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Entry regulations for Cyprus Entry regulations apply only to the areas controlled by the Government of the Republic Cyprus. Passport: Required, except for holders of: 1. Laissez-Passer issued by the United Nations. 2. Document issued to stateless persons and recognised refugees. 3. Further to the above, citizens of the European Union countries, as well as of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway may enter Cyprus with their national identity card provided there is a photo. Admission and transit restrictions: The Government of the Republic of Cyprus refuses admission to: 1. Holders of Former Yugoslav Republic’s passports bearing a renewal stamp with the name “Macedonia”. Entry is only allowed to holders of Yugoslav passports without the above-mentioned stamp. 2. Holders of “passports” issued illegally by the secessionist entity, the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Other nationalities having stamps or visas of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in their passports are only allowed to enter Cyprus after the above-mentioned visas/stamps are cancelled by the Immigration Authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. 3. For those intending to be employed in Cyprus the issue of an employment permit by the Migration Officer is required and no visa is required in order to travel to Cyprus. ------------------------------- * “TRNC” has been denied any international recognition and has been condemned and declared as illegal by the whole of International Community through Security Council Resolutions 541/83 and 550/84” Additional information: 1. The legal ports of entry into the Republic of Cyprus are the airports of Larnaca and Paphos and the ports of Larnaca, Limassol, Latsi and Paphos, which are situated in the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Any entry into the territory of the Republic of Cyprus via any other port or airport in the area of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic does not exercise effective control (Turkish occupied area) is illegal. Categories of visas 1. Short-stay or travel visas: multiple-entry visas: This visa entitles aliens who seek to enter the territory of Cyprus, for reasons other than immigration, to pay a continuous visit or several visits, the duration of which does not exceed three months in any half-year from the date of first entry. As a general rule, this visa may be issued for one or several entries. In the case of aliens who need to travel frequently to Cyprus, for example on business, short-stay visas may be issued for several visits, provided that the total length of these visits does not exceed three months in any half-year. This multiple entry visa may be valid for one year, and in exceptional cases, for more than a year but for no more than five years for certain categories of persons. 2. Airport Transit Visa (ATV) This visa entitles aliens who are required to have such a visa to pass through the international transit area of Cypriot airports without actually entering the national territory of Cyprus, during a stop-over or transfer between two stages of an international flight. The requirement to have this visa is an exception to the general right to transit without a visa through Cyprus. Nationals from the countries listed in the Table below and persons who are not necessarily nationals of those countries but who possess travel documents issued by their authorities are required to possess this type of visa. List of third countries whose nationals are subject to the airport transit visa requirement, where holders of travel documents issued by these third countries are also subject to this visa requirement.1 1. AFGHANISTAN 2. BANGLADESH 3. CONGO (Democratic Republic) 4. ERITREA 5. ETHIOPIA 6. GHANA 7. IRAN2 8. IRAQ 1 The following persons shall be exempt from the ATV requirement: - flight crew who are nationals of a Contracting Party to the Chicago Convention. 2 The following persons shall be exempt from the ATV requirement: - holders of diplomatic and service passports. 9. NIGERIA 10. PAKISTAN 11. SOMALIA 12. SRI LANKA 13. TURKEY 3. Transit visas This visa entitles aliens who are travelling from one Third State to another Third State to pass through the territory of Cyprus. This visa may be issued for one, two or exceptionally several transits, provided that the duration in each case does not exceed five days and provided that the entry of the alien into the territory of the destination Third State is guaranteed and that the route taken normally requires transit through Cyprus. 4. Group Visas This is a transit visa or a visa limited to a maximum of thirty days, which may be affixed to a group passport - except where national legislation provides otherwise - issued to a group of aliens formed prior to the decision to travel, provided that the members of the group enter the territory, stay there and leave it as a group. Group visas may be issued to groups of between 5 and 50 people. The person in charge of the group shall possess an individual passport and, where necessary, an individual visa. 5. Long-stay visas Visas for visits exceeding three months for the following categories: a. Employment b. Study c. Business TABLE I List of third countries whose citizens are required to have a visa : States 1. AFGHANISTAN 2. ALBANIA 3. ALGERIA 4. ANGOLA 5. