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Home , Trump peace plan

How the Trump Plan Makes Peace Possible

by Douglas J. Feith and Lewis Libby

resident ’s Middle East peace plan transforms long- P standing official U.S. ideas about peace diplomacy and about the U.S. role in the region. In the past, U.S. peace- making efforts aimed directly at a Palestinian-Israeli deal. The Trump peace plan, however, stresses that fundamental changes are required on the Palestinian side before such a deal can become realistic. The plan does not hold out the promise of a quick peace settlement. Rather, it has a more limited aim: to improve chances that peace will one day U.S. president Donald Trump with Israeli be possible. prime minister (left), January 28, 2020, White House. The Trump peace plan warns that if the Palestinian side A Warning continues to support terrorism and reject The plan’s most original element is a peace, its cause will suffer. warning: If the Palestinian side continues to support terrorism and reject peace, its cause will suffer. For decades, Palestinian leaders, The Trump plan effectively tells the while refusing peace offers seen as reasonable Palestinians that the sensible question is not by top U.S. officials, incited violence and de- whether a deal provides everything they manded that the status quo in the territories think they are entitled to, but whether it is the be frozen pending a peace deal. The best deal available, now and in the fore- Palestinians are now being told that, if they seeable future. A huge development program continue on this path, Washington will not is promised as a reward for compromise. block from advancing its own claims Obviously, the U.S government cannot force to areas in the that, in the Palestinian leaders to accept a peace that they administration’s view, would be left to Israel consider unjust, but if their demands for in realistic peace talks. Those areas, “justice” include the destruction of Israel, according to the peace plan’s “Conceptual Trump warns that Washington will not Map,” include not just the major settlement support them and will not fight to preserve blocs but also the Valley.

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the West Bank’s legal status quo for their of a “jihad to liberate ,” comparing benefit. Oslo to a peace the Prophet Muhammad The peace plan’s strong language and accepted before obliterating his enemy.2 PA unequivocal conclusions reflect more than schools and official media stoked hostility to just this president’s personal talking style. Israel. In demanding an end to “the oc- They reflect the Trump team’s acquaintance cupation,” they applied the term to cities with the long, exasperating history of U.S. within pre-1967 Israel—Haifa and Jaffa, for diplomacy undone by Palestinian rejection- example—as much as to the territory Israel ism and terrorism. won in the 1967 Six-Day War. The PA honored terrorists that killed Israeli civilians, calling them heroes, naming streets for them, Installation of Arafat and the PLO and urging children to emulate them. The PA For nearly thirty years, Palestinian-Israeli enacted legislation that incentivized terrorism peace diplomacy has been based on the 1993 by providing official payments to terrorist . These agreements created the prisoners held by Israel and to families of Palestinian Authority (PA), which Yasser “martyrs” (i.e., terrorists killed in action). Arafat, chairman of the Liberation Critics call such legislation “pay-for-slay.”3 Organization (PLO), headed. Israeli officials More Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks empowered the PA so that it would end the after the Oslo accords than before.4 intifada, which began in 1987, promote peace, Nonetheless, U.S. president Bill Clinton and negotiate in good faith a formal end to tried for years to promote mutual Israeli- the conflict. Palestinian confidence through agreements Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, on practical problems such as water disputes, who signed the accords, is often portrayed as boundary issues, and local security arrange- the champion of the “two-state solution,” ments. He hoped that diplomacy, by resolving but, until the end, he opposed creation of a misunderstandings and overcoming mistrust, Palestinian state. In his last Knesset speech could resolve the conflict. on October 5, 1995, a month before he was assassinated, Rabin said the conflict’s “permanent solution” would be a State of A Most Generous Bid for Peace Israel and “alongside it a Palestinian entity,” With his term winding down, Clinton which he envisioned as “less than a state,” held a peace conference at Camp David in which would “independently run the lives of July 2000 to push for a deal to end the the Palestinians under its authority.”1 Rabin conflict. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak promised in the same speech to preserve made extraordinary concessions, offering the security through permanent Israeli control of Palestinians control over an area at least 95 the . Arafat disappointed expectations that he would use his new power and prestige as PA 2 Daniel Pipes, “Lessons from the Prophet Muhammad’s president to promote peace. Rather, he spoke Diplomacy,” Middle East Quarterly, Sept. 1999. 3 Douglas J. Feith and Sander Gerber, “The Department of Pay-for-Slay,” Commentary, Apr. 2017. 1 “PM Rabin in Knesset – Ratification of Interim 4 Efraim Karsh, The Oslo Disaster (Ramat Gan: Agreement,” Oct. 5, 1995, Israeli Ministry of Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar- Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem. Ilan University, 2016), p. 18.

