Martin Indyk In
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Additional Documents to the Amicus Brief Submitted to the Jerusalem District Court
בבית המשפט המחוזי בירושלים עת"מ 36759-05-18 בשבתו כבית משפט לעניינים מנהליים בעניין שבין: 1( ארגון Human Rights Watch 2( עומר שאקר העותרים באמצעות עו"ד מיכאל ספרד ו/או אמילי שפר עומר-מן ו/או סופיה ברודסקי מרח' דוד חכמי 12, תל אביב 6777812 טל: 03-6206947/8/9, פקס 03-6206950 - נ ג ד - שר הפנים המשיב באמצעות ב"כ, מפרקליטות מחוז ירושלים, רחוב מח"ל 7, מעלות דפנה, ירושלים ת.ד. 49333 ירושלים 9149301 טל: 02-5419555, פקס: 026468053 המכון לחקר ארגונים לא ממשלתיים )עמותה רשומה 58-0465508( ידיד בית המשפט באמצעות ב"כ עו"ד מוריס הירש מרח' יד חרוצים 10, ירושלים טל: 02-566-1020 פקס: 077-511-7030 השלמת מסמכים מטעם ידיד בית המשפט בהמשך לדיון שהתקיים ביום 11 במרץ 2019, ובהתאם להחלטת כב' בית המשפט, מתכבד ידיד בית המשפט להגיש את ריכוז הציוציו של העותר מס' 2 החל מיום 25 ליוני 2018 ועד ליום 10 למרץ 2019. כפי שניתן להבחין בנקל מהתמצית המצ"ב כנספח 1, בתקופה האמורה, אל אף טענתו שהינו "פעיל זכויות אדם", בפועל ציוציו )וציוציו מחדש Retweets( התמקדו בנושאים שבהם הביע תמיכה בתנועת החרם או ביקורת כלפי מדינת ישראל ומדיניותה, אך נמנע, כמעט לחלוטין, מלגנות פגיעות בזכיות אדם של אזרחי מדינת ישראל, ובכלל זה, גינוי כלשהו ביחס למעשי רצח של אזרחים ישראלים בידי רוצחים פלסטינים. באשר לטענתו של העותר מס' 2 שחשבון הטוויטר שלו הינו, בפועל, חשבון של העותר מס' 1, הרי שגם כאן ניתן להבין בנקל שטענה זו חסרת בסיס כלשהי. ראשית, החשבון מפנה לתפקידו הקודם בארגון CCR, אליו התייחסנו בחוות הדעת המקורית מטעם ידיד בית המשפט בסעיף 51. -
Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State .............................................................................................. -
August 2011 Postcard
postcard_marchapril_2020.qxp_MARCH APRIL 2020 Postcard 1/29/20 10:06 AM Page 2 ¡ DEAR PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: PLACE You have repeatedly boasted of your skills as a negotiator. If you were the You may wish leader of Palestine, would you view the recently released Israel-Palestine 35¢ “peace plan” as a serious overture? Of course not! Any negotiator would STAMP hastily dismiss a proposal that only reflects one side’s interests. How does HERE to send these this deal advance peace? It’s clear this proposal will not lead to a peace set- tlement and could only result in a worsening divide and more violence and injustice. What does the U.S. get out of this deal? Nothing but the promise of greater global distrust. This proposal cards to forgoes any sense of partiality and signals an almost complete acquiescence to Israeli desires. So much for putting “America First.” President TO: Donald Trump PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW and the WASHINGTON, DC 20500 Senator and ¡ Representative DEAR SENATOR: PLACE It’s painfully clear to objective observers that President Trump’s Israel- Palestine “peace plan” is simply a green light for Israel to do as it wishes. 35¢ in whose The plan embarrassingly forgoes any premise of U.S. impartiality and puts a STAMP blind rubber stamp on Israel’s desire to annex the West Bank and exert its HERE control over Palestinians. How does this deal advance peace? It’s clear this constituency proposal will not lead to a peace settlement and could only result in a worsening divide and more violence and injustice. -
Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North the Role of the Arab States Africa Programme
Briefing Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking January 2019 Middle East and North The Role of the Arab States Africa Programme Yossi Mekelberg Summary and Greg Shapland • The positions of several Arab states towards Israel have evolved greatly in the past 50 years. Four of these states in particular – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and (to a lesser extent) Jordan – could be influential in shaping the course of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. • In addition to Egypt and Jordan (which have signed peace treaties with Israel), Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among other Gulf states, now have extensive – albeit discreet – dealings with Israel. • This evolution has created a new situation in the region, with these Arab states now having considerable potential influence over the Israelis and Palestinians. It also has implications for US positions and policy. So far, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan have chosen not to test what this influence could achieve. • One reason for the inactivity to date may be disenchantment with the Palestinians and their cause, including the inability of Palestinian leaders to unite to promote it. However, ignoring Palestinian concerns will not bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which will continue to add to instability in the region. If Arab leaders see regional stability as being in their countries’ interests, they should be trying to shape any eventual peace plan advanced by the administration of US President Donald Trump in such a way that it forms a framework for negotiations that both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships can accept. Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking: The Role of the Arab States Introduction This briefing forms part of the Chatham House project, ‘Israel–Palestine: Beyond the Stalemate’. -
