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BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 9028, 15 October 2020 The diplomatic deals By Ben Smith

between and the UAE and

Contents: 1. Israel/Gulf diplomatic relations 2. Analysis 3. Further reading

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 The diplomatic deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain

Contents

Summary 3 1. Israel/Gulf diplomatic relations 4 1.1 Diplomatic relations agreement 4 1.2 West annexation 5 1.3 Further developments 5 Bahrain 5 6 1.4 UK reaction 6 2. Analysis 6 2.1 Perspectives 6 Palestinians 6 Israel 7 The UAE 7 Bahrain 8 The /UAE rift 8 US 8 9 Saudi Arabia 9 2.2 A step towards stability? 9 3. Further reading 10

Cover page image copyright Indoor Signing of Documents: Bahrain Foreign Minister Abdullatif al-Zayani, Prime Minister , President , and United Arab Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Flickr home page Credit: Avi Ohayon/ GPO. Licensed by Creative Common Attribution-Non-Commercial 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC 2.0) license/ image cropped.

3 Commons Library Briefing, 15 October 2020

Summary

On 13 August the White House announced a deal to normalise diplomatic relations between Israel and the . The deal included a commitment by Israel to suspend its planned annexation of occupied Palestinian territory. The agreement is considered historic because of the refusal of many Arab states to recognise Israel ever since its creation. Bahrain quickly followed the UAE lead. is another that analysts say may join the UAE and Bahrain, but it is Saudi Arabia that would be by far the biggest prize. The UK Government warmly welcomed the deal. Several commentators have argued that, while the deal offers a lot of economic and political advantages for Israel and the UAE, Palestinians are the biggest losers. Palestinian leaders bitterly denounced the deal. The deal has been widely welcomed in Israel, with opposition politicians saying that such negotiations are the way forward for Israel’s relations with its neighbours. The UAE Government has said that it wants a “warm peace”, unlike the peace between Israel and , for example. The UAE public may not yet be fully behind that, according to one opinion poll. The deal shows that despite US withdrawal of many of its troops in the region, the US remains the most influential country. The real usefulness of the deal to the Trump Administration could be to encourage evangelical Christians to vote Trump in November, however. While Saudi Arabia has so far stuck to its traditional policy of requiring a two-state solution before establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, it has taken steps that could be interpreted as trying to pave the way for that historic change. A Saudi move would transform the political scene in the . Although it could end the division between Israel and many Arab states, however, it could widen other divides, such as that between and the Gulf states, and that between pro- and anti- Islamist factions, which has seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE blockade Qatar.

4 The diplomatic deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain

1. Israel/Gulf diplomatic relations

Until recently, Israel had full diplomatic relations with only two of its Arab neighbours: Egypt and Jordan. Relations were established with these after peace treaties concluded in 1979 and 1994, respectively. Regional map1

1.1 Diplomatic relations agreement On 13 August 2020 the Tump Administration announced the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel. The two would establish embassies and begin co- operation including on , trade and security. The agreement brought into the open a security relationship that was already growing. Particularly in the light of Israel and the Gulf states’ shared hostility towards Iran, Israel has been quietly co-operating with other Sunni Arab states, too. Separate meetings are in progress to sign agreements on transport and other areas of co-operation. Indeed, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi flew to Berlin at the beginning of October to meet with his Emirati and German counterparts to discuss further steps in normalising ties. The UAE is likely to find buying arms from the US easier since normalising relations with Israel, since it would no longer be viewed as a possible threat to Israel.

1 Map showing Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Iran as well as other countries in the region by Image Editor – Flickr home page. U.S. DoD Open Source Software (OSS). Licensed by Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0)/ image cropped. 5 Commons Library Briefing, 15 October 2020

A vote on the agreement between Israel and the UAE in the Israeli , or parliament, took place on Monday 12 October, after a petition was filed to bar the accord from going into effect until it was approved by the Cabinet and the Knesset. The Knesset is expected to vote in favour of the bill and ratify the Accord.

1.2 annexation A joint communiqué issued by Israel, the UAE and the US on 13 August linked the agreement between the UAE and Israel to Israel’s plan to annex much of the occupied Palestinian territory on the West Bank. The communiqué said: As a result of this diplomatic breakthrough and at the request of President Trump with the support of the United Arab Emirates, Israel will suspend declaring sovereignty over areas outlined in the President’s Vision for Peace…2 The language version of the communiqué reportedly used a word meaning “stop” rather than “suspend”, which Palestinians highlighted. A spokesman for the UAE foreign ministry said that the word was the nearest possible Arabic translation of “suspend”. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said in a televised address on 13 August: “There is no change to our plans to apply sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, in coordination with the US. I remain committed to that…”