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percent the size of the West Bank.5 Barak also agreed to divide Jerusalem and accept Palestinian sovereignty over most of the Old City, including on the .6 Arafat refused to make peace, how- ever, angering Clinton. Arafat demanded accept- ance of a Palestinian “” that would require Israel to admit millions of Pales- tinians—a small number of original refugees and a large number of their descendants. “No Israeli leader would ever let in so many Palestinians that U.S. president Bill Clinton (center) hosted a conference at Camp the Jewish character of the state David, July 2000, to push for a peace deal. While Israeli prime could be threatened,” Clinton minister Ehud Barak (left) made major concessions, PA president told Arafat, calling the claimed (right) refused to make peace. right “a deal breaker.”7

After the Camp David 9 talks collapsed, Arafat launched an all-out precedent is replicated in the territories.” From 2000 to 2005, Arafat’s terrorism terrorism campaign against Israel. Many of 10 the attacks were perpetrated by official PA campaign killed more than 1,100 Israelis. Palestinian fatalities are estimated between security forces or other individuals re- 11 sponsive to Arafat or protected by him.8 3,000 and 5,000. Misleadingly called the Before the talks, Barak had removed Israeli , this campaign has more accurately been labeled “Arafat’s War” by forces from Lebanon where for years they 12 had been fighting militias that Israeli historian Efraim Karsh. endangered northern Israel. Emboldened Palestinian demonstrators proclaimed, 9 “Lebanon Today, Palestine Tomorrow.” At Efraim Karsh and Gershon Hacohen, “Israel’s Flight from South Lebanon 20 Years On,” Begin-Sadat Camp David, Arafat threatened that “we can Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, see to it that the Hezbollah [Lebanon] Ramat Gan, May 22, 2020. 10 “Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israel Conflict (1860-Present),” Jewish Virtual Library, Chevy Chase; “Five Years of Violent Confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians,” Meir Amit 5 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2004), p. 936. Ramat Hasharon, Oct. 2, 2005. 6 Ehud Barak, My Country, My Life: Fighting for 11 “Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israel Conflict Israel, Searching for Peace (New York: St. (1860-Present).” Martin's Press, 2018), p. 395. 12 See Efraim Karsh, Arafat’s War: The Man and His 7 Clinton, My Life, p. 943. Battle for Israeli Conquest (New York: Grove 8 , Sept. 29, 2010. Press, 2003), p. 189.

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Despite the ongoing group, not a people violence, Clinton tried The conflict was a matter of entitled to national self- again for a peace deal. intense beliefs rooted in religious determination and a Jew- With Barak’s agreement, and nationalist identities. ish majority state.15 Pales- he offered Arafat terms tinian leaders have never (the “Clinton Parameters”) actually been willing to even more forthcoming renounce, once and for all, than Barak’s Camp David proposals.13 U.S. Palestinian claims over any territory from the peace negotiator Dennis Ross says the to the Mediterranean Sea. “unprecedented” offer went absolutely as far as , a senior Middle East Israel could go and included poliicy advisor to Clinton, marveled that U.S. officials held so tenaciously to the delusion a Palestinian state in all of Gaza that Arafat was a peacemaker. “After eight and nearly all of the West Bank; a years, Clinton and our team surely should capital for the state in East have known with whom we were dealing,” Jerusalem; security arrangements Indyk wrote, criticizing Clinton for making that would be built on an himself “dependent on the statesmanship of international presence; and an 16 unlimited right of return for Yasser Arafat.” Palestinian refugees to their own Many Israelis, including on the Left, state.14 were galled that Arafat had repaid Barak’s concessions by instigating horrific attacks Arafat, however, refused to make peace. against Israelii civilians. More and more Israelis concluded that they could neither perrsuade nor compel Palestinian leaders to Arafat’s Reje ectionism and makke peace. PLO leaders might accept Oslo’s Flawed Premise limited agreements—especially if rewarded After eight years, the failure of the Oslo by foreign donnors—but were unwilling to process suggested that the conflict was end the conflict. Even if it agreed to a something more fundamental than mutual Palestinian staatte, Jerusalem could not stop misunderstandings and lack of trust. It was the violence, so long as the Palestinian side increasingly clear that the problem was a remained unreconciled to Israel’s existence. matter of intense beliefs rooted in religious and nationalist identities. According to Palestinian nationalist ideology, Palestine is an indivisible, inalienable possession of 15 “The Palestiniaan National Charter: Resolutions of the Arabs, and the are only a religious the Palestinee National Council, July 1-17, 1968,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, art. 20; The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 11, 2014.