Impacts of Climate Change on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank
COMPOUNDING VULNERABILITY: IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON PALESTINIANS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK MICHAEL MASON, MARK ZEITOUN, AND ZIAD MIMI Coping with (and adapting to) climatological hazards is commonly understood in intergovernmental and aid agency fora as a purely tech- nical matter. This article examines the UN Development Programme’s stakeholder consultations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to challenge the donor-driven technical-managerial framing of Palestinian climate vulnerability by showing how Israeli occupa- tion practices exacerbate environmental stresses. While emphasizing the importance of social, economic, and political contexts in shap- ing populations’ responses to climate change in general, the authors demonstrate the multiple ways in which the occupation speci!cally compounds hazards reveals it as constitutive of Palestinian climate vulnerability. AT THE DECEMBER 2009 !fteenth conference of the parties (COP15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, 130 heads of state and government af!rmed their commit- ments to address climate change, including Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Israeli President Shimon Peres. Observ- ers hoping that shared climate risks would be an area for Palestinian- Israeli cooperation were disappointed. Both leaders acknowledged that signi!cant climate change was forecasted by the end of this century for the Eastern Mediterranean region: its impacts, Fayyad noted, included decreased precipitation, signi!cant warming, more frequent extreme weather events, and a rise in sea level.1 There was also a shared recogni- tion that the key hazards posed by these changes—greater water scarcity, falling agricultural productivity, an increased probability of "ash "oods, and saline intrusion into groundwater—will be accentuated by a growing population. -
The Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of the Middle East and Their Impact on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Efforts
Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Honors Theses Lee Honors College 4-25-2018 The Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of the Middle East and their Impact on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Efforts Daniel Bucksbaum Western Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Bucksbaum, Daniel, "The Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of the Middle East and their Impact on Israeli- Palestinian Peace Efforts" (2018). Honors Theses. 3009. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses/3009 This Honors Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Honors College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Changing Geopolitical Dynamics of the Middle East and their Impact on Israeli- Palestinian Peace Efforts By Daniel Bucksbaum A thesis submitted to the Lee Honors College Western Michigan University April 2018 Thesis Committee: Jim Butterfield, Ph.D., Chair Yuan-Kang Wang, Ph.D. Mustafa Mughazy, Ph.D. Bucksbaum 1 Table of Contents I. Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3 II. Source Material……………………………………………………………………………………………………….4 III. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4 IV. Historical Context for the Two-State Solution………………………………………………………...6 a. Deeply Rooted and Ideological Claims to the Land……………………………………………….…..7 b. Legacy of the Oslo Accords……………………………………………………………………………………….9 c. Israeli Narrative: Why the Two-State Solution is Unfeasible……………………………………19 d. Palestinian Narrative: Why the Two-State Solution has become unattainable………..22 e. Drop in Support for the Two-State Solution; Negotiations entirely…………………………27 f. -
… Haïm Bresheeth, Ahmed Moor, Youssef Munayyer, Georges Bisharat