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 6. ARMENIA 7. AZERBAIJAN 8. BAHAMAS 9. BAHRAIN 10. BANGLADESH 11. BARBADOS 12. BELARUS 13. BELIZE 14. BENIN 15. BHUTAN 16. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 17. BOTSWANA 18. BURKINA FASO 19. BURMA/MYANMAR 20. BURUNDI 21. CAMBODIA 22. CAMEROON 23. CAPE VERDE 24. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 25. CHAD 26. CHINA 27. COLOMBIA 28. COMOROS 29. CONGO 30. CUBA 31. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 32. DJIBOUTI 33. DOMINICA 34. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 35. EAST TIMOR 36. ECUADOR 37. EGYPT 38. EQUATORIAL GUINEA 39. ERITREA 40. ETHIOPIA 41. FIJI 42. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 43. GABON 44. GAMBIA 45. GEORGIA 46. GHANA 47. GRENADA 48. GUINEA 49. GUINEA-BISSAU 50. GUYANA 51. HAITI 52. INDIA 53. INDONESIA 54. IRAN 55. IRAQ 56. IVORY COAST 57. JAMAICA 58. JORDAN 59. KAZAKHSTAN 60. KENYA 61. KIRIBATI 62. KUWAIT 63. KYRGYZSTAN 64. LAOS 65. LEBANON 66. LESOTHO 67. LIBERIA 68. LIBYA 69. MADAGASCAR 70. MALAWI 71. MALDIVES 72. MALI 73. MARSHALL ISLANDS 74. MAURITANIA 75. MAURITIUS 76. MICRONESIA 77. MOLDOVA 78. MONGOLIA 79. MOROCCO 80. MOZAMBIQUE 81. NAMIBIA 82. NAURU 83. NEPAL 84. NIGER 85. NIGERIA 86. NORTH KOREA 87. NORTHERN MARIANAS (ISLANDS) 88. OMAN 89. PAKISTAN 90. PALAU 91. PAPUA NEW GUINEA 92. PERU 93. PHILIPPINES 94. QATAR 95. RUSSIA 96. RWANDA 97. SAMOA 98. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 99. SAUDI ARABIA 100. SENEGAL 101. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 102. SEYCHELLES 103. SIERRA LEONE 104. SOLOMON ISLANDS 105. SOMALIA 106. SOUTH AFRICA 107. SRI LANKA 108. ST KITTS AND NEVIS 109. ST LUCIA 110. ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 111. SUDAN 112. SURINAME 113. SWAZILAND 114. SYRIA 115. TAJIKISTAN 116. TANZANIA 117. THAILAND 118. TOGO 119. TONGA 120. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 121. TUNISIA 122. TURKEY 123. TURKMENISTAN 124. TUVALU 125. UGANDA 126. UKRAINE 127. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 128. UZBEKISTAN 129. VANUATU 130. VIETNAM 131. YEMEN 132. ZAMBIA 133. ZIMBABWE Entities and territorial authorities 134. TAIWAN 135. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITIES TABLE II NO visa is required for a stay of up to 90 days for all bona fide tourists nationals of the following countries States 1. ANDORRA 2. ARGENTINA 3. AUSTRALIA 4. AUSTRIA 5. BELGIUM 6. BOLIVIA 7. BRAZIL 8. BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 9. BULGARIA 10. CANADA 11. CZECH REPUBLIC 12. CHILE 13. COSTA RICA 14. CROATIA 15. DENMARK 16. EL SALVADOR 17. ESTONIA 18. FINLAND 19. FRANCE 20. GERMANY 21. GREECE 22. GUATEMALA 23. HOLY SEE (STATE OF THE VATICAN) 24. HONDURAS 25. HUNGARY 26. ICELAND 27. IRELAND 28. ISRAEL 29. ITALY 30. JAPAN 31. LATVIA 32. LIECHTENSTEIN 33. LITHUANIA 34. LUXEMBURG 35. MALAYSIA 36. MALTA 37. MEXICO 38. MONACO 39. NETHERLANDS 40. NEW ZEALAND 41. NICARAGUA 42. NORWAY 43. PANAMA 44. PARAGUAY 45. POLAND 46. PORTUGAL 47. ROMANIA 48. SAN MARINO 49. SINGAPORE 50. SLOVAKIA 51. SLOVENIA 52. SOUTH KOREA 53. SPAIN 54. SWEDEN 55. SWITZERLAND 56. UNITED KINGDOM 57. UNITED STATES 58. URUGUAY 59. VENEZUELA 3. Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China 60. HONG KONG S.A.R. 61. MACAO S.A.R. Additional categories of persons who do NOT require visa 1. holders of diplomatic, service or other official passports 2. civilian air and sea crew 3. the flight crew and attendants on emergency or rescue flights and other helpers in the event of disaster or accident 4. the civilian crew of ships navigating in international waters 5. the holders of laissez-passer issued by the United Nations to their officials 6. School pupils having the nationality of a third country listed in ANNEX I who reside in a third country listed in Annex II and are travelling in the context of a school excursion as members of a group of pupils accompanied by a teacher from the school in question. 7. all persons who are in possession of work permit issued by the Migration Officer. 8. all persons who possess permanent or temporary residence permit issued by the Migration Officer. 9. all persons who possess study permit. Issue: Visas will be issued by the Embassies and General Consulates of the Republic of Cyprus (see for the list at the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus: http://www.mfa.gov.cy), and additionally by the British High Commissions/Embassies in the following countries: ARGENTINE REPUBLIC BAHREIN HONG KONG JAPAN JORDAN KAZAKSTAN KUWAIT NORWAY OMAN SWITZERLAND SUDAN UAE (ABU DHABI, DUBAI) UZBEKISTAN and by the Greek Embassy in: KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA and the Honorary Consulates in the rest of the countries.
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