16 Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate 13 Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), ppp. 295-6. 2009), p. 375; see also, Elliott Abrams, Tested by 14 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli- of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Palestinian Conflict (New York: Cambridge Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), pp. 3-4. University Press, 2013), pp. 25-6.

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Israelis in large num- bers came to the unhappy realization that they lacked the ability, short of na- tional suicide, to appease their enemies. The slogan “peace now,” which im- plied that the Israeli gov- ernment could have peace simply by changing its own policies, lost its fol- lowing. The self-described “peace camp” shrank and has not recovered to this day. Military equipment confiscated from the Karine A, January 3, 2002. Clinton warned in- Yasser Arafat tried to smuggle a huge quantity of Iranian-supplied arms coming President George into Gaza in violation of his Oslo commitments. Israeli forces W. Bush against trusting intercepted the contraband-laden ship. Arafat. Soon thereafter, in February 2001, Barak lost his reelection bid, and Ariel Sharon insufferable for him after exposure of the became Israeli prime minister. Karine A affair. In January 2002, Arafat tried to smuggle a huge quantity of Iranian-supplied arms into A Deceitful Terrorist Gaza by sea in violation of his Oslo Despite Clinton’s warnings and the commitments. Israeli forces intercepted the 18 raging violence, the Bush team entered office contraband-laden ship, the Karine A. With- willing to invest additional U.S. prestige in in weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Arafat had mediating between the Israelis and Arafat. opted not only to continue terrorism, but to Trying to induce Arafat to end terrorism and prepare an escalation and to stand with , reinvigorate cooperation with Israel, Bush the U.S. enemy and a major state sponsor of broke new diplomatic ground by endorsing terrorism. Bush’s concession on Palestinian a Palestinian state.17 Arafat, however, con- statehood appeared to have no effect on tinued to fuel terrorist attacks. Bush was slow Arafat’s behavior. to anger, but Arafat’s bad will became In her memoirs, then-national security advisor Condoleezza Rice recounted that the Karine A affair “made it absolutely clear that [Arafat] was not going to lead his people to 19 17 George W. Bush, “Address to the peace.” Nonetheless, immediately after the General Assembly,” Oct. 3, 2001, State Dept. archives, Washington, D.C.; Ross, The Missing 18 Peace, p. 786; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 306, Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea.” 307, 311; Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 16; Robert 19 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea: Karine A Affair Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, and the War on Terrorism,” The National Interest, 2011), pp. 135-6; see also, Abrams, Tested by Zion, Mar. 1, 2002. p. 25.

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ship’s capture, she Secretary of State Colin joined State Department Arafat’s war included shooting Powell believed that Arab officials in proposing that Israeli families in their homes states would defy Bush on Bush write Arafat, chiding and massacring students at a Iraq unless he reactivated him on the Karine A but Jewish religious school. diplomacy with Arafat.23 implicitly assuring him Cheney, Secretary of De- that no serious con- fense Donald Rumsfeld, sequences would fol- and their staffs disagreed low.20 The idea was to put the affair behind and argued that new peace initiatives would be them quickly and revive peace talks. One of futiile and would appear to reward Arafat’s the authors of this article, Lewis Libby, then terrorism. Cheney’s national security adviser and chief State Department officials predicted dire of staff, and Libby’s deputy, Foreign Service consequences if Cheney failed to meet Arafat Officer Eric Edelman, opposed the letter, during the vice president’s spring 2002 arguing that the Karine A presented a rare, Middle East trip. Cheney agreed with Libby clarifying moment and that sweeping Arafat’s that, as a precondition, Arafat should sign a misconduct under the rug would undermine limited security agreement with Israel as the U.S. diplomacy and likely result in more U.S. negotiator expected him to do. Arafat, terrorism.21 Cheney agreed, so Rice brought however, refuseed to sign.24 Then, in an April the issue to Bush. Bush overruled Rice, speeech, Bush announced that Powell would scrapped the letter, elevated the Karine A issue, go to the region to promote peace. In two and demanded that Arafat show clearly that he meetings, Powell urged Arafat to make a was changing course. positive gesture, but Arafat stood pat. Powell Arafat, however, denied any role in the and Rice, nonetheless, favored convening a Karine A arms smuggling, a lie that infuriated new peace conference. Bush rebuffed them. Bush.22 Over the next months, Arafat’s war In June, Powell tried again, but, as Rice included shooting Israeli families in their wriites, the “President again said no, not with homes, bombing civilians on streets and in Arafat.”25 shopping malls, and massacring students at a Bush waas growing less and less Jewish religious school. receptive to advice from State Department In spring 2002, Bush was considering and National Security Council staff officials how to handle Iraqi dictator Saddam to move forward with Arafat.26 Bush and Hussein’s defiance of U.N resolutions. Cheney eventually embraced three insights: First, there was no hope for progress toward

