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Building Bridges for Peace U.S Building Bridges for Peace U.S. Policy Toward Arab States, Palestinians, and Israel DAVID MAKOVSKY Executive Summary January 2021 he Biden administration has the opportunity to use progress in Arab-Israel normalization to reenergize dormant ties T between the United States and the Palestinian Authority and between Ramallah and Jerusalem. While circumstances are not ripe for a dash toward a conflict-ending final settlement, now is the time for U.S. leadership to rebuild constructive relations between the key parties and restore hope, energy, and enthusiasm in the potential for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following are principles for moving U.S. policy in a positive direction: DAVID MAKOVSKY Invest in Arab-Israel normalization. Strategic Affirm U.S. support for Israeli security. If Israel convergence between moderate Arab states and limits settlement activity to within the security Israel is a longstanding goal of U.S. policy and a barrier, the United States should differentiate plus for U.S. interests. The Biden administration between settlements consistent with a two-state should welcome its predecessor’s legacy in terms of solution and those undermining the potential Arab state normalization with Israel, deepen these for it. Any U.S. discussion of Israeli territorial emerging partnerships, anchor them in a common compromise for the sake of peace must begin with strategy to counter threats to common interests, an unwavering affirmation of U.S. support for and use them to enhance the potential for Israeli security, including strategic cooperation constructive Israeli-Palestinian relations. with Jerusalem to confront the Iranian nuclear challenge and measures Israel might take to combat Build on normalization to shrink the Israeli- Iran’s efforts to arm its allies and proxies with Palestinian conflict and keep open the door to a advanced weaponry. Once this principle is affirmed, negotiated two-state solution. Washington should Washington will have firmer standing for serious use economic, political, and diplomatic incentives discussion with Jerusalem on issues that could to build a network of Arab capitals at peace with either enhance or erode the potential for a Israel, bringing together longtime peace partners negotiated agreement with the Palestinians, (Egypt and Jordan), new partners (United Arab including settlement activity. Here, the operating Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco), as well principle should be to engage Israel in quiet as the Palestinian Authority (PA) into this emerging consultations to achieve an understanding based on partnership. Practical steps that improve economies Israel’s agreement to limit new construction to terri- and enhance the security of partner-states will tory within the security barrier. This agreement to chip away at the skepticism about the potential limit settlement activity to areas west of the security for a negotiated peace among both Israelis and barrier, combined with an Israeli commitment to Palestinians. (Without American diplomatic the idea of land swaps, opens opportunities for the orchestration, such an outcome will not materialize eventual resolution of the territorial aspect of the on its own.) This is especially important given that conflict with the Palestinians. By making separation the current gap between the two sides—and the between Israeli and Palestinians possible, it will chasm between the two leaderships—is too wide avoid the slide to a one-state reality, which will for Washington to embark on a major diplomatic erode Israel’s Jewish and democratic identity. initiative to achieve a final-status agreement with If Israel agrees to differentiate its approach to any reasonable hope of success. settlements, the United States should also adopt a differentiated position on the issue, distinguishing Explore parallel interim arrangements between between settlements that impede a two-state Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, outcome and those that do not. This differentiated as well as Israel and the Palestinians. Saudi- policy does not mean Washington endorses any Israel progress can create incentives to end particular settlement activity but that it should the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. Building on the modulate its public posture on settlements based model of UAE-Israel normalization, which included on whether that activity erodes the potential for a Israeli suspension of plans to annex West Bank negotiated resolution to the conflict. territory, Washington should explore the potential for a win-win-win interim diplomatic arrangement Maintain the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem; clarify between Israel and Saudi Arabia in which Riyadh policy on the future of the city. The Biden secures Palestinian gains in terms of greater administration should follow through on then- territorial access, improvements in the economic candidate Biden’s commitment to keep the U.S. terms with Israel, and limitations on Israeli embassy in Jerusalem. In so doing, Washington settlement activity. should reaffirm the policy outlined in the original 2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY DAVID MAKOVSKY BUILDING BRIDGES FOR PEACE announcement of the embassy relocation, which socioeconomic toll of the Covid-19 pandemic on states that “recognition of Jerusalem as the capital the Gaza regime’s ability to sustain the ceasefire, of Israel does not mean the United States has taken U.S. policy should be guided by the modest goal of a position on final status negotiations” and that maintaining calm by working through the United “such decisions should be worked [sic] between Nations and other parties to provide emergency aid Israelis and Palestinians.”1 In addition, the without strengthening Hamas. administration should consider ways to restore diplomatic representation to the Palestinian people. Appoint a coordinator to orchestrate elements This could mean reestablishing a consulate in of policy, emphasizing the need for trust among Jerusalem with a potential representative office in parties more than political profile. The diplomacy Ramallah. The proposal to reestablish a consulate envisioned here—the vital task of expanding Arab- will require the consultation with and agreement Israel normalization, building a foundation for a of the host country. While discussions with Israel hoped-for push toward resolution of the Israeli- on this issue may be complicated, the United States Palestinian conflict, and connecting these two is on firm ground both recognizing Jerusalem as processes through mutually reinforcing measures— Israel’s capital and supporting negotiations between will require the focused, sustained engagement Israel and the Palestinians to determine the final of a dedicated peace process coordinator, not the disposition of the city’s boundaries, including the precious time and attention of a president and potential location of a Palestinian capital therein. secretary of state whose urgent priorities lie elsewhere. That does not diminish the importance Reengage the PA in direct diplomacy, with a focus of the task or its sensitivity, especially since it will on effective governance, anti-corruption, and be connected—in Arab and Israeli perceptions instituting a needs-based social welfare system. alike—to diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran. More important The Biden administration should seek renewed than the coordinator’s rank or prominence is to diplomatic engagement with the Palestinians, have the U.S. president and secretary’s confidence through both reestablishing diplomatic representa- as well as the trust of the Israeli, Arab, and tion and resuming funding of worthy development Palestinian leaderships. With trust and confidence, and humanitarian projects. Restoring aid to the real progress is possible; without it, the most PA will require clear and verifiable PA measures creative ideas will fall on deaf ears. to meet the requirements of the 2017 Taylor Force Act.2 As part of this renewed dialogue, Washington ------------------------------------------------------------ should seek to dissuade the Palestinian leadership from pursuing legal action against Israel at the International Criminal Court, a provocative political step that might deliver a symbolic victory but would severely undermine the potential for peace diplomacy, likely triggering a crisis in Israeli- Palestinian relations for no appreciable improvement in the lives of Palestinians. The author would like to thank a number of Washington Institute colleagues for the helpful comments they provided Help parties sustain the Gaza truce by facilitating as he prepared this paper: Katherine Bauer, Patrick modest assistance. A quasi-ceasefire between Clawson, Michael Herzog, Barbara Leaf, Matthew Levitt, Israel and Hamas in Gaza—lubricated by certain Ghaith al-Omari, David Pollock, Dennis Ross, Robert Israeli economic concessions and Israel-approved Satloff, Michael Singh, and Ehud Yaari. He would also like Qatari financial aid—has held since spring 2019. to thank editor Jason Warshof, research assistant Sheridan Given the PA’s reluctance to reenter Gaza, the larger Cole, and interns Alex Harris and David Patkin. Of course, objective of reenergizing Israel-PA ties, and the the author is solely responsible for the paper’s contents. POLICY NOTES FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION 3 DAVID MAKOVSKY foreseeable future, removed the cloud of Israeli annexation of West Bank territory from the political he Biden administration has enormous tasks agenda. The expected renewal of Israeli-Palestinian to address—at home
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