In this issue An interview with Salah Salah, Chair of the PNC Commission on the Right of Return … Haïm Bresheeth, Ahmed Moor, Youssef Munayyer, Georges Bisharat .Virginia Tilley: The One-State Solution. A break- through for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock .Eric Hazan and Eyal Sivan : A Common State bet- ween the River Jordan and the Sea. Dialogue 31 - June 2012 issue page 1 Dialogue 31 - June 2012 issue page 2 Contents Short web-interview with Prof. Haim Bresheeth, of the One State in Palestine group - page 5 Appeal : A single secular democratic state in Palestine: A Republic of all its citizens! - page 7 Not All Israeli Citizens Are Equal by Yousef Munayyer - page 9 One state for Palestinians and Israelis by Ahmed Moor - page 11 Interview of Salah Salah, Chair of the PNC. Commission on the Right of Return - page 14 Virginia Tilley: The One-State Solution A breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian dea- dlock (The University of Michigan Press – 2005) by Sam Ayache - page 18 A One-State Solution for Israel and Palestine by Georges Bisharat - page 26 Book review : A Common State between the River Jordan and the Sea, by Eric Hazan and Eyal Sivan by François Lazar - page 28 Dialogue 31 - June 2012 issue page 3 Presentation he « two State » solution to the conflict that has been devastating Palestine for several decades is an official solution replying to political necessity. At whatever T cost, with one “peace plan” after another, the UN, successive American govern- ments and in their wake, the European Union have tried in vain to impose a permanent partition of Palestine, i.e. -
The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options
ISSUE BRIEF 08.25.20 The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D, Fellow for the Middle East conflict, the Gulf states complied with and INTRODUCTION enforced the Arab League boycott of Israel This issue brief examines where the six until at least 1994 and participated in the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council— oil embargo of countries that supported 1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 1973, for example, the president of the (UAE)—currently stand in their outlook and UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian claimed that “No Arab country is safe from issue. The first section of this brief begins by the perils of the battle with Zionism unless outlining how positions among the six Gulf it plays its role and bears its responsibilities, 2 states have evolved over the three decades in confronting the Israeli enemy.” In since the Madrid Conference of 1991. Section Kuwait, Sheikh Fahd al-Ahmad Al Sabah, a two analyzes the degree to which the six brother of two future Emirs, was wounded Gulf states’ relations with Israel are based while fighting with Fatah in Jordan in 3 on interests, values, or a combination of 1968, while in 1981 the Saudi government both, and how these differ from state to offered to finance the reconstruction of state. Section three details the Gulf states’ Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor after it was 4 responses to the peace plan unveiled by destroyed by an Israeli airstrike. -
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Updated May 18, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44245 SUMMARY R44245 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief May 18, 2020 The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations. Jim Zanotti Israeli unity government, possible West Bank annexation, and COVID-19. In May Specialist in Middle 2020, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his main political rival Benny Eastern Affairs Gantz formed a unity government, bringing an end to a long political stalemate in Israel that had continued through three elections in April 2019, September 2019, and March 2020. Netanyahu and Gantz cited the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to address its public health, economic, and other implications for Israel as a major reason for their agreement. By accepting a unity government, Gantz departed from his campaign pledge not to join with Netanyahu, who is scheduled to begin a criminal trial on corruption charges on May 24. While the agreement provides for Gantz to rotate into the position of prime minister by November 2021, and appears to give him broad powers of approval over the government’s actions, his choice to join Netanyahu split his Kahol Lavan party and might leave Netanyahu with an overall political advantage. Arguably, the most significant aspect of the Netanyahu-Gantz deal for U.S. policy is its explicit authorization of a cabinet and Knesset vote on annexing West Bank territory—in coordination with the United States—after July 1, 2020 (see more on the issue’s significance below). -
From Israel's Perspective, Joe Biden Is As Good As It Gets—For A