1.3 Further developments In his statement announcing the agreement, President Trump said: We are already discussing this with other nations — with very powerful, very good nations and people that want to see peace in the Middle East. So you will probably see others of these, but this is the first one in more than 25 years.3 Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia made no early official comment on the announcement. Bahrain Bahrain and Oman quickly welcomed the move and, on 11 September, the US Administration announced that it had brokered a similar agreement between Bahrain and Israel. Bahrain has far less economic weight than the UAE but is still politically important. Hamad Al Khalifa said after Bahrain’s deal was announced that it should lead to increased efforts to resolve the Palestinian/Israeli conflict through a two-state solution. The Bahraini Government is highly invested in tackling Iranian influence and would see a Gulf/Israel front against Iran as beneficial. Bahrain is run by Sunni Muslims, even though the country has a Shi’i majority. When the ruling family looked threatened during the 2011 Arab

2 Joint Statement of the , the State of Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, White House, 13 August 2020 3 Remarks by President Trump Announcing the Normalization of Relations Between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, White House,13 August 2020 6 The diplomatic deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain

uprisings Saudi Arabia intervened militarily. The Bahraini is unlikely to have signed up for diplomatic relations with Israel if it was against the wishes of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia An agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would be the most significant, but the ruling elite appears divided. Prince bin Salman has suggested normalisation with Israel. His father, King Salman, remains committed to the 2002 , however, which offered to exchange land for peace: a two- state solution would lead to normal diplomatic relations with Arab states. In a demonstration of Saudi ambiguity over the deal, the Kingdom opened its airspace to flights between the UAE and Israel – a significant boost for UAE/Israel relations. Not long afterwards, the Saudi Foreign Minister said that Saudi Arabia’s position on a Palestinian State with East as its capital had not changed.

1.4 UK reaction UK Middle East minister James Cleverly welcomed both agreements on behalf of the Government: We warmly welcome the agreement between Israel, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. This is an historic step which sees the normalisation of relations between three great friends of the UK. We welcome both the decision to normalise relations, as well as the suspension of plans for annexation - a move the UK has opposed as it would have been counterproductive to securing peace in the region. The UK is committed to making progress towards a two-state solution and is strongly supportive of a regional approach to peace. We profoundly hope that this moment can be used as a step towards direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians.4 After the deals, some Members asked about their effect on Palestinians and efforts to secure peace between Palestinians and Israel. The Government said that the Foreign Secretary had visited Israel and the Occupied Territories in August and had urged the Palestinian Authority to resume co-operation with Israel. He had also called on both sides to take constructive steps towards re-opening dialogue.5 2. Analysis 2.1 Perspectives Palestinians Some have argued that the deals might lead to direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Natan Sachs of the Brookings Institution says that the deal offers benefits for Israel and the UAE, but the Palestinians lose:

4 PQ 93688, 30 September 2020 5 PQ 95155, 2 October 2020 7 Commons Library Briefing, 15 October 2020

The losers, as often, are the Palestinians. The impatience in the Gulf with the Palestinians now comes to full daylight. The Gulf won’t wait for them any longer, asking of Israel only to avoid declarations of a major change to the status quo.6 Salam Fayyad, former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, dismissed the deal: Yet another sign of bad times. Little did Arab leaders know, when they adopted the Arab Peace Initiative some 18 years ago, that normalization for withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories would turn into normalization for a mere suspension — read: deferment to a more opportune time — of further formal annexation of West Bank territory. Israel got itself a huge prize for merely temporarily refraining from committing another egregious violation of international law.7 Several analysts agree that Arab publics and governments are less focused on helping the Palestinians as much as they used to be, however.8 Israel In response to the normalisation agreements, Leader of the Opposition Yair Lapid said: [it was] an important step toward normalization of relations with the United Arab Emirates. This step is proof that negotiations and agreements, not unilateral steps like annexation, which would harm Israel’s security, are the way forward for our diplomatic relations. I thank President Trump for his support for this agreement. In general, Israeli commentators have responded positively to the news of the agreement. Many are optimistic about the potential trade and security benefits. More importantly, many suggest that the UAE’s decision to normalise relations with Israel demonstrates that the Palestinian question no longer has the political potency it once did and should no longer hold peace in the region hostage. Others consider that these accords have the potential to bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. The UAE The UAE foreign minister, Anwar Gargash said in August 2020: “…this is going to be a warm peace because we really – unlike Jordan and unlike Egypt, we have not fought a war with Israel”. The UAE perceives shared interests with Israel in countering the influence of Islamists, such as the and , and in containing Iranian influence in the region. Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel should help both countries work towards those goals.

6 ‘Around-the-halls: Experts analyze the normalization of Israel-UAE ties’, Brookings Institution, 13 August 2020 7 ‘Around-the-halls: Experts analyze the normalization of Israel-UAE ties’, Brookings Institution, 13 August 2020 8 HA Hellyer, Without the Palestinians, Israeli normalization is still beyond reach, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 September 2020 8 The diplomatic deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain

