitze gehörender https://www.facebook.com/SaarLorLuxBadmintonOpen/ Spieler sein, die man live auf dem Court erleben kann. News, Bilder, Videos und Berichte – alles rund um das Turnier. -
Taiwan's Fight for International Space
21 TAIWAN’S FIGHT FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE Michael C. Burgoyne The Taiwan Strait separating Taiwan and the People’s Republic of Chi- na (PRC) has long been considered a geopolitical flashpoint. Both sides continue to plan and prepare for a kinetic attempt by the PRC to coerce Taiwan into unification. However, the gains in the conflict between these two entities have largely been made in non-kinetic ways: fights over dip- lomatic recognition and attendance in international bodies, among others. The battleground in which this non-kinetic fight has taken place has come to be labeled “international space,” where Taiwan is striving for mean- ingful participation in the international community—broadly defined and evaluated in this chapter as diplomatic relations and participation in inter- governmental organizations (IGO)—and the PRC is trying to isolate the island from these interactions. Having its roots in the Chinese civil war that culminated in the 1940s, this fight is crucially important for both sides. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees Taiwan as a matter of legitimacy. The Party portrays itself as a staunch defender of sovereignty and territorial integrity to its citizens, yet Taiwan remains outside its control, which it feels could dele- gitimize it in the eyes of the populace. Constricting Taiwan’s international space is a way to leave Taiwan with no other choice than eventual unifica- tion. Taiwan sees itself as a separate country in a practical sense, with a strong, advanced economy and many advantages; yet it is only recognized as a country by 14 nations, and lacks representation in many IGOs. -
The CPC Its Mission and Contributions
The CPC Its Mission and Contributions The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee Contents Preamble I.Serving the People Wholeheartedly 1.Putting the People First 2.From Victory to Victory with the People 3.The People as Masters of the Country 4.A Good Life for the People II.Realizing the Ideals of the Party 1.Upholding Marxism 2.Firm Ideals and Convictions 3.Breaking New Ground 4.Defusing Risks and Overcoming Challenges III.Robust Leadership and Strong Governance 1.A Strong Central Committee 2.Sound Guidelines and Strategies 3.Effective Implementation of Decisions and Plans 4.Pooling the Efforts of All Sectors 5.Fostering High-Caliber Party Officials IV.Maintaining Vigor and Vitality 1.Upholding Intra-Party Democracy 2.Correcting Mistakes 3.Protecting the Party's Health 4.Promoting Study and Review V.Contributing to World Peace and Development 1.Safeguarding World Peace 2.Pursuing Common Development 3.Following the Path of Peaceful Development 4.Building a Global Community of Shared Future Conclusion Preamble The Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, has just celebrated its centenary. These hundred years have been a period of dramatic change – enormous productive forces unleashed, social transformation unprecedented in scale, and huge advances in human civilization. On the other hand, humanity has been afflicted by devastating wars and suffering. These hundred years have also witnessed profound and transformative change in China. And it is the CPC that has made this change possible. The Chinese nation is a great nation. With a history dating back more than 5,000 years, China has made an indelible contribution to human civilization. -
I CHINESE INVESTMENT in the UNITED STATES: IMPACTS AND
i CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPACTS AND ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 2017 Printed for use of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Available via the World Wide Web: www.uscc.gov UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION WASHINGTON: 2017 ii U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, CHAIRMAN HON. DENNIS C. SHEA, VICE CHAIRMAN Commissioners: ROBIN CLEVELAND HON. JONATHAN STIVERS HON. BYRON L. DORGAN HON. JAMES TALENT HON. CARTE P. GOODWIN DR. KATHERINE C. TOBIN DANIEL M. SLANE MICHAEL R. WESSEL MICHAEL R. DANIS, Executive Director The Commission was created on October 30, 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Public Law No. 106-398, 114 STAT. 1654A-334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001), as amended by the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for 2002 § 645 (regarding employment status of staff) & § 648 (regarding changing annual report due date from March to June), Public Law No. 107-67, 115 STAT. 514 (Nov. 12, 2001); as amended by Division P of the “Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,” Pub L. No. 108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003) (regarding Commission name change, terms of Commissioners, and responsibilities of the Commission); as amended by Public Law No. 109- 108 (H.R. 2862) (Nov. 22, 2005) (regarding responsibilities of Commission and applicability of FACA); as amended by Division J of the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,” Public Law Nol. -
Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference On
Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major- Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics Michael D. Swaine* Xi Jinping’s speech before the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs—held November 28–29, 2014, in Beijing—marks the most comprehensive expression yet of the current Chinese leadership’s more activist and security-oriented approach to PRC diplomacy. Through this speech and others, Xi has taken many long-standing Chinese assessments of the international and regional order, as well as the increased influence on and exposure of China to that order, and redefined and expanded the function of Chinese diplomacy. Xi, along with many authoritative and non-authoritative Chinese observers, presents diplomacy as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of an ambitious, long-term, and more strategic foreign policy agenda. Ultimately, this suggests that Beijing will increasingly attempt to alter some of the foreign policy processes and power relationships that have defined the political, military, and economic environment in the Asia- Pacific region. How the United States chooses to respond to this challenge will determine the Asian strategic landscape for decades to come. On November 28 and 29, 2014, the Central Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership convened its fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作会)—the first since August 2006.1 The meeting, presided over by Premier Li Keqiang, included the entire Politburo Standing Committee, an unprecedented number of central and local Chinese civilian and military officials, nearly every Chinese ambassador and consul-general with ambassadorial rank posted overseas, and commissioners of the Foreign Ministry to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region. -