20 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 26; authors’ telephone 23 interview with Amb. Eric Edelman, June 2020; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 311, 315; Abrams, Ross, Doomed to Succeed, p. 312; Satloff, “The Tested by Zion, p. 34. Peace Process at Sea.” 24 Cheney, In My Time, p. 378. 21 Authors’ interview with Amb. Eric Edelman; 25 Rice, No Higher Honor, pp. 139, 142. Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 26. 26 Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 25-6; Midland 22 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Reporter Telegram (Midland, Tex.), Jan. 24, Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 401; Dick Cheney, 2002; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, p. 312; authors’ In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir telephone interview with John Hannah, June (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), p. 373. 2020; The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 28, 2017.

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peace with Arafat. Second, the Palestinian issue would not bar Arab states from cooperating on important regional concerns, including Iraq. And third, as Cheney and others had re- peatedly heard from leading Israelis, Jerusalem would com- promise if Palestinians offered reasonable prospects for security and peace. Bush saw Arafat as a deceitful terrorist. Yet he also, for the first time, gave Washington’s U.S. president George W. Bush at the podium with (left to support to a Palestinian state. right) Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, and Donald Rumsfeld, And he pressured Sharon to relax White House, June 24, 2002. Bush called on the Palestinians security measures in hopes of to elect new leaders “not compromised by terror.” facilitating a peace deal with Arafat. All in all, Arafat could claim credit with his people for persisting in the goal of a the anti-Zionist armed struggle while causing will remain out of reach.29 changes in U.S. policy that favored the Palestinian national cause. Bush’s new speech would go through more than thirty drafts. Delivered on June 24, 2002, its main point was repudiation of the Repudiating Palestinian Leadership PA’s leaders and institutions. Bush called on In spring of 2002, Rice pushed for a the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not presidential speech that would appeal to compromised by terror.” He criticized PA Arafat.27 The Cheney and Rumsfeld teams corruption, opacity, and lack of accountability. favored a different speech. They wanted Bush to Bush said that the Palestinians needed “entirely say that Arafat was not a peace partner.28 new political and economic institutions based on Undersecretary of defense for policy Douglas democracy, market economics and action 30 Feith wrote to Rice’s deputy and suggested against terrorism.” In U.S. Middle East pol- that the president say, icy, this was a major departure. Blaming the PA for the lack of peace Until the Palestinians have a and for Palestinian suffering was novel, even leadership that can speak credibly shocking, especially for those wedded to of peace, prevent terrorism, what Rice in her memoirs called “the stale counter extremism, and handle ideas governing policy toward the Middle funds honestly and transparently,

29 Feith fax to Steve Hadley, “Notes for possible speech,” June 10, 2002.

30 “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership,” 27 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 39. White House archives, Washington, D.C., June 24, 28 Authors’ interviews with Edelman and Hannah. 2002.