Diplomatic relations with Israel may not be popular with Emirati citizens, however. In a poll taken before the agreement, around 80 per cent of Emiratis disagreed with the statement: “people who want to have business or sports contacts with Israelis should be allowed to do so”.9 Bahrain groups rejected the deal with Israel, saying it was against the wishes of Bahrainis. Civil society organisations including the Bahraini Bar Association issued a joint statement criticising the deal. The head of Bahrain’s small Jewish community welcomed the fact that the deal would enable Israelis with family connections in Bahrain to visit the synagogue and cemetery. Some commentators have pointed to Bahrain’s security dependence on the US as partly explaining the move. Bahrain is home to the US Navy Fifth Fleet, as well as the UK’s Naval Support Facility, where a Type 23 and four anti-mine vessels are based. The Qatar/UAE rift One factor in the Gulf’s distancing from the Palestinians is the rise of political Islam in the form of Hamas. That has tied the fate of the Palestinians to the region-wide power struggle between supporters and opponents of political Islam, notably pitting and Qatar against the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The in has been exacerbated by that struggle. The UAE camp is far more open to improved relations with Israel. Sarah Feuer of the Washington Institute argues that the deals will deepen the split over political Islam. Feuer writes: The war in Libya—where a stalemate has set in between Turkish/Qatari-backed forces and Egyptian/Emirati-backed forces (alongside Russian mercenaries)—is perhaps the most glaring example, and could be a prelude to greater unrest in this arena if Erdogan perceives the latest normalization agreements as yet another attempt to isolate him.10 She argues that the deals could also worsen conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean. US The deal shows that, despite its intention to dedicate fewer resources to Middle East region, the US is still highly influential there. Mentioning also the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the (seized from in 1967) and the annexation plan, David Gardner of the FT argues that it is all about the US presidential election: …the real point — in this and other moves Mr Trump has made in the Middle East — is the use of Israel as a stage prop from which

9 ‘Half of Emiratis Approve Domestic Policies, But Just 20% Want Israeli Ties’, Washington Institute, 20 2020 10 Sarah Feuer, ‘UAE-Israel Peace Is Revealing The Middle East's Fault lines’, The National Interest, 26 September 2020 9 Commons Library Briefing, 15 October 2020

to address the huge vote bank of American evangelical protestants that he needs to win the US election in November.11 Robert Satloff for the Washington Institute writes that the deal is a good one, though not as important as Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. He says that the Trump Administration realised that annexation would kill any hopes of a deal on the Palestinian question, so Netanyahu was offered the deals with the UAE and Bahrain as a way to climb down from the annexation plan.12 Jordan Also writing for the Brookings Institution, Bruce Riedel argues that Jordan is a big winner, because Israel’s annexation of the Jordan Valley would have required a vigorous and costly Jordanian response, perhaps even suspending Jordan’s own peace treaty. A rich Gulf country also joins Jordan in the peace-with-Israel camp. Saudi Arabia Although Saudi officials have announced no change to their approach, recent comments by a figure close to the highest echelons of Saudi power might hint at movement. Negative public perceptions of Israel in the Kingdom would have to change first, however. In an interview with Saudi broadcaster on 5 October, the former Saudi Ambassador to the US, Bandar bin Sultan, denounced Palestinians’ criticisms of the deal (see below), perhaps suggesting that Saudi Arabia was preparing Saudi public opinion for an eventual deal with Israel. The veteran diplomat and “pillar of the Saudi establishment” said: What I heard from Palestinian leadership in recent days was truly painful to hear. This low level of discourse is not what we expect from officials who seek to gain global support for their cause. Their transgression against the Gulf states' leadership with this reprehensible discourse is entirely unacceptable.13 While Bandar said that the Palestinian cause was just, he blamed the Palestinian leadership as well as the Israelis for a failure to solve the problem.

2.2 A step towards stability? The deals have been named the Accords, implying a re-uniting of and Jews, both peoples being descended from Abraham, according to Christian and Muslim traditions. The normalisation agreements bring Israel and some Arab countries closer but several analysts argue that they could deepen other fault lines: firstly that between Sunni and Shi’i Muslims and the battle for influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran and secondly the divide between pro- and anti-Islamists, exemplified in the Qatar blockade.

11 David Gardner, ‘Middle East’s real ‘deal of the decade’ was not Trump’s’, , 26 August 2020 12 Robert Satloff, Putting the UAE-Israel Agreement in Its Proper Perspective, The Washington Institute, 18 August 2020 13 ‘Full transcript: Prince Bandar bin Sultan’s interview on Israel-Palestine conflict’, Al Arabiya, 5 October 2020 10 The diplomatic deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain

The hostility between Palestinians and Israelis looks likely to persist; Arab public opinion in many countries could be at least as resistant to normal relations with Israel as are UAE citizens. Representatives of Bahrain’s Shi’ite majority are already showing determined resistance. Saudi Arabia could follow the UAE and Bahrain’s example; that would transform the region but would do nothing to end the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although brokered by the US, the deals are also partly a response to the determination of recent US Administrations to reduce US military engagement with the Middle East; small and relatively vulnerable Arab states may seek to bolster their security in relation to Iran. The deals seem likely to re-arrange divisions rather than remove them; whether that helps bring stability to the region remains to be seen. 3. Further reading

Annexation of the West Bank, 10 June 2020 Coronavirus and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 28 April 2020 Libya: upsurge of violence amid the pandemic, 21 April 2020 UK forces in the Middle East region, 15 January 2020 The Qatar crisis and regional ramifications, October 2019 The Iran nuclear deal and rising tensions in the Gulf, October 2019

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