Selected articles concerning Israel, published weekly by Suburban Orthodox Toras Chaim’s (Baltimore) Israel Action Committee Edited by Jerry Appelbaum ( [email protected] ) | Founding editor: Sheldon J. Berman Z”L Issue 8 5 2 Volume 20 , Number 3 1 Parshias Re'eh | Shabbos Mevarchim August 15 , 20 20 From Israel’s Perspective, Joe Biden Is as Good as It Gets — for a Democrat By Shmuel Rosner nytimes.com August 9, 2020 And any vice - presidential pick is better than Susan election because we fear losing President Trump. For Rice. many reasons, he is seen by Israelis as one of the In the pile of old notebooks I saved from when I was friendliest leaders in the history of the United States - Israel covering American politics for an Israeli newspaper (and alliance. Israel is one of few countries in the world in when reporters still used a pad and pen), I found five which the pr esident is highly popular: A whopping 56 mentions of Joe Biden’s Israel story. percent of Israelis prefer Mr. Trump in the upcoming Most of them are from 2008 — first during the election, compared to 16 percent who support Mr. Biden. Democratic primary, when Mr. Biden was running against As far as Israelis are concerned, Mr. Biden has two Barack Obama, and then the general election, when Mr. disadvantages. He is not Mr. Trump, and he is a Biden was running alongside Mr. Obama. I was cover ing Democr at. In other words, he is not the candidate they that election for the Tel Aviv - based Haaretz, and every support and he comes from the party many of them mention of Israel was of interest to me. -
Just Below the Surface: Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the Limits of Cooperation
Middle East Centre JUST BELOW THE SURFACE ISRAEL, THE ARAB GULF STATES AND THE LIMITS OF COOPERATION IAN BLACK LSE Middle East Centre Report | March 2019 About the Middle East Centre The Middle East Centre builds on LSE’s long engagement with the Middle East and provides a central hub for the wide range of research on the region carried out at LSE. The Middle East Centre aims to enhance understanding and develop rigorous research on the societies, economies, polities and international relations of the region. The Centre promotes both special- ised knowledge and public understanding of this crucial area, and has outstanding strengths in interdisciplinary research and in regional expertise. As one of the world’s leading social science institutions, LSE comprises departments covering all branches of the social sciences. The Middle East Centre harnesses this expertise to promote innova- tive research and training on the region. Middle East Centre Just Below the Surface: Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the Limits of Cooperation Ian Black LSE Middle East Centre Report March 2019 About the Author Ian Black is a former Middle East editor, diplomatic editor and European editor for the Guardian newspaper. He is currently Visiting Senior Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre. His latest book is entitled Enemies and Neighbours: Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1917–2017. Abstract For over a decade Israel has been strengthening links with Arab Gulf states with which it has no diplomatic relations. Evidence of a convergence of Israel’s stra- tegic views with those of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain has accumulated as all displayed hostility to Iran’s regional ambitions and to United States President Barack Obama’s policies during the Arab Spring. -
Reclaiming the PLO, Re-Engaging Youth Al Shabaka the Palestinian Policy Network Al Shabak Table of Contents the Palestinian Policy Network
a the palestinian policy network policy palestinian the shabak al al shabaka the palestinian policy network RECLAIMING THE PLO RE-ENGAGING YOUTH An Al-Shabaka Policy Circle Report Co-Facilitated by Marwa Fatafta and Alaa Tartir Joe Catron © Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network August 2020 a Reclaiming the PLO, Re-Engaging Youth al shabaka the palestinian policy network al shabak TABLE OF CONTENTS the palestinian policy network Introduction 3 Reconstituting the PLO: Can Hamas and Islamic Jihad be Brought into the Fold? 5 by Belal Shobaki The Question of Palestinian Representation: Elections vs. Consensus Building 10 by Nijmeh Ali Palestinian Leadership Through Resistance or Leaderless Subsistence? The Role of Youth 14 by Fadi Quran A Leadership Model from the Palestinian Diaspora in the US 21 by Dana El Kurd Accountability: The PLO’s Bridge from the Past to the Future 24 by Marwa Fatafta Conclusion 28 Literature Review 30 by Marwa Fatafta Annex I: Brief Background and Structure of the PLO 38 Annex II: PLO Chart 39 Author and Co-Facilitator Bios 40 Page 2 a Reclaiming the PLO, Re-Engaging Youth al shabaka the palestinian policy network shabak INTroDUCTION: RECLAIMING THE PLO, al the palestinian policy network RE-ENGAGING YOUTH The Palestinian national movement is in an acute state In short, the Palestinians’ governance structures at of crisis, facing unprecedented obstacles to its quest for all levels are weak and undemocratic. There are no self-determination. The Oslo Accords of the 1990s and functioning mechanisms in place to ensure their the statehood project they produced have failed on every renewal through an infusion of new political actors count to secure justice for the Palestinian people.