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East.”31 Within weeks, the Palestinian branch of State Department officials The “Roadmap” assumed that the , argued for Bush to modify Palestinian leaders were pursuing calls for elim- his stand.32 He remained a peace deal in good faith. ination of Israel and the committed, however, to killing of Jews.34 To never dealing with bolster Abbas, the State Arafat again. Department supported the Arab diplomats soon proposed creating a PA’s January 2006 parliamentary elections, “roadmap” for peace. The roadmap, as but Hamas won. A little over a year later, drafted by State Department officials, would Hamas took control of Gaza away from the call on the Palestinians to end terrorism and PA, after killing or expelling all the reform their political institutions first, then perrsonnel theree. As Hamas’s power grew, move toward a provisional state, and finally, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger full statehood.33 cautioned U.S. officials that Hamas’s raddiicalism should not obscure the support for terrorism from Abbas and the PLO, or their The “Roadmap” Fails continued refussal, despite the Oslo accords, When Arafat died in November 2004, to accept Israell’s right to exist.35 his longtime deputy Despite all this, State Department officials became PLO head and president of the PA. restarted peace talks. Rice pressed Israeli Bush, on the advice of Rice, his new officials to negotiate a ““political horizon” secretary of state, greeted Abbas’s accession addressing so-called final-status issues. This as a new beginning and treated him as a was contrary to previous assurances to reformer and peacemaker. Jerusalem that the Palestinians would first have Israel’s Sharon saw things differently. to stop terrorism. The “Roaddmap” had become Not expecting peace in the near term, he little more than a revival of the Oslo process, finished building the security barrier that which assumed that Palestinian leaders were would impede terrorist infiltration from the pursuing in goood faith a peace deal that West Bank. He also decided that Israel would would partition the Holy Land. Palestinian withdraw from Gaza unilaterally, without poliitical reform, a critical issue in Bush’s negotiations or agreements. He viewed the June 24, 2002 speech, fell far to the rear. costs of staying in Gaza as too high and Like Arafat, Abbas received a thought that withdrawal, completed in fall remarkably forthcoming offer from the 2005, could strengthen Israeli security Israelis. Prime Minister offered overall. approximately 94 percent of the West Bank Abbas and his Fatah faction within the and a “land swap” from pre-1967 Israel equal PLO faced a political challenge from Hamas. As to another 5 percent; Palestinian sovereignty in ; joint governance of

31 Rice, No Higher Honoro , p. 144. 32 Abrams, Tested by Zion, p. 43. 34 “Hamas Covenant 1988,” The Avalon Project, Lillian 33 Bush, Decision Points, p. 405; “President Goldman Law Library, Yale University, New Discusses Roadmap for Peace in the Middle Haven; Abrams, Tested by Zion, pp. 142, 160. East,” White House archives, Washington, D.C., 35 Henry Kissinger, “Sharon’s legacy and Hamas,” Mar. 14, 2003. , Feb. 15, 2006.

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Jerusalem’s Old City; and Israeli acceptance of fifteen to twenty thousand Palestinian refugees over five years. In her memoirs, Rice expressed amaze- ment at Olmert’s “remarkable” offer, but “Abbas refused.”36 A 2007 international peace con- ference Rice had organized produced no breakthroughs.

Obama Reverses Course entered the presidency hoping to transform the U.S. relationship with the Muslim world, seeing the U.S. president Barack Obama (right) meets with PA president Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a Mahmoud Abbas, White House, May 28, 2009. Obama distanced principal irritant in that re- his administration from Israel and promoted sympathy for the lationship and holding Israel Palestinian cause but made no progress on peace through his efforts. largely to blame for the lack of peace. Bush, he thought, had been too close to Israel, which relieved its Iran could use to finance pro-Assad military leaders from making concessions, which operations and activities by Tehran’s terrorist Obama expected would bring peace.37 proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and To encourage peace talks, Obama Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. prevailed on Israel to accept a ten-month Abbas continued to lead the PA “freeze” on new West Bank construction. throughout the Obama years as he still does Abbas squandered the freeze, failing to though he was elected PA president only negotiate directly with Israel during most of once, in 2005, to a four-year term. Under it and then refusing to talk unless Israel him, the PA continues to support terrorism extended it. and remains undemocratic, corrupt,39 and As he urged Jerusalem to take risks for unwilling to conclude a permanent peace peace, Obama gave the Israelis additional with Israel. Abbas insists on a Palestinian grounds to fear for their security. Most “right of return” that would end Israel as a notably, Obama offered an “extended hand” Jewish-majority state. He said he would never if Iran, Israel’s foremost threat, would recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish “unclench its fist”38 The resulting nuclear people.40 Meanwhile, rejectionist Hamas rules deal, top Israeli officials believed, gave Iran a Gaza, expanding its arsenal. path to a weapon and over $100 billion that Over two terms as president, Obama tested his theory for advancing peace. He

36 Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 723. 37 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 345-7. 39 Middle East Monitor (London), July 18, 2019. 38 , Jan. 27, 2009. 40 Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 378, 384, 387.

