Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies

Volume 20 Article 5

12-1-2002

The Velvet Divorce: Slovakia's Divorcement of Her Abusive Spouse

Steven C. Page

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Recommended Citation Page, Steven C. (2002) "The Velvet Divorce: Slovakia's Divorcement of Her Abusive Spouse," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 20 , Article 5. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. THE VELVET DIVORCE: SLOVAKIA'S DIVORCEMENT OF HER ABUSIVE SPOUSE

STEVEN C. PAGE

Only three years after the Velvet Revolution and the peacefitl fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, Czechs and Slovaks peacefUlly parted ways on 31 December 1992. Most research has attributed Czech and Slovak national­ istic, linguistic, historical, and political diffirences to be the impetus of this separation, known as the Velvet Divorce. This study, however, will argue that the Slovak perception ofoppression by foreigners was the major stimu­ lus ofthe Velvet Divorce, evidenced by other previous Slovak autonomy movements.

On 17 November 1989, actors from key player in communism's demise in Czecho­ Prague theaters and political dissidents defiantly slovakia. Slowly the new government instated gathered and protested against the Czechoslovak democratic institutions and began to privatize communist regime. During the next ten days, state-run industries. After more than forty years in what later came to be known as the Velvet of oppressive communist dictatorship, the Revolution, these anti-regime protests quickly Czechoslovak people had finally begun their spread from Prague's large Vaclavske namiesti to arduous journey to democracy. other smaller town squares throughout the The early nineties were a new, dynamic, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. As the protests and exciting time for Czechoslovakia. The spread, university students joined the move­ people sought political stability amid the ment. These protestors courageously, yet peace­ Czechoslovak pursuit of democracy. Regrettably, fully, rattled their keys, signifying their political stability remained elusive, and instabil­ disapproval of the oppressive policies of the ity, caused by differences in Czech and Slovak regime. Subsequently, at the end of November, approaches to political and economic reform, Communism officially ended in Czechoslovakia prevailed. Eventually, on 31 December 1992, with little or no conflict. the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully parted ways. Following the Velvet Revolution and the This separation, known as the Velvet Divorce, peaceful fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, ended a relationship of over seventy years. democratic elections were held. The Czechoslo­ Few researchers have thoroughly exam­ vak people elected Vaclav Havel as their new ined the causation of the Velvet Divorce, and president: a playwright, political dissident, and they have generally limited their analyses to the

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political atmosphere of Czechoslovakia from the minor role in this great Eutopean empire. For Velvet Revolution to the Velvet Divorce. They example, Hungarian was the lingua franca attributed Czech and Slovak nationalistic, lin­ within the Slovak realm of the Empire. The guistic, historical, and political differences to Hungarians prohibited the use of the Slovak lan­ be the impetus of the Velvet Divorce. Existing guage and the teaching of Slovak culture and his­ research gives a partial and superficial explana­ tory in schools. Slovaks who refused to assimilate tion of the centrifugal force that dissolved the could not pursue advanced education or the Czechoslovak Federal Republic. The Slovak per­ careers of their choice (Leff 1997, 7). The Slovak ception of oppression by foreigners was a major people had to assimilate and become Hungarian stimulus of the Velvet Divorce; this perception is for a modern Magyar state to become a reality. evidenced in other Slovak autonomy movements Magyarization reaffirmed the Slovak perception during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the First of oppression. To be Slovak was anathema. The Czechoslovak Republic, the Second World War, social and political conditions within the Austro­ the subsequent communist period, and the time Hungarian Empire provided virtually no hope following the Velvet Revolution. for Slovak autonomy.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE AND THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REpUBLIC: MAGYAR OPPRESSION A "PRAGOCENTRIC" REPUBLIC