MPP System Control Module User Guide /V1.0 Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni Nulllindeni
nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni MPP System Control Module User Guide /V1.0 nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni Document version:V1.0 Release Date:2017.4.13 nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni Copyright © Zhuhai Allwinner Technology Co., Ltd. 2018. All rights reserved. No part or all of the contents of this document may be copied or reproduced without the written permission of the company, and may not be used.What form of communication. nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni Trademark statement 、Allwinner and other Allwinner trademarks are trademarks of Zhuhai Allwinner Technology Co., Ltd.All other trademarks or registered trademarks mentioned in this document are the property of their respective owners. Note The products, services or features you purchase are subject to the terms and conditions of the company and all or part of the products, services or features described in this document may not be covered by your purchase or use. Unless otherwise agreed by the contract, Allwinner Company makes no representations or warranties, nulllindeni expressnulllindenior implied, regarnulllindeniding the contentsnulllindeniof this document.nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni nulllindeni The contents of this document -
Chapter I: Assessing the Problem
The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition Chapter I: Assessing the Problem By Sarah Kirchberger, Hans Binnendijk, and Connor McPartland party-state’s functional logic and the universal values em- Section A: braced by liberal democracies around the world, includ- China’s Strategic Goals and Policies ing Taiwan. These are seen as an existential threat to the CCP’s legitimacy and survivability. Preserving the par- The overall strategic goals of the People’s Republic ty-state is the top concern among China’s so-called core of China (PRC) are intimately related to the Chinese interests, a term Chinese officials use to signal a categori- Communist Party (CCP) leadership’s survival interests cal unwillingness to compromise. In 2010, Dai Bingguo, at and threat perceptions—both domestic and external. As the time state councilor in charge of foreign policy, defined the National Bureau of Asian Research’s Nadège Rolland China’s “core interests” as follows: pointedly explains: “ What are China’s core interests? My personal “ In the Chinese leadership’s eyes, shaping the understanding is: First, China’s form of govern- world is essentially about making sure that the ment and political system and stability, namely international system accommodates the CCP’s the leadership of the Communist Party of China, ambitions for power as well as its anxieties about the socialist system and socialism with Chinese survival. Beijing’s vision for a new international characteristics. Second, China’s sovereignty, ter- order is an outward extension of what the party ritorial integrity and national unity. Third, the basic wants to secure (its perpetual rule and unchal- guarantee for sustainable economic and social lenged power) and what it rejects as existential development of China. -
Tiktok and Wechat Curating and Controlling Global Information Flows
TikTok and WeChat Curating and controlling global information flows Fergus Ryan, Audrey Fritz and Daria Impiombato Policy Brief Report No. 37/2020 About the authors Fergus Ryan is an Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI. Audrey Fritz is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI. Daria Impiombato is an Intern working with the International Cyber Policy Centre at ASPI. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Danielle Cave and Fergus Hanson for their work on this project. We would also like to thank Michael Shoebridge, Dr Samantha Hoffman, Jordan Schneider, Elliott Zaagman and Greg Walton for their feedback on this report as well as Ed Moore for his invaluable help and advice. We would also like to thank anonymous technically-focused peer reviewers. This project began in 2019 and in early 2020 ASPI was awarded a research grant from the US State Department for US$250k, which was used towards this report. The work of ICPC would not be possible without the financial support of our partners and sponsors across governments, industry and civil society. What is ASPI? The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non-partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. -
Detective 11.0 October 2018