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distanced his admin- Trump’s principal istration from Israel and For the Trump team, the primary innovation in Middle promoted sympathy for obstacle to peace is the hope East peace diplomacy is the Palestinian cause. among Israel’s enemies that they insisting that there should Yet, he had no progress will defeat the Jewish State. be consequences if the to show for his efforts. Palestinian side persists During his tenure, in terrorism and refuses neither Israel nor the PA reasonable peace terms. made substantial new political concessions. This means that outsiders should not tell Palestinian schools and official news media Israel to preserve the West Bank status quo if continued to exhort antisemitism and Palestinian officials choose to perpetuate the terrorism. Palestinians still labored under the conflict. PA’s violent misrule, which stifled their lives A theme oof the Obama administration and prospects. There were no peace talks was that Israel fuels terrorism by causing the underway when Obama left office. Palestinians to despair about peace. While expressing sympathy for Palestinian suf- fering, the Trump team’s contrary message is Deflatingn Hopes of Destroying Israel that the primary obstacle to peace is not Trump rejected Obama’s peace policy as desspair but hope among Israel’s enemies that thoroughly as Obama had rejected Bush’s. they will eventually isolate and defeat the Top Trump administration officials do not Jewish State. That hope is rooted in the well- accept the view that the Palestinian-Israeli known propaganda argument that Israel is an conflict is the main issue in Middle East alien, artificial presence in the region that can affairs. They do not believe that Washington be worn down, demoralized, and ultimately must distance itself from Israel to promote expelled as were the Crusaders and, in later peace or win cooperation from Arab states. centuries, the European imperial powers. They blame Palestinian leaders for refusing The Trump peace plan and the highly to make compromises to end the conflict and visible initiatives that preceded it— for harming Palestinians.41 Trump values recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Israel as the kind of foreign partner he recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the seeks—a strong, democratic ally, active in Golan, announcing that Israel’s West Bank defense of shared interests. His team praises settlements are not inherently a violation of Jerusalem for taking initiative, relying on its international law, and curtailing assistance to own troops, making available valuable the PA while it funds terrorism—all counter intelligence, and battling successfully for PA hopes for Israel’s elimination. These goals common to Israel and the United measures, taken in defiance of exaggerated States.42 fears of reactions from the “Arab street,” convey mutually reinforcing messages: Israel is as legitimatee as any other state. It is rooted in its land and has rights to security and self- defense. It will not forever be hostage to 41 BBC, Jan. 28, 2020; Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Palestinian rejectionism. And it will retain June 6, 2019. U.S. support. 42 “A Conversation with John Bolton,” The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 25, 2018.

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The Trump Peace Plan The Trump plan contradicts conventional wisdom by con- tending that there can be strategic cooperation between Israel and the Arab states before any Palestinian peace deal. Integrating Israel into the region, the plan states, would facilitate countering Iran’s threats and “set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs.”43 The plan sees Israel as ready to make necessary compromises to end the conflict but lacking a competent, well-intentioned Pales- tinian partner to engage. It would Photo: Natan Flayer not ask Israel to sacrifice its Rockets from Gaza hit Sderot, June 2014. The Trump plan states security, noting that “extraor- that Gaza and the West Bank are “politically divided,” and dinary geographic and geo- Hamas is “a terror organization that has … murdered hun- strategic challenges” give Israel dreds of Israelis.” “no margin for error.” Negative events in the West Bank—a takeover by Hamas, for example—could pose territory that my vision provides to be part of 45 an “existential threat,” the plan observes, the State of Israel. Very important.” It is adding that Israel “had the bitter experience of notable that the plan includes this map. No withdrawing from territories that were then prior administration ever defined the territory used to launch attacks against it.”44 that Israel could have U.S. support to hold The plan describes the Jordan Valley—a permanently, with or without a peace defensive buffer that benefits both Israel and agreement. Jordan—as “critical for Israel’s national security” and expects it, together with Israel’s main West Bank settlement blocs, to Replacing Palestinian Leadership remain “under Israeli sovereignty” following The Trump plan paints a sorry picture of good-faith peace negotiations. The plan’s Palestinian politics: “Gaza and the West “Conceptual Map” shows boundaries that Bank are politically divided. Gaza is run by might emerge from such talks. This has Hamas, a terror organization that has fired immediate real-world consequences, for, as thousands of rockets at Israel and murdered Trump has stated, “The will hundreds of Israelis.” In the West Bank, the recognize Israeli sovereignty over the PA is corrupt, runs failed institutions and,

43 “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of 45 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister the Palestinian and Israeli People,” White House, Netanyahu of the State of Israel in Joint Washington, D.C., Jan. 2020, p. 37. Statements,” White House, Washington, D.C., 44 Ibid., p. 7. Jan. 28, 2020.