In the eleventh century A.D., the Hungar­ World War I marked the end of great Euro­ ian Empire was rapidly expanding as it acquired pean empires and the birth of new states. new lands for the imperial crown. Hungarian Czechoslovakia arose from the fall of the King Steven conquered the Slovak people, and impervious Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918, Slovakia was absorbed in the Hungarian Empire Tomas Garrigue Masaryk became president of (Leff 1997, 7). The Slovaks became subservient the fledgling Czechoslovak state, which consisted to their oppressive Hungarian overlords. For over of three major regions: Bohemia, Moravia, and nine centuries the Slovak people could not over­ Slovakia. This inexperienced state was by no throw Hungarian rule. In the 1848 revolution means united. A lack of homogeneity in its con­ and later in 1861, the Slovaks pursued their pro­ stituent regions resulted directly from their sepa­ gram and insisted that they rate histories. Bohemia and Moravia, comprising the Czech Republic, had maintained relations Were to be given a semi-independent state within with Germanic peoples for nearly a millennium. the framework of Hungary, i.e. Hungary was to be In contrast, Slovakia unwillingly had closer ties federalized on the basis of nationality.... Naturally, with the Magyar. The ethnic composition of the the Slovak demands were absolutely incompatible lands provides evidence of the former ties of with the aims of the Hungarian [rulers], which were these regions. Researchers, studying the 1921 to transfOrm Htmgary into a modem Magyar state .... Czechoslovak census, have found that 22% of Therefore the Slovak demand for an autonomous Slovakia's populace were Hungarian and 31 % territory ... was rejected. (Rychlik 1995,100) of the population of the Czech Lands were Sudeten Germans (Kucera and Pavlik 1995, 15). Slovak autonomy remained elusive because they Indeed, Czechoslovakia was formed from "the lacked the political clout within the Hungarian debris of the Austro-Hungarian Empire" (Pehe Empire and the support of other powerful 1992, 16). The new state was a giant conglomer­ nations. ate of ethnically diverse peoples: Bohemians, In 1867 Slovakia's subservient role was vali­ Moravians, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, dated by the Austrian Empire's formation of Poles, and Ruthenians. a dual monarchy with the Hungarian Em­ The separate histories of the Czechs and pire. Concomitantly, Hungarian attempts to Slovaks did not provide for a firm foundation Magyarize the Slovak people reaffirmed their upon which to build a new nation. The most

44· SIGMA PAGE mmor difference between the people was the state. The Slovaks could not tolerate another era mutually intelligible Czech and Slovak lan­ of oppression and "inferiority." Czechoslovakia guages. However, larger differences existed. Slo­ was not the state the Slovak nation had envi­ vaks enjoyed a more agrarian lifestyle, and sioned. Much of the Slovak intelligentsia felt that Czechs were more urbanized. Slovaks were reli­ "the Czechs were bent on eventually assimilating giously active. In contrast, a trend toward the Slovak community" (Goldman 1999, 5). Just atheism prevailed among the Czech people. as the Hungarians had sought to Magyarize the Surprisingly, these two distinct nations chose Slovaks, now the Czechs sought to "Czechize" to unite. the Slovaks. Attempted cultural assimilation "The birth of Czechoslovakia... was of greatly fueled the fires of demand for autonomy. immense importance for the Czech and Slovak nations, especially for the Slovaks ... though both SLOVAKIA: A NAZI STATE-NOMINAL AurONOMY nations welcomed the new state, each had a dif­ ferent concept of it" (Rychlik 1995, 102). The The occupation of the Czech Lands by Slovaks envisioned a loosely united confedera­ Nazi Germany beginning 6 October 1938 finally tion of Czecho-Slovakia composed of two sover­ provided Slovakia with nominal autonomy. eign regions. They perceived unification to be However, it was not until 14 March 1939 that beneficial; relative autonomy was foreseen under Slovakia, under Hitler's pressure, formally Masaryk's Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks sought to declared her independence (Mlynirik 1993,28). free themselves from oppression. However, the Father Tiso became Slovakia's first president. Czechs had a different vision. They envisioned a Under Tiso's rule, Slovakia was only a Nazi pup­ unitary state governed in Prague by Czechs. pet state run by oppression and other dictatorial To Slovak dismay, the new state was a "Prago­ means. To ensure control of Slovakia, Hitler sta­ centric" republic controlled by Czechs. In 1921, tioned troops in the Vah Valley near Budapest the Slovak newspaper Slovensky tyUlennik wrote: and on the Austrian side of the Danube (Gold­ man 1999, 7). With Hitler watching and con­ Let us not speak about a Czechoslovak nation. We trolling her actions, Slovakia had not obtained are either Czechs or Slovaks, but we cannot be the autonomy she had sought. Czechoslovaks. We are citizens of a Czechoslovak Under the rule ofTiso, Slovakia followed state, we have a common Czechoslovak state admini­ the mandates of Hitler. Slovakia participated in stration, but we are two nations. (Felak 1990, 145) Nazi Germany's Drang nach Osten by assisting the Germans in their takeover of Poland. Slovak The Slovaks wanted independence. Their desire Storm Troopers, the Hlinka Guard, were to separate themselves from the Czechs resulted known for stealing Jewish property (Ule 1996, from perceived oppression. Czech dominance 333-4). Tiso's regime deported thousands of in Czechoslovakia helped "to nurture the stereo­ Jews to death camps (Mlynirik 1993, 29). Para­ type of Slovak inferiority" (Ule 1999, 333). The doxically, the Slovaks had hoped to gain auton­ Slovaks quickly realized that a union with their omy, but they believed they must collude with Slavic relatives reaffirmed the "inferiority" they the Germans to attain it. However, collabora­ had previously experienced with the Magyar. tion only caused continued foreign domination "During the two decades of the First of the Slovak people. True independence was Republic, it became apparent that nearly every­ not found in fascism. Many Slovaks realized one was dissatisfied with a unitary state of two that the Nazi state was merely a continuation of constituent nations and minorities-except the foreign domi-nance furthering their perception Czechs" (Leff 1997, 25). The Slovak dissatisfac­ of oppression. By 1943, anti-Tiso movements tion with Czechoslovakia caused many Slovak arose throughout Slovakia (Goldman 1999, 8). leaders, such as Monsignor Andrej Hlinka and This was ultimately a third failed attempt at Father Jozef Tiso, to seek the foundation of autonomy. Slovakia as an autonomous Christian nationalist