OXYGEN FORENSIC® DETECTIVE 11.0 OCTOBER 2018 USE NEW WHATSAPP EXTRACTION METHOD AQCUIRE IOT DEVICES WhatsApp is without doubt the most popular messenger Digital assistants are already a part of everyday life and in the world with over 1.5 billion users globally. Thus, have been successfully used to solve several crimes. extracting complete WhatsApp content from all possible Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.11 brings support for the sources is essential for any investigation. two most popular digital assistants – Amazon Alexa and Google Home. Commonly used methods of WhatsApp data acquisition involve extracting data from mobile devices and their You can access Amazon Alexa cloud using a username cloud backups. Oxygen Forensic® Detective v.11 and password or token. A token can be found on the introduces an industry-first alternative method of device’s associated computer with Oxygen Forensic® WhatsApp data extraction. KeyScout and used in Cloud Extractor. The software acquires a complete evidence set from Amazon Alexa, In the new software version, you can access complete including account and device details, contacts, messages, WhatsApp data by scanning a QR code from a mobile calendars, notifications, lists, activities, skills, etc. app or using the WhatsApp token from a PC. This token can be extracted by our KeyScout utility from the Google Home data can be extracted via Google WhatsApp desktop app or from desktop Web browsers. username/password or a master token found in mobile devices. Extracted Google Home data includes account Once data is extracted, you will be able to download and device details, voice commands, and information WhatsApp communications from the subject’s account about users.Google Home data can also be acquired from any time later when an investigation requires by using a the Google Home mobile app on Apple iOS and Android specially generated WhatsApp QR token available in the devices. -
2015 Military Reform in the People's Republic of China
BELFER CENTER PAPER 2015 Military Reform in the People’s Republic of China Defense, Foreign and Domestic Policy Issues Andrei A. Kokoshin PAPER OCTOBER 2016 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org Translated from Russian by Kirill Leonov Edited by Mari Dugas Design & Layout by Andrew Facini Cover image: A Chinese military band conductor leads the band at the end of the opening session of the annual National People’s Congress in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, Saturday, March 5, 2016. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan) Statements and views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Copyright 2016, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America BELFER CENTER PAPER 2015 Military Reform in the People’s Republic of China Defense, Foreign and Domestic Policy Issues Andrei A. Kokoshin PAPER OCTOBER 2016 About the Author Andrei Kokoshin is a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and dean of Moscow State University’s Faculty of World Politics. He has served as Russia’s first deputy defense minister, secretary of the Defense Council and secretary of the Security Council. Dr. Kokoshin has also served as chairman of the State Duma’s Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States and as first deputy chairman of the Duma’s Committee on Science and High Technology. iv 2015 Military Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Defense, Foreign and Domestic Policy Issues Table of Contents Synopsis of the Study .............................................................vi Introduction ............................................................................. -
History of Badminton
Facts and Records History of Badminton In 1873, the Duke of Beaufort held a lawn party at his country house in the village of Badminton, Gloucestershire. A game of Poona was played on that day and became popular among British society’s elite. The new party sport became known as “the Badminton game”. In 1877, the Bath Badminton Club was formed and developed the first official set of rules. The Badminton Association was formed at a meeting in Southsea on 13th September 1893. It was the first National Association in the world and framed the rules for the Association and for the game. The popularity of the sport increased rapidly with 300 clubs being introduced by the 1920’s. Rising to 9,000 shortly after World War Π. The International Badminton Federation (IBF) was formed in 1934 with nine founding members: England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Denmark, Holland, Canada, New Zealand and France and as a consequence the Badminton Association became the Badminton Association of England. From nine founding members, the IBF, now called the Badminton World Federation (BWF), has over 160 member countries. The future of Badminton looks bright. Badminton was officially granted Olympic status in the 1992 Barcelona Games. Indonesia was the dominant force in that first Olympic tournament, winning two golds, a silver and a bronze; the country’s first Olympic medals in its history. More than 1.1 billion people watched the 1992 Olympic Badminton competition on television. Eight years later, and more than a century after introducing Badminton to the world, Britain claimed their first medal in the Olympics when Simon Archer and Jo Goode achieved Mixed Doubles Bronze in Sydney. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
3/2006 Data Supplement PR China Hong Kong SAR Macau SAR Taiwan CHINA aktuell Journal of Current Chinese Affairs Data Supplement People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax:(040)4107945 Contributors: Uwe Kotzel Dr. Liu Jen-Kai Christine Reinking Dr. Günter Schucher Dr. Margot Schüller Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 3 The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 22 Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership LIU JEN-KAI 27 PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries LIU JEN-KAI 30 PRC Laws and Regulations LIU JEN-KAI 34 Hong Kong SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 36 Macau SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 39 Taiwan Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 41 Bibliography of Articles on the PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and on Taiwan UWE KOTZEL / LIU JEN-KAI / CHRISTINE REINKING / GÜNTER SCHUCHER 43 CHINA aktuell Data Supplement - 3 - 3/2006 Dep.Dir.: CHINESE COMMUNIST Li Jianhua 03/07 PARTY Li Zhiyong 05/07 The Main National Ouyang Song 05/08 Shen Yueyue (f) CCa 03/01 Leadership of the Sun Xiaoqun 00/08 Wang Dongming 02/10 CCP CC General Secretary Zhang Bolin (exec.) 98/03 PRC Hu Jintao 02/11 Zhao Hongzhu (exec.) 00/10 Zhao Zongnai 00/10 Liu Jen-Kai POLITBURO Sec.-Gen.: Li Zhiyong 01/03 Standing Committee Members Propaganda (Publicity) Department Hu Jintao 92/10 Dir.: Liu Yunshan PBm CCSm 02/10 Huang Ju 02/11