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due to “lack of ac- tinians elevate leaders countability and bad gov- Trump blames Palestinian leaders that make needed gov- ernance,” has “squan- for indoctrinating their publics to ernmental reforms and dered” billions of dol- hate Israel and commit terrorism. accept reasonable terms lars.46 Without substantial for peace. The idea is reform, the plan warns, not novel. The amount there will be neither im- is. provement in Palestinians’ lives nor peace Would-be peacemakers have tried for with Israel. Using language virtually identical many decades to counter Palestinian anti- to that in Bush’s June 24, 2002 speech, it calls Zioonism by dangling prospects of future for rule of law, transparency, accountability, prossperity. Though never carrying so enormous separation of powers and a fair and inde- a price tag, such incentives consistently failed to pendent judiciary.47 Trump, like Bush, blames overcome Arab nationalist and religious Palestinian leaders for indoctrinating their objections to Zionism and Israel. Palestinian publics—children, in particular—to hate Israel leaders framed their rejectionist case as a matter and commit terrorism.48 This is hardly of honor, justice, and duty to the Arab nation designed to win favor with current Palestinian and to God, considerations that they say officials. It is an appeal over their heads to the outwweigh material concerns. people and around the PA to the Arab states. Economic inducements have never yet Critics who say Trump’s plan will not generated a politically significant Palestinian win acceptance by Mahmoud Abbas are parrtty in favor of ending the conflict. The missing its main point, which is that peace Trump plan is testing whether economic in- has no chance without substantial Palestinian ducements can work now, in an era of in- political changes. In the Trump team’s view, creasing Israeli military and economic might, Abbas and his colleagues brought this Palestinian division, and Sunni Arab states’ negative judgment on themselves through a anxiety about Iran. At a minimum, one can long train of terrorism, ideological ex- assume that the $50 billion carrot is meant tremism, and bad-faith diplomacy. Having to communicate U.S. sympathy for the declared the need for Palestinian reform, the Palestinians and hopes to improve their Trump plan proposes ways to encourage the situation. rise of new leadership. It admits that success may prove elusive. Help from Arab States The Trump plan urges Arab states to The $50 Billion Carrot proomote better Palestinian leadership and to The plan promises a $50 billion reach their oown accommodations with economic development program if the Pales- Israel.49 Clinton and Bush had similar hopes. Trump officcials think that present circumstances are more favorable. Sunni Arab states, some of which 46 “Peace to Prosperity,” p. 4. 47 Ibid., p.. 34. 48 “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel,” White House, Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 2017. 49 “Peace to Prosperity,” p. 36.

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include significant Shiite populations, see Iran’s growing regional influence, revolutionary Shiite ideology, military power (including its potential nuclear weapons capability), and capable proxies as a deadly threat. The Israelis help counter Tehran militarily through strikes against Iranian forces in and against Iran’s proxy Hezbollah. The Israelis also fight Tehran diplo- matically, especially in Washington, by arguing for economic sanctions and other means of constraint. Needing Jerusalem’s voice on this issue, Arab states have shown a greater wil- lingness to deal openly with Israelis PA president Mahmoud Abbas (right) at and to increase their economic and 50 headquarters, Cairo, April 21, 2019. Abbas has called strategic cooperation. for Arab political support for the Palestinian people. But, At the same time, Arab leaders Arab leaders have ample grounds to be antagonized by have ample grounds to be antagonized the Palestinians’ political disunity, growing Iranian by the Palestinians’ political disunity, influence in Gaza, and the corruption of PA leaders. the power of Hamas—an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, an enemy of and other Arab states— Changing Strategic Calculations growing Iranian influence in Gaza, and the An innovative feature of the Trump corruption and other shortcomings of PA peace plan is the warning to the Palestinians leaders. that steadfast rejectionism will not give them The Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians victory, but further erode their position. In consequently have an interest in promoting other words, time is not on their side, and it better Palestinian leadership. The Pales- is not necessarily even neutral. As noted tinians rely heavily on foreign diplomatic and above, if the Palestinians refuse to end the financial support, so foreigners have some conflict, Washington will support the Israelis leverage. Improving Palestinian governance unilaterally extending sovereignty in parts of may be a mission impossible, but there is the West Bank that the Trump team expects sense in appealing to regional and other Israel would keep anyway in any future actors to play a role. peace agreement. Trump has thus set aside what had been a general principle of U.S. policy since 1967: that changes in the status of the West Bank should be made only through negotiations. Negotiated change, of course, would be pre-