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COMMUNISM: CZECH OPPRESSION democracy for the Czechoslovak state. Commu­ AND MUSCOVITE RULE nism had ended, and the Czechoslovaks were free again. Initially the Czechs and Slovaks In 1945 the Allies defeated Germany and shared a common course; however, this course reestablished the antebellum status quo in markedly changed as time passed. "After the Czechoslovakia, namely a Pragocentric Czecho­ non-Communist government took office, slovak state. To the Czechs, Czechoslovakia had Czechs and Slovaks began to disagree over polit­ never ceased to exist; conversely, to the Slovaks, a ical and economic issues. The disagreements semi-autonomous Slovakia was their perception blocked the adoption of a new constitution and of reality. By 1948, the democratic Czechoslovak slowed economic reform" (Wolchik 2001, government was replaced by a communist regime. 1214). The Slovak people were generally opposed to the To the West it seemed that Czechs and Slo­ Czechoslovak communist regime; it allowed for vaks only differed economically and politically; Soviet rule and further Czech dominance. however, other differences existed. In fact, Slova­ kia's history of oppression and disputes over dif­ By the early 1950s post-World War II Czechoslova­ ferences in history, language, and culture led to a kia had become a satellite of Moscow, with a Soviet­ sudden resurgence in Slovak nationalism (Aber­ style monolithic dictatorship committed to the crombie 1993, 10-1; Pehe 1992, 16). Slovak inttoduction of economic and social policies devel­ nationalism had always existed, but democracy oped by Stalin in the Soviet Union .... The commu­ provided the means for the Slovaks to express nist leadership in Prague acted with the apptoval of their feelings, beliefs, and political agenda. Slo­ the Kremlin. (Goldman 1999, 11-2) vaks were no longer "inferior." In 1991, the Slovaks wrote in the Czechoslovak newspaper Though Communism helped to alleviate many Lidove noviny: "We favor a looser cooperating of the tensions between the Czech and Slovak confederation of two sovereign republics with peoples-forty years of oppressive communist confederative principles, with sufficient advan­ leadership forced the Slovaks, Moravians, tages and sliding extent of jurisdiction" (Ule Czechs, and other ethnic groups of Czechoslova­ 1996, 341). A Pragocentric republic would no kia to coalesce into a fairly unified nation-the longer suffice. The Slovaks insisted that their Slovaks still had not attained the autonomy they voice be heard in the new Czechoslovak democ­ sought. Rather, control was switched from fascist racy. Many Czechs disagreed with the Slovak Berlin to communist Moscow. stance, and the government reached an impasse. Once again, the Czechs dominated the In 1990-91 Slovak politicians began dis­ Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. cussions about dissolving the Czechoslovak state. From 1948-68 Slovaks accounted for 82 of 585 A breakup appeared inevitable. Not all were appointees to the Czechoslovak corps diploma­ pleased with the Slovak politicians' choice to part tique. Additionally, in 1968 only 3.7% of gov­ ways, so they ernment personnel were Slovak (Goldman 1999, 12-3). Slovak interests could not be justly Initiated a campaign to have the people rather than addressed in such conditions of Czech domi­ the politicians decide the fate of the country.... nance; the communist Czech government was Within a month, petitions with over 2 million sig­ content with the status quo. Czech dominance natures, including 200,000 from Slovakia, were col­ during Communism only perpetuated the Slo­ lected in support of a referendum .... Alas, as was to vak perception of oppression. be expected, the parliament could not reach a con­ sensus on the wording of the referendum. The pub­ THE VELVET DIVORCE: THE END TO OPPRESSION lic resulted to a novel, unique way of expressing its will in what became known as the "light-bulb refer­ The bloodless Velvet Revolution on 17 endum." At 7 :40 p.m. on November 24, 1991, those November 1989 inaugurated a new journey to in favor of saving Czechoslovakia switched on two