ferable, but the Palestinians are being warned 50 See, for example, The New York Times, Oct. 26, 2018; TRTWorld (Istanbul), Feb. 6, 2020; The that, if they refuse to negotiate reasonably, Japan Times (Tokyo), Feb. 23, 2020; The Times the Israelis can improve their position, with of Israel, Feb. 24, 2020. U.S. backing.

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U.S. support for suffering of the Pales- unilateral extension of Trump’s plan abandons past tinians and argues that Israeli sovereignty has U.S. policies that rewarded ending the conflict with generated worldwide con- the PA’s violent intransigence. Israel would alleviate troversy over whether their misery. If they agree Israeli prime minister to reasonable peace Benjamin Netanyahu will terms, the plan promises and should take the action. The pros and cons unprecedented rewards. But it warns that, in are worthy of serious debate. Whatever the the event of continued Palestinian terrorism Israeli government decides, the Trump plan’s and rejectionism, the United States will not key goal is to change the diplomatic cir- oppose Jerusalem improving its position cumstances that have incentivized the Pales- through steps that a realistic peace agreement tinian side to perpetuate the conflict. The would in any case allow.. In this, Trump’s Trump team is saying it makes no sense for plan abandons past U.S. policies that Palestinian leaders to support terrorism and rewarded the PA’s violent intransigence by reject reasonable offers of peace while ex- trying to presserve the West Bank’s legal pecting U.S. officials to insist that the Israelis status quo. maintain the West Bank’s legal status quo. The Trump team sees Israel’s security and strength as serving U.S. interests in the Midddle East. As it encourages Arab states to Conclusion cooperate with Israel against rising regional For the last half century, U.S. officials threats, Trump’s peace plan argues that such have tried persistently to persuade bad cooperation can grow substantially even Palestinian leaders to do good—that is, to befofore an Israeeli-Palestinian final peace deal. improve Palestinian lives, fight terrorism, If it grows, the plan says, peace could more and make realistic compromises for a peace easiily be achieved. based on permanent coexistence with Israel. Since the 1940s, U.S. policy has been The history reviewed above shows why the constrained by fear of thhe “Arab street”— Trump team has concluded that neither concern that support for Israel would ignite “even-handed” U.S. diplomacy nor pressure the tinderbox of Arab public opinion with to resolve “final-status issues” will succeed terrible effects on U.S. regional interests. without Palestinian leaders willing to end the Trump administration policies have time and conflict once and for all. The Trump peace again successfully flouted that fear, from plan is the most categorical U.S. government recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to declaration ever that the key to peace is reform publication of this peace plan with its strong that produces new Palestinian leadership support for Israeli security and blunt criticism willing to make reasonable compromises. of the PA. One of the lasting effects is likely to That is why it is fair to say that the be that, in future U.S. policy debates, arguments Trump plan is not trying to make peace but about the “Arab street” will be evaluated with to bring about changes that will make peace skepticism. possible. In prioritizing Palestinian re- The Trump plan cannot ensure a peace form, Trump’s plan builds on ideas laid out in deal and does not expect one soon. Its virtues the Bush June 24, 2002 speech but expands on lie in exposing the falsity of conventional them dramatically. The plan, like those of views about the Middle East; pointing to Trump’s predecessors, sympathizes with the what is truly precluding peace; offering

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ample rewards for overcoming those obstacles; and ending policies that incentivize the con- flict’s perpetuation. It advances U.S. interests in the region by sending sympathetic and constructive messages to the Palestinians and forthrightly supporting the security of the capable, democratic U.S. ally, Israel.

Douglas J. Feith is a senior fellow and Lewis Libby is the senior vice president of Hudson Institute. During the first five years of the George W. Bush administration, they served as principal national security advisers to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, respectively. This article is adapted from a historical analysis of the Trump peace plan recently pub- lished by the Begin-Sadat Center of Israel’s Bar-Ilan University.

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