46· SIGMA PAGE 100-watt bulbs. The sudden increase in energy adamantly declared that they were no longer consumption registered the following unscientific subordinate to Czechs or any other people. The results: support for the federation in the Czech Slovaks wanted Czecho-Slovakia (that is, a state Republic was expressed by 2.7 million households consisting of two equally autonomous re­ (8.1 million population, 80 percent of the total), and publics), but the Czechs wanted Czechoslovakia in the Slovak Republic in 450,000 households (1.35 (namely, a Pragocentric state). The Slovak aware­ million population, 37 percent of the total). (VIc ness of oppression contributed to the Slovak 1996,344) desire to be independent. The Czech govern­ ment attempted to hinder the breakup, but the Though the "light-bulb referendum" was unoffi­ relationship was irreparable. cial and unscientific, the Slovak will was made In the late twentieth century the former known. The Czechs wanted unity; the Slovaks Eastern bloc has exemplified the role of political wanted svrchovanost' (sovereign ty). change in defining a region. The proverbial fall In July 1992, Slovak politicians declared of the Iron Curtain, which marked the dawn of Slovakia a sovereign state free of Czech rule. The a new era of autonomy and democracy in Cen­ Slovaks had finally attained svrchovanost: Czech tral and Eastern Europe, was the impetus of politicians realized that the two nations would much modern European change. Despite the never again be one. The formal dissolution of newly acquired democratic freedoms in Europe, Czechoslovakia, the Velvet Divorce, occurred at few strong cohesive forces bound the region's midnight on 31 December 1992. After nearly peoples together. Rather, balkanization, a power­ one thousand years, the Slovaks could rule them­ fully destructive centrifugal force, prevailed. The selves. Svrchovanost~ To be Slovak was no longer once powerful and ominous Soviet Union disin­ anathema; rather, Slovak citizenship was a source tegrated into many new states: the Ukraine, of pride. The Slovaks were free from the Mag­ Belarus, and Georgia, to name a few. Many once yars, Germans, Soviets, and Czechs. Oppression communist states have disappeared, forming had ended. The Slovak nation was subject to over a dozen new democratic states: the Czech no one. Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and others. Furthermore, Communism's demise UNDERSTANDING THE VELVET DIVORCE resulted in the end of oppressive eras. Indeed, the pursuit of actual freedom from oppression is evi­ Westerners may feel inclined to question denced in the esoteric breakup of Czechoslova­ the causation of the Velvet Divorce. After all, the kia: the Velvet Divorce-Slovakia's divorcement Czechs and Slovaks bear a great deal of resem­ of her oppressive and psychologically abusive blance and appear to be one people. Many West­ spouse. erners may ask: Wasn't the fall of Communism the actual cause of the Velvet Divorce? The answer is dearly yes, but with the caveat that the Steven Clark Page is a senior from Orem, Utah, Velvet Revolution cannot be viewed as anything majoring in international studies. After gradua­ more than the superficial stimulus of the Velvet tion, he will pursue a joint lI1A in Czech studies Divorce. and a master ofpublic affoirs at Indiana University The Velvet Revolution opened many at Bloomington. unhealed wounds. Whereas some wounds resulted from Czech-Slovak interaction, other wounds resulted directly from Magyar-Slovak, German-Slovak, and Russian-Slovak interaction. WORKS CITED The historical, linguistic, ethnic, and political differences led to a sudden rise in Slovak nation­ Abercrombie, Thomas J. 1993. CzechoSlovakia: The velvet alism and awareness of the recurring role of divorce. National Geographic 184 (September): 2-21, oppression in Slovak history. The Slovaks 